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ABSTRACT
The responses by the American, French, and British governments, in efforts 
to secure the release of their citizens taken hostage in Lebanon, have demon­
strated the difficulty for Western states in reconciling their firmly-held prin­
ciples of no-negotiations and no-concessions in dealing with either the 
Hizb'allah or its patrons with the actual and practical realities governing any 
resolution to the hostage-situations in Lebanon. This case-study on the dynamics 
of the Hizb'allah and its interaction with Iran and Syria provides a basis for
the evaluation of the effectiveness of Western government responses to the 
hostage-crisis in Lebanon using crisis management techniques.
This study shows that the abduction of Western citizens by Hizb'allah was 
motivated either by internal organisational requirements or in alignment with 
Syrian and Iranian interests, and that mechanisms for the resolution of the 
hostage-crisis were subject to continuous interaction between Hizb'allah, Iran, 
and Syria influenced by internal Lebanese, regional, and international events. 
The Western responses to the hostage-crisis showed limited effectiveness as the 
crisis management techniques were poorly adjusted in timing and direction to the 
actual crisis environment. With the exception of the French response, the over­
all employment of Western crisis management techniques showed disregard for the 
opportunities and constraints in the fluctuating relationship between Syria and 
Iran as well as the political environment within Lebanon which the Hizb'allah 
operates and exists. This was clear by their failure to rely on either Iran or 
Syria as the only channel in negotiations over hostages without regard to their 
individual ability to exert its influence over the movement in accordance with 
shifts in their ties to Hizb'allah's command leadership between 1987-1991 and 
to the status of the Iranian-Syrian relationship over time, as displayed by the 
friction between 1986-92. This study provides a new approach in the study of 
terrorism by merging a case-study of the dynamics of the hostage-crisis with 
an evaluation of Western responses through crisis management techniques in order 
to more closely resolve the dilemma of the fulfillment of these states' duty to 
protect their citizens taken hostage abroad, without major sacrifices in the 
conduct of foreign policy.
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PREFACE
"Thereupon I discovered an ventured divers ans^ fers; I distinguished 
between ages, degree of rank among individuals; I departmentalized my 
problan; out of my answers there grew new questions, inquiries, probabi­
lities - until at length I had a country of my own, a soil of my own, an 
entire discrete, thriving, flourishing world, like a secret garden the 
existence of which no one suspected"/
"[Lebanon] is a country which - in the eyes of the West at least - 
has made the study of Islam and ' international terrorism' indistinguishableIt I
"Terrorism denies the distinction between state and society, public and 
private, government and individual, the distinction that lies at the heart of 
humane belief. For the terrorist, as for the totalitarian state, there are no 
innocent bystanders, no private citizens. Terrorism denies that there is any 
private sphere, that individuals have any rights or any autonomy seperate from 
or beyond politics. There are thus no standards according to which the individual 
citizen, or the threatened society, can attempt to come to terms with the totali­
tarian terrorist. There is no way to satisfy his demands".^
The picturesque Scottish seaside town of St Andrews would seem unlikely 
to naturally lend itself to the study of religious fundamentalism in any 
form. Yet, the historical remnants of the this medieval town today, which 
predates the origins of the University of St Andrews in 1411, bear witness 
to a period of fervent religious fundamentalism at the very heart of the 
town's existence, whose first victim of the Scottish reformation became the 
martyred university student Patrick Hamilton. Any sense of detachment from 
the study of religious fundamentalism was also lost with the discovery of 
the fact that I belonged to the post-graduate college of St Leonard, the 
patron saint of hostages adopted by noblemen and soldiers away on the 
Crusades, most notably Bohemund the first prince of Antioch, who were held 
captive in Muslim hands in the battles between Christendom and Islam in the 
Middle Ages.* Notwithstanding the power of saints to those unjustly impriso­
ned and forgotten as hostages in solitary confinement for several years, the 
release of hostages either during the Crusades or in contemporary Lebanon
* Friedrich Nietzche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. W. Kaufmaim and R.J. 
Hollingdale (New York, NY.: Vintage, 1969).
 ^See: As'ad Abu Khalil: "Ideology and Practice of Hizballah in Lebanon: 
Islamization of Leninist Organizational Principles", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.27, 
No.3 (July 1991): p.390.
 ^Senator Daniel Patrick f-kyhnihan, quoted in Time, April 14, 1986.
* This was revealed to the author in a sermon delivered by Father Fergus Kerr 
in commemoration of St Leonard, St Leonar'd's Chapel, University of St Andrews, 
November 3, 1991.
home to pay a ransom for their release. While the abduction of Bohemund 
during the Crusades embodied an effort by Islam to contain militant 
Christendom from recovering the holy place of Jerusalem from Muslim rule, 
the abduction of Westerners in Lebanon encapsulated the resurgence of a wider 
pan-Islamic effort to expel foreigners from the region in an attempt to 
liberate Jerusalem under non-Islamic control. Although the practise of 
hostage-taking has an old tradition in the Middle East, dating back to the 
early days of the Crusades, contemporary Western efforts to understand or 
deal with the hostage-incidents in Lebanon have been a surprising failure 
given that the "rules of the game" for the resolution of the hostage-crisis have changed little since Bohemund's days. The West’s fear and inability to 
comprehend the enemy's willingness to sacrifice their own lives was also 
surprising given our own practise of martyrdom during the Crusades.
Despite the many historical parallels, the decision to adopt the Western 
hostage-crisis in Lebanon as a subject for research was more due to a per­
sonal ambition to confront the inner dynamics of one of the most important, 
yet least understood, terrorist organisations in the Middle East, whose 
activity has continously constituted a major foreign policy problem for 
Western governments for over a decade, rather than any intitial or real 
understanding of the enourmous complexity of the subject matter itself. A 
project of this magnitude could not have been completed without the assi­
stance of patient and supportive colleagues, friends and family, to whom I 
would like to publicly express my gratitude to for services beyond any call 
of duty or responsibility. I am deeply grateful and indebted to staff and 
colleagues at the Department of International Relations, whom have offered 
invaluable ideas, criticism and suggestions. Three staff members, in parti­
cular, deserve special mention to whom I have incurred personal debts to as 
they were present with advice and encouragement during this long haul and 
across the finishing line. First, and foremost, I owe special gratitude to 
my supervisor Professor Paul Wilkinson, who provided me with invaluable and 
endless encouragement as well as advice throughout the research. I will 
always be indebted to his personal enthusiasm and kind consideration for my 
academic ability and for other research opportunities he provided to me 
during my enjoyable stay in St. Andrews. I am also deeply grateful to Mrs 
Gina Wilson, the Departmental secretary, who deserves a sainthood for her 
assistance in administrative and personal matters, always with great humour 
and diligence. I would also like to extend gratitude to my friend. Dr Myles 
Robertson, for his linguistic expertise and patience in reading my thesis as 
well as for his sound advice and laconic endurance of everything-anyone- 
could-ever-want-to-know-about-the-Hizb'allah. A number of colleagues also 
deserve special thanks for encouragement and advice at some stage of my 
research, most notably Gus, Guy, Charlie, Robin and others. In particular, 
I would like to acknowledge the invaluable comments made by my colleague and 
friend Gus Xhudo in the introductory chapter.
Apart from research in the United Kingdom, I also had an opportunity to 
make several research trips to Israel, France, Egypt, and the United States 
to interview government, intelligence and security officials with special 
knowledge of the Hizb'allah and the hostage-crisis in Lebanon. Many of these 
interviews provided invaluable and unique insights into the organisation as 
events unfolded and I am deeply grateful to those whom I have meet, some who 
due to the nature of their profession would prefer to remain anonymous. To 
those I can mention, I owe special thanks to (in Israel): Uri Lubrani, head 
of IDF activity in Lebanon; Yossi Olmert, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Yigal 
Charmon, Prime Minister's Advisor for Counter-terrorism; Dr Martin Kramer, 
Dr Ariel Merari and Maskit Burgin of the JCSS at Tel Aviv University; (in 
France): Xavier Raufer, 1'Institut de Criminologie de Paris; (in the United 
States): Professor Richard Schultz and Professor Robert Pfalzgraff, Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; National Security Fellows at
the JFK School of Government, Harvard University; Dr Bruce Hoffman, RAND 
Corporation and to many others unnamed who have assisted this project. I am 
particularly grateful to my friends the Norwegian Ambassador, Per Thelin 
Haugestad and his wife, whose hospitality and kindness during my two visits 
to Cairo is second to none and who provided me with an opportunity to meet 
with some of the key players in the Israeli-PLO peace negotiations.
To Ellen, my friend, whose unfailing support, inspiration and under­
standing proved not only essential throughout the writing process but also 
made life endurable outside the office, I am eternally grateful and indebted 
to.
Finally, I want to acknowledge the inexhaustible support and encourage­
ment of my parents, especially my father, whose unending belief in my ability 
was equally matched by generous financial support. I dedicate this work to 
them and to my grandparents, Carl and Esther, who provided me early at home 
with an atmosphere of intellectual inquiry, for their endless encouragement 
and love through the years.
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"Muster against them [the believers] all the men and cavalry at your disposal, 
so that you may terrorize the enemies of Allah and the faithful"*
"Iherefore, when ye meet, the Unbelievers (in fight), smite at their necks; 
at length, when ye have thoroughly subdued them, bind a bond firmly (on them): 
thereafter (is the time for) either generosity or ransom; until the war lays 
down its burden"*
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Thesis Topic
The seizure of American diplomats as hostages at the U.S. embassy in 
Teheran in 1979, and their subsequent incarceration for 444 days, was widely 
considered, at the time, an anomaly in the conduct of contemporary interna­
tional relations and unique to the dynamics of revolutionary efforts by 
Iranian clerics to use the hostage-crisis in the foreign policy arena for in­
ternal gains in the establishment of a theocratic regime.* While the handling 
of the U.S embassy siege demonstrated the vulnerability of a Western demo­
cracy to this special form of terrorism used by a non-Western adversary as 
a foreign policy instrument and the difficulty in applying conventional tools 
of statecraft to deal with this new form of foreign policy crisis,* it also
 ^ Holy Qur'an, Surat al-Anfal ch.7:60. A Hizb'allali leader, Ibrahim al-Amin, has 
cited this verse from the Qur'an to justify the organisation's terrorist activity against the 
enemies of Islam.
* The Holy Our'an, ch. 47:4. As laid down by the laws of Sliarl'ah, once the taking of 
"prisoners of war" brings the enemy under control: either generosity (i.e. the release of 
prisoners mthout ransom) or ransom is the only ordained conduct under Islamic law. Also see: 
Abdur Rahman I. Doi, Sliari'ah: Ttie Islamic Law (London: Ta Ha Publishers, 1984),
* For an overview of the functions of the hostage-crisis for the consolidation of the 
Islamic revolution in Iran, see: Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Avatollalis: Iran and the 
Islamic Revolution (New York, NY.: Basic Books, 1984): pp.71-91; and Farhad Kazemi and Jo-Anne 
Hart, "Hie Slii'i Praxis: Domestic Politics and Foreign PoliQ'' in Iran", in David Menashri 
(ed.) Hie Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World (Boulder, CO.: West\4ew Press, 1990): pp.61- 
2. President Carter viewed the Iranian hostage crisis as: "Unprecedented in human history’", 
see; Public Papers of the President, November 28, 1979.
* See: Warren Christopher, American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis (New 
Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1985); Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter 
ivdth Iran (New York, NY.: I.B. Tauris, 1985); Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: Hie Last Year of the
represented a landmark event in which hostage-taking situations would become 
a permanent feature in Middle East politics for Western governments, espe­
cially within the context of the civil war in Lebanon/ In a -ten-year period, 
between 1982 and 1992, almost one hundred foreign citizens were abducted in 
Lebanon by a number of enigmatic pro-Iranian Shi'ite organisations, seemingly
loosely or closely affiliated with the Hizb'allah movement/ Unlike the 1979 
U.S. embassy siege in Teheran, the hostage-taking of foreign citizens in
Lebanon differed in many ways in the prolongation and complexity of the inci­
dents/ While the proceeding hostage-crisis involved 52 American diplomats 
used collectively by revolutionary clerics in Iran in an extremely aggressive 
confrontation with the United States, the abduction of foreigners in Lebanon 
was perpetrated by non-identifiable groups with pro-Iranian affiliation, ope­
rating within the confines of a protracted civil war, in the pursuit of an 
array of demands ranging from each respective group's own requirements to the 
advancement of specific foreign policy objectives either directly or in­
Carter Presidencv (New York, NY. : G.P. Putnam's Son, 1982); and Gary Sick, October Surprise 
(New York, NY. : Random House, 1991).
* See: Robert Fisk, Pity The Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 
1990); Xavier Raufer, Atlas Mondial de L'Islam Activiste (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1991); Oliver 
Carre and Paul Dumont et al. Radicalismes islamiques (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1985); Pierre Pean, 
La Menace (Paris: Fayard, 1987); and Xavier Raufer, La Nebuleiise le Terrorisme du Moyen-Orient 
(Paris: Fayard, 1987).
 ^For a useful overview, see: Maskit Burgin, Ariel Merari, and Anat Kurz, Foreign 
Hostages in Lebanon, JCSS Memorandum no.25 - August 1988 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for 
Strategic Studies) : pp.42-50; and Brian Michael Jenkins and Robin Wright, "Hie Kidnappings in 
Lebanon", TVI Report, Vol.7, No.4 (Fall, 1986): pp.2-11.
* While the maximum confinement of any hostage in the 1979 Iranian incident was 444 
days, the average time of confinement of hostages in Lebanon was 782 days see: Appendix I. 
#ereas the 1979 Iranian hostage-situation involved a clearly defined barricade/siege in a 
hostile country, the complexity of the Lebanese hostage-incidents relates to the multitude of 
groups and states involved in these incidents as well as the anarchial environment of 
Lebanon's civil war, see: Dilip Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Rnbers - A History of the Lebanese 
Civil War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1993).
directly benefitting Iran and Syria/ In many cases, these Lebanese hostage- 
taking situations caused major crises for Western governments in the conduct 
of foreign policy in the regional and international arena/ Although most 
Western governments, whose citizens are held hostage, pursue an official de­
clared policy of no-concessions to terrorists,** their actual conduct towards 
the foreign hostage-crisis in Lebanon has often had a chequered history with 
secret concessions to secure the release of some of their hostages/* Over
the last decade the balance-sheet for responses to the hostage-crisis in 
Lebanon also underlines the inherent difficulties for Western democratic 
states to resolve the dichotomy between the duty to protect its citizens 
abroad and the governmental obligation in hostage-taking situations to main­
tain the national interest in the conduct of foreign policy/* This problem
* For conditions of the relationship between sponsor and proxy, see: Grant Wardlaw, 
"Terror as an Instrument of Foreign Policy", in David C. Rapoport (ed.) Inside Terrorist 
Organizations (New York, NY. : Columbia University Press, 1988): 237-59. Also see: Con 
Coughlin, Hostage (London: Little, Brown and Coipany, 1992); and Sean K. Anderson, "Iranian 
State Sponsored Terrorism", Conflict Quarterly, Vol.11, No.4 (Fall 1991): pp.19-34.
* See: Conor Gearty, Terror (London: Faber and Faber, 1991): pp.80-93.
*® According to official U.S. policy: "[t]he U.S. government will make no concessions 
to terrorists. It will not pay ransoms, release prisoners, change its policies or agree to 
other acts that might encourage terrorism", see: Public Report of the Vice-President's Task 
Force on Terrorism (Washington, DC. : US Government Printing Office, February 1986): p.7. The 
Council of Europe adheres to the principle of: "no concessions to the coercion of terrorists 
and those who support them", see: Gilbert Guillaume, "France and the Fight Against Terrorism", 
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1992): p.134.
** For example, see: Samuel Segev, The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel's
Role in the Iran-Contra Affair (New York, NY.: Hie Free Press, 1988); Tieodore Draper, A Very 
Thin line; The Iran-Qjntra Affairs (New York, NY. : Simon and Schuster, 1991) ; L. Chauvin, 
"French diplcmacy and the hostage-crises", in B. Rubin (ed.) Hie Politics of Counter- 
Terrorism: The Ordeal of Democratic States (Washington, DC.: The John Hopkins Foreign Poliq^  
Institute, 1990): pp. 91-104; Nicolas Tenzer and Fi'anck Magnard, "Le terrorisme et la politique 
de la France au Moyen-Orient", Le Débat, Vol.45 (Mai-Sept., 1987): pp.90-101.
** This has been aptly demonstrated by David Clinton: "[a] state whose leaders and
people forget or dismantle the ties that bind thm into a comnunity mth a recognized national
interest does more than run the risk of an internal 'war of every man against every man'. As 
the recent example of Lebanon and the American hostages makes clear, it also becomes a danger 
to any international ties, since its inability to maintain civil order allows internal vio­
lence to spill over into the outside world and threaten innocent third parties. What inter­
national society there is relies on states to undergird it by safeguarding their own national
has been present regardless of the adoption of either a resolute hardline 
approach, as in the case of measures adopted by Great Britain characterized 
by firmness and refusal to make any concessions despite executions of hos­
tages, or a softer approach, as in the case of the American and French dual­
track measures characterized by the pursuit of a public hardline position 
while engaged in secret negotiations and concessions to secure the release 
of its hostages/* In both cases, the targeted governments have been viewed 
as weak, incompetent and discredited through diminished public trust and con­
fidence in the government in conjunction with maintaining a publicly enuncia­
ted policy by the abandonment of their citizens abroad or by the disclosure 
of the existence of negotiations or even deals/* As a unique crisis or pro­
blem in the foreign policy arena, the nature of the foreign hostage-incidents 
in Lebanon as well as responses by Western governments have not only appeared 
to be enigmatic and secretive to the public and policymakers, even with the 
benefit of hindsight after the complete dénouement of the hostage-file in 
1991-2,** but have also been inadequately dealt with by academic research and 
within decision-making circles in studies of the management of these situa­
tions and in the application of prescribed lessons for any future incidents 
under similar conditions/* This must be considered quite surprising given
interests as functioning cormunities", see: W. David Clinton, "The National Interest: 
Normative Foundations", Review of Politics, Vol.48, No.4 (1986): p.506
** See: Rex Hudson, "Dealing mth International Hostage-Taking: Alternatives to 
Reactive Counterterrorist Assaults", Terrorism, Vol.12 (1989): pp.321-78.
** See: Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit.: p.155-7.
** Information about hostage-incidents have been classified as national security 
matters. In the American case, this was confirmed to the author in replies to official 
requests, under the Freedom of Information Act, from U.S. Department of State; U.S. Department 
of Justice; U.S. Department of Defense; Central Intelligence Agenc}'; and Defense Intelligence 
Agency.
** A useful start has been made by the application of crisis management to 
"controllable" barricade/siege hostage-taking situations. However, these differ fundamentally 
on the micro (law enforcement) and macro (foreign policy) level.
the duration and significant ramifications of these hostage-taking incidents 
on the conduct of foreign policy by Western democratic states in an atmo­
sphere of crisis over the last decade.** As a consequence, the hostage-crisis 
in Lebanon underlines both the complexity and the difficulty in the success­
ful resolution of hostage-situations for many Western governments and the 
importance of devoting considerable academic and policy attention to this 
issue in view of its ability and continued potential for affecting interna­
tional relations.**
This study examines, through a case-study approach, the complex nature 
and dynamics of the foreign hostage-crisis in Lebanon perpetrated by the 
Hizb'allah organisation with special reference to the multiple abductions of 
American, British, and French citizens between the period of 1982-1992. It 
also addresses the multi-tiered relationships between the Hizb'allah and its 
patrons, Iran and Syria, as a prerequisite for the accompanying evaluation 
of the corresponding policies and responses adopted by the United States and 
the two European states within the framework of the application of crisis 
management requirements and techniques.
This present chapter examines the nature of hostage-taking as a unique 
form of foreign policy crisis for Western governments and the theoretical 
applicability of crisis management as an instrument to confront it. It also 
provides the methodological raison d'etré for the study as well as a litera­
ture review of past and present material.
** M  aptly stated by Ariel Merari: "[a] considerable part of acadanic writing on 
terrorism is simply irrelevant to government decision-making'', see: Ariel Merari, "Academic 
Research and Government Policy", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.3, No.l (Spring 1991) 
p.98. This has been echoed by Martha Crenshaw: "[s]tudies of international terrorism are 
rarely linked to the literature politics", see: Martha Crenshaw, "Current Research on 
Terrorism: The Academic Perspective", Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 15, No.l 
(January-March 1992): p.4.
** See: Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: New Modes of Conflict (Santa Monica, 
CA.: Rand Corporation, 1983): p.2.
In the second chapter, an indepth historical background of the formation 
of the Hizb'allah movement in 1982 is provided to explain the close deference 
by the movement to Iran and the metamorphosis of a traditionally non-activist 
Shi'a community into an extremly militant Islamic movement with a pan-Islamic 
ideology.
A third chapter provides analysis of Hizb'allah's organisational struc­
ture and its connections with Iran's clerical establishment and with Syria 
in order to establish the influences on the movement's decisionmaking 
process. These influences are superimposed onto Hizb'allah's practise of 
hostage-taking of American, French, and British citizens, within the frame­
work of the movement's interaction with the constantly changing internal 
Lebanese environment.
The fourth chapter analyses the basis for the dynamics of the Iranian- 
Syrian relationship and its impact on the Hizb'allah within Lebanon with 
reference to opportunities and constraints in the abduction and release of 
foreign hostages.
A fifth chapter provides analysis of the performance of crisis manage­
ment responses by the American and two West European states to the hostage- 
crisis. It draws on the analysis of the previous chapters to which Western 
governmental performance in these crises are evaluated in accordance with 
conformity to the established requirements for successful crisis management 
and to the dynamics of the hostage-crisis as presented through the case- 
study.
The sixth and final chapter draws conclusions from the proceeding eva­
luation of the hostage-crisis and the application of crisis management 
techniques in order to assess the effectiveness of Western responses and its 
applicability for future hostage-incidents in the Middle East.
1.2 Definition of Hostage-Taking:
The act of "hostage-taking" is among the most common manifestations of 
political terrorism. Its practitioners has been uniformly codified in inter-
national lav as;
"Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or 
to continue to detain another person in order to compel a third party, 
namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural 
or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any 
acts as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage."*'
By employing the definition provided by the Hostage ’Convention, it is pos­
sible to discern certain key characteristics of hostage-taking in order to 
separate it from other forms of political terrorism.** In this context, the 
term hostage-taking will only relate to acts which are international in 
nature. An act of hostage-taking can be considered international when it is; 
"(1) directed at foreigners or foreign targets; (2) concerted by the govern­
ments or factions of more th'an one state; or (3) aimed at influencing the 
policies of a foreign government^."** Within the framework of this definition, 
it is possible to obtain and identify four constitutive elements indispens­
able to the act of hostage-taking on the assumption that the dynamics of 
hostage-taking acts and the behaviour of all parties involved will be gover­
ned by the same fundamental priniciples and processes which apply to all
** International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, [Article 1(1)], annexed to 
GA Res 34/146 of 17 December 1979, UN GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp.46, pp.245-47, UN Doc A/34/45 
(1980). As of August 1989, the Convention had 56 signatories. Neither Lebanon, nor Iran and 
Syria, are parties to the Convention.
** While there is still disagreement id.thin academia over definitions of terrorism, the 
most comprehensive has been provided by Alex Schmidt: "terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring 
method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi)clandestine Individual, group or state 
actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to 
assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human 
victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively 
(representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message 
generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist 
(organisation), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target 
(audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of 
attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought", 
see: Alex P. Schmidt, Albert Jongman, et al.. Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, 
Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing, 
1988): p.28.
** See: Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (London: Macmillan, 1977):p.174.
social interactions/* As a consequence, the hostage-takers are treated as 
rational actors, in which rationality only implies that the actor has a 
reason for the execution of his actions and that the actor believes the 
action itself is not only useful in obtaining his goals but also that it 
maximises effect and possible outcomes/*
The first of the four necessary elements of hostage-taking is the sei­
zure or detention of another person. Although acts of hostage-taking may
assume a wide variety of ways in which the actual seizure or detention may 
be carried out, it is useful to classify hostage-incidents into two major 
categories: barricade/siege and hostage concealment situations.** The dis­
tinction between these two types of hostage-situations is necessary as both 
differ in logistical and physical terms and require almost inevitably diffe­
rent policy and tactical responses.** In a hostage barricade/siege situation, 
the hostage-takers and their victims are besieged in a location known to and 
controlled by the authorities.** This severely restricts the mobility of the 
hostage-takers and often the duration of the incident.** In a hostage con­
** See: Clive C. Aston, "Political Hostage-taking in Western Europe", in William 
Gutteridge (ed.) Hie New Terrorism (London: Mansell Publishing Ltd, 1986): p.59.
** See: Kent L. Oots, "Bargaining with Terrorists: Organizational Conciderations", 
Terrorism, Vol.13, No.2 (March-April 1990): pp.146.
See: Richard Clutterbuck, Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion (London: MacMillan, 1987).
** See, Reuben Miller, "Game Theory and Hostage-Taking Incidents: A Case Study of the 
Munich Olympic Games", Conflict Quarterly, Vol.10, No.l (Winter 1990):pp.12-33. Also see: 
Brian Jenkins, Janera Johnson and David Ronfeldt, Numbered Lives: Some Statistical 
Observations from 77 International Hostage Episodes (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, P- 
5905, July 1977),
** See: Jerome R. Corsi, "Terrorism as a Desperate Game", Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol.25, No.l (March 1981): pp.47-85.
** See: Alastair C. MacWillson, Hostage-Taking Terrorism (London: MacMillan, 1992):
p.172.
cealment situation, the perpetrators detain hostages at an unknown location. 
These incidents are usually longer in duration as they provide the hostage- 
takers with anonymity, security and mobility.** In relation to the situation 
in Lebanon, the concealment of the hostages is not only a function of effi­
cient operational secrecy by the terrorist organisation but also can be
attributed to the chaotic environment caused by the protracted civil war 
which complicates the process of any response by governments. As such, the
hostage-crisis in Lebanon is unique and precedent-setting since it does not
conform to previous models of hostage-taking as the concealment is merely a
technique or mechanism rather than an end itself.
A second element of the act of hostage-taking involves the threat to 
kill, to injure or to continue the detention of a hostage in order to compel 
a third party, A major underlying assumption of hostage-taking is that the 
act itself is carried out in order to affect the choices of a third party.** 
The selection of choices by a third party are dependent on the expected re­
sponse of the hostage-taker to a particular decision and its preference for 
humanitarian values.** The death of a hostage is threatened by the hostage- 
taker, as a last resort, in order to compel a third party to comply with any 
demand[s].** This rests on the presumption that a third party must consider
** See: R. Reuben Miller, "Negotiating with Terrorists: A Comparative Analysis of Three 
Cases", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.5, No.3 (Autumn 1993): p.103.
** As stated by Thomas Schelling: "[hjostages represent the power to hurt in its purest 
form", see: Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influences (New Haven, CN. : Yale University Press,
1966): p.6.
** See: Clive C. Aston, A Contmporarv Crisis: Political Hostage-Taking and the 
Experience of Western Europe (London: Greenwood Press, 1982): pp.33-45.
** See: Harvey E. Lapan and Todd Sandler, "Terrorism and Signalling", European Journal 
of Political Econcmv, Vol.9 (1993): pp.383-97.
the death of a hostage to be worse than complying with the demand[s]/* Con­
sequently, the threat in itself requires credibility which means that a third 
party will resist compliance to demands if the threat to kill hostages is not 
believable/* Herein, the hostage-taker faces the dilemma that the credibi­
lity to carry out the threat is actually undermined by the fact that a third 
party's compliance with any demand is dependent on the survival of the hos­
tage. However, this dilemma may be resolved by multiple abduction of hostages
while the credibility of a threat can be enhanced through sequential killings 
of hostages, whereby the hostage-taker increases the costs for a third party 
for non-compliance.** In the case of the abductions in Lebanon, the hostage- 
takers repeatedly threatened to execute their hostages to force compliance 
to its demands, yet only a relatively limited number of hostages were exe­
cuted/* While only a few bodies'of hostages were found, the hostage-takers 
used the presumed deaths of hostages and through silence regarding the hos­
tage, as a means of reinforcing the credibility of their threats.**
The third element of hostage-taking is that the aforementioned threat 
against hostages compels a third party to do or abstain from doing specified 
act[s]. All acts of hostage-taking must be considered goal-oriented activity.
** See: E.F. Mickolus, "Negotiating for Hostages: A Policy Dilemma", Orbis, Vol. 19, 
No.4 (1976): pp.1309-25.
** See: Clive C. Aston, (1982), op.cit.: pp.33-46.
** See: H.E. Lapan and Todd Sandler, "To Bargain or not to Bargain: Hiat is the 
Question", American Econanic Review, Vol.78 (1988): pp.16-20.
** Between 1982 and 1992, only five Western hostages either died or were executed by 
the Hizb'allah. Hiese were: Michel Seui'at (1986); Peter Kilbum (1986); William Buckley 
(1985); William Higgins (1988); and Alberto Molinaro (1992). For comparison, see; Appendix I.
** For a useful overview, see: Masldt Burgin, Ariel Merari, and Anat Kurz (1988), 
op.cit.: p.14-7.
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either motivated by economic, financial and/or political reasons/* It is 
also assumed that all hostage-takers genuinely seek compliance rather than 
resistance from a third party in response to any demand[s]/® In the bar­
gaining process between a hostage-taker and a third party,** the hostage- 
taker faces two options in any attempts to achieve concessions from a third 
party: either to raise the level of the threat for a third party to force 
submission or, subsequently, reward any compliance/* In turn, the main goal 
of the hostage-taker is to compel a third party to either take any action or 
refrain from certain activity/*
A final element of hostage-taking is compliance by a third party to the 
demands of the hostage-taker as an explicit or implicit condition for the 
release of the hostage [s]. It is important to recognize that the outcome of 
a hostage-incident, regardless of' the nature of demands, is implicitly or ex­
plicitly the quid pro quo for the submission of the third party to the com­
pulsion/* The process of bargaining in hostage-taking incidents assumes that 
a hostage-taker attempts to achieve maximum objectives, while the third party
** See: Grant Wardlaw (1989), op.cit: p.151. Also see: W.L, Waugh, "Integrating the 
Policy Models of Terrorism and Emergency Management", Policy Studies Review, Vol.6, No.2 
(November 1986): pp.287-300; and K.L. Oots, A Political Organization Approach to Transnational 
Terrorism (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1986).
** See; Martha Crenshaw, "Tlie Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as A Product of 
Strategic Choice", in Walter Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990): p.21.
*' See: Scott E. Atkinson, Todd Sandler, and John Tschirhart, "Terrorism in a 
Bargaining Framework", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.30 (1987): pp.1-21.
** See: T. Sandler and J.L. Scott, "Terrorist Success in Hostage-Taking Incidents", 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.31, No.l (March 1987).
** See: Clive C. Aston, "Political Hostage-Taking in Western Europe", in William 
Gutteridge (ed.), (1986), op.cit.: pp.57-84.
** See: Bruce D. Fitzgerald, "The Analytical Foundations of Extortionate Terrorism", in 
Terrorism, Vol.l, No.3-4 (1978): p.350.
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seeks to resolve the situation by conceding the minimum amount possible/* 
As a consequence, the relationship between the hostage-taker and a third 
party is conducted through a zero-sum framework, whereby if one party wins 
then the other must necessarily lose/*
1.3 Hostage-Takings in Lebanon as a Form of Foreign Policy Crisis
Over the last decade, incidents of hostage-taking of foreigners in 
Lebanon have had a disproportionate effect on foreign and domestic policy for 
many Western governments compared to other forms of crisis in foreign 
affairs, given the nature of the problem and the actual number of victims 
involved in these incidents/* Even in comparison to other forms of interna­
tional terrorism and in relation to incidents carried out in previous years, 
the phenomenon of hostage-taking in the 1980s neither increased significantly 
in number of incidents or fatalities/* Despite the reality of the low-level 
threat posed by hostage-taking to vital national interests and security of 
Western governments, there has been a close association of the hostage-taking 
incidents in Lebanon with the notion of "crises"/* Although the prolonged
** See: S.E. Atkinson, T.Sandler, and J. Tschirhart, (1987), op.cit.: p.3; and NehemLa 
Friedland, "Hostage negotiations: types, processes, outcomes". Journal of Negotiation, Vol.2, 
No.l (January 1986): pp.57-72.
** See: Narek Hessel, "Bargaining costs and rational behavior: a simple model", Joumal 
of Conflict Resolution, Vol.25, No.3 (September 1981).
** See: Jeffrey D. Simon, Misperceiving the Terrorist Threat, R-3423-RC (Santa Monica, 
CA. : Rand Corporation, June 1987).
** A comparison between the data-bases of Mickolus A (1968-1980) and Mickolus B (1968- 
1987) reveals that hostage-taking incidents with a concealed natiure increased only three 
percent from 6% to 9% of the total number of types of terrorist events, see: Edward F. 
Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism, A Qu'onology of Events, 1968-1979 (London: Aldwych Press, 
1980); Edward F. Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism, A Clironologv of Events, 1980-1987 (London: 
Aldwych Press, 1989) ; A.J. Jongman, "Trends in International and Domestic Terrorism in Western 
Europe, 1968-1988", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1992): pp.26-76.
** Hiis has been reinforced by the rhetoric of major Western political leaders in 
response to the hostage-incidents in Lebanon. President Reagan stated that: [i]f we permit 
terrorism to succeed anywhere, it will spread like cancer, eating away at civilized societies 
and sowing fear and chaos everywhere, see: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 21
(1985): p.859. For the French political candidates in the national elections in 1986 and 1988,
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hostage-incidents in Lebanon have presented foreign governments with unique 
and unprecedented foreign policy problems as well as challenges, it is essen­
tial to determine the degree of conformity of these hostage-taking acts to 
necessary criteria of what constitutes a crisis in the foreign policy arena 
and to determine the way in which hostage-taking differs from other more con­
ventional foreign policy crises.
The term "crisis" itself is frequently used indiscriminately by jour­
nalists, academics and policymakers alike to describe conditions of conflict 
and disagreement in international politics. While agreement exist that cri­
sis, stemming from the etymology of the word, involves a turning-point from 
a condition of peace to the possibility of war,*® there is no generally 
agreed definition of the term.*' In fact, as conceded by many analysts, the 
concept of crisis has been rendered hollow and useless as it is applied to 
all situations which are difficult to diagnose, distressful to confront, and 
whose course is unpredictable with any great degree of certainty.** The main 
reason for the wide variety of definitions of the term stems not only from 
the methodological approach adopted** but also from the actual context within
the issue of the hostages became a "veritable obsession", see: Le Monde, May 6, 1988.
*® For the etymology of the word crisis, see: André Béjin and Edgar Morin, 
"Introduction", Communications, No.25 (1976): pp.1-3. For general agreement that crisis 
involves a turning-point or decision-point, see: Oran Young, Politics of Force: Bargaining 
During International Crisis (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1968): pp.6-15.
*' According to Robinson, a crisis is a "lay term in search of a scholarly meaning", 
see: James A. Robinson, "An Appraisal of Concepts and Theories", in diaries F. Hermann (ed.) 
International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research (New York, NY.: Hie Free Press, 1972): 
p.510. Also see: A.J.R. Groom, "Crisis management in long range perspective", in Daniel Frei 
(ed.) International Crisis and Crisis Management (London: Saxon House, 1978): pp.101-117.
** See: Edgar Morin, "Pour une crisologie". Communications, No.25 (1976): p. 149-63; and 
James A. Robinson, "Crisis", in D.L. Sills (ed.) International Encyclopedia for Social 
Sciences, Vol.3 (New York, NY. : Macmillan, 1968): pp.510-14.
** For various approaches, see: Michael Brecher, "Toward a Theoiy of International 
Crisis Behavior", International Studies Quarterly, Vol.21 (March 1977): pp.39-40.
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which the crisis occurs, in terms of the diverse actors and means as well as 
the length of the struggle in many grey areas of conflict." From the etymo­
logical roots of the term crisis and its subsequent development, it is 
possible to discern a number of recurring components. Apart from the notion 
of decision and turning-point, crises also signify a threat to vital goals 
and objectives, a moment of truth for those confronted with it, short time 
for decisions, as well as a sense of opportunity, the last most evidently
revealed by the Chinese definition of crisis depicted by a double ideogram 
representing both danger and opportunity."
While scholars have offered a wide range of definitions of crisis, 
usually dependent on the context, the term has been defined descriptively 
in accordance to certain key traits or sets of characteristics." As most 
attempts to define crisis focus"on high-threat situations restricted to the 
military and security areas alone between two or more state actors, espe­
cially within the context of the conventional application of crisis manage­
ment," it is necessary to find suitable and broad definitions of crisis for 
situations created by non-territorial political groups against territorial 
entities, especially within the context of the so-called "grey areas" of
** For the context-dependency of crisis-management, see: Alexander George, "A 
Provisional Hieory of Crisis Management", in Alexander L, George (ed.) Avoiding War: Problems 
of Crisis Management (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1991): p.23.
** See: Randolf Stam, "Metamorphose d'une notion. Les historiens et la 'crise', 
Conimmications, No.25 (1976): pp.4-18. Also see the twelve general attributes of crisis 
formulated by Anthony J. Wiener and Herman Kalin cited in: Charles F. Hermann, "Some issues in 
the study of international crisis", in C.F. Hermann (ed.), (1972), op.cit.: p.21.
" For a useful review of crisis literature, see: Michael Haas, "Research on 
International Crisis: Obsolescence of an Approach?", International Interactions, Vol.13, No.l
(1986): pp.23-58.
** For example, see: Gilbert R. Winham (ed.) New Issues in International Crisis 
Manageiient (London; Westview press, 1988).
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conflict.^
Among the most frequently used and classical definitions of crisis has 
been offered by Charles Hermann, who defines it as a "situation that (1) 
threatens high-priority goals of the decision-making unit; (2) restricts the 
amount of time available for response before the decision is transformed; and 
(3) surprises the members of the decision-making unit by its occurrence. 
While this definition has been valuable for the decision-making approach to 
crisis behaviour, some argue it is limited as it cannot be applied to many 
situations which fail to conform to "stringent requirements of coherent 
decision-making by a group perceiving itself to be in a situation of high 
threat, short time .and surprise.The application of this definition to 
the hostage-situation in Lebanon reveals its limitations due to the longevity 
of the situation, in many cases hostages had been held for several years, as 
well as by the recurring repetition of these abductions which minimised any 
element of surprise. As a consequence, it is more useful to adopt a broader 
definition which includes two characteristics of any crisis, commonly accep­
ted by the scholarly community as: [1] a severe threat to important values 
and [2] a finite time for coping with the threat.s*
According to Alexander George, crisis situations are heavily context-dependent, see: 
Alexander F. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, Tlie limits of Coercive Diplomacy' 
(Boston, MA.: Little-Brown, 1971): p.217. For a useful discussion of the grey areas, see: 
Xavier Raufer, "Grey Areas: A New Security Ttireat", Political Warfare: Intelligence, Active 
Measiures and Intelligence Report, No.20 (Spring 1992); and National Strategy Information 
Center, The Grey Area Phenomenon: Report of a Research Seminar (Washington, DC.: US GPO, July 
1992).
See: Cliarles F. Hermann (ed.), (1972), op.cit. : p. 13.
” See: A.J.R. Groom, "Crisis management in long range perspective", in Daniel Frei 
(ed.), (1978): op.cit.: p.102. diaries Hermann recognized himself the limitation of smrprise 
and later dropped it as a necessary condition of crisis, see: Jonathan Wilkenfeld, et al., 
Crises in the Twentieth Century, Vol.II (Oxford: Pergamon, 1988) : p.3
” See: Ole R. Holsti, "Foreign Policy Decision Makers Viewed Psychologically: 
'Cognitive Process' Approaches", in J.N. Rosenau (ed.) In Search of Global Patterns (New York, 
NY.: Free Press, 1976).
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The assessment of the level of the threat of the Lebanon hostage-taking 
acts is based on various components: [1] what are the important values for 
decision-makers of Western governments, whose citizens have been held hostage 
in Lebanon?; [2] they must be placed within the context of the perceived 
degree of the threat to national interests; [3] this will be influenced by 
the previous experience in countering terrorism; and [4] the constraints im­
posed by the dynamics of the incident itself for governments in responding
effectively and rapidly for its resolution.^*
At its core, acts of hostage-taking constitute a direct assault on 
commonly held principles and values of all citizens within liberal democra­
cies, most notably the maintenance of order by a state to ensure that the 
lives of it's citizens are secure against violence.As such, a government 
has a required responsibility, especially in hostage-taking situations, to 
be viewed as doing all in "its power to defend the life and limb of its citi­
zens" not only within its own borders but also abroad.In this task, the 
concerned government faces a fundamental dilemma to balance its individual 
responsibility towards its citizens taken hostage abroad with its requirement
** For aspects on perception of threats and its different interpretations by actors 
from different cultural contexts, see: D.B. Bobrow, and J.A. Kringen St. Chan, "Understanding 
How Others Treat Crises", International Studies Quarterly, Vol.21 (1977). For a definition of 
national interest, see: Friedrich Kratochml, "On the notion of 'interest' in international 
relations". International Organization, Vol.36, No.l (Winter 1982): pp.1-30.
According to Hedley Bull, all societies attempt to sustain order through the pursuit 
of three primary goals: "[t]o ensure that life will be in seme measure secure against violence 
resulting in death or bodily harm...that promises, once made, mil be kept, or that agreements 
once undertaken, mil be carried out...pursue the goal of ensuring that the possession of 
things remain stable to some degree, and will not.be subject to challenges that are constant 
and without limit", see: Hedley Bull, Hie Anarchcial Society: A Study of Order in World 
Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977): pp.4-5.
” See: Paul Wilkinson, (1977): op.cit.: p.124. The claim that the state has a duty to 
protect its citizens and their welfare rests on the reciprocal duty by the citizen, as a 
priviledge of receiving this protection, to risk his or her life for the state, at certain 
times, see: Ingrid Defter De Lupis, "Hie Legal Position of a Hostage", in Magnus D. Sandbu and 
Peter Nordbeck (ed.) International Terrorism (Lund: Juristforlaget, 1989): pp.96-98.
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to safeguard the maintenance of other collective national interests.An 
underlying reason for this dilemma has been that many governments have moved 
to integrate their strategy to confront and combat international terrorism 
as, inturn an integral component of their foreign policy.As a consequence, 
the handling of the hostage-issue in Lebanon by governments has not only ’been 
influenced by efforts to confront state-sponsored terrorism by proxy but has 
also been closely affected by internal Lebanese, regional and international
affairs.” While the integration of efforts to confront terrorism as compo­
nents of foreign policy has made the issue of handling the hostage-situation 
in Lebanon susceptible to the opportunities and constraints arising from the 
conduct of wider foreign policies in the Middle East, it has also been sub­
ject to a wide variety of pressures, most notably associated with the per­
ceptions of the threat and laCk of available options for its resolution 
based on the previous assessment,”
The salience of the hostage-situation in Lebanon to Western governments' 
foreign policy agendas was inextricably linked to the perceived serious 
challenge of the rise and spread of militant Islamic fundamentalism in the
” See: M. Sassoli, "International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism", in Paul Wilkinson 
and A.M. Stewart (eds.) Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University 
Press, 1987): p.466; and Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit.: pp.155-7. It should be the case, 
according to George F. Kennan, that: "[glovemment is an agent, not a principal. Its primary 
obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents, not to the moral 
impulses that individual elements of that society may experience", see: George F. Kennan, 
"Morality and Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs (Winter 1985/6): p.206. Also see: William 
Qitteridge, "Countering Terrorism: Evaluating the Options", Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, 
Vol.6 (April 1988).
” See: Neil C. Livingstone and Terrell E. Arnold (ed.) Fighting Back: Winning the War 
Against Terrorism (Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books, 1985).
” The influence of these factors were briefly explored in: Bruce Hoffman, Recent 
Trends and Future Prospects of Iranian Sponsored International Terrorism, R-3783-USDP (Santa 
Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, March 1990); and Robin Wright, In the Name of God: The Khomeini 
Decade (London: Skoi and Schuster, 1989).
See: Jeffrey Simon, (1987), op.cit: p.5.
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Middle East, embodied in the establishment of an Islamic theocracy in Iran 
and in its drive to export its revolution beyond its borders, to the detri­
ment of regional stability and against Western interests in the broader 
Muslim world.” While Iran's most direct and sustained influence pertained to 
their co-religionists in Lebanon, direct violent acts under the banner of
militant Islam against Western citizens and property, coupled with anti- 
Western demonology and promises of a holy war against the enemies of Islam,
exacerbated the perception among Western policy-makers and publics that Islam 
could be equated with fanaticism and terrorism.” This image was reinforced 
by the October 1983 twin-suicide attacks against American and French Multi­
national Forces (MNF) contingencies in Lebanon, resulting in the deaths of 
300 servicemen, which elevated the problem of Islamic terrorism to the level 
of a major national security issue.” While the incidents were symptomatic 
of the problems faced by the West in their involvement in Lebanon and in 
attempts to find a resolution to the intractable civil war,” their impact 
was also compounded by the subsequent systematic abduction of foreign citi-
” See: Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and the Spread of Revolutionary Islam", Third World 
Quarterly, Vol.10, No.2 (April 1988): pp.730-49; Alvin H. Bernstein, "Iran's Low-Intensity War 
Against the United States", Qrbis, Vol.30 (Spring 1986); Robin Wright, Sacred Rage: The Wrath 
of Militant Islam (New York, NY.: Simon and Schuster, 1985); R.K. Ramanzani, Revolutionary 
Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East (Baltimore, MD.: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1986); Dr. Millward, "Hie Rising Tide of Islamic Fundamentalism (I)&(II), Contnentaiyy 
Xo.30/31 (April 1993).
” For a discussion of these stereotypical images between Islam and the West, see: John 
L. Esposito, The Islamic Hireat: Myth or Reality? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992): 
pp. 168-215, For the operational significance of ethnic differences, see: Hans Binnendijk (ed.) 
National Negotiating Styles (Washington, DC.: Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study 
of Foreign Affairs, 1987).
” See: Bonnie Cordes et al., Trends in International Terrorism, 1982 and 1983, R-3183- 
SL (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, August 1984): p.l; and David C. Martin and John 
Walcott, Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism (New York, NY.: 
Harper Row, 1988).
” See: Husseiyn Sirriyeh, Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict, Adelphi Papers 243 (London: 
Brassey's, Autumn 1989).
zens by shadowy pro-Iranian groups, operating under the cover of an anarchial 
environment.” Although these incidents were closely reminicent of the 1979 
Iranian hostage-crisis for policymakers and public, the hostage-situation in 
Lebanon differed from the previous situation both in complexity and longe­
vity.”
As a manifestation of the threat of Iran’s attempts to spread Islamic 
fundamentalism in the Middle East, the hostage-taking incidents in Lebanon
were viewed by Western policymakers through the application of a narrow 
Western ideological prism depicting Islam against the West.” This approach 
ignored the causes of the rise of the Shi'a community in Lebanon, from poli­
tical queitism to militant activism against the background of confessional 
warfare, and consequently suffered from the misperception of the Hizb’allah 
as merely a creation of revolutionary Iran, orchestrated and directed from 
Teheran in a holy war against the West.” This image of the adversary, as 
fanatical and dangerous, and the nature of its links with Iran was also re­
inforced in the West by Hizb'allah's public deference to Iran in all spheres 
of its activities.” As a consequence, the hostage-issue in Lebanon became
” See: Marius Deeb, Militant Islamic Movements in Lebanon: Origins, Social Basis, and 
Ideology, Occasional Paper Series (Washington, DC.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 
Georgetown University, November 1986).
” For a brief comparison, see: Stansfield Turner, Terrorism and Democracy (Boston,
MA. : Houghton Mifflin, 1990). For the impact of hostage-crisis on decisionmaking, see: Betty 
Glad, "Personality, Political, and Group Process Variables in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: 
Jimmy Carter’s Handling of the Iranian Hostage Crisis", International Political Science 
Review, Vol.10, No.l (January 1989): pp.35-62.
” See: Amir Taheri, Holy War: The Inside Story of Islamic Terrorism (London: Sphere 
Books, 1987).
” This has been observed by Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: Hie Internal Conflict 
and the Iranian Connection", in Jolm L. Esposito (ed.) Hie Iranian Revolution: Its Global 
Impact (Miami, FL. : Florida International University Press, 1990): p.121.
” See: Martin Kramer, "Redeeming Jerusalem: The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah", in 
David Menashri (ed.) The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World (Boulder, 00. : Westview Press, 1990): p.111-2.
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not only viewed as a logical extension of the West's wider foreign policy 
efforts to contain Iranian influence in the region but also contributed to 
its treatment by Western governments as an issue both of assault on indivi­
dual lives of its citizens and on national integrity.”
While the treatment by the West of the hostage-incidents in Lebanon 
within the confines of wider foreign policy efforts to contain Iran naturally 
elevated the issue of the hostages on the foreign policy agenda, the nature 
and dynamics of these incidents contributed to the athmosphere of crisis in 
efforts by their governments to extract Western hostages.” The elevation of 
the hostage-incidents to the status of foreign policy crisis stemmed from 
pressures on Western decision-makers in failing to effectively confront and 
rapidly secure the release of their own citizens from captivity.” Apart from 
the sensational and spectacular nature of these acts, the pressures faced by 
Western governments from within their own borders were related to the public 
discrepancy between the expression of concern for the welfare of citizens 
taken hostage abroad as well as promises made for their safe return and a 
publicly enunicated firm policy of "no concessions" to any terrorist demands. 
While the publicly enuniciated policy no concessions redu-ced government
” See: Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, "Hostage taking, the Presidency, 
and Stress", in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism, op.cit.: p.212.
” See: Stanley S. Bedlington, Combatting International Terrorism: U.S.-Allied 
Cooperation and Political Will (Washington, DC. : The Atlantic Council of the United States, 
November 1986). For example, after the revelation of the Iran-Contra affair. President 
Reagan's approval rating dropped from 67 percent to 46 percent, the largest single drop for a 
president ever, see: Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, Landslide: The Unmaking of the President 
(Boston, MA.: Houghton-Mifflin, 1988): p.292.
” See: John Tower, Edmund Muskie, and Brent Scowcroft, The Tower Commission Report 
(New York, NY.: Bantam Books and Times Books, 1987): p.79. Also see: Albert Bandura, 
"Mechanisms of moral disengagement", in Walter Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism, op.cit.: 
p.166; and James A. Bill, "Hie U.S. Overture to Iran, 1985-1986: An Analysis", in Nikki R. 
Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowsld (ed.) Neither East Nor West: Iran, the Soviet Union, and the 
United States (New Haven, Cl.: Yale University Press, 1990): pp.170-3.
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flexibility in the handling of the hostage-crisis, as credibility would be 
seriously damaged by the subsequent disclosure of any dealings with terro­
rists, it also increased the pressure on government decisionmakers from the 
public and media, who regarded their respective governments as weak and 
soft, in concurrence with the continued prolongation of these incidents de­
spite assurances of a rapid resolution.” The creation of heightened and 
unrealistic expectations by governments in dealing with the hostage-taking
incidents when, in reality, there were no simple solutions, underlined the 
unique contradictory pressures created by hostage-taking situations on 
governments compared to other forms of foreign policy crisis.” A distingui­
shing pressure for decision-makers in dealing with these hostage-incidents 
relates to the human dimensions of the crisis, most notably the identifica­
tion of an individual predicament.” The knowledge by a government leader of 
the actual identity of a particular Western hostage incarcerated in Lebanon 
removed any bureaucratic sense of impersonality towards the issue and in the 
application of any delineated policies and principles.” In turn, these
” See: Farhang Jahanpour, "The Roots of the Hostage Crisis", The World Today (February 
1992): pp.33-6.
” The cost inflicted by abandonment of previous public rhetoric and promises has been 
described by Doris Graber as: "[IJosses in credibility and prestige which may impair the de­
faulting parties' political effectiveness", see: Doris A. Graber, Verbal Behavior and Politics 
(Urbana, IL.: University of Illinois Press, 1976): pp.66-7. Also see: Martha Crenshaw, "Tlie 
Psychology of Political Terrorism", in Margaret G. Hermann (ed.) Political Psychology (San 
Francisco, CA. : Jossey-Bass, 1986); and 0. Rosenthal, P.T. Hart, and M. Charles, Coping with 
Crisis: The Management of Disasters, Riots, and Terrorism (Springfield, IL.: Charles Thomas 
Books, 1989).
” For a very useful overview of these influences, see: Gary Sick, "Taking Vows: The 
Domestication of Policymaking in Hostage Incidents", in Walter Reich (ed.), op.cit.: pp.230- 
44. Also see: Ariel Merari, "Government Policy in Incidents Involving Hostages", in Ariel 
Merari (ed.) On Terrorism and Combatting Terrorism (Frederick, MD.: University Publication of 
America, 1985): p.166. For the impact of stress on decision-makers, see: Jerrold M. Post, "The 
Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers", in Alexander George (ed.) Avoiding War: 
Problems of Crisis Managment (Boulder, 00.: Westview Press, 1991): pp.471-96.
” For example, see: Washington Post, November 16, 1986; and Le Monde, May 6, 1988.
Also see: Bob Woodward, Veil: Hie Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987 (New York, NY.: Simon and 
Schuster, 1987): p.439. In Ms memoirs, President Reagan admitted that he: "[f]elt a heavy 
weight on (his) shoulders to get the hostages home", see: Ronald Reagan, An American life'(New
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pressures were continuously reinforced by the terrorists, through the release 
of personal appeals by the hostages, through intense scrutiny of any action 
or in-action by targeted governments by the media and by the victims' fami­
lies, through various pressure groups.” This was further compounded by the 
perceived innocence of the suffering hostages themselves, only guilty of
being at the wrong place at the wrong time.”
Unlike most other forms of foreign policy crisis, the hostage incidents 
were also extremely long in duration. As a crisis, the degree of intensity 
was closely dependent on the nature of threats by the terrorist for the exe­
cution of a hostage unless the government meet certain political demands. 
While the sense of urgency was dependent on the credibility of the hostage- 
taker to carry out the. threat, it also led to constant readjustment of 
escalation and de-escalation along the crisis ladder by governments in re­
sponse to new abductions, threats, and demands by the terrorists over an ex­
tensive period of time.”
As a unique form of foreign policy crisis, the hostage-incidents in 
Lebanon have constituted a serious problem for many Western governments,
York, NY.: Simon & Schuster, 1990): p.510.
” For discussion of the role of media, see: Carol Winkler, "Presidents Held Hostage: 
Hie Rhetoric of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan", Terrorism, Vol.12, No.l (1989): pp.21-30; 
Russell F. Famen, "Terrorism and the Mass Media: A Systematic Analysis of a Symbiotic 
Process", Terrorism, Vol.13, No.2 (March-April 1990): pp.99-143; and Ronald H. Hinckley, 
"American Opinion toward Terrorism: The Reagan Years", Terrorism, Vol.12, No.6 (1989). As 
admitted by Thomas Twetten to the Tower Conmission: "[t]he real thing that was driving this 
was...a lot of pressure from the hostage families...and there were articles in the magazines 
about the forgotten hostages, and there were alot of things being said about the U.S. 
Government isn't doing anything...And there [was] alot of fear about the yellow ribbons going 
back up and that this President would have the same problems that the last President had liad 
mth the Iranian hostages", see: John Tower, et.al.,(1987), op.cit.: p.96.
” For the moral justification of the seizure of hostages by the Hizb'allah, see: 
Martin Kramer, "Hie Moral logic of Hizballali", in Walter Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism, 
op.cit.: pp.131-160.
” For tlireats, see: Maskit Burgin, Ariel Merari, and Anat Kurz, (1988), op.cit.: 
pp.14-9.
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which at the core underlines the fundamental dilemma for liberal democracies 
in finding a remedy for the inbalance between safeguarding its moral obliga­
tion towards protecting its individual citizens while maintaining long-term 
foreign policy interests.” In response to the search for an equilibrium bet­
ween interests and obligations in these hostage-crises, Western governments 
have usually vacilliated between the extremes of either underreacting or 
overreacting in a seemingly ad hoc manner in response to pressures from the 
public and from foreign states or for the advancement of foreign policy agen­
das and the fortunes of individual political leaders.” Although hostage- 
incidents exhibit unique pressures for decisionmakers compared to other more 
conventional crises? all types of crisis restrict the maneuverability of 
government responses.” As the primary goal of all governments in response to 
any type of crisis must be to contain and minimize the effects of a crisis 
while maximizing their available initiatives,” the employment of traditional 
principles and techniques of crisis management to the handling of a hostage- 
crisis by governments can provide a useful instrument for the evaluation of 
the crisis itself as well as a guideline in order to cope and manage these 
complex forms of crisis more effectively and successfully.”
” See: D.J.C. Carmichael, "Of Beasts, Gods, and Civilized Men: The Justification of 
Terrorism and of Counterterrorist Measures", Terrorism, Vol.6 (1982): pp.1-26. Also see: 
Stephen Sloan, Beating International Terorism: An Action Strategy for Preemption and 
Punishment (Maxsrell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, December 1986): pp.49-51. 
The obligation to protect "the lives, liberty and property of the people composing it, whether 
abroad or at heme" in the United States is legally enshrined in: Durand v. Hollins, 4 Blatdi. 
451, 454, 8 Fed. Cas. Ill (no.4186) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860).
” See: Grant Wardlaw, (1989) op.cit.: pp.65-75, 147-60.
” See: Patrick Lagadec, Preventing Chaos in a Crisis: Strategies for Prevention, 
Control and Damage limitation (Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill, 1992).
” See: Clive C. Aston, (1982), op.cit; p.137.
” This has been previously argued by Clive C. Aston in response to siege/barricade 
situations, see: Clive C. Aston, "Political Hostage-Taking in Western Eiuope", in William 
Gutteridge (ed.), (1986), op.cit.: p.62. Also see: William L. Waugh Jr. "Integrating the 
Policy Models of Terrorism and Qærgency Management", Policy Studies Review, Vol.6, No.l
1.4 Crisis Management and Its Application to Hostage-Crises
The term "crisis management" has been indiscriminately employed in the 
field of social sciences by academics and policymakers in attempts to exer­
cise control over an array of "crisis" situations, ranging from nuclear con­
frontation between the two superpowers to terrorism incidents and natural 
disasters.” Although the literal meaning of the term "management" itself 
denotes efforts "to control" and "to take charge of" crisis situations, it 
has been regarded as somewhat misleading for the activity at hand.” At its 
core, the inherent paradox and dilemma of crisis management has been the 
necessity of taking certain actions in order to protect one’s vital interests 
while avoiding actions that may result in undesired costs and risks.” While 
the conventional application of the craft of crisis management has centered 
on efforts to minimize chances of crisis-situations between two or more 
state-actors from escalating into war,” which led to the establishment of
(August 1986): pp.287-301; Uriel Rosenthal and B. Pijnenburg (eds.) Special issue on multiple 
scenarios for crisis management and decision making, International Journal of Contamorarv 
Crises, Vol.14, No.4 (December 1990).
” For example, see: C.V. Raghaulu, "Research Trends in Crisis Management and 
Organisation Tlieory", Indian Journal of Administrative Science, Vol.2, No.l (January-July 
1991): pp.21-35. Also see: Paul Hart, "Symbols, Rituals and Power: Hie Lost Dimensions of 
Crisis Managanent", Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol.l, No.l (March 1993): 
pp.36-50.
” As pointed out by Coral Bell: "[t]he overtones of the word "management" imply a 
rational, dispassionate, calculating, well considered activity, conducted vith. judgement and 
perhaps even at a leisurely pace with a view to long term as against short term interests. 
Actual crisis decisonmaking is not usually at all like that: it is improvised at great 
pressure of time and events by men working in a fog of ambiguity, see: Coral Bell, "Decision- 
maJdng by Governments in Crisis Situations", in Daniel Frei (ed.), (1978), op.cit.: p.51.
” Alexander L. George, "Crisis Management: Hre Interaction of Political and Military 
Considerations," Survival (September/October, 1984): p.224.
” The term "crisis management" was an American concept which developed from the Cold 
War years in the 1950s in the use of coercive bargaining between the two superpowers in compe­
titions short of war. Hie faith in the concept increased significantly in stature by the 1962 
Cuban Missile Crisis, as demonstrated by Robert McNamara's statement that there was no longer 
any such thing as strategy only crisis management, see: Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis: 
A Stiidv in Diplomatic Management (London: Oxford Ikiiversify Press, 1971): p.2. Also see: Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Making, and System
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certain conventions and instruments in the management of crisis,” it is 
possible to discern and apply a number of these underlying principles of 
crisis-management to violent crisis-situations, most notably in response to 
the hostage-crisis in Lebanon.”
The most central task of crisis management is to ensure the resolution 
of a crisis on a satisfactory basis, in which the vital interests of the 
state are secured and protected, through a process of coercion and accommo­
dation in order to achieve effectively a maximum amount of concession from 
the adversary and, at the same time, maintain one's own position relatively 
intact.” The process of coercion and accomodation must be carefully balanced 
in order to prevent either the escalation of a crisis or capitulation to the 
wishes of the adversary at any price.” In this task, the ability to manage 
the crisis for a policymaker is dependent on the understanding of the nature
Structure in International Crises (Princeton, CT.: Princeton University Press, 1977);
” See: Coral Bell, ibid: pp.73-98. For an overview of the state of crisis management 
as a discipline, see: Michael Brecher and Patrick James, "Patterns of Crisis Management", 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.32, No.3 (September 1988): pp.426-56; William I. Zartman, 
Alternative Attmpts at Crisis Management (Paris: World Congress XIII, 15-20 July 1985); 
Arthur W. Gilbert and Paul Gordon Lauren, "Crisis Management: An Assessment and Critique", 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.24, No,4 (December 1980): pp.641-64; Ole R. Holsti, 
"Historians, Social Scientists, and Crisis Management: An Alternative View", Journal of 
Conflict Resoluti.on, Vol.24, No.4 (December 1980): pp.665-82; and R. Tanter, "Crisis 
Managment: A Critical Review of Academic Literature", Jerusalem Journal of International 
Relations, Vol.l, No.l (Fall 1975): pp.71-101.
” Hie need for the employment of crisis-management to the problem of international 
terrorism was briefly considered in: Ottino Caracciolo di Forino, et al. A Study in Crisis 
Management (Bruxelles:Institut Européen Pour la Paix et la Sécurité, April 1987). Also see: 
Charles F. Hermann, "Types of Crisis Actors and Hieir Implications for Crisis Management", in 
Daniel Frei (ed.), (1978), op.cit.: p.37; U. Rosenthal et al. (eds.), (1989), op.cit.; and 
Richard H. Schultz, Jr. and Stephen Sloan, Responding to the Terrorist Threat: Security and 
Crisis Management (New York, NY.: Pergamon Press, 1980).
” See: Phil Williams, Crisis Management: Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear
Age (New York, NY. : Wiley, 1972): p.30.
” See: Charles F. Hermann (ed.), (1972), op.cit.; Paul Gordon Lauren, "Ultimata and
Coercive Diplomaq^ ", International Studies Quarterly, Vol.16 (1972): pp.131-65; and Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing (eds.), (1977), op.cit.: p.196.
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and degree of threats to his country's interests in order to gain control 
over the crisis situation and in the evaluation of employment of instruments 
and policy preferences, an assessment of the way in which the adversary views 
the crisis situation, and a determination of the probable consequences of 
different courses of action designed to influence the adversary's behaviour 
in order to secure specific objectives in a crisis.” While crisis management 
involves the ability to communicate resolve and intent to an adversary, the 
instruments for this purpose can be distinguished into two basic categories 
in confronting a specific crisis involving hostage-taking, namely physical 
acts and verbal statements of intent.”* The verbal dimensions of crisis 
management may preceed the actual application of the instruments but are
■It
always present as reinforcement used in combination with the physical acts.”  ^
The physical instruments *01 crisis management in a hostage-crisis 
involve either military actions or nonmilitary instruments of statecraft.”* 
The military dimensions of crisis-management in hostage-crisis situations 
involves the movement of military forces to designated positions as a signal 
of commitment and resolution.”* This may involve the threat or actual use 
of limited violence against the adversary either to force a change in its 
position to achieve concessions or to punish for non-conciliatory beha­
” See: I.L, Janis, Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management 
(New York, NY.: Free Press, 1989).
”* See: Robert L. Pfalzgraff, Jr. "Crisis Management", in Werner Kaltefleiter and 
Ulrike Schumacher (eds.) Conflicts, Options, Strategies in a Hireatened World (Kiel: Institute 
of Political Science, Giristian-Albrechts-University, 1987): p.29-30. •
See: Coral Bell, (1971), op.cit.: pp.73.
”* For a typology of crisis management instruments and technicpies, see: Jonathan 
Wilkenfeld, et al. (1988), op.cit.: pp.70-3.
103 See: Coral Bell, (1971), op.cit.: pp.73-98,
viour.”  ^In order to achieve control over the application of military force 
to avoid an unwanted escalation of the crisis, it is important to recognize 
the limited applicability of the use of military instruments, either in iso­
lation of other nonviolent instruments of statecraft or for the resolution 
of the crisis itself.”* Although the use of military force must be closely 
integrated with a diplomatic strategy, avoidance of the application of mili­
tary force is also appealing as an inexpensive approach in that it reduces 
the political and psychological costs involved in the crisis.”*
The other physical instrument of crisis management assumes greater im­
portance than violent means and must be considered more complex as it in­
volves the combined use of an array of political tools of statecraft. While 
these can be broadly categorized within the field of diplomacy, economics, 
and international law,”* their use is far more flexible and applicable to a 
hostage-crisis situation, than just applying military force, as they consist 
of a variety of combined resources, utilized within the framework of a 
crafted strategy to alter the behaviour of an adversary in accordance with
”* See: G. Davidson-Smith, Combating Terrorism (London: Routledge, 1990); Peter C. 
Sederberg, Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric, and Reality (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice 
Hall, 1989); and Neil C. Livingstone and Terell E. Arnold, (1986), op.cit.
”* See: North Atlantic Assembly Political Committee Working Group on Terrorism,
Interim Report, November 1986: p.39. According to Casper Weinberger, U.S. Secretary of 
Defense, five basic conditions, reminicent of just, war theory, must be met before applying 
military force to a situation: ”[t]he force must be timely, appropriate, have public support, 
have a high probability of success and should be used only as a last resort", see: Brian M. 
Jenkins, "The US Response to Terrorism: a Policy Dilenma", TVI Journal (1985): p.34.
”* See: Paul Wilkinson, The Fight Against Terrorism, Mackenzie Paper No.14 (Toronto: 
Hie Mackenzie Institute, 1989): p.15.
”* See: Coral Bell, (1971), op.cit.: p.77. Also see: Paul Wilkinson, "Proposals for 
Government and International Responses to Terrorism", Terrorism, Vol.5, Nos.1-2 (Januaiy-April 
1981): pp.161-93; and Paul Wilkinson, "State-sponsored International Terrorism: the Problem of 
Response", Hie World Today, Vol.40, No.7 (July 1984): pp.201-9.
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one’s own interests.”* This strategy relies on a mixture of these political 
instruments of crisis management, either in isolation or in combination, 
through a process of "persuasion, coercive threats or actions, accommodative 
offers and concessions".”* While the components of the political instruments 
of statecraft may assume a coercive nature, ranging from the rupture of dip­
lomatic relations with states closely associated with the hostage-takers to 
the active apprehension and prosecution of hostage-takers in accordance with
domestic or international law, or may become conciliatory, ranging from 
lifting economic sanctions to the release of imprisoned terrorists, the 
actual application of these instruments to a crisis situation involves the 
techniques of crisis management.*” The exact nature of these techniques vary 
from crisis to crisis as crisis management is highly context-dependent, sub­
ject to the interplay of all ihVolved actors and to an array of important 
factors affecting the crisis situation.”* As a consequence, the application 
of a crisis management approach to hostage-situations in Lebanon will have 
to be adapted to the individual character of the crisis, in terms of actors 
as well as to the dynamics of the situation, which will determine the poli­
tical constraints and opportunities under which to apply different techniques
*” See: Alexander L. George, "Strategies for Crisis Management", in Alexander George 
(ed.) (1991), op.cit.: pp.377-394.
*” See: Alexander George, (1984), op.cit.: p.225. Also see: Russell J. Leng and 
Stephen G. Walker, "Comparing Two Studies of Crisis Bargaining: Confrontation, Coercion and 
Reciprocity", Joiunal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.26, No.4 (December 1982): pp.571-91.
*** Bell distinguishes between techniques and instruments of crisis management: a 
teclmique indicates how an instruments is used, see: Coral Bell, (1971), op.cit.: p.73. For a 
useful discussion of the use of these instruments, see: Kim Richard Nossal, "International 
sanctions as international punishment". International Organization, Vol.43, No.2 (Spring
1989): pp.301-22.
*** Tlris astute observation was made by Alexander George in crisis situation involving 
armed conflicts between two states and can be invariably related to all other ti^ pes of crisis, 
see: Alexander George, "A Provisional Tlieory of Crisis Management", in Alexander George, 
(1991), op.cit.: pp.23-4.
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of crisis management. While crisis management involves the choice between 
coercion and accommodation, or a mixture of the two, any application of 
crisis management techniques is dependent on the employment of a strategy.”* 
As the hostage-crisis in Lebanon involved not only the Hizb'allah organisa­
tion itself but also two identifiable state-actors, Iran and Syria, the 
application of crisis management instruments through various techniques as 
well as the devising of any strategy for their employment had to be conducted 
at two levels, accounting for both the advancement of Hizb'allah's own inte­
rests and the interests of its two patron states. This differentiation be­
comes necessary as both Iran and Syria have been not only closely involved 
in the activities of the Hizb'allah but also have exploited their roles as 
intermediaries in the hostage-crisis, in which these two states have actively 
used their influence over the Hizb'allah to release Western hostages through 
coercion and accommodation, in order to gain substantial advancements in 
their own foreign and domestic policy agendas.”* While the interests of 
Hizb'allah may converge with the interests of its patrons, as a range of de­
mands by the organisation is presented in conjunction with those of the spon­
soring states, it is necessary to clarify the salience of these demands to 
either adversary in order to discern the necessary strategy and direction of 
the application of crisis management techniques.”* This issue underlines the 
existence of certain requirements of crisis management in order to select
”* The concept of strategy conforms to the ideas of Thomas Schelling that it needs to 
be broadly based in terms of how one actor attempts to get another actor to do sonething it 
might not othenvise do, see: Thomas Schelling, The Strategv of Conflict (Cambridge, MA.: 
Harvard University Press, 1960).
*** See: Maskit Biugln, Ariel Merari, and Anat Kiurz, (1988), op.cit. : pp.42-50.
*** In fact, the selection of a strategy^  must be appropriate to the character of the 
crisis which offers a reasonable chance of achieving required political objectives in a crisis 
situation, see: A.L. George, Ü.K. Hall, and W.E. Simons, Hie Limits of Coercive PiplotnacN’ 
(Boston, MA.: Little, Brown, 1971): pp.228-44. Hie direction of crisis management instruments 
involves the necessary intelligence estimates of a crisis situation, see: R. Jeffrey Smith, 
"Crisis Management Under Strain, Science, No.225 (August 21, 1984).
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appropriate instruments of statecraft, to deploy these through effective 
techniques, and to devise a useful strategy for their deployment with a view 
to achieving the successful resolution of the crisis itself in accordance 
with clear and obtainable political objectives.**’ Although the requirements 
of crisis management vary in different types of crisis, these should be 
regarded as general principles for more effective management of hostage- 
crisis situations for policy-makers rather than necessary conditions in the
stricter sense.*** These political and operational requirements of crisis 
management in terrorist crisis situations, within the framework of the 
hostage-crisis in Lebanon, can be limited to: the limitation of political 
objectives pursued in a crisis; the limitation of means employed in pursuit 
of these objectives; accurate and timely intelligence on the adversary and 
on the crisis situation; the maintenance of communication with the adversary; 
access to and experience with crisis management machinery; search for a broad 
platform of support; and consideration of the precedent effect of crisis 
behaviour.***
The first requirement of the limitation of political objectives in a 
crisis for effective crisis management means that a policymaker must realize 
that in most cases it will be unable to achieve its maximum political objec­
**’ See; Alexander George, "Crisis Managanent: The Interaction of Political and 
Military Considerations", op.cit.: pp.225-6.
This point has been stressed in all major works of crisis manageiænt. For exaiiple, 
: Alexander George (ed.), (1991), op.cit.: pp.23-26.see
*** These requirements of crisis management were adapted from a wide variety of sources 
as recurrent components without the elements of war, see: Richard Clutterbuck, International 
Crisis and Conflict (London: Macmillan, 1993); Daniel Frei (ed.), (1978), op.cit.; Harlan 
Cleveland, "Crisis Diplomacy", Foreign Affairs, Vol.41 (July 1962/63); U. Rosenthal, et al., 
(1989), op.cit.; Alastair Buchanan, Crisis Management (Boulogne sur Seine: Atlantic Institute,
1966); Alexander George (ed.), (1991), op.cit.; Hilliard Roderick, Avoiding Inadvertent War: 
Crisis Management (Austin, TX.: L.B. Jolinson School of Public Affairs, 1983).
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tives.”* It can be expected that the increased intensity of the pursuit of 
political objectives at the expense of the adversary will be proportional 
to the increased will to resist by the adversary.”* It is also necessary to 
define the political objectives in a crisis within the framework of opportu­
nities and constraints in the given crisis environment for the establishment 
of the boundaries for the application of crisis management.”*
A second requirement for effective crisis management, the limitation 
of means employed in pursuit of these political objectives, is essential in 
order to avoid an unnecessary escalation of a crisis situation.”* This must 
entail a cost-benefit analysis that posits the risks to be run in pursuit of 
these political objectives as well as the costs of compromising these same 
objectives.”* It is also crucial to provide various ways in which the adver­
sary can retreat without losing^face in order to provide an avenue for the 
resolution of the crisis itself without too much cost.*** This may be achieved 
by the involvement of an international organisation or through mediation by 
a third party.
The third requirement of crisis management, accurate and timely intelli­
gence on the adversary and on the crisis-situation, involves the identifica­
*** See; I.L. Janis, (1989), op.cit.
*** See: Oran R. Young, Hie Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crisis,
op.cit.
*** See: J. Philip Rogers, "Crisis Bargaining Codes and Crisis Management", in 
Alexander George (ed.), (1991), op.cit.: p.415.
121 See: Alexander George (ed.), ibid.: pp.23-4.
*** See: Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing (ed.), op.cit.; and Cliristopher C. Joyner, "In 
Search of an Anti-Terrorism Policy^ ", Terrorism, Vol.11, No.l (1988); pp.29-42.
*** See: Coral Bell, "Decision-making by Governments in Crisis Situations", in Daniel 
Fi'ei (ed.), (1978), op.cit. : p.54.
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tion of the adversary and the dynamics of the crisis as a fundamental pre­
requisite to base any application of crisis management.*” As the failure to 
provide reliable and timely intelligence at the onset of the crisis and 
through its development leads to major errors in estimating an adversary's 
intentions in the crisis and reactions to employed responses,.it is critical 
to rely on accurate and timely intelligence in order to determine whether the 
selection of crisis management instruments are likely to be effective in eli­
citing a favoured response, where to apply these instruments, and when the 
application of these techniques is likely to be effective.**’
A fourth requirement of crisis management, the maintenance of communi­
cation with the adversary, is imperative as a means to avoid misunderstanding 
and ffliscommunication with the adversary, either through the means of direct 
channels or through an intermediary.*** As crisis management involves the 
signalling of coercion and accommodation, means of communication with the 
adversary become more valuable during a crisis as the likelihood of being 
misunderstood is greater.*** In order to utilize the crisis management in­
struments, even in the absence of diplomatic relations with an adversary, 
it is necessary to find alternative means of communication in order to 
maintain the balance between coercion and accommodation. Often the employment 
of a third party as an intermediary is advantageous in situations which pre-
*** See: Alfred C. Maur'er, Marion D. Tunstall, and James M. Keagle (eds.) Intelligence; 
Policy and Process (Boulder, 00. : Westview Press, 1985; and Uri Ra'anan, Robert Pfalzgraff, 
Jr., Richard H. Schultz, Ernest Halperin and Igor Lukes (eds.) Hydra of Carnage (Lexington, 
MA.: Ijexington Books, 1986).
**’ For a useful overview of intelligence as a requirement for crisis management, see: 
Jeffrey Smith, (1984), op.cit.; and Stan A. Taylor and Hieodore J. Ralston, "Hie Role of 
Intelligence m  Crisis Management", in Alexander George (ed.), (1991), op.cit.: pp.395-412.
**^ See: Charles F. Hermann, "Types of Crisis Actors and Their Implications for Crisis 
Management", in Daniel Frei (ed.), (1978), op.cit.: pp.29-30.
*** See: Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperceptions in International Politics 
(Princeton, CT.: Princeton University Press, 1976): p.58.
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vents direct negotiations with an adversary and as a shield to delay the 
urgency of the crisis.”* In order to maintain communication channels and to 
reduce the possibility of escalatory effects of a crisis, there must be re­
straint in the use of language through avoidance of ideological and mora­
lising posturing towards the adversary and the crisis itself.”*
The fifth requirement of crisis management, access to and experience 
with crisis management machinery, is essential for preparedness and effecti­
veness in any given crisis-situation.”* The existence of crisis management 
machinery will directly affect the outcome of success or failure in any 
efforts to employ various instruments and techniques to a crisis and to limit 
the effects of the situation.for policymakers.”* In order to be effective, 
the crisis management machinery must serve as the operational and support 
requirement for crisis management and negotiations as well as be able rapidly 
and accurately to adapt itself to the changing dynamics of the crisis- 
situation.”*
A sixth requirement of crisis management, the search for a broad plat­
*** See: Norman Antokol and Mayer Nudell, No Che A Neutral: Political Hostage-Taking in
the Modem World (Medina, OH.: Alpha Publications, 1990): pp.137-9.
*** See: Coral Bell, "Decision-making by Governments in Crisis Situations", Daniel Frei 
(ed.), (1978), op.cit.: p.55. For a useful overview of the importance of this in the Middle 
East, see: Xavier Raufer, "Middle East Terrorism: Rules of the Game", Political Warfare, No.18 
(Fall 1991): pp.l & 11-13.
*** See: Richard Clutterbuck, "Negotiating with Terrorists", Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1992): pp.263-287; and Uriel Rosenthal, et.al. (1989), op.cit.: 
p.3-33.
*** See: Alastair C. MacWillson, Hostage-Taking Terrorism: Incident-Response Strafecu' 
(London: Macmillan, 1992): pp.81-152..
*” It has been suggested that the functions of bureau-politics of crisis management
must put crisis and crisis-relevant agencies to the test, avoid single-mindeness and group-
think, and explore the potential relevance of open strategies for crisis management, see:
Uriel Rosenthal, Paul 't Hart and Alexander Kouzmin, "Hie Bureau-Politics of Crisis 
Management", Public Administration, Vol.69 (Simmer 1991): pp.211-33.
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form of support, is crucial in the domestic and international context in 
order to obtain endorsement of measures already implemented or planned in the 
future.*” In the domestic context, it is necessary to educate the public over 
the inherent difficulties of responding to the crisis in order to limit the 
effects of the crisis on the political leadership as well as to search for 
political support for any course of action prior to and throughout the cri­
sis.*” In the international context, it is necessary to seek political 
support from allies for the co-ordination and implementation of any course 
of action in order to avoid tension and cross-purpose activity.*”
The final requirement of crisis management, consideration of the pre­
cedent effect of crisis behaviour, must be present in order to avoid setting
•tt
unfavourable precedents for similar situations in the future.*” Apart from 
ensuring the legality of adopted measures in accordance with domestic and 
international law, the course of action adopted and implemented must be in 
accordance with previous agreements entered into with other states in order 
to avoid undermining either the credibility of promises made with allies or 
the actions of other states confronted by a similar crisis.*” An assessment 
must be made whether the behaviour in the handling of the crisis either en-
*” See: Hanspeter Neuhold, "Principles and Implementation of Crisis Management: 
Lessons from the Past, in Daniel Frei (ed.), (1978), op.cit.: p.8-9.
*” See: Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, 'Tfestem Responses to Terrorism: A 
Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1992): 
pp.322-30.
*” See: Paul Wilkinson, "Proposals for Government and International Responses to 
Terrorism", in idem (ed.) British Perspectives on Terrorism (London: Allen & Univin, 1981).
*” See: Hanspeter Neuhold, "Principles and Implementation of Crisis Management: 
Lessons fran the Past", in Daniel Frei (ed.), (1978), op.cit.: p.13-4;
*” See: L. Paul Bremer III, "Tlie West’s Counter-Terrorist Strategy", Terrorism and 
Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1992): pp.255-262.
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courages or discourages more crisis situations of a similar nature.*”
These requirements of crisis management should serve as a guideline in 
the task of formulation of an effective strategy which takes into account the 
necessary diplomatic desiderata in order to reconcile, as closely as possi­
ble, the policy dilemmas of crisis management, namely the dichotomy between 
the protection of national interests in a crisis and avoidance of measures 
that would escalate any crisis to undesirable and uncontrollable levels.*”
They can also serve as a useful guideline to the evaluation of any govern­
ment performance in confronting the hostage-crisis in Lebanon. Using crisis 
management instruments and techniques as adherence to these requirements 
should make for a more effective and consistent policy as well as path in 
efforts to resolve the dilemma of fulfillment of the duty by a state to pro­
tect its citizens abroad taken‘'hostage without sacrifice of its national 
interests in the conduct of foreign policy.*”
1.5 Methodology of Study:
In any field of academic study there exist an array of levels of ana­
lysis, each distinguished by different concepts, research questions and 
methodologies. While insight into any one level will illuminate a particular 
segment of analysis, although valuable in itself, it is the linkage of the 
findings at all levels into an aggregate whole that provides the ultimate 
challenge for academicians.*** A main point of departure for this study is 
that the focus on a single and one-dimensional level of analysis is deficient
*” See: Paul Wilkinson, (1977), op.cit.; p.129.
*” See: Alexander George, "A Provisional Theory of Crisis Management", in Alexander
George (ed.), (1991), op.cit.: p.23.
*** For axample, see: Clark McCauley, "Terrorism, Research and Public Policy: An
Overview", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.3, No.l (Spring 1991): p.139.
*** See: Michael Brecher and Hemda Ben Yehuda, "System and Crisis in International 
Politics", Review of International Studies, Vol.11 (1985): p.29.
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as a framework for full comprehension of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon. An 
examination of the dynamics of the crisis itself, and the application of cri­
sis management to it, through the employment of a multi-layered case-study 
approach, would enable us to move beyond the position of blind men attempting 
to grasp the elephant.***
Any methodological approach to study the hostage-crisis in Lebanon would 
seem to lend itself naturally to the use of a systems analysis in order to 
discern definable and regular patterns of interaction between the constituent 
actors.*** Using systems theory as a framework for understanding the hostage- 
crisis in Lebanon could provide academics with an analytical tool to identi­
fy, measure, and examine the interaction between Hizb'allah, Syria, and Iran 
within the environment of a regional subsystem.*** Although systems theory 
has valuable merits as an approach with wide application, it also has some 
severe limitations from a foreign policy approach in dealing with the complex 
interactions between the triangular relationship between Hizb’allah-Iran- 
Syria.**’ As systems theory is geared towards determination of predictability
*** As aptly observed by North: "[a]s research scholars and would-be theorists in 
international relations we might all derive at least three useful lessons from the old fable 
about the blind men and the elephant. The first is that the elephant [crisis] presumably 
existed; the second is that each of the groping investigators at the unit and system levels, 
despite sensory and conceptual limitations, had his fingers on a part of reality; and the 
third is that if they had cruieted the uproar and begun making comparisons, the blind men might 
- all of them - have moved considerably closer to the truth", see: R.C. North, "Research 
Pluralism and the International Elephant", International Studies Quarterly, Vol.11 (December
1967): p.394.
*** For definition of system analysis, see: Anatol Rapoport, "Foreword", in Walter 
Buckley (ed.) Modem Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientists (Chicago, IL.: Aldine,
1968): p.xvii. Also see: Michael Banks, "Systens Analysis and the Study of Regions", 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol.13, No.4 (December 1969).
*** For a list of propositions about regional subsystems, see: William R. Thompson,
"The Regional Subsystan: A Conceptual Explication and Propositional Inventory", International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol.17, No.l (March 1973): p.93.
**’ See: J.W. Biurton, Systems. States, Diplomacy and Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1968): p.6.
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in the interaction between the constituent actors within the regional sub­
system as well as with the international system/” it has been criticized 
for failing to achieve this objective/** A major problem with systems ana­
lysis, as deliniated by Stanley Hoffman, is the construction of a model of 
the behaviour of interacting groups within a system on certain hypotheses, 
which are often questionable, abstract, and arbitrarily derived and thus far 
removed from reality/** In theory, this flaw can be effectively demonstrated
by treating systems analysis as a broad-based funnel, which originates at its 
widest base with all actors involved in a particular hostage-crisis situation 
and begins with some general assumptions by policymakers, based upon precon­
ceived notions and information about a particular actor or several actors/** 
Moving along the narrower base of the funnel towards the crisis situation 
itself, these general assumptions become increasingly modified in order to 
adapt to a particular situation or actor. However, as the move away from the 
broad-based original assumptions occurs through modification, it often leads 
to the application of a new set of assumptions, at times in total contradic­
*** See: Morton A. Kaplan, "Systems Analysis: International Systems", in International 
Ihcvclopedia of Social Sciences (New York, NY.: The Macmillan Co. & The Free Press, 1968): 
p.481.
*** See: James E. Docherty and Robert J. Pfalzgraff, Jr. Contending Theories of 
International Relations: A Comprehensive Siu’vev (London: Harper & Row, 1990): pp.172-5.
*** See: Stanley Hoffman, "Theory as a Set of Questions", in Stanley Hoffmann (ed.) 
Contemporary Theory of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1960); 
and Stanley Hoffman, "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory", in James N. Rosenau 
(ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York, NY.: The Free Press, 1961),
*** In crisis situations, Richard Ned Lebow argues that policymakers are often strongly 
committed to particular policies from the outset of the crisis and either ignore or interpret 
any new information to make it consistent with own expectations, see: Robert Jeiyis, Richard 
Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, MD.: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1985): p.183. According to Pfaltzgraff, a major problem for US policymakers 
is: "[t]he tendency to rely upon faulty preconceptions and assumptions about societies whose 
cultures, values, and foreign policy goals differ drastically from those of the United 
States", see: Robert Pfalzgraff, "Intelligence in the Formation of Defense Policy", in Roy 
Godson (ed.) Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s (Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books, 1986):
p.81.
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tion to the original broad-based theory/” In the event that this occurs 
across a general area, it leads to a series of several assumptions with no 
linkage between each other as the original base has been perverted.”* In 
practise, this can be demonstrated by the systems analysis approach adopted 
by the Western policymakers to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon, both in terms 
of assumptions about the relationship between Hizb'allah and Iran as well as 
the applicability of traditional hostage-negotiation strategy and tactics to 
the situation. A major original and broad-based belief among Western policy­
makers has been that Hizb'allah's relationship with Iran has been monolithic 
and static, as the movement was considered merely an Iranian autonom.*” 
Another assumption has been that traditional counter-terrorism policy and
•H
techniques, crafted and applied to the broader areas of confronting state- 
sponsored terrorism in the Middlfe East and other forms of political violence 
elsewhere, were not only applicable but also adequate for effective responses 
to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon.*” As these original and broad-based
*” For example, the question of the relationship between Hizb'allah and Iran has 
vacilliated between total control and total independence. For exairple, see: Alvin B.
Bernstein, "Iran's Low-Intensity War Against the United States", Qrbis, Vol.30 (1986): pp.149- 
67; Independent, August 30, 1989; New York Times, December 18, 1986; and Newsweek. February 
27, 1989.
*’* The perversion of the base of original assumptions may explain some of the reasons 
for the failure to pursue a coherent policy throughout the hostage-crisis, see: J. Philip 
Rogers, "Crisis Bargaining Codes and Crisis Managemnt", in Alexander George (ed.), (1991), 
op.cit.: pp.413-42.
*” For remarks by William J. Casey, CIA director, "International Terrorism: Potent 
Challenge to American Intelligence", Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 
April 17, 1985. Also see: William B. Quandt, "The Wti-Dimensional Cliallenge of Terrorism: 
Common Misperceptions and Policy Dilenmas", in Qiarles W. Kegley, Jr. International Terrorism: 
Cliaracteristics, Causes, Controls (London: Macmillan, 1990): pp.74-80. Also see: James A.
Bill, "The U.S. Overture to Iran 1985-1986: An Analysis", in Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. 
Gasiorowski (eds.), (1990), op.cit.: p.176
*” For the range of counter-terrorism tools, see: Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit.: 
pp.66-8. This flawed assumption has been demonstrated by Ridiard Clutterbuck from his 
statement that: "[t]hese kidnaps appear to have achieved nothing at all for Hezbollah and Iran 
other than an image of barbarism", see: Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism in an Unstable World 
(London: Routledge, 1994): p.156.
assumptions moved towards the narrower base of the funnel in interaction with 
the multitiered dynamics of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon, it resulted in a 
series of new uncoordinated assumptions for policymakers, fundamentally 
different from the assumption from which policy and approach were based upon 
originally. This problem has been eloquently echoed by Paul Wilkinson that 
the tendency to oversimplify and generalize tends to produce simplistic and 
dangerous proposals for panaceas.”* As a consequence, this fundamental pro­
blem necessitates a different type of approach, namely that: "[i]ndividual 
cases rather than a series of abstract assumptions can credibly constitute 
the ’building blocks' of theory formation".”’ In terms of this study, using 
a case-study approach to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon, through the employ­
ment of the same funnel from systems analysis, translates into a "bottom- 
up" approach without any generaï* assumptions from the start.”’ A case-study 
analysis of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon involves a thorough study of the 
particular situation at hand and the multitiered dynamics of all involved 
actors [Hizb'allah, Iran and Syria], all interconnected at various levels, 
in order to evaluate and formulate a specific policy for a particular situa­
tion.*’* In the event that this can be done with several individual hostage-
*’* As stated by Paul Wilkinson: "[c]ontaxt is all in the analysis of political 
violence. In view of the enormous diversity of groups and aims involved, generalizations and 
evaluations covering the whole field of modem terrorism should be treated with considerable 
reserve", see: Paul Wilkinson, "Fighting the Hydra: Terrorism and the Rule of Law", Har\’ard 
International Review, Vol.7 (1985): pp.11-15.
*” See: George Andreopoulos, "Studying American Grand Strategy; Facets in an 
Exceptionist Tradition", Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol.42, No.7 (July 1991): p.226.
*” As Uri Bar-Joseph has aptly described the problem: "[t]hat the best methodology is 
no substitute for cannon sense, and that basic errors in selecting propositions and in testing 
them through inappropriate case-studies mil yield erroneous conclusions", see: Uri-Bar- 
Joseph, "Methodological Magic", Journal of Intelligence and National Security (October 1988): 
p.134.
*’* For the various levels of analysis, see: J. David Singer, "Tlie Level-of-Analysis 
Problem in International Relations", in Klaus Rnorr and Sidney Verba (eds.) The International 
System (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1961): pp.77-92.
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crises with similar dynamics, the various crises can be examined for linkage 
and commonality which, in turn, forms the framework for a new broad theory.
The employment of systems analysis with a high degree of generalization 
will automatically also not achieve the expected positive results or predic­
tability of using crisis management to the hostage-crisis.^* This can be ex­
plained by the fact that the generalizations of systems analysis fail to 
account for the dynamics of a continuous fluctuation in the environment vis- 
à-vis the interaction between Hizb'allah-Iran-Syria.^” The configuration of 
the hostage-crisis in Lebanon is reminiscent of a cobweb in which the inter­
action of the Hizb’allah with its environment; the interaction between 
Hizb'allah and Iran and Syria, respectively; and the interaction between Iran 
and Syria superimpose themselves on the ground in Lebanon, resulting in a 
multitiered system of constant interaction, a process vital to the under­
standing of the mechanics of the hostage-crisis itself and, in particular, 
to the application of any crisis management techniques.In order for
This can be considered in alignment with the ideas for theory formation advanced by 
Schmid and Jongman through case-studies to make any theoretical progress, see: Alex P. Schmid 
and Albert J. Jongman, (1988), op.cit.: pp.61-130. For the development of theory through the 
use of case-studies, see: A.L. George, "Case Studies and Tlieory Development: The Method of 
Structured Focused Comparison", in P. Lauren (ed.) Diplonacv: New Approaches (New York, NY. : 
Free Press, 1979): pp.43-68.
As stated by J.L. Gaddis: "[f]or in coping mth unsimulatable situations, theory - 
wliich is only past experience projected forward - is, and should be, of little help: variables 
overwhelm the capacity for generalization; generalizations, if attoipted, are almost certain 
to mislead", see: John Lems Gaddis, The United States and the Bid of the Cold War (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992): p.192. For example, in a memorandum for the U.S. President, 
entitled "Covert Action Finding Regarding Iran" (January 17, 1986), John Poindexter advocated 
that, the approach through Iran was the only way to achieve the release of the American 
hostages, see: Peter Kombluh and Malcolm Byrne (eds.) Tlie Iran-Contra Scandal; The 
Declassified Story (New York, NY.: The New Press, 1993): p.233,
Wiile identifying the breadth of linkages between Hizb'allali-Iran-Syria becomes 
essential for any analysis of the hostage-crisis, it is equally important to understand its 
depth.
See: Gregory A. Raymond, "Comparative Analysis and Nomological Explanation", in 
diaries W. Kegley,'Jr., et.al. (eds.) International Events and the Comparative Analysis of 
Foreign Policy (Columbia, SC.: University of South Carolina Press, 1975): pp.41-51.
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policy-makers to avoid a one-dimensional general approach, it is necessary 
to opt for an integrated multilayered framework of analysis as a base for a 
case-study from which it is possible to superimpose the instruments and 
techniques of crisis management used by Western governments to evaluate its 
effectiveness in the past and its applicability for the future.^” A main 
underlying criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of crisis management is 
not only adherence to certain requirements of effective crisis management 
strategy but also its employment in accordance with the dynamics of the 
crisis situation itself As a consequence, in agreement with Robert Jervis, 
when not only many factors are at work, but also the relationships among them 
are varied, case studies will make the greatest contribution to under- 
standing."*
1.6 Literature Review:
The literature on the hostage-crisis in Lebanon can be characterized by 
the discrepancy between the enormous quantity of sources available in the 
public domain and the relatively limited quantity and quality of analysis 
pursued by academics and policymakers on the subject. While the quantitative 
aspects of the hostage-crisis literature can be related to the sensational 
nature of this form of foreign policy crisis, the hostage-issue has been
As aptly described by Charles Kegley, Jr.: "Merely asking the question, 'Is a 
particular act of terrorism accounted for by domestic or external influences?' requires us to 
consider the possibility that it was not determined exclusively by only one set of factor's, 
but by a number in combination. This allows complexity to be captured and serves as an 
antidote to inaccurate stereotypes and invalid inferences", see: Charles W. Kegley, Jr.: 
International Terrorism: Clraracteristics, Causes, Controls, op.cit.: p.98.
As aptly stated by Coral Bell: "[cjrisis management must certainly be thought of as 
an art or craft, not a science, and as in other arts, success may depend on the imaginative 
capacity to disregard rules and precedents. I would therefore be doubtful of any ambitious 
effort to attain a high level of abstraction in the analysis of crisis. Abstraction requires 
simplification: to simplify realities that are in fact very complex is to falsify them", see: 
Coral Bell, "Decision-Making by Governments in Crisis Situations", in Daniel Frei (ed),
(1978), op.cit.: pp.51-2.
"* See: Robert Jervis, "Models and Cases in the Study of International Conflict", 
Journal of International Affairs, Vol.44, No.l (Spring-Surrmer 1990): pp.81-101.
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amplified as a subject, as it occured within a protracted civil war environ­
ment, but has also suffered from constraint by the same environment, in terms 
of the availability and scope of information on the hostage-taking organisa­
tions acting under the umbrella of the Hizb'allah.*" Although the complexity 
of operating within the chaotic environment of Lebanon's civil war has con­
tributed to the difficulty in accurately identifying the nature of the 
hostage-takers themselves, it has been compounded by the obsession of the
Hizb'allah movement for operational secrecy.*" The lack of accurate intelli­
gence on the Hizb'allah movement, exacerbated by an abundance of rumours, has 
presented academic analysts and journalists with special barriers to overcome 
in order to provide a composite picture over the dynamics of the hostage-
■X
crisis.*" While these inherent problems have led most academics to dismiss 
the possibility of unravelling -the inner dimensions of Hizb'allah activity 
in any meaningful way for a fuller and better understanding of the hostage- 
crisis, it has also contributed to a countless array of unreliable Western 
journalistic accounts based on unconfirmed rumours and faulty assumptions.*" 
The lack of in-depth analysis by academics into the Hizb'allah movement have 
forced them into no other avenue than reliance on systems theory to provide
*" While most studies on Lebanon's civil war only mention Hizb'allah in passing, the 
best account of the movement can be found in: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.; and Andreas Rieck, 
Die Sliiiten und der Kampf um den Libanon, Politische Clironik 1958-1988 (Hambiu'g: Deutsches 
Orient-Institut, 1988).
*" For Hizb'allah's secrecy, see: Ali al-Kiuani, Tariqat Hizballah fil-amal al-islami 
(Beirut: 1986); and Robin Wright, (1989), op.cit.
*" For example, see: Daniel Pipes, "Dealing with Middle Eastern conspiracy theories", 
Orbis, Vol.36, No.l (Winter 1992): pp.41-56.
*" See: John Calabrese, "Iran II: the Damascus connection". The World Today (October
1990) ; Robin Wright, Sacred Rage: Tlie Wrath of Militant Islam (New York, NY. : Simon and 
Schuster, 1986); Farhang Jalianpoiur, "Hie Roots of the Hostage Crisis", Hie World Today 
(February 1992); John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics (Syracuse, NY. : Syracuse University 
Press, 1991); and Martin Kramer, "La morale du Hizbollah et sa logique", Maghreb-Machrek, 119, 
(janv.-mars, 1988): pp.39-59.
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a general approach to a complex subject. Herein lies the inherent inconsis­
tency of analysis for those who study these movements, such as academics, 
and, more importantly, policymakers, who are handcuffed into making specific 
crisis management decisions with only a general composite picture.*" Like a 
giant jigsaw puzzle, the real dilemma for any serious scholar has been not 
only to decipher the valuable information from either dis- or misinformation 
as well as seperating facts from fiction, but also to describe and interpret 
the bigger picture, especially the contexts of international and domestic 
politics present during the crisis. The need to conduct post-mortems of 
Western responses to the hostage-crisis are obvious given the failure of most 
states to adequately minimise its impact on domestic and foreign policy
•H
affairs and its destabilizing effect during the last decade on intra-state 
relations in the international system which has served to perpetuate past and 
present Middle East conflicts.
A number of valuable scholarly contributions exists on the the transfor­
mation of the Lebanese Shi'a community from political quietism to militant 
activism, shedding light on the conditions that facilitiated its active 
political and military entry within a civil war environment.*" Yet, this 
only contributed to a limited amount of direct academic analysis on the
*" As accurately pointed out by the eminent Middle East scholar John Esposito: " [m] ore 
often than not, Islamic movements are lumped together; conclusions are dram based on 
stereotyping or expectation than empirical research. The problem owes less to the secrecy of
individuals and organizations than to more mundane factors: the less we know, the more we tend
to generalize or deductively conclude from that which we do Mow", see: John L. Esposito, 
"Presidential Address 1989 - The Study of Islam: Qiallenges and Prospects", Middle East 
Studies Association Bulletin, Vol.24-5 (1990-1): p.5.
*" Among the most valuable are: Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Slii'a: Struggle 
for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin, TX.: University of Texas Press, 1987); Martin Kramer (ed.)
Shi'ism. Resistance and Revolution (Boulder, 00.: Westview Press, 1987); Juan R.I. Cole and '
Nikki R. Keddie (eds.) Shi'ism and Social Protest (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press,
1986); Fouad Ajami, Tlie Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr & the Shia of Lebanon (Ithaca, NY. :
Cornell University Press, 1986); and James Piscatori, The Rindementalism Project (Chicago,
IL. : The American Acadmy of Arts and Sciences, 1992).
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Hizb'allah movement itself."* While few academic studies have dealt with 
certain aspects of Hizb'allah's practise of terrorism and hostage-taking, 
more recent efforts have focused on Hizb'allah's political readjustment 
within Lebanon's post-civil war environment.*"
The exisiting academic literature on Hizb'allah and its use of political 
violence against foreigners make valuable individual contributions to the 
overall picture of the true nature of the movement and its activity.*" While 
a few studies have concentrated on exploration of certain aspects of the 
movement's relationship with Iran,*" most small fragments of information on
*" For a journal article on the origins of Hizb'allah, see: Shimon Shapira, "The 
Origins of Hizballali", The Jerusalem Quarterly, Vol.46 (Spring 1988). Among the most valuable 
work on the movement has been conducted by Martin Kramer, mainly on the ideological dimensions 
of the movement, see: Martin Kramer, "The Moral Logic of Hizballah", in Walter Reich (ed.) 
Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, op.cit.: pp.131- 
57; and Martin Kramer, "The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah", in Martin Kramer (ed.) The 
Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World (Boulder, 00. : Westview Press, 1990). For a useful 
overview of Hizb'allah's position vis-à-vis other Shi'ite movements in Lebanon, see: Marius 
Deeb "Shia Movements in Lebanon: Their Formation, Ideology, Social basis, and Links with Iran 
and Syria", Third World Quarterly, Vol.10, No.2 (April 1988) : pp.683; and Marius Deeb,
Militant Islamic Movements in Lebanon: Origins, Social Basis, and Ideology, Occasional Paper 
Series (Washington, DC. : Georgetown Uhivei^ ity, November 1986).
*" A useful overview of Hizb'allah's political aspirations in Lebanon, see: A. Nizar 
Hamzeh, "Lebanon's Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation", Third 
World Quarterly, Vol.14, No.2 (1993): pp.321-37.
*" See: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz, and Ariel Merari, Foreign Hostages in Ldiancm, 
op.cit.; As'ad AbuKhalil, "Ideology and Practise of Hizballah in Lebanon; Islamization of 
Leninist Organizational Principles", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.27 (July 1991); Xavier 
Raufer, Atlas Mondial de L'Islam Activiste, op.cit.; Shimon Shapira, "Shi'ite Radicalism in 
Lebanon: Historical Origins and Organizational, Political and Ideological Patterns", M.A. 
thesis (Hebrew; Tel Aviv University, May 1987); George Joffe, "Iran, the Southern 
Mediterranean and Europe: Terrorism and Hostages", in Anoushiravan Ehtesham and Manshour 
Varasteh (eds.) Iran and the International Cotrmunity (London: Routledge, 1991); Xavier Raufer, 
La Nebuleuse: le Terrorisme du Moyen-Orient, op.cit. ; and Martin Kramer, "Hizbullah: The 
Calculus of Jiliad", in E.M. Martin and Scott Appleby (eds.) Fundementalisms Cbserved: The 
Fundementalist Project, Vol.3 (Chicago, IL.: University of Chicago Press, 1991): pp.539-56.
*" For the academic studies on Hizb'allah's relationship with Iran, see: Nassif Hitti, 
"Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Constraints", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and 
Nader Entessar (eds.) Iran and the Arab World (London: Macmillan, 1993); Yosef Olmert, 
"Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik", in David Menashri (ed.) The Iranian 
Revolution and the hkislim World, op.cit.; Sean K. Anderson. "Iranian State-Sponsored 
Terrorism", Conflict Quarterly, Vol.11, No.4 (Fall 1991); Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: 
Hie Internal Conflict and the Iranian Connection", in John L. Esposito (ed.) The Iranian 
Revolution: Its Global Impact (Miami, FL. : Florida International University Press, 1990) ; and
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the dynamic interaction between Hizb'allah and its environment as well as 
with Iran and Syria must be extracted from other more general academic stu­
dies on Middle East politics and from domestic as well as foreign press re­
ports.*" The dénouement of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon in 1991, coupled 
with a more openess of the Hizb'allah as a parliamentary political party 
from 1992, has made the study of the movement not only more feasible and 
accessible in terms of new information about the movement than previous aca­
demic attempts to overcome the secrecy barriers of the subject, but also 
more salient in terms of providing a broad and in-depth understanding of a 
phenomenon that plagued the conduct of foreign policy for most Western 
governments for over a decade.*"
In contrast to information surrounding the hostage-crisis in Lebanon, the 
academic literature on the subject, as opposed to theory, of crisis manage­
ment and its application to specific hostage-situations in unknown environ­
ments is still in its infancy. This is due to the fact that many of these 
hostage-crisis situations are not fixed, rather part of an ongoing process. 
As such, they remain static which means that indepth comprehensive and accu­
rate accounts of their study are subject to scrutiny. While previous analysis
Bruce Hoffman, Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Iranian Sponsored International Terrorism 
R-3783 USDP (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, 1990).
*" For a range of book and journal sources used in this study, see: bibliography. Over 
104 newspapers and periodicals over a ten-year period were used as sources in the study of 
Hizb'allah and were cross-checked for accuracy with other sources. A majority of information 
and its validity about the nature of the movement was also confirmed in interviews (1990-94) 
by the author with intelligence, counterterrorism, and government officials from the iMted 
States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Israel, Soviet Union, and Sweden. Interviews were also 
conducted with a number of Lebanese journalists with close contacts to highranking Hizb'allah 
members in August 1991 as well as with a senior PLD official with knowledge about Hizb'allah's 
SSA, most notably of Imad Mughniya, and with the movement's links with other Islamic 
organisations in April 1994. For an extremely useful exposé of the merits of using newspapers 
in academic and scholarly analysis, see: Paul Wilkinson, "Contributing to Broadcast News 
Analysis and Current Affairs Documentaries: Qiallenges and Pitfalls", in Cheryl Haslam and 
Alan Brymaii, Social Scientists Meet the Media (London: Routledge, 1994): pp.138-50.
*" For example, see: The Middle East, February 1993; and The Lebanon Report, Vol.4,
No.3 (Mardi 1993).
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has focused on the mechanics of using crisis management machinery to specific 
barricade/siege situations, the void in the academic field of using crisis 
management as an applied instrument and guideline for the evaluation of 
Western government response to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon needs to be 
filled in order to bridge efforts to reconcile the inherent policy dilemmas 
displayed by the chequered history of Western government response to this 
form of foreign policy crisis. Apart from the inherent tendency by these
Western governments to veil their past performance to the hostage-crisis in 
complete secrecy, the emerging literature on uncovered secret initiatives by 
policymakers are useful not only as a justification that performance in 
managing hostage-taking situations needs to be significantly enhanced in 
order to limit its effect in the conduct of foreign policy, but also as a 
rich source of information to the whole range of problems facing policymakers 
trying to extract themselves from these forms of crisis.*" While the majority 
of these exposés, most notably the Iran-Contra debaclé, have provided fuller 
insights into the inner sanctum of foreign policy-making in hostage-crisis 
situations, few have drawn valuable lessons for the improvement of Western 
government responses in the past or for the future. This study intends not 
only to contribute to a fuller understanding of the labyrinthine complexity 
of the dynamics of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon but also to bridge the gap 
between a detailed case-study of a terrorist group, sponsored by outside 
states, and the evaluation of Western government responses to this foreign
*" The most valuable studies or reports are: Peter Komblum and Malcolm Byrne (eds.) 
The Iran-Contra Scandal; The Declassified History (New York, NY.: The New Free Press, 1993) ; 
Executive Office of the President. President's Special Review Board 1987. Report of the 
President's Special Review Board [Tower Commission Report] (Washington DC.: GOP, February 26,
1987) ; Scott Armstrong, Malcolm Byrne, and Tom Blanton, The Chronology: The Documented Dav-bv- 
Day Account of the Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Contras (New York, NY.: Warner 
Books, 1987); Bob Woodward, Veil: Hie Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987 (New York, NY.: Simon 
and Schuster, 1989); Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs, op.cit.; 
Pierre Pean, La Menace, op.cit.; Annie Laurent and Antoine Basbous, Guerres Secretes au Liban 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1987); Yves Loiseau, Le Grand Troc: Des Otages Français au Liban (Paris: 
Hachette, 1988); and Gilles Delafon, Beyrouth: Les Soldats de l'Islam (Paris: Stock, 1989).
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policy crisis using crisis management as an instrument to evaluate their 
effectiveness and success.
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CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND TO THE FORMATION OF THE HIZB'ALLAH IN LEBANON 
2.1 Introduction:
Prior to the organisational formation of Hizb'allah in June 1982, the 
Lebanese Shi'a community was largely regarded, by other militias as well as 
outside observers, as politically irrelevant in Lebanon.* Apart from the Amal 
movement, founded in 1974 by Imam Musa al-Sadr,* the Shi'a of Lebanon re­
mained a predominatly poor and disorganized religious community.’ Although 
certain signs of Shi'a political and socio-economic grievances began to sur­
face during the 1970s, through increasing politicization and involvement in 
a number of multiconfessional leftist and Communist groups, the mobilization 
of the Shi'a into militant Islamic movements was largely overshadowed by the 
dimensions of civil war in Lebanon. Subsequently, the emergence of Hizb'allah 
in 1982 was perceived by the West largely within the context of Iran's revo­
lutionary efforts to export its revolution following Israel's 1982 invasion 
of Lebanon.* However, it would be erroneous, as pointed out by Augustus
* See: Augustus Richard Norton, "Changing Actors and Leadership Among the Shiites of 
Lebanon", The Annals of the American Acadmv of Political Sciences, Vol.482 (November 1985: pp.109- 
121) .
' Hie Amal movement [Harakat AMAL - ^ o^vement for the Dispossessed] was formed by Imam Musa 
al-Sadr, the president of the Higher Shi'i Islamic Council from 1969 until his disappearence in 
Libya in August 1978. See: Marius Deeb, "Lebanon: Prospects for National Reconciliation in the mid- 
1980"s", Hie Middle East Joiunal, Vol.38 (1984): pp.268-9. Also see: Shimon Shapira, "Hie hnam Musa 
al-Sadr: Father of the Shiite Resurgence in Lebanon", Jerusalm Quarterlv, No.44 (Fall 1987): 
pp.121-44.
’ For a detailed analysis of the socio-economic status of the Shiites, see: Augustus Richard 
Norton, "Harakat Amal (Hie Movement of Hope)", in Myron J. Aronoff (ed.) Religion and Politics,
(New Brunswick, NJ.: Transaction Books, 1984): pp.105-31.
* For prominent examples of this view, see: Alvin H. Bernstein, (1986), op.cit.: pp.149-67; 
Brian Michael Jenkins and Robin Wright, (1986), op.cit.: pp.2-11; and Marius Deeb, (1988), op.cit.; 
p.692.
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Richard Norton, to assume that the Shi'a emerged to prominence on the Leba­
nese scene in 1982 as a mere creation by Iran.’ Although recognizing that 
Iran played a decisive role in the emergence of Hizb'allah, from being 
initially a small group spearheaded by senior Shi'i clergy without a distinct 
organisational apparatus to a full-fledged participant in the mainstream of 
Lebanese politics, the political mobilization of Lebanon's Shi’i community 
has occurred in stages which preceeded Hizb'allah's entry as a radical and 
militant organisation in June 1982 by several decades.*
Although the actual creation of the Hizb'allah movement occurred in June 
1982 when a breakaway faction from Amal, the Islamic Amal party, merged with 
a network of radical Shi'ites from other Lebanese movements, such as the 
Lebanese al-Da'wa, the Association of Muslim Uluma in Lebanon, and the 
Association of Muslim Students, the various strands of these Shi'ite move­
ments and organisations which formed into one political entity under the 
umbrella of Hizb'allah could trace its origins to the activities during the 
1960-7ÛS of the Shi'i religious academies in the south of Iraq most notably 
in the Shi'i shrine city of Najaf,’ and was closely associated and connected 
with the emergence of the Iraqi underground movement al~Da'vah al-Islâmiyah 
(the Islamic Da'wa).* At these theological schools, a cadré of young Shi'ite
’ Augustus Richard Norton, (1990), op.cit.; p.121.
* As accurately recognized by Richard Schultz, Jr., see: R. Schultz, Jr., Iranian Covert 
Aggression: Support for Radical Political Islamists Conducting Internal Subversion Against States 
in the Middle East/Southwest Asia Region, unpublished manuscript (Summer 1994): p.17.
’ Both Najaf and Karbala contain shrines pre-eminently holy for the Shi'is. While Najaf is 
the burial site of Imam Ali, thought by the Shia to have been the rightful successor to the Prophet 
("îuhammed, the shrine at Karbala contains the body of Imam Ali's son Hussein, the third Imam. For 
the role of Najaf and Karbala in the Shi'ite world, see: Christine Moss Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank 
of the Arab World (Washington, B.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1984): p.142.
* See: Hanna Batatu, "Shi'i Organizations in Iraq: al-Da'wah al-Islamiyya and aH^ lujahidin", 
in Juan R. I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (eds.), (1986), op.cit. ; p.191; and Le Monde Diplomatique,
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scholars from Iran, Iraq and Lebanon were educated and influenced by radical 
Islamic theories from prominent senior Iraqi and Iranian Shi*a clergy.’ As 
Islam does not recognize the concept of nationality, leading to the founda­
tion of a pan-Islamic ideology, it was natural that most senior clergy and 
their students at Najaf and Karbala forged close and personal friendships. 
In fact, the activity of the Shi'i clergy in Najaf has been at the heart of 
most revivalist movements in the Muslim world and has contributed to most of 
Islam’s current political vitality." In particular, it was in Najaf that 
Rûhallah al-Khumayynl spent fourteen years in exile and where he formulated 
his own revolutionary brand of Shi'i Islam which was transformed into reality 
with the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 and has subsequently served as 
a great source of inspiration and guidance to Lebanon's Shi'a community and 
to contemporary Islamic movements across the Middle East and beyond." While 
the religious indoctrination of radical Islamic theory that the future 
Hizb'allah clerics received at Najaf provided the ideological foundation for
April 1984, p.15. While the exact date of origin of al-Da'wah al-Islamiyya is unknown. Ayatollah 
Mahdi al-Hakim has dated the origin of the organisation to 1958 or briefly thereafter. For 
interview with al-Hakim, see: Impact International, April 25 - May 8, 1980.
’ The leading Iraqi Shi'i clergy at Najaf included; Muhsin al-Hakim and Abu'l-^im al-Khu'i 
[two most senior legal authorities in Iraq]; and Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. For details of Shi'i 
fundamentalists in Najaf, see: Marvin Zonis and Daniel Brumberg, "Khomeini, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, and the Arab World", Harvard Middle East Papers. V (1987). For an historical overview of the 
activity at the spiritual center of Najaf, see: Elie Kedourie, "The Iraqi Shi'is and Their Fate", 
in Martin Kramer (ed.), (1987), op.cit.: pp.135-7. Also see: Hanna Batatu, "Iraq's Ikiderground 
Shi'a bbvements: Characteristics, Causes and Prospects", Middle East Studies, Vol.35, No.4 (Autumn 
1981).
" See: Abbas Kelidar: "Hie Shii Imami Comminity and Politics in the Arab East", Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol.19, No.l (January 1983): pp.3-16,
" See: Chibli Mallat, Slii'i Thought from the South of Lebanon, Papers on Lebanon, no.7 
(Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, April 1988). Also see: Amazia Baram, "The Impact of 
Khomeini's Revolution on the Radical Shi'i >fovement of Iraq", in David Menashri (ed.), op.cit.
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the organisation and led to the forging of close-knit relationships and net­
works between eminent leaders of the Shi'a community across the Middle East, 
the involvement of Lebanese Najaf-educated clerics, who later became pro­
minent Hizb'allah leaders, with other radical clergy in the activities of the 
Iraqi al~Da'wa al-Islàmiya directly influenced the Shi'a resurgence in 
Lebanon." In particular, the confrontation with the Ba'athi regime had a 
strong influence on the political mobilization of the Shi'a community." 
Apart from an extensive campaign of repression against Shi'i clergy and 
institutions in Iraq, the Ba'th regime launched a policy resulting in the 
massive deportation of foreign clerics." As a consequence, a number of 
Najaf-schooled Lebanese clerics returned to Lebanon where they established 
Shi'ite educational institutions, based on the Najaf model, to a young 
generation of students, indoctrinated in radical Islamic theory." Other 
Najaf-educated clerics returned to Lebanon where they formed a Lebanese twin 
organisation of the Iraqi al-Da‘wa al-Islamiyah, the Lebanese al-Da'wa 
party." This party, under the spiritual guidance of Sheikh Muhammad Hussein
" See: Hanna Batatu, "Shi'i Organizations in Iraq: al-Da'wah al-Islamiyya and al-Mujahedin", 
in Juan R.I, Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (eds.), (1986), op.cit.; pp.179-200. Also see: Chibli Mallat, 
"Religious Militancy in Contemporary Iraq: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr and the Sunni-Shia Paradigm", 
Third World Quarterlv, Vol.10, No.2 (April 1988): pp.699-729.
" Following the Ba'ath coup d'état of 1969, the secular regime unleashed a campaign of 
repression against Shi'i clergy and their institutions. Fearful of the growing influence of the 
radical uluma in Najaf and Karbala, the Ba'ath regime directed this campaign towards curbing 
Islamic institutions through persecution of Shi'i clergy and imposition of strict cencorship on 
religious publications, see: Ofra Bengio, "Shi'is and Politics in Ba'athi Iraq", Middle Eastern 
Studies, Vol.21, No.l (January 1985).
" Amazia Baram, Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba'athist Iraq: 1968-89 
(New York, NY. : St. Martins Press, 1991): p.138.
" See: Shimon Sliapira, (1988), op.cit.: p.130. Also see: Hie Times, April 3, 1986; al-Nahar, 
January 19, 1989; al-Nahar, March 21, 1989; and Xavier Raufer, (1987), op.cit.: pp.160-1.
** See: al-Shira, March 15, 1986.
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Fadlallah,*’ would later become a core component in the establishment of the 
Hizb'allah movement in 1982." It is, therefore, essential to understand that 
the Najaf-background of most members of Hizb'allah’s command leadership as 
veil as the activity of Iraq's al-Da'wa al-Islamiya, as a forerunner to the 
creation of the Hizb'allah, was the antecedent to the revolutionary ideologi­
cal basis of, and the organisational evolution of, the current movement in 
Lebanon as well as the influence of the close friendships forged between 
Hizb'allah clergy and members of Iran's clerical establishment."
The background to the establishment of Hizb'allah can also be attributed 
to an array of other factors and events both within and external to Lebanon. 
Parallel to the activities of the religious academies in Iraq and al-Da 'wa 
al-Islémiya, the Lebanese Shi'a community emerged as a major political and 
military force against the background of social exclusion and economic 
deprivation within Lebanon. While the history of the Lebanese Shi'ites had
** Sheikh Fadlallah was bom in 1934 in Najaf. A descendant of a family of clergymen, SheiMi 
Fadlallah hails from Aynata, a southern Lebanese town near the Shi'ite center of Bint Jbail. For a 
full biographical account of SheiWi Fadlallah, see: Martin Kramer, "Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah", 
Orient; German Journal for Politics and Economics of the Middle East, Vol.26, No.2 (June 1985): 
pp.147-49; and "Leadership Profile: Sheikh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah", Defense & Foreign Affairs 
Weekly (June 23-29, 1986): p.7 Sheikh Fadlallah used the bi-montly al-Muntalaq, published by the 
Lebanese Ikiion of Muslim Students, as the main vechicle to distribute his radical-activist ideas, 
see: Ehmanuel Sivan, "Sunni Radicalism and the Iranian Revolution", International Journal of Middle 
East Studies, Vol.21 (1989): p.27. In Islam and the Logic of Force, SheiMi Fadlallah used the 
Quranic idea of uniting believers into Hizb'allali and unbelievers into Hizb'al-shaytan as a 
response to the threat of Islam, see: Olivier Carré, "Quelques mots-clefs de Muhanmad Husayn 
Fadlallah", Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol.37, No.4 (August 1987): pp.478-501; and idem, 
"La 'révolution islamique' selon Muhanmad Husayn Fadlallah", Orient: German Journal for R>litics 
and Economics of the Middle East, Vol.29, No.l (March 1988): pp.68-84.
" Hie Lebanese al-Da 'wa dissolved in 1980 as it was considered to be divorced from the 
masses of the Shi'a community as it enphasized secrecy and underground activity, see: al-Muntalaq, 
October 1985.
" See: John Calabrese, (1990), op.cit.: p.189.
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been traditionally marked by political submission and lament, the advent of 
Imam Musa al-Sadr's leadership over the Shi'a community transformed it into 
one of rebellion and social protest." Yet, Shi'a activism was not only the 
product of political and socioeconomic grievances combined with an effective 
charismatic religious leadership, that used key religious symbolism to mobi­
lize Shi'i Muslims into protest and revolutionary movements." It was also 
profoundly influenced between 1975 and 1982 by a number of major events." 
Apart from the breakdown of the Lebanese state signified by the onset of 
civil war in 1975, a number of events, both within and external to Lebanon, 
changed the Shi'i community from a marginal entity to a major political and 
military force within Lebanon. Three major events, preceeding Israel's 1982 
invasion of Lebanon, transformed the Shi'a into political action: firstly, 
the disappearence of the Imam Musa al-Sadr in Libya in August 1978 became a 
focal point for the mobilisation and radicalisation of the Shi'a community."
" See: Fouad Ajami, (1986), op.cit. Also see: Majed Malawi, A Lebanon Defied: Musa al-Sadr 
and the Shi'a Community (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992) ; Salim Nasr, "Mobilisation comnunitaire et 
symbolique religieuse: l'Imam Sadr et les Chi'ites du Liban (1970-1975)", in Oliver Carré and Paul 
Dumont (eds.) Radicalismes Islamiques (Paris, 1984); and "Imam Musa al-Sadr", in Bernard Reidi 
(éd.). Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa (Westport, CT.: Grenwood 
Press, 1990): pp.460-7.
" See: Fouad Ajami, "Lebanon and Its Inheritors", Foreign Affairs, Vol.63 (Summer 1985) ; 
pp.778-99; and Elizabeth Picard, "Political Identities and Cbnmunal Loyalties: Shifting 
Mobilization Among the Lebanese Shi'a Through Ten Years of War, 1975-85", in Dennis L. Thompson and 
Dov Ronen (eds.), Etlinicity, Politics and Development (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1986).
" See: Augustus Richard Norton, "Religious Resurgence and Political M)bilization of the 
Shi'a in Lebanon", in Emile Saliydi (ed.) Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary 
World (New York, NY. : State University of New York Press, 1990): pp.229-241.
" For many Shi'ites, the event was reminiscent of the Shi'i doctrine of the Hidden Iman, the 
occultation of the twelfth Imam who would return to restore a just order and it elevated Musa al- 
Sadr as a national hero. For Musa al-Sadr's disappearence, see: Augustus Richard Norton, Harakat 
Amal and Political Mobilization of the Shi'a of Lebanon, Ph.D. dissertation (University of Chicago,
1984); idem, "Political Violence and Shi'a Factionalism in Lebanon", Middle East Insight, Vol.3,
No.2 (1983): pp.9-16; and Salim Nasr, "Roots of the Shii Movement", MERIP Reports (June 1985); and 
Fouad Ajami, (1986), op.cit.
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Secondly, Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon in 1978, with the consequent 
loss of Shi'i lives and destruction of their homes, revitalized Amal and 
reinforced the image of Israel as the enemy of Islam," and thirdly, the 
establishment of a Shi'a Islamic state in Iran, which followed Khumaynl's 
successful overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979," reverberated among the 
Shi'a community in Lebanon and provided them with an effective model for 
political action. The manner in which these internal Lebanese events affected 
and contributed to the Shi'i resurgence in Lebanon, in combination with the 
activity by the radical clergy in Najaf and the revolutionary underground 
movement, the al-Da'wa al-Islâmiya, as an antecedent to the ideological 
foundation and organisational framework of the Hizb'allah, were important 
components to the transformation of a politically assertive Shi'a community 
into a militant Islamic movement in Lebanon, as embodied in the Hizb'allah." 
It also provides a vital assessment of the movement's close personal ties to 
their co-religionists in Iran as well as its ready assimilation of Iranian 
post-revolutionary Shi'ite ideological principles in the struggle against an
" See: Augustus Richard Norton, "Religious Resurgence and Political >fobilization of the 
Shi'a of Lebanon", Ehiile Sahliyeh (ed.), Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary 
World (New York, NY. : State Ikiiversity of New York Press, 1990); idem, "Militant Protest and 
Political Violence under the Banner of Islam", Armed Forces and Society, Vol.9, No.l (Fall 1982); 
idem, "The Origins and Resurgence of Amal", in Martin Kramer (ed.), (1987), op.cit.; Asad 
AbuKhalil, "Syria and the Shiites: Al-Asad's Policy in Lebanon", Third World Quarterly, Vol.12, 
No.2 (April 1990); and Helena Cobban, The Shia Coromunitv and the Future of Lebanon, Occasional 
Paper No.2 (Washington, DC.: American Institute for Islamic Affairs, 1985).
" See: Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and the Spread of Revolutionary Islam", Third World 
Quarterlv, Vol.10, No.2 (April 1988); Amir Taheri, He Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic 
Revolution (London: Hutchinson, 1985); Martin Kramer, "The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah", in 
David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.; and R.K. Ramazani, "Iran's Export of the Revolution: 
Politics, Ends, and Means", in John L. Esposito (ed), (1990), op.cit.
" A whole overview of this process is provided in Appendix III.
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array of enemies and in their ideological commitment to the establishment of 
an Islamic Republic of Lebanon.
Although the political mobilization of the Shi'i community was accele­
rated by these factors and events, the 1982 Israeli invasion became a semi­
nal event as it facilitated not only Iran's direct involvement with the Shi'a 
community, through the deployment of a small Iranian contingent to the Big'a 
area of Lebanon, but also led to the proliferation of a number of radical and 
militant Shi'a movements. These groups merged into the establishment of a 
main revolutionary Shi'a movement, the Hizb'allah, an organisational umbrella 
composed of a coalition of radical movements under the leadership of small 
select group of Najaf-educated clergy.
2.2 The Influence of Israel's 1982 Invasion For the Creation of Hizb'allah
Israel's invasion of June-September 1982 and its subsequent occupation 
of southern Lebanon profoundly influenced the political mobilization and 
radicalization of the Shi'a community. Although the Lebanese Shi'a community 
initially welcomed Israel's decision to eradicate the PLO presence, any 
Shi'a euphoria soon developed into resentment and militancy following the 
realization that Israel would continue to occupy southern Lebanon." The 
reaction of Amal's Nabih Berri to the Israeli invasion, seeking political 
accomodation rather than military confrontation to the crisis, precipitated 
a major split within the Amal movement by more radical officials, who were 
actively encouraged by official Iran to establish an Islamic alternative to 
Amal."
" For the attitude of the southern Slii'i population following Israel's invasion, see: lo 
Matin, July 5, 1982; Wasliington Post, July 10, 1982. Also see: Augustus Richard Norton, "Making 
Enemies in South Lebanon: Harakat Amal, the IDF, and South Lebanon", Middle East Insight, Vol.3, 
No.3 (January-February 1984): pp.1-19.
" See: Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Constraints", in 
Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: pp.182-3, The inability of the 
Lebanese al-Da'wa party to mobilize the Shi'i conminity into political action had led to the
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A major event, which led to division within Amal's hierarchy between 
moderates and those adopting a hardline Islamic approach, occurred when Nabih 
Berri decided to join the National Salvation Committee, which was formed by 
president Ilyas Sarkis in mid-June 1982 to deal with Israel's occupation and 
siege of Beirut, For the more radical Amal members, who were inspired by 
Ayatollah Khumayynl and viewed Amal as the vanguard of revolutionary struggle 
in Lebanon based on the model and ideals of the Iranian revolution, Nabih 
Berri's participation was not only contrary to the line adopted by Amal at 
its fourth congress but also judged un-Islamic." The most vocal opposition 
came from Husayn al-Musawi, deputy head and official spokesman of the move­
ment, who not only openly opposed Berri's decision but also directly 
challenged the Amal leadership by calling for Iranian arbitration of the 
matter." While the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, Moussa Fakhr Rouhani, 
requested Berri's withdrawal from the Committee, Iran's ambassador to Syria, 
Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, became involved as arbitrator and issued a ruling on 
the matter in favor of al-Musawi." Subsequently, when Berri did not abide by 
the Iranian ruling, al-Musawi resigned from the Amal movement."
decision to use Amal as a vechicle to dissimenate revolutionary ideas by infiltrating former al- 
Da'wa members into the Amal. While Iran urged increased political activism frcrn Najaf-educated 
clergy, it also used its penetration of Amal, through the al-Da'wa trend in the movement and other 
radical members, to challenge the secular and moderate orientation of Amal, see: al-Watan al-Arabi, 
December 11, 1987; Malaf al-Sliira', Al-harakat al-islandwa fi lubnan (Beirut: Dar Sannin, 1984): 
p.222. Also see: Shimon Shapira, (1988), op.cit.
" See: Marius Deeb, (1986), op.cit.: p. 12; and Malaf al-Shira, Al-harakat al-islaitûwa fi 
lubnan [Islamic Movements of Lebanon] (Beirut, 1984): pp.222-3.
" See: al-Safir, June 10, 1982; and al-Nahar al-Arabi wa-al-duwali, June 10-16, 1985.
" See: As'ad AbuKlialil, (1991), op.cit. : p.391.
" Although Amal officials claim that al-Misawi was expelled (as reported in al-Safir, July
8, 1982), most sources indicate that he simply resigned from Amal. See, Augustus Richard Norton,
(1987), op.cit.: p.88.
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Disillusioned with Amal's political moderation and actively encouraged 
by Iran, al-Musawi and some other members, mostly residents of the Biqa, left 
Amal's Beirut headquarters and moved to Baalbek." When Berri participated at 
the first session of the six-man National Salvation Committee, on 21 June 
1982, al-Musawi announced from Baalbek the creation of his own movement, the 
Islamic JmaJ." While al-Musawi denounced Amal's Berri for having deserted 
the Islamic line of Imam Musa al-Sadr, which necessitated the creation of 
Islamic Amal, he clearly emphasised that Islamic Amal was not a rival move- 
# ment but rather assumed the role of the authentic Amal."
Another challenge to Nabih Berri's participation in the National 
Salvation Committee came from Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin, Amal's representative 
in Iran. After unsuccessful appeals to Nabih Berri from the Iranian 
ambassador to Lebanon, Moussa Fakhr Rouhani, Iran encouraged Sheikh Ibrahim 
al-Amin to challenge Berri's decision." Simultaneous with the announcement 
by al-Musawi's of the creation of Islamic Amal, Sheikh al-Amin criticised 
Nabih Berri at a press conference in Teheran and announced his split from 
Amal."
" See, Robin Wright, "Lebanon", in Shireen T. Hunter (ed.), (1988), op.cit.: p.63.
" See: The Times, April 3, 1986.
" Al-Misawi referred to Musa al-Sadr's pledge at Amal's first congress, held in lyre in 
1976, when he stated: "It is an Islamic movement and its ideology is ()ir'anic Islam". Also see: 
Middle East Reporter, September 14, 1982.
" See: Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Constraints", in 
Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit. p. 183.
" See: Sharif al-Husaini, al-Shira, March 17, 1986; al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987; 
and As'ad AbuKhalil, (1991), op.cit.: p.392.
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As demonstrated by the defections of al-Musawi and Sheikh al-Amin from 
Amal, the split within Amal was symptomatic of the fact that the movement was 
a broad-based and loose organisation, which reflected the geographical areas 
it represents." This was exacerbated by Berri's secular and moderate poli­
cies opposed by the more fundamentalist elements within Amal, who with 
Iranian support managed to not only defect but also remove a sizeable number 
of followers from the mainstream movement, especially in the Biq’a area."
While Iran actively seized the opportunity to use its influence with 
pro-Iranian and leading Amal members to provoke a serious internal challenge 
within the movement over Berri's secular orientation, especially concerning 
his decision to participate with the National Salvation Committee, Israel's 
invasion provided Iran with another opportunity to exert direct involvement 
and influence over their Shi'a co-religionists in Lebanon through the de­
ployment of an Iranian contingent of Revolutionary Guard Corps units (IRGC 
or Pasdaran) to the Biq'a valley. The Iranian presence in Lebanon through the 
Pasdaran directly contributed to ensure the survival and growth of Husayn al- 
Musawi's newly-created small militia, Islamic Amal, and the Pasdaran actively 
supervised in the formation and development of Hizb'allah in late 1982." In 
the formation of the Hizb'allah, Ayatollah Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, who served 
as Iran's ambassador to Syria and would later become Iran's minister of the 
interior, played a pivotal role as he supervised the creation of the movement
" Amal was dispersed into three regions: the South; the Northern Biq'a; and Beirut. See: 
Marius Deeb, (1988), op.cit.; pp.688-9
" See: al-Masira, January 3, 1987: p.12; al-Watan al-Arabi, June 6, 1987. For Nabih Berri's 
concern that he was losing control over Amal, see: Le Monde, September 20, 1983.
" See: Nader Ehtessar, "The Military and Politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran", Hooshang 
Amirahmadi & Manoucher Parvin (eds.) Post-Revolutionary Iran (Boulder, 00. : Westview Press, 1988): 
pp.69-70.
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by merging the Lebanese al~Da'wa; the Association of Muslim Students; al~ 
Amal al-Islamiyya; and other radical movements within the framework of the 
Department for Islamic Liberation Movements in the Iranian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs."
2.3 The Establishment and Expansion of the Hizb'allah
The establishment of Hizb'allah, with active Iranian supervision, in 
Lebanon occurred in three phases and the movement divided its operations into 
three main geographical areas: the Biq'a; Beirut; and the South." Each of 
these regional divisions were lead by high-ranking Hizb'allah clergy with 
local background and affiliation.
Phase I: The Establishment of Hizb'allah in the Biq'a
Immediately following Israel's invasion, Iran sent a high-ranking dele­
gation to Syria which was spearheaded by Colonel Sayyad Shirazi, the comman­
der of the Islamic Army's Ground Forces, who urged Syria to allow the de­
ployment of a small Iranian contingent into Lebanon and also to turn the 
war in Lebanon into a religious war against Israel." As a result of the 
threat posed by the Israeli invasion, Syria signed a military agreement with 
Iran which allowed the entry of Iranian Pasdaran into Lebanon in return for 
Iranian oil supply." Initially, Syria allowed the establishment of an
" See: John L. Esposito, (1992), op.cit.: pp.146-51; and Roger Faligot and Rémi Kauffer, Les 
Maîtres Espions (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1994): pp.412-3. Mohtashora. had spent considerable time in 
Najaf with his mentor Ayatollah Khumayynl until his expulsion from Iraq and had forged close 
relationships with Hizb'allah members during this time, see: Independent, October 23, 1991.
See: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Publication, August 1989: Ha'aretz, Septanber 22, 
1986; al-Shiira, April 2, 1986; and al-Watan al-Arabi, Decenber 11, 1987.
*’ Tlie Shirazi-led delegation arrived on the second day of Israel's invasion. See: R.K. 
Ramazani, (1986), op.cit.: p.156, A year earlier, in June 1981, Iranian Majlis approved legislation 
which allowed Iranian Pasdaran to go and fight Israel in southern Lebanon. Also see: Teheran 
Domestic Service, February 13, 1984.
** Tliis military agreement was revealed by Ali Rida Ma'iri, an assistant to the Iranian prime
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Iranian headquarters in the Syrian border village of Zebdani", while a 
second contingent of 800 Iranian Pasdaran, led by Mohsen Rafiqdoost, were 
deployed into Ba'albek." This contingent was later reinforced by another 700 
Pasdaran, who were distributed in a number of villages in the Biq'a valley. 
Although the Iranian contingent was largely composed of military instructors 
and fighters, it also included clergy from the "Cultural Unit of the Revolu­
tionary Guards" who engaged in religious indoctrination." Despite the 
Iranian contingent's proximity to IDF frontlines in the southern part of the 
Biq'a, coupled with Iran's call for a jihad against Israel, the Pasdaran did 
not engage in any military combat with Israel which underlined that the main 
nature of Iran's mission was geared towards aiding the formation of an 
organisational basis for a new revolutionary Shi'a group."
While the Iranian Pasdaran provided regular military training to the 
militiamen of Islamic Amal, it concentrated mainly on the systematic re­
minister. See: al-Nahar, May 23, 1986. Also see: Le Point, May 11, 1987; and Liberation, March 19, 
1985. In the terms for the 1982 accord between Iran-Syria, Iran agreed to supply Syria with 9 
million tons of free bartered discounted crude oil per year, see: The Economist, April 30, 1983.
" The Zebdani headquarters was the Pasdaran's single largest base outside Iran, see: New 
York Times, October 4, 1984; and Le Point, May 11, 1987.
** Robin Wright, (1989), op.cit.: pp.108-9; Radio Free Lebanon, November 21, 1982; Radio 
Fi'ee Lebanon, November 23, 1982; Voice of Lebanon, December 10, 1982; and Voice of Lebanon, March 
17, 1983.
" See: Shimon Shapira, (1988), op.cit.: p.123; Ronald A. Perron, "The Iranian Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps", Middle East Insight (June-July, 1985): pp.35-39; al-Amal, May 19,
1984; and al-Dustur, November 6, 1989. The importance of the Iranian clergy within the Pasdaran in 
the process of ideological indoctrination for the Hizb'allah was discussed in an interview between 
the author and Martin Kramer at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 
September 1, 1991.
*’ See: Robin Wright, "Lebanon", in Shireen T. Hunter (ed.), (1988), op.cit.: p.68. Also see: 
L'Orient le Jour, November 25, 1982.
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cruitment and ideological indoctrination of radical Shi'ites in the Biqa 
area." Under guidance from the Pasdaran, leading Najaf-educated Lebanese 
clerics with local background spearheaded the formation of a nucleus leader­
ship of the new revolutionary Shi'a organisation and began the process of 
recruitment and indoctrination of Shi'i residents in Ba'albek." The two 
individuals most closely identified as the initial founders of the Hizb'allah 
were Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi and Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, who both founded 
religious institutions and were regarded as the spiritual leaders in 
Ba'albek." These religious figures were closely supported by units of 
Iranian Revolutionary Guards not only in the creation of a first Hizb'allah 
military unit in the Biq'a but also in the imposition of Islamic fundamen­
" The base of the Iranian Pasdaran for indoctrination was the Imam Muntazar School, east of 
Ba'albek, see: International Herald Tribune, January 10, 1984. Also see: Robin Wright, "A Reporter 
at Large", The New Yorker, September 5, 1988. Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin was closely involved with the 
Iranian Pasdran in the formation of Hizb'allah, see: al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987.
" See: Shimon Shapira, Shi'ite Radicalism in Lebanon: Historical Origins and Organizational, 
Political and Ideological Patterns. M.A. thesis (Hebrew), (Tel Aviv University: Dayan Center for 
Middle Eastern and African Affairs, May 1987). Also see: Politique International, April 1984; al- 
Dustur, November 6, 1989; al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987; and Liberation, March 29, 1985.
’* Abbas al-Musawi, who was bom in 1952 in Nabishit near Ba'albek, studied at the Institute 
for Islamic Studies in Tyre between 1969-70. Thereafter he moved to Najaf where he studied under 
Muhanmad Baqer al-Sadr until Ms return to Lebanon in 1978. See: Ma'aretz, June 14, 1984; al-SMra, 
March 17, 1986. Abbas al-Musawi heads the Islamic College in Ba'albek, see: Ma'aretz, June 14,
1984. For biography of members of the al-Musawi clan, see: Washington Post, February 14, 1986. 
SheiWi Subhi al-Tufayli, who was bom in 1948 in Brital near Ba'albek, spent nine years studying 
theology in Najaf and briefly in Qum (Iran) and was also a student of Baqer al-Sadr. On his return 
to Lebanon, Sheikh al-Tufayli participated actively in the creation of the Supreme Islamic Shi'ite 
Coimcil and was considered to be the Mghest religious authority in Ba'albek, For details, see: 
Ha'aretz, January 10, 1984; and al-Nashra, December 5, 1983.
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talism on all citizens of the Ba'albek." On December 26, 1982, Sheikh al- 
Tufayli was appointed as the "president of the Islamic Republic" in 
Ba'albek."
Although the activities of the Iranian Pasdaran rapidly transformed the 
Biq'a area into a citadel for the Hizb'allah and Islamic Amal, they encoun­
tered resistance from segments within the Shi'i community and, more impor­
tantly, from the Lebanese armed forces." A key factor in the successful 
transformation of the Biq'a area was Syria's acquiesence to anarchy in a 
territory under its control and responsibility. Apart from the Iranian-Syrian 
military agreement for the deployment of Iranian Pasdaran to Lebanon, Syria's 
lack of effort to control the activities of the various Shi'a groups, 
buttressed by the Iranian Pasdaran, was based on the desire not to offend its 
Iranian ally, especially in the confrontation with the Americans and the 
Lebanese government over the May 17 Agreement." Although the Lebanese 
government severed diplomatic relations with Iran, on 23 November 1983, after 
many attacks by the Iranian Pasdaran on the remaining Lebanese army units in
" For example, Hizb'allah and Islamic Amal, supported by the Pasdaran, enforced strict 
Islamic dress-codes; banned alcohol and western music; and were left free to inpose their own rule 
tlirough kidnapping and harassment. See: William Harris, "The View from Zahle: Security and Economic 
Conditions in the Central Bekaa 1980-1985", Middle East Journal, Vol.39, No.3 (Summer 1985): 
pp.270-86; Time, August 15, 1984; and April 24, 1984. For Pasdaran military training, see: al- 
Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987.
" See: Ha'aretz, June 4, 1984. Another important Hizb'allah cleric is Sheikh Muhanmad 
Yazbek, who founded an Islamic Academy in Ba'albek, and is currently official spokesman of the main 
Majlis al-Shura, see: al-Nahar, February 20, 1989.
" For Shi'a opposition, see: al-Nahar, December 6, 1982; Voice of Lebanon, November 27,
1982. On November 22, 1982, (Lebanon's Independence Day) Pasdaran units attacked the Lebanese army 
barracks in Ba'albek, see: Radio Free Lebanon, November 23, 1982; August 15, 1984; and Beirut 
Domestic Service, November 25, 1983.
" See: Middle East Contemporarv Siuvev 1983-84: Also see: "The Path of Slii'ite Militancy", 
Middle East International (March 22, 1985): pp.6-7.
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the Biq'a, Syria began only to reassert its authority and restrain the 
activity of the pro-Iranian groups and the Pasdaran after the abrogation of 
the May 17 1983 Agreement in March 1984." Prior to mid-1984, Hizb'allah and 
Islamic Amal, in concert with Iran's Pasdaran, were able to rapidly recruit 
and indoctrinate a large number of Shi'a followers as the Iranian contingent 
was also supported by large Iranian funds." These substantial funds were 
used by the Iranian Pasdaran to support the Hizb'allah in running an array 
of social and financial services for the Shi'a community, including religious 
schools, clinics and hospitals, and agricultural co-operatives, which boosted 
the popularity and growth of the pro-Iranian movement in the Biq'a." The 
funds were also used to provide sophisticated armaments and military training 
for young Hizb'allah and Islamic Amal militiamen." In particular, newly-
" For al-Musawi's responsibility for the attacks on the Lebanese army, see: Asad AbuKhalil, 
(1990), op.cit.; and Associated Press, March 25, 1983. Lebanon's military prosecutor demanded the 
death penalty for 75 Hizb'allah and Islamic Amal members, most notably al-Musawi and al-Tufayli, 
for a March 4, 1983, ambush which killed six Lebanese army soldiers in Ba'albek. The Lebanese 
government issued an ultimatum to Iran to leave the Biq'a in 3 days after the October 1983 
bombings, see: Beirut Domestic Service, November 25, 1983.
" Iran has provided Hizb'allah with an average of $10 million per month, see: al-Shira, 
Septanber 19, 1988. Also see: al-Musawwar, September 17, 1987; Voice of Lebanon, October 29, 1987 - 
BBC/SWB/ME, October 30, 1987; Jerusalgn Post, July 22, 1987. The estimates of Iranian aid to 
Hizb'allah in 1985 totalled $30 million and in 1987 reached $64 million. See: Middle East Defense 
News, May 16, 1988. For Iran's financial assistance to Hizb'allah, see: Basana Kodmani-Darwish, 
'L'Iran, Nouvel Acteur Fort au Liban', Liban: Espoirs et Réalités (Paris, 1987): pp.153-64; 
Liberation, March 19, 1985; and International Herald Tribune, October 26, 1987.
" See: Jim Muir, "Buying Hearts and Minds", Middle East International. No.315 (December 19, 
1987): pp.6-7; and Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: The Internal Conflict and the Iranian 
Connection", in John L. Esposito (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.126-27. For an interview with the 
General Director of the Beirut office of the Martyrs' Foundation, see: al-Atid, no.135 (January 23,
1987). Approximately $225,000 is distributed monthly to martyrs' families, see: "Details about 
'Hizballah' and Its Leaders", Middle East Reporter, March 22, 1986. Also see: Financial Times, July 
25, 1987; al-Dustiur, October 14, 1985; Jerusalem Post, July 22, 1987; and al-Misawar, September 
17, 1987.
" Iran's deputy foreign minister, Hossein Sheikholislam Zadeh, supervised aims shipments and 
military funding for Hizb'allah and Islamic Amal in coordination with General Gliazi Kaan'an, head 
of Syria's Military Intelligence in Lebanon. Hizb'allah maiiber, Mustafa Mahmud Mahdi, was 
responsible for the arms shipments received from Iran at the Sheikh Abdallali Barracks in the Biq'a,
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trained Hizb’allah and Islamic Amal fighters received approximately £200 per 
month."
Parallel to the creation of Hizb'allah and its subsequent rapid growth 
in the Biq'a, under the leadership of Sheikhs Abbas al-Musawi and Subhi al- 
Tufayli, the movement spread to other areas heavily populated by Shi'a, to 
the southern suburbs of Beirut and to the villages and towns in southern 
Lebanon.
Phase II: Hizb'allah's Expansion Into in Beirut
In Beirut, Hizb'allah's natural source for organising Shi'ites was to 
work within the framework of existing radical Shi'ite organisations and re­
ligious institutions. Apart from recruiting more fundamentalist elements 
within Amal, who followed the example set by the departure of Husayn al- 
Musawi and Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin, the involvement of Sheikh Muhammad Hussein 
Fadlallah proved to be important for Hizb'allah as he commanded a conside­
rable number of Shi'a followers in the Sir al-'Abed quarters of southern 
Beirut and wielded unrivalled influence over the activity of religious 
movements, most notably within the Lebanese Muslim Students' Union and among 
former Lebanese al-Da'wa members." As one of the three most prominent Shi'i 
clergymen in Lebanon, Sheikh Fadlallah's active involvement in the Lebanese 
political arena, through his criticism of foreign intervention in Lebanon and 
appeals for the establishment of an Islamic Republic, led to the emergence
see: Ha'aretz, June 21, 1987. In July 1984, the Iranian Pasdaran established six military centers 
in the Biq'a for training Hizb'allah and Islamic Amal fighters, see: Radio Free Lebanon, July 6,
1984.
" See: Hie Times, Novmber 14, 1987. Hizb'allali members under military training in the Biq'a 
earned $140 a month and junior cormanders received $300 a month, see: Independent, August 3, 1989.
** See: Martin Kramer, "Hie Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizb'allah", in David Menashri (ed.), 
(1990), op.cit.: p.122
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of Sheikh Fadlallah as the spiritual guide and the most senior cleric 
associated with the Hizb'allah.” Although Sheikh Fadlallah had rejected the 
claim of "spiritual guide" of the movement, his role as the leader of the 
defunct Lebanese al-Da'wa meant that his standing within the Hizb'allah was 
bolstered by the fact that a considerable number of its newly recruited 
members in Beirut had previous affiliation with the al-Da'wa,^^ A number of 
other prominent clergymen in Beirut joined the Hizb'allah, who brought with 
them their own memberships and followers which merged within one organisa­
tional framework.** Among the initial founders of the first Hizb'allah units 
in Beirut were Sheikh Muhammad Ismail al-Khaliq and Sheikh Hassan 
Nasserallah, who used their prominent hawzat in Beirut (Hawzat al-Rasul al~ 
Akram) as a base for recruitment, and Sheikh al-Amin, who returned to Beirut 
to act as Hizb'allah's official spokesman.” These clergymen managed to
” The other two senior clergy are Sheikh Muhamnad Mahdi Shams al-Din, the deputy of the 
Supreme Shi'i Islamic Council, and Slieikh Abid al-Amir Qabalan, the leading Shi'i mufti. For Sheikh 
Fadlallah's position as the spiritual guide, see; Martin Kramer, "I^ Iuhammad Husayn Fadlallah", 
op.cit. : pp. 147-49; al-Shiraa, August 4, 1986; "Leadersliip Profile: Sheikh Muhaimiad Husayn 
Fadlallah", Defense & Foreign Affairs Weeklv (June 23-29, 1986): p.7. For an example of Sheikh 
Fadlallah's views on foreign intervention and the creation of an Islamic Republic of Lebanon, see: 
Olivier Carré, "La 'Révolution Islamique' selon Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah", op.cit.: pp.68-84; and 
Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, "Islam and Violence in Political Reality", Middle East 
Insight, Vol.4, Nos. 4-5 (1986): pp.4-13.
” For denials by Slieikh Fadlallah over his role within the Hizb'allah, see: Al-Ittihad al- 
Usbu'i, January 30, 1986; al-Nahar, October 3, 1984; For Sheikh Fadlallah's role as leader of al- 
Da'wa, see: Ali al-Korani, op.cit.: p.172; al-Muntalaq, October 1985: pp.4-12; and Shimon Shapira,
(1988), op.cit.: p.127.
” For example, the Rally of Muslim Clergymen (Tajammu' al-'uluma' al-muslimin) was created 
in Beirut during the Israeli invasion. This group, supported by the Iranian embassy in Beirut, 
attempted to bridge differences between the Shi'is and Sunnis in Lebanon. When Hizb'allah organized 
in Beirut, members of the Rally of l'îuslim Clergymen joined the Hizb'allah but maintain their own 
identity within the movement. See: al-Nahar, June 1, 1985; al-Nahar, June 7, 1985; and al-Wahdah 
al-islmiwa, June 21, 1985. For its identity within Hizb'allali, see; al-Anba, November 27, 1989; 
and al-Hayat, November 27, 1989. Also see: Ali al-Korani, Tariqat Hizballah fi-l-'Amal-il-Islami 
(Tlie Method of Hizb'allah in Islamic Action (Beirut, 1986).
” See: Shimon Sliapira, (1988), op.cit. : p. 127. Sheikh al-Klialiq is Ayatollah Montezari's 
representative in Lebanon, see: al-Nahar, February 6, 1989. For information on Sheikh Nasserallah,
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expand their influence not only through the religious Shi'ite academies in 
Beirut but also with Iranian technical and financial assistance through 
Iran's embassies in Beirut and Damascus.” Furthermore, the Hizb'allah was 
assisted by the expansion of the Iranian Pasdaran from Ba'albek into Beirut 
beginning in April 1983.”
While the influx of Iranian Pasdaran and substantial financial support, 
coupled with Iranian assistance in the indoctrination and recruitment pro­
cess, contributed to the rapid growth of Hizb'allah in Beirut, it was also 
assisted by the suicide attacks against the US and French contingents of the 
Multinational Force (MNF) on October 23, 1983.** Although the identity of the 
bombers remain uncertain” , the alleged complicity of Hizb'allah promoted the 
movement as the spearhead of the sacred Muslim struggle against foreign
see: Ma'aretz, June 14, 1984; al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989; AFP, 1520 
gmt 18 Feb 92 - BBC/SWB ME/1309, February 20, 1992. For information on Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin, see: 
Ma'aretz, June 14, 1984; al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987; Independent, August 30, 1989; and 
Liberation, March 19, 1985.
** For Sheikh Fadlallah's close cooperation with the Iranian embassy in Beirut, see:
Ma'aretz, January 11, 1984; and Ha'aretz, June 3, 1986. For the role of Iran's ambassador to Syria, 
Ali Akhbar Mohtashemi, in coordinating Iran's activity in Lebanon, see: The Economist: Foreign 
Report, No.1841, September 27, 1984. For Iranian elements in Beirut, see: Ma'ariv, March 27, 1983.
” See; Israeli Defence Forces Spokesman (IDFS), February 18, 1986; and International Herald 
Tribune, January 1, 1984. For Sheikh Fadlallali's relationship with Iranian Pasdaran in Beirut, see: 
Ha'aretz, June 3, 1984.
” For details concerning the Hizb'allah attacks, see: Report of the POD CoRirtlssion on Beirut 
International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983. Admiral Robert L. Long, USN (Ret.), 
chairman. (Washington, DC.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984). Also see: al-Watan al-Arabi, 
December 14-20, 1984.
** According to imœnfirmed reports, an Iranian (code-named Abu Musleh) was the indi\ldual 
responsible for the bombings. Iran's deputy foreign minister, Husayn Shaykh al-Islam, in co­
ordination with the SiTian government, gave the final order to Husayn al-Musawi to execute the 
twin-suicide attacks. For further details, see: Foreign Report, October 27, 1983; Ma'ariv, October 
28, 1983. For al-Musawi's role, see: Washington Post, February 14, 1986; Die Welt, September 22, 
1984; and International Herald Tribune, September 22-23, 1984.
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occupation.” The subsequent withdrawal of the United States and France from 
Lebanon was hailed.as a major victory for the Hizb'allah, both in terms of 
establishing itself as a revered militia and in driving away foreign enemies 
of the Lebanese Shi'ites.” The Hizb'allah attacks, which went under the nom 
de guerre al-Amal al-Islami, also underlined the major role of Iranian 
support and guidance to the movement's activities, especially in Beirut. 
Apart from logistical support provided by Iran's diplomatic representatives 
in Lebanon and Iranian Pasdaran, Hizb'allah enjoyed close cooperation with 
Iran's embassy in Syria, most notably with its ambassador, Ali Akbar 
Mohtashemi
Phase III: Hizb'allah's Expansion Into Southern Lebanon
In southern Lebanon, Hizb'allah's expansion was hindered initially by the 
dominance of Amal's authority.” However, the failure of Amal to confront the 
challenge posed by Israel’s military presence in southern Lebanon led to the 
emergence of more militant organisations in the spring of 1983, led by local 
radical clergy with ideological ties to Iran, which united under the banner 
of the Association of the Uluma of Jabal Beneath this coalition was
” See interview with Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin: al-Ahd, January 23, 1987. Also see: Radio Free 
Lebanon, November 29, 1983. Also see: g ,  October 24, 1983.
” See interviews with Husayn al-f'fusawi in: al-Nahar, September 7, 1985; Voice of Lebanon, 
October 28, 1983; Kavhan, July 29, 1986; Le Figaro, September 12, 1986; and Le Monde, November 2,
1983. See interview with SheiMi Ibrahim al-Amin: Kavhan, October 19, 1985. See interviews with 
SheiWi Fadlallah: al-Ittihad, June 7, 1985; and Washington Post, February 2, 1984.
” I^ bhanined Nurani, the charge d'affair in the Iranian embassy in Beirut between 1981-1985, 
was liaison with Hizb'allah, see: Foreign Report, July 30, 1987. For Mohtashemi's role as 
coordinator of Iranian activities in Lebanon, see: al-SIiira, September 19, 1988; Voice of Lebanon, 
October 23, 1983; and Jeune Afrique, January 25, 1984.
” See: Augustus Richard Norton, "Israel and the South Lebanon", American-Arab Affairs, Vol.4 
(Spring 1983): pp.23-31.
” Prominent among the local leaders were: Sheikh Rageb Harb of Jibshit; Abd al-Karim Shams
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a number of small organized Shi'i cells, headed by Sheikh Rageb Harb, who 
both planned and carried out persistant resistance attacks against Israel.” 
These young and fire-brand clerics provided the core foundation for the 
extension of Hizb'allah in the South and their resistance activity not only 
undermined the influence of Amal in the area but also seriously challenged 
Israel's presence, especially through self-martyring operations.” Although 
the growth of the Hizb'allah units in the South can be attributed to the 
infusion of Iranian aid and the arrival of Iranian Pasdaran,” it was also 
due to the increased militancy by these units both in response to Israel's 
military activity and, more importantly, to raised prospects for an Israeli 
withdrawal.” This was fuelled by Israel's withdrawal from the Shouf
al-Din of Arab Salim; and Sa'id Ali Mahdi Ibrahim of Adlun, see: Augustus Richard Norton, (1987), 
op.cit.: p.112; Shimon Shapira, (1988), op.cit.: p.128. Other local leaders are: A'bd al-Karim Abid 
Mohamad and Afif Nabalsi, see: Israeli Defense Force Spokesman, February 19, 1986.
” See: Martin Kramer, "The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah", in David Menashri (ed.),
(1990), op.cit.: p.128; Shimon Sliapira, (1988), op.cit.; pp.128-29; and Liberation, March 19, 1985.
” For a detailed account of Shi'ite self-martyring operations against Israeli targets, see: 
Martin Kramer, "Sacrifice and Fratricide in Shiite Lebanon", Journal of Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Vol.3, No.3 (Autumn 1991): pp.30-47; W.A. Terrill, "Low Intensity Conflict in Southern 
Lebanon: Lessons and Dynamics of the Israeli-Shi'ite War", Conflict Quarterlv, Vol.7, No.3 (1987): 
pp.22-35.
” Tlie lin](s with Iran was highlighted by Sheikh Ragib Harb, who stated: "[m]y house in 
Lebanon is the embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran". See: Ettela'at, December 21, 1983; and The 
Times, February 23, 1984.
” See: Andreas Rieck, Die Schiiten und der Kampf urn den Libanon. Politische Chronik 1958- 
1988 (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1989); Augustus Richard Norton, "Making Enemies in South 
Lebanon: Harakat Amal, the IDF and South Lebanon", Middle East Insight, no.3 (1984); and Clinton 
Bailey, "Lebanon's Shi'is After the 1982 War", in Martin Kramer (ed.), (1987), op.cit.: pp. 219-36. 
Also see interview with Sheikh Hamid Sadiqi, a representative of the Iranian embassy in southern 
Lebanon: al-Nahar, November 9, 1987.
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Mountains in September 1983 and the decision by Sheikh Shams al-Din's to 
issue a fatwa, calling on all Muslims to conduct "comprehensive civil oppo­
sition" to the Israeli occupation, following Israel's desecration of the 
Shi'a Ashura commemoration in Nabatiya.” The deadly effectiveness of 
Hizb'allah suicide attacks, as manifested by the destruction of IDF head­
quarters in Tyre on 4 November 1983, not only earned the movement prestige 
among the southern Shi'a residents but also directly contributed to Israel's 
decision to announce a withdrawal in January 1985.” The military wing of 
Hizb'allah, which adopted the name of Islamic Resistance (al~muqavama al~ 
islamiyya) c l a i m e d  that Israel's withdrawal was achieved by its persistent 
attacks and was a major victory for Islam as well as a direct prelude for the 
liberation of Jerusalem.”
The rapid growth and popularity of the Hizb'allah in these three regions 
was achieved not only by a successful combination of ideological indoctrina-
” On the Nabatiya incident, see: Augustus Richard Norton, External Intervention and the 
Politics of Lebanon (Washington, DC. : Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1984) : 
pp.12-3.
” Hizb'allah's Islamic Resistance claimed that the bombing had been executed by Alimad 
Qusayr, see: al-Ahd, May 24, 1985; and al-Ahd, November 14, 1986. Also see; al-Amaliyyat al- 
istishhadiwa: Watha'iq wa-suwar [The Self-Martyring Operations: Documents and Photographs] 
(Damascus, 1985).
Hizb'allah's military branch in southern Lebanon, the Islamic Resistance, was organized by 
Iranian Pasdaran officers into the structure of a regular army. This army was composed of smaller 
units, headed by young members who knew the territory well as they are recruited from local 
villages, see: Ma'aretz, June 15, 1987.
” For Hizb'allah's claim of credit, see: Nass al-risla al-maftuha allati waiiaha hizb allah 
ila al-mustad Afin fi lubnan wa al-alam (Text of Open Letter Addressed by Hizb'allah to the 
Downtrodden In Lebanon and in the World), February 16, 1985, reprinted in Augustus Richard Norton, 
Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, op.cit.: pp.171-73. Also see interview with 
Iranian Ayatollali Karrubi, see: al-Nahar, June 5, 1985. For interview with Sheikh Fadlallah, see: 
al-Naliar al-arabi wa-al-duwali, March 18-24, 1985.
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tion and material inducement by Hizb'allah through the infusion of Iranian 
aid and military assistance. It was also achieved by the ability of the 
Hizb'allah leaders to mobilize the Shi'i community and unite it within the 
framework of an organisation with clearly defined and articulated political 
objectives. Apart from providing a social and financial infrastructure for 
the Shi'i community, which was deeply affected by the economic crisis 
exacerbated by Israel's 1982 invasion,” the Hizb'allah effectively gained 
supporters as the movement projected itself as the spearhead of the struggle 
against the enemies of Islam, namely the United States and Israel.” In this 
task, the Hizb'allah exploited central Shi'a symbols, especially through 
the Ashura commemorations, to enlist support while it displayed ideological 
deference to Ayatollah Khumayyni's pan-Islamic vision, in which the movement 
would expel foreign influence from Lebanon, establish an Islamic regime based 
on social justice and set the stage for the liberation of Jerusalem,” When 
Hizb'allah successfully forced the departure of the multi-national force from 
Lebanon and the retreat of Israel into a narrow zone in southern Lebanon, 
through a combination of relentless guerilla warfare and self-martyring 
operations, it was viewed a major achievement by Hizb'allah and Iran as no
** The Biq'a area had already suffered due to the Zahla crisis of December 1980 - June 1981, 
see: as-Safir, June 24, 1984. The Biq'a region and southern Lebanon faced severe economic problems 
with the Israeli invasion and occupation. In southern Lebanon, militant Islamic movements appeared 
in regions most affected economically, namely the regions southeast of Sidon, north and northeast 
of Tyre, and west of Nabatiya. Israel's siege of Beirut led to severe economic crisis and rising 
unemployment. Many found employment with the local militias. See: Marius Deeb, (1986), op.cit.: 
p.4; and Middle East Report, January-February 1990.
” See: al-Ahd, July 25, 1985; al-Alid, March 7, 1986; Monday Morning. September 14, 1986; and 
"An Open Letter: Hie Hizballah", The Jerusalem Quarterlv, No.48 (Fall 1988): pp.11-16.
** For the centrality of the Ashura for Hizb'allah, see: al-Nahar, October 5, 1984; 
Libération, September 26, 1985; and Ayla Hammond Schbley, "Resurgent Religious Terrorism: A Study 
of Some of the Lebanese Shi'a Contemporary Terrorism", Terrorism, Vol.12 (1989): pp.213-47. For 
details concerning Hizb'allali's grand strategic see: al-Ahd, December 5, 1986.
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other force had been able to accomplish the expulsion of both the United 
States and Israel from its soil.” It also boosted the popularity of 
Hizb'allah and enhanced the movement's credibility as the promoter of the 
sacred struggle against foreign occupation.”
2.4 The Ideological Foundation of the Hizb'allah:
Hizb'allah's radicalization of the Shi'a community, through the ex­
ploitation of Shi'i symbols, and its declared allegance to the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and Ayatollah Khumayyni, underlined the movement's close 
ideological and spiritual deference to Islamic Iran's pan-Islamic vision and 
authority. At its simplest level, the very adoption of the name of Hizb'allah 
derived from the Quran, which denotes the body of Muslims, symbolizes the 
revolutionary character of the movement, namely that the followers of Allah 
(hizb'allah) would triumph over the followers of Satan (hizb-ush-Shaytan) 
Sheikh Fadlallah, in his book Islam and the Logic of Force, referred to this 
Islamic struggle between Hizb'allah and Hizb-ush~Shaytan when he called on 
Muslims to organize along party lines in order to safeguard the survival of 
Islamic values and movements against the threat of powerful secular par-
** According to Ayatollah Karrubi, only Hizb'allah has been able to drive Israel out of 
southern Lebanon which is a major accomplisliment as Israel has won the four previous wars with the 
Arabs, see: al-Nahar, June 5, 1985. Also see: al-Ahd, January 2, 1988; and al-Ittihad, June 7,
1985.
*' See: James P. Piscatori, "The Shia of Lebanon and Hizbullah, the Party of God", in 
Christine Jennett and Randal G. Stewart (eds.) Politics of the Future: The Role of Social Movements 
(Melbourne: Macmillan, 1989).
** The term Hizb'allali, meaning "the party, or adherents, of God", originally appeared in the 
Holy Quran (V,61/56; LVIII,22) which premises triunph for believers (Party of God) over the 
unbelievers Hizb al-shaytan (Party of the Devil). For further explanation of the Arabic term 
Hizb'allali, see: Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago, 111.: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1988): p.123. Hie symbol of the Hizb'allah involves the writing of "Hizb'allah" 
integrated into: [1] an arm wielding an automatic assault rifle (symbol of armed movement) ; (2) the 
Holy Q'uran (symbol of Islamic faith); (3) the branch (symbol of renewal); and (4) the globe 
(symbol of pan-Islam and the universality of the movement).
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ties.” In this task, the ideologists of Hizb'allah justified not only the 
leadership structure of the movement but also most of its activities on the 
Quranic tenents.”
A fundamental feature of the Hizb'allah leadership structure was the 
central role of the uluma within the movement. Although many Hizb'allah 
leaders maintained that the movement was "not an organisation, for its mem­
bers carry no cards and bear no specific responsibilities",” the leadership 
of the movement was strictly composed of uluma and the structure based on the 
doctrine of "the centralism of the uluma" Accordingly, the central role of 
the uluma in Hizb'allah concentrated all powers to a small elité clerical 
group which ensure strict discipline and obedience by the followers to the 
rulings and orders of their religious leaders, whose decisions flows from the 
uluma down the entire community. In this structure, decisions made by the 
collective clerical Hizb'allah leadership were reached through consensus and 
delegated to a regional alim of a certain district, who presents his follo­
wers with the required actions and their general outlines. In turn, the 
manner in which a certain act is executed is left to the initiative of these
** See; Muhamnad Husayn Fadlallali, Al-islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa (Beirut: al-îki'assasa al- 
Jam'iyya li-al-Dirasat wa-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawzi', 1981 (2nd ed.)): p.246. Also see: Malaf al-Shira, 
Al-harakat al-islamiyya fi lubnan (Beirut: Bar Sannin, 1984) : p.298. See interview with Mohamnad 
Nurani: Monday Morning, January 14, 1985.
” See: Ali al-Kurani, Tariqat Hizballah fi-l-'Amal-il-Islami (The Method of Hizballah in 
Islamic Action, 1986); and al-Ittihad, June 7, 1985.
” Instead Husayn al-Musawi claims: "It is a 'nation' of all who believe in the struggle 
against injustice and all who are loyal to Iran's hnam Khomeini", See: al-Nahar al-arabi wal- 
duwali, June 10-16, 1985. Also see: La Revue du Liban, July 27 - August 3, 1985.
” The only non-clerical member of the highest ruling body, Majlis ash-Shura, is Husayn al- 
Musawi, see: Independent, August 30, 1989. For the basis of Hizb'allali's organi-sational 
principles, see: Ali al-Kurani, al-Harakat al-Islandvaa fi Lubnan (Beirut: 1984): p.122; and As'ad 
AbuKIialil, (1991), op.cit.: p.394.
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followers under the guidance of the aJiffl.”
As in Iran, the prominent role of the uluma within Hizb'allah's leader­
ship confers them with religio-political legitimacy in the eyes of their 
followers. Apart from ensuring strict obedience by followers to decisions 
taken by the Hizb'allah leadership, the authority of the Hizb'allah uluma 
extends all the way to the religious and political authority of Iran's 
Ayatollah Khumayyni, to whom they appeal for guidance and directives incases 
when Hizb'allah's collective leadership fail to reach a consensus.” The 
ultimate authority and allegiance to the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
Khumayyni by the Hizb'allah was most evidently displayed by the publication 
of an official manifesto in February 1985 in which they pledged absolute 
loyalty to Khumayyni, whom they described as their leader faJ-ga'idl.” In 
fact, the absence of an opinion and ruling by Ayatollah Khumayyni on certain 
matters created divisions within, and problems for, Hizb'allah's clerical 
leadership in the execution and justification of actions within the framework 
of Islamic law.” A clear example of this dilemma was Hizb'allah's practise 
of suicide attacks and the abduction of foreign citizens which seemed to 
violate some principles of Islamic law. In the former case, the problem
” Ali al-Kurani, al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984). This information was 
confirmed in an unattributable interview with a former Israeli military intelligence officer, Tel 
Aviv, August 28, 1991.
” See: Marius Deeb, (1986), op.cit.: p.16.
” See: "An Open Letter: The Hizb'allah Program", Jerusalem Quarterly, No.48 (Fall 1988): 
pp. 111-16. For Hizb'allah's allegiance to Kliomayyni, see: al-Alid, April 24, 1987; al-Harakat al- 
Islamiwa fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984): p.150; al-AIid, February 7, 1986; and ^ o^ndav Homing, October 
15-21, 1984.
” For a useful discussion of these problems, see: Martin Kramer, "La Morale du Hizballah et 
sa Logique", Maghreb-Machrek, No.119 (January-March, 1988): pp.39-59.
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centered around the strong Islamic prohibition against suicide, and in the 
latter case that the seizure of innocent hostages was irreconcilable with 
Islamic law.” As Ayatollah Khumayyni has offered no formal opinion on the 
legality of these issues, primarily because Iran has disawoved any direct 
involvement, the most senior Hizb'allah leaders have offered their own 
interpolation in accordance with what they perceive to be the tacit approval 
of the Imam.” In this task. Sheikh Fadlallah emerged an important figure for 
Iran and the rank and file of Hizb'allah as he offered Iran a medium for 
translating and conveying the Islamic Republic's message to the Hizb'allah 
followers as well as providing them with spiritual guidance on specific 
matters. Sheikh Fadlallah's importance as the locus of spiritual and politi­
cal authority of the Hizb'allah, as it's most senior and learned cleric, and 
his deference to Ayatollah Khumayyni was evidently revealed by the fact that 
he was refered to as the "Khumayyni of Lebanon".” While Sheikh Fadlallah 
occupied a crucial position as a bridge between Hizb'allah's Iranian patrons 
and its Lebanese clients, he also pursued his own independent agenda which 
created considerable tension with Iranian leaders as well as with other 
leading clerical leaders of Hizb'allah. A main area of contention being the 
feasibility of establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon in the near
” See: Franz Rosenthal, "fti Suicide in Islam", Journal of the American Oriental Society,
Vol.66 (1946): pp.24; and Mehdi Mozaffari, La Violence Shi'ite Contemporaine: Evolution Politique 
(Aarhus: Institute of Political Science, University of Aarhus, 1988),
” For SheiMi Fadlallah's justification of the Hizb'allah method of suicide attacks, see: al- 
Ittihad, June 7, 1985; al-Majallali, October 1, 1986; Middle East Insight, Vol.4, No.2 (June-July
1985): pp.10-11; and Monday Morning, December 16, 1985. For Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin's views, see: 
al-Alid, January 23, 1987; and Kavhan, February 9, 1986. For Hizb'allah leaders justification of 
hostage-taking, see: al-Ahd, September 6, 1985; al-Ittihad al-usbu'i, December 4, 1986; and la 
Revue du Liban, July 27, 1985.
” Sheikh Fadlallah considered this comparison a great honour, see: al-Naliar al-Arabi wal- 
Duwali, August 20-26, 1984.
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future. Yet, this only served to highlight that Hizb’allah was not a mono­
lithic body with total subservience to Iran but rather a coalition of 
clerics, who each had their own views and networks of followers as well as 
ties to Iran's clerical establishment.
The concentration of the supreme powers of the Hizb'allah movement in 
the hands of a select few, coupled with the mechanism of implementation of 
decisions through delegation at a lower level, reflected not only the ability 
of Hizb'allah to protect its leaders from persecution and elimination in an 
extremely hostile environment but also the depth of Hizb'allah's clerical 
relationship with Iran. Although leading Hizb'allah clergy and Iranian 
officials deny that the movement had a clearly defined organisational struc­
ture, the Hizb'allah was secretly governed on the national and local level 
by the supreme political-religious leadership, composed of a small and select 
group of Lebanese uluma.*” The supreme decision-making bodies of the 
Hizb'allah were divided between the Majlis al-Shiira (the Consultative 
Assembly), which was headed by 12 senior clerical members with responsibility 
for tactical decisions and supervision of overall Hizb'allah activity 
throughout Lebanon*” , and the Shura (the Deciding Assembly), headed by Sheikh 
Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah and composed of eleven other clerics with respon-
*” For Hizb'allah and Iranian denials of an organisational structure, see: al-Harakat al- 
Islamiwa fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984) ; Monday Morning, January 14, 1985; and al-Nahar al-Arabi, June 
10, 1986.
*” See: "Hizballah", in Terrorist Group Profiles, US Department of Defense (DOD), Wasliington 
DC. (November 1988): p.15; Independent, August 25, 1989; and The Jerusalem Report, August 1, 1991. 
The most prominent members of the Majlis al-Shura included: Sheikh Abbas al-Musaid.; SheiMi Siibhi 
al-Tiifayli; SheiMi Hassan Nasserallali; Sheikh Haj Hussein al-Khalil; Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin; SheiMi 
M^haiimad Raad; SheiMi Naim Qassem, Sheikh Muhammad Fennish; Sheikh Muhhamad Yazbek; and Hussein al- 
^^ usawi. For further details, see: al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987; al-Shiira, March 16, 1986; 
al-Anba, November 11, 1989; Independent, August 30, 1989; al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; Ha'aretz, 
April 2, 1986; and al-Oabas, July 20, 1989.
75
sibility for all strategic matters.*” Within the Majlis al-Sbura, there 
existed seven specialized committees dealing with ideological, financial, 
military, political, judicial, informational and social affairs.*” In turn, 
the Majlis al-Shura and these seven committees were replicated in each of 
Hizb'allah's three main operational areas (the Biq'a, Beirut, and the South), 
They functioned as the principal governing body on daily activity while 
advising the main Majlis al-Shura on the result of their efforts.*” 
Furthermore, the Islamic Republic of Iran was also represented in the Majlis 
al-Shura by one or two Iranian military and diplomatic representatives from 
either the Pasdaran or Iran's embassies in Beirut and Damascus.*” The pre­
sence of Iranian officials within the Majlis al-Shura underlined the close 
co-operation and supervision of activities between Iran and Hizb'allah.*” In 
fact, Hizb'allah's Majlis al-Shura, which was instituted by Iran's Fazlollah 
Mahallati in 1983, meet infrequently until 1986*” , which would suggest that
*” Ikiattributable interview with high-ranking Israeli military official, August 28, 1991. 
Also see: al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987.
*” See: As'ad AbuKhalil, (1991), op.cit.: p.397. Also see: Da'var. January 11, 1987.
*” See: Marius Deeb, (1988), op.cit.: p.693. Also see: IGPO, July 5, 1985.
*” Most prominent of Iranian diplomatic representatives on the Majlis al-Shura have been:
Ali Akhbar Mohtashemi (Iran's Ambassador to Syria between 1981-85); Muhammad Nurani (Iræian charge 
d'affair in Beirut) ; Ali Akbar Rahimi and Mohammed Javad (diplomatic staff at Iran's embassy in 
Beirut), see: Foreign Report, July 30, 1987; al-Shira, September 19, 1988; Independent, March 7, 
1990; Israeli Defence Force Spokeanan, February 19, 1986; and US News and World Report, March 6, 
1989. Wbst prominent Pasdaran officials have been: Alimad Kanani, Mohsen Rafiqdoost and fk)hsen 
Reza'i, see: Washington Post, January 8, 1990; Ronald Perron, "The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary 
Guards Corps", Middle East Insight, op.cit.: p.39; Paris Jeune Afrique, January 25, 1984; and 
Washington Post, July 8, 1987.
*” See: Bruce Hoffman, (1990), op.cit. Also see; Ha'aretz, September 30, 1984; Ma'aretz, 
November 10, 1987; Ha'aretz, August 7, 1989; Washington Post, June 21, 1985; Washington Post,
August 1, 1985; and Washington Post, July 7, 1988.
*” See: Amir Taheri, (1987), op.cit.: p.125. For meetings of Hizb'allah's Majlis al-Shura,
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Iran was able to exert more direct control over Hizb'allah activity, espe­
cially during Ayatollah Ali Akhbar Mohtashemi's tenure as Iran's Ambassador 
to Syria.*” However, the supreme governing body of the Hizb'allah assumed a 
more central and independant role with the intensity of factionalism within 
Iran's clerical establishment and following the death of Ayatollah Khumayyni 
in 1989.*”
The composition of the Majlis al-Shura underlined the close personal 
affiliation between Hizb'allah's clerical elite and Iran's clerical esta­
blishment, as most of the members of Hizb'allah's leadership received their 
education at the Najaf religious academies and were influenced by Ayatollah 
Khumayyni, both before and after his departure in 1978. Apart from Sheikh 
Fadlallah, who returned to Beirut in 1966 after his studies under Abu al- 
Qasem al-Musawi al-Khoi, the most senior clergy of the Hizb'allah leadership 
are all graduates of the Najaf religious academies who returned to Lebanon 
in the mid-1970s .**“ Both Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi and Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, 
who spearheaded the formation of Hizb'allah and the movement in the Biq'a
see: al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987. Hojjat ol-Eslam Fazlollah Mahallati had trained in the 
PIÛ guerilla training camps in Lebanon and was appointed Pasdaran Supervisor until his death in a 
1986 plane crash, see: Nikola Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic (Santa 
Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, 1987): p.119-21.
loa See: New York Times, August 27, 1989; and al-Sharg al-Awsat, January 22, 1989.
*” In October 1989, over 200 leading representatives of Hizb'allah and its military wing, 
the Islamic Resistance, assembled in Teheran for a special convention in response to major changes 
in the internal and external environment for Hizb'allali, see: al-Anba. November 27, 1989; and 
Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989.
**“ As Augustus Richard Norton has plirased it: "[i]f the Shii seminaries in Najaf published 
yearbooks, they would contain pictures of Ibraliim al-Amin, Abbas Musawi, Hasan Nasrallah, Subhi 
Tufayli, and Raghib Harb (assassinated in 1984), leading figures in Hezbollah who studied in Najaf 
during the 1970s". Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: The Internal Conflict and the Iranian 
Connection", in John L. Esposito (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.125. Also see: Martin Kramer, "The Moral 
Logic of Hizballah", in Walter Reich (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.134-35.
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area, spent respectively eight and nine years studying theology in Najaf.*** 
The Najaf experience of the Hizb'allah leadership explains both the depth of 
personal ties between leading Hizb'allah and Iranian leaders as well as the 
movement's ready assimilation of, and adherence to, Islamic Iran's ideolo­
gical doctrines.***
While Hizb'allah's structure were based on a close-knit and secret 
leadership and a broad based political movement***, which made it more capable 
of engaging in successful covert operations while shielding the movement's 
leaders from elimination, the method of organisation was not only fashioned 
after but also closely reflected the ideological principles of the Islamic 
revolution in Iran. In particular, Hizb'allah's close ideological identifica­
tion and its adherence to the line and authority of Ayatollah Khumayyni, was 
most evidently displayed by the movement's subscription to the principle of 
government by the just jurisconsult (al~wali al-faqih) Hizb'allah's 
adoption of this political theory, made famous by Ayatollah Khumayni during 
his exile in Najaf and enshrined in the 1979 constitution of the Islamic
*** See: Ma'aretz, June 14, 1984; al-Shira, March 17, 1986; Ha'aretz, January 10, 1984; and 
al-Nashra,'Dëcénber 5, 1983.
*** For a brief exploration of this issue, see: Martin Kramer, "Muslim Statecraft and 
Subversion", Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol.8: 1983-84 (Tel Aviv: JCSS, 1986): pp.170-3.
*** The secretive nature of Hizb'allah's leadership was critized by a prominent member, Ali 
al-Kurani, Tariqat Hizb'allali fi-l-'Amal-il-Islami (The Method of Hizballah in Islamic Acticn). To 
become a Hizb'allah member, a prospective candidate pass through the stages of 'mobilisation' (al- 
Tabia) which means at least a year's education during which the individual is closely obsen^ ed. 
After this, actual membership (al-Intizam) Involves further responsibili-ties, see: al-Shira, March 
17, 1987; and Ha'aretz, May 31, 1985.
*** For Hizb'allah's adherence to the principle of al-wali al-fagili, see: Nass al-risala al- 
maftuha allati waiiatialia Hizballah ila al-mustad'afin fi Lubnan wal-alam, reprinted in Augustus 
Richard Norton, (1987), op.cit.: pp.167-87. Also see: al-Ahd, August 29, 1985; and al-Ahd,
September 12, 1985.
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Republic of Iran, makes it a duty for the movement to obey the decisions and 
authority of the just jurisconsult in the absence of the twelfth Imam.**’ As 
Hizb'allah clerics professed absolute allegiance to the authority of 
Ayatollah Khumayyni, the movement also embraced many other principles of 
Iran's Islamic ideology.*** Following Iran, Hizb'allah viewed itself as a 
movement under the guidance of Imam Khumayyni and struggling against the 
injustices of imperialism and colonialism, followed by the stand of "no- 
East and no-West, only Islam".*** In Hizb'allah's ideology, all disasters 
which have befallen the historically oppressed Muslims can be attributed to 
foreign imperialists, especially the United States and its regional mani­
festation, Israel.*** In a dialectic fashion, Hizb'allah divides the world 
into the oppressors (mustakbirun) and the oppressed (mustad 'afun) in which 
the struggle for justice and equality can only be achieved through a revolu­
tionary process and activism.*** To this end, an important instrument employed
**’ For Hizb'allah's position, see: al-Harakat al-Islamiwa fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984); al-Ahd, 
August 29, 1985; al-Ahd, September 12, 1985; al-Ahd, December 12, 1986; al-Ahd, December 19, 1986; 
al-Ahd, April 24, 1987; and al-Ahd, November 7-28, 1987.
*** Hizb'allah's allegiance to Ayatollah Khumayni was declared clearly in Hizb'allah's only 
published manifesto: "[w]e abide by the orders of the sole wise and just command of the supreme 
jurisconsult who meets the qualifications, and who is presently incarnate in the Imam and guide, 
the Great Ayatollah Khomeini, may his authority be perpetuated - enabler of the revolution of the 
Muslims and harbinger of their glorious renaissance". As reprinted in Augustus Richard Norton, 
(1987), op.cit. Also see; al-Ahd, April 10, 1987; and Le Révue du Liban, July 27-August 3, 1985.
117 See: Marius Deeb, (1988), op.cit.: p.694. Also see: al-Shira, December 5, 1983.
*** For Hizb'allah's militancy against the United States, Israel and other NATO members, see: 
al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, October 28-November 2, 1985; al-Ahd, July 24, 1987; al-Nahar al-Arabi 
wal-Duwali, February 9-15, 1987; and La Revue du Liban, July 27 - August 3, 1985.
*** Hizb'allah's use of Iranian revolutionary rhetoric is evident in the movement's official 
manifesto, entitled: Open letter to the 'disinherited of Lebanon and the world, and in the daily 
statements of the movement's clerics. For exançle, see: al-Ahd, June 12, 1987.
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by both Iran and Hizb'allah has been the martyrdom of Imam Husayn as a symbol 
for the struggle against all contemporary tyrants.*” This symbolism used 
during the Ashura processions heightens the feelings of deprivation and in­
justice of the Shi’a community and revives annually Shi'i commitments to 
struggle against the enemies of Islam.*** In order to relieve the oppressed 
from the socio-economic reality of the Shi'a community, as well as take 
revenge on the oppressors, Hizb'allah's revolutionary ideology calls for a 
comprehensive "jihad" under the guidance of leading religious officials, the 
Shi'i uluma
The central position of the Shi 'a uluma, as the vanguard of revolu­
tionary struggle and social change, stems from its perceived independence 
from political rulers and tyrants and an closeness to the oppressed Shi'a 
masses.*** As such, the Lebanese Shi'a uluma, under the divine guidance of 
Ayatollah Khumayyni, has rejected the Western secular model of separation 
between church and state as it has caused the political, military, economic, 
and social ills of Muslim societies.*** As a result, Hizb'allah's declaratory
*** For the political significance of the Ashura commémoration of the martyrdom of Dnam 
Husayn in both Iran and Lebanon, see: Brmanuel Sivan, op.cit.: pp. 1-30. Also see: al-Ahd, August 
15, 1985; al-Nahar, October 5, 1984; and Libération, September 26, 1985.
*** See: Yves Gonzalez-Quijano, "Les Interprétations d’un Rite: Célébrations de la 'Achoura 
au Liban", Maghreb-Machrek, No. 115 (January-March 1987): pp.5-28. For a useful historical overview 
of Ashura in Islam, see: Yitzhak Nakash, "An Attenç)t to Trace the Origin of the Rituals of 
"Ashura", Die Welt des Islam, Vol.33, No.2 (1994): pp.161-81.
*** Until the creation of an Islamic uranfia, there exists a state of war between the dar al- 
Islam (the empire of Islam and peace) and dar al-Harb (empire of war), see: Richard Hartmann, 
"Islam und Nationalismus", Abhandlungen der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin 
(Berlin, 1946): pp.4-47.. .
*** See: al-Ahd, August 8, 1985; al-Alid, July 25, 1985; al-Slilra, March 17, 1986; and al- 
Liwa, March 16, 1984. Also see: Fuad Khuri, "The uluma: a comparative study of Sunni and Shi'a 
religious officials". Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.23, No.3 (July 1987): pp.291-312.
*** See: ^^ uhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Al-islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa (Beirut: 1981) ; Oliver Carré,
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aim has been the complete overthrow of the confessional system and the esta­
blishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon governed by Sharia law.*”
Although disagreement exist within Hizb'allah ranks over the feasibility 
of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon in the near future, the move­
ment's central doctrine of rule by the just juristconsult, whereby Hizb'allah 
subject itself to authority from outside their own nation-state, means that 
it rejects the idea of nationalism.*** Instead, Hizb’allah's revolutionary 
vision of the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon must be viewed within 
a larger pan-Islamic context.*** As the principle of rule by just jurist­
consult occupies a central position within the Hizb'allah's ideology, the 
movement does not recognize limitations of territorial boundaries in the 
quest for the creation of an Islamic state.*** On the contrary, Hizb'allah's 
embrace of a pan-Islamic identity means that the movement viewed itself as 
an extension of a worldwide Islamic movement under the guidance of Ayatollah 
Khumayni.*** As such, Hizb'allah's strategy of creating an Islamic state in
"La 'Révolution Islamique' selon Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah", Orient, op.cit. ; p.68-84; and al- 
Harakat al-Islamiwa fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984).
*” See: al-Harakat al-Islamiwa fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984) ; al-Alid, September 5, 1986; al-Ahd, 
April 10, 1987; Kavhan, July 27, 1986; al-Shira, September 28, 1989; La Révue du Liban, January 30, 
1988; and al-Safir, August 29, 1987.
*** For disagrement within Hizb'allah ranks over feasibility, see: See: al-Harakat al- 
Islamiwa (Beirut, 1984); Ma'aretz, February 21, 1988; Middle East Insight, June-July 1985; al- 
Hawadith, May 24, 1985; and al-Ahd, May 22, 1987.
*” See: Jmes Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation-States (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986): pp.114-15; and Martin Kramer, "Redeeming Jerusalem: The Pan-Islamic Premise of 
Hizballah", David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.105-30.
*” See: Malaf al-Shira, al-Harakat al-Islamiwa fi Lubnan (Beirut: Dar Sannin, 1984);
Kavhan, July 29, 1986; al-Ahd, March 7, 1986; al-Ahd, May 2, 1986; Liberation, March 19, 1985; and 
al-Naliar al-Arabi wal-Duwali. June 10-16, 1985.
*** For statements by Hizb'allah clerics, see: al-Ahd, September 5, 1986; al-Ahd. February 7,
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Lebanon was part and parcel of a grander design which aimed to establish an 
"all-encompassing Islamic state" uniting the entire region.*” Hizb'allah's 
grand strategy is closely linked to not only the internal conditions within 
Lebanon's borders but, more importantly, to regional Islamic victory in 
adjacent territories.*** As a result, Iran's war with Iraq was viewed by the 
Hizb'allah as an Islamic struggle between "Truth and Falsehood", in which
Iranian victory would not only result in Islam's triumph in Iraq but also set 
the stage for Hizb'allah's own victory in Lebanon.*” After Iran's acceptance 
of UN resolution 598 in 1988, the Hizb'allah substituted the setback in the 
Gulf war, in terms of achieving its pan-Islamic vision, with the revival of 
Islamic fundamentalism within the Palestinian uprising (intifada) in the 
Israeli occupied territories.*” As such, Hizb'allah viewed the internal 
conflict in Lebanon not within the confines of confessional strife but rather 
as a battle for the liberation of Quds (Jerusalem).***
Hizb'allah's grand strategy of implementing "the one Islamic world
1986; and La Révue du Liban, July 27-August 3, 1985.
*” See: al-Harakat al-Islamiwa fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984) ; al-Ahd. September 5, 1986; and al- 
m ,  May 29, 1987.
*” See: La Révue du Liban, July 27-August 3, 1985; and Kayhan, July 27, 1986.
*” See: al-Ahd, January 23, 1987.
*” See: al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, June 10-16, 1985; and al-Anwar, January 1, 1988.
*” See: al-Ahd, January 23, 1987; A number of sacred Islamic sites are located in Jenisalon 
and Palestine. The control of these by Israel is regarded by the entire Islmic world as unlawful 
usurpation of Islamic territory by non-^ u^slims and as an affront to the sanctity of these sites. 
See: Qiristine Rajewsky, "Der Gerechte Krieg im Islam", Friedensanalysen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1980). Hizb'allah's uncompromising position on the liberation of Jerusalem was revealed by 
Sheikh Fadlallah, who stated that: "[w]e must persecute Israel for one hundred years if necessary", 
see: Monday Morning, September 14, 1986.
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plan"*” was set to proceed in four stages: armed confrontation with Israel; 
overthrow of the Lebanese regime; the liberation of any form of intervention 
by the Great Powers in Lebanon; and finally the establishment of Islamic rule 
in Lebanon which will be joined by other Muslims in the creation of a single 
Islamic community (umma) While the order of priorities were continously 
redefined by leading Hizb'allah ideologists, reflecting the changing internal 
and external context for Hizb'allah, the pan-Islamic premise of the movement 
furnished the ideological raison d'etré for most of Hizb'allah's political 
and military activity. As a result, Iran occupied a central role as the van­
guard for Hizb'allah since it embodied both the revolutionary struggle and 
model that the movement itself was attempting to achieve in Lebanon.*” In 
turn, Hizb'allah received major support and guidance from Iran not only 
because it defended and disseminated Iran's pan-Islamic message among the 
Shi'a community but also as it performed important functions for Iran's 
foreign policy in the Lebanese, regional and international arena.
2.5 Hizb'allah's Pan-Islamic Ideology and Strategy:
The pan-Islamic premise of Hizb'allah was a defining characteristic of 
the movement's relationship with Iran. While Hizb'allah's pan-Islamic 
strategy reflected the specific conditions of the Lebanese Shi'a community,
*” See: al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, March 18-24, 1985; al-Majallah, July 15-26, 1987; ai^  
Ahd, December 30, 1988; al-Hawadith, February 13, 1987; and al-Nahar, August 10, 1986.
*” Martin Kramer, "Redeeming Jerusalem: The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah", in David 
Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.119. Also see: al-AIid, December 5, 1986; and feyhan, October 19,
1985.
*** Hizb'allali's identification ivith Iran has been described by a Hizb'allah cleric as the 
following: "Tie Islamic Republic is our mother; its place is in out' hearts, we receiye our 
inspiration from it", see: FBIS, February 14, 1984. According to Husayn al-Musawi: "[t]he Islamic 
Republic is our mother, our religion, our Mecca, our blood, our arteries", see: al-Alid, April 10,
1987.
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which led to the establishment of radical Shi'a movements, it was also 
predicated in a larger context on the ideological and political unity between 
the Hizb'allah and the Islamic revolution in Iran.*” Apart from professing 
absolute allegiance to the authority of Ayatollah Khumayni, Hizb'allah's 
implementation of its pan-Islamic strategy was closely linked to Iran's 
ability to project successfully its foreign policy of exporting the Islamic 
revolution abroad while consolidating and protecting it at home. In a pan- 
Islamic context, this symbiotic relationship between Hizb'allah and Iran 
manifested itself in many different ways in Lebanon.
The pan-Islamic goal of liberating Jerusalem through armed confrontation 
against Israel had been not only a reflection of suffering by the Shi'a 
community, following Israel's invasion and subsequent occupation of southern 
Lebanon, but also used by Hizb'allah as a pretext to mobilize support for the 
overthrow of the secular Lebanese regime and the establishment of an Islamic 
state.*” Hizb'allah's successful and relentless guerilla activity, which led 
to Israel's withdrawal in 1985, served to enhance the movement's role as 
protector of the Shi'a community in southern Lebanon while it bolstered the 
movement's support and image, among both followers and adversaries alike, as 
an implacable foe of Israel and other enemies of Islam.*” While Hizb'allah 
succeeded initially to fill the power-vacuum created by Israel's withdrawal
*” For Hizb'allah and Iranian unity, see: al-Harakat al-Islamiwa fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984); 
and Monday Morning, October 15-21, 1984.
*” In March 1985, Muhairmad Mahdi Shams al-Din declared a "defensive jihad" that made it a 
religious duty for all Muslims to fight against Israel as long as it occupied any part of Lebanon, 
see: FBIS, March 5, 1985. For Hizb'allah's justification, see: Ali al-Kurani, Tarikat Hizballah 
fil-Amal al-Islami (Beirut, 1986); al-Safir, January' 22, 1988; and al-Ittihad al-Ubus'i, July 2, 
1987,
*” See: al-Ahd, July 25, 1985; al-Nahar, June 5, 1985; and al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, 
March 18-24, 1985.
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at the expense of Amal, the race for the leadership of the Shi'a community 
in southern Lebanon was not only a battle between the Hizb'allah and Amal but 
also between Iran and Syria. Apart from expanding Iran's position within the 
Shi'a community through Hizb'allah, by a successful combination of ideolo­
gical indoctrination and material inducement, Iran's support for Hizb'allah 
was also based on Lebanon's geo-strategic position allowing Iran to parti­
cipate actively in the wider context of Middle East politics, especially in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. As a stumbling block to Syria's plans for the 
future of Lebanon, Iran actively promoted the destabilisation of security in 
southern Lebanon in order to obstruct any prospects for accommodation in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.*” The anarchic situation in the South also provided 
Iran with a forum to expand its influence in other areas of regional politics 
while paving the way for the Hizb'allah in the establishment of an Islamic 
state in Lebanon. As a result, both Iran and Hizb'allah were vehemently 
opposed to UN resolution 425, as the continous deployment of UNIFIL obstruc­
ted the jihad against Israel, and were opposed to the implementation of the 
1989 Ta'if Accord, which attempted to end the civil war through the disarma­
ment and dissolution of Lebanon's militias under Syrian auspices and
*” For example, prior to the 1991 Madrid meeting, the increased militancy of the Hizb'allah 
was a joint effort with Iran to sabotage the sclieduled Middle East peace process. In meetings with 
Sheikh Mohammad Jawad Klionsari, director of the Middle East and African department at the Iranian 
Foreign Ministry, the Hizb'allah discussed the coordination of the resistance work to liberate the 
south and holy Jerusalem, see: Voice of the Oppressed 1430 gmt 9 Sept 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1176, 
September 13, 1991.
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control.*” In the latter case, Hizb'allah's permission to maintain their 
armed presence in the South and in the eastern Biq'a, as the Hizb'allah 
claimed to be a resistance movement rather than a militia, came as a result 
of a modus vivendi between Iran and Syria.*” This underlines that the fate 
of Hizb'allah was not only been dependent on the regional relationship 
between Iran and Syria with regards to Lebanon but also that the movement's 
position vis-à-vis Israel reflected both its own internal agenda as well as 
Iran's foreign policy interests.
Hizb'allah's pan-Islamic goal of overthrowing the secular Lebanese re­
gime was inspired by the revolutionary achievement set by the establishment 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. While Iran proved that it was 
possible to achieve the impossible in the face of oppression and injustice, 
Hizb'allah's rejection of the confessional system was based on the adherence 
by the movement to governance by the just juristconsult (al-walih al-faqi) 
as its ideological foundation.*” As such, Hizb'allah viewed its revolutionary 
struggle in Lebanon not within the confines of geographical borders but
*” Hizb'allah initiated a political and military carrpaign against UNIFIL in August 1986 as 
the movement regarded the deployment as a de facto implicit recognition of Israel, see: al-Nahar, 
August 29, 1986; and al-Nahar, August 30, 1986. For a useful overview of Hizb'allah's position vis- 
à-vis UNIFIL, see: Alan James, Interminable Interim: Tie UN Force in Lebanon (London: The Centre 
for Security and Conflict Studies) No.210 (April 1988): pp.21-5. For Iran's and Hizb'allah's 
opposition to the Ta'if agreement, see: Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon After Ta'if: Is the Civil 
War Over?", Middle East Journal, Vol.45, No.3 (Sumner 1991): pp.457-473; and al-Shira, September 
28, 1987.
*” For Hizb'allah concerns over disarmament, see: Voice of the Oppressed 0630 gmt 24 Mar 
91 - BBC/S^ fB ME/1030, March 26, 1991; and Voice of the Oppressed 0530 gmt 8 May 91 - BBC/SWB 
ME/1068, May 10, 1991. For agreement between Iran and Syria, see: Financial Times, February 17, 
1992; and Voice of the Oppressed 0630 gmt 30 Apr 91 - BBC/SWB ME/1061, May 2, 1991.
*” See: Muhammad Zu'aytar, Nazrah 'ala Tarh-i-l-Jumhuriwa-l-Islamiyyah fi Lubnan [A Look at 
the Presentation of the Islamic Republic in Lebanon], (Beirut, 1988); al-Harakat al-Islamiwa fi 
Lubnan (Beirut, 1984); and al-Alid, May 2, 1986. According to Slieikh Fadlallah: "[t]he Iranian 
revolution proves that an Islamic movement can materialize the wishes of a nation and disproves the 
myth of the invulnerability of the big powers of the world", see: IRNA, January 19, 1988.
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rather as a chapter in the liberation of Jerusalem and the establishment of 
one great Islamic umma.*” Although Iran and Hizb'allah shared the conviction 
that Islamic rule will ultimately triumph in Lebanon, there existed diver­
gence over methods and their feasibility, even within Hizb'allah ranks.*” The
Hizb'allah sceptics, with Sheikh Fadlallah at its fore, acknowledged that the 
conditions in Lebanon were both more complex and difficult than those which 
existed in pre-revolutionary Iran. Unlike Iran, the situation in Lebanon was 
complicated by the multiplicity of, and opposition by, other religious 
militias supported by powerful foreign involvement.*” In particular, Syria 
was alarmed over Hizb'allah's emergence not only as its agenda was directly 
juxtaposed with Syria's hegemony in Lebanon but also as the movement posed 
the only real challenge to Asad's attempts to resurrect the defunct Lebanese 
political system.*” As Syria showed uncompromising determination to reassert 
its suzerainty over Lebanon, especially within the framework of the Ta'if 
Accord*” , Hizb'allah readjusted its grand strategy of overthrowing the 
secular regime through armed struggle towards a willingness to participate 
in mainstream Lebanese politics, a move partly inspired by the decisive
*” See: al-Ahd, December 5, 1986; al-Ahd, March 6, 1986; al-Ahd, April 10, 1987; Le Révue du
Liban, July 27-August 3, 1985; and al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, June 10-16, 1985.
*” See: al-Ahd, May 22, 1987; Orlbli Mallat, (1988), op.cit.: pp.36-7.
*” See: George Nader, "Interview with Sheikh Fadl Allah", Middle East Insight, June-July
1985.
*” In October 1989, Iran assembled Lebanese groups in Teheran to counter the Ta'if meeting, 
see: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; and al-Hayat, November 27, 1989. For Iranian and Hizb'allali 
opposition, see: Andreas Rieck, "A Peace Plan for Lebanon?: Prospects After the Taif Agreement", 
Aussenpolitik, No.3 (1990): pp.297-309.
See: al-Watan al-Arabi, November 24, 1989.
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victory in the Algerian elections of the Muslim fundementalist grouping, the 
Islamic Salvation front.*” Hizb'allah's readjustment demonstrated not only 
flexibility within the movement in the post-Khumayynl era, with diminished 
Iranian support and limited maneuverability in the post-civil war period in 
Lebanon, but also its susceptibility to changes in the regional and inter­
national arena. As such, the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon has been 
dependent on Hizb'allah's willingness to abandon violence and patiently work 
within the Lebanese confessional system, and perhaps more importantly, by 
tempering their pan-Islamic zeal both in terms of expansion into Syria and 
willingness to accept the present Pax Syriana in Lebanon. In addition, the 
prospects for an Islamic state in Lebanon, and to a larger extent, the future 
of Hizb'allah is predicated on not only Iran's ability to sustain its support 
for the movement but also the direction of Islamic Iran's foreign policy and 
the intensity of factionalism within Iran's clerical establishment.
Hizb'allah's third pan-Islamic goal of "the liberation of Lebanon from 
any form of political and military intervention by the Great Powers"*’* 
mirrors Islamic Iran's foreign policy of exporting the revolution as well as 
the continued Shi'a predicament in Lebanon and the country's vulnerability 
to foreign interests and foreign intervention.*” While the Lebanese Shi'a
*” See: Voice of the Oppressed 0630 gmt 3 Jan 92 - BBC/SWB ME/1269, January 4, 1992. For 
interview with Slieikh Fadlallali on the pcssibility of Hizb'allah participation in democratic 
elections; g  in English 2038 gmt 8 Jan 91 - BBC/Slffi ME/1274, January 10, 1992.
*’* See: al-Ahd, December 5, 1986; and Nass al-risala al-mafthua allati wajjahaha ila al- 
mustad'afin fi Lubnan wal-alam, reprinted in Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle 
for the Soul of Lebanon, op.cit.: pp.167-87. Also see: al-Ahd, March 11, 1986; al-Qabas, June 15, 
1988; al-Hawadith, February 13, 1987; al-Naliar, August 10, 1986; and al-Ahd, April 21, 1988.
*” For Islamic Iran's ideological worldview, see: R.K. Ramazani, (1988), op.cit., For a 
useful overview of Lebanon's militias and their foreign support, see: Hussein Sirriyeh, (1989), 
op.cit.; and Kenneth J. Alnwick & Thomas A. Fabyanic (eds.), Warfare in Lebanon (Washington, DC.: 
National Defense University, 1988).
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community's anti-Western hostility was deeply rooted in the historical legacy
of Western colonialism and intervention, it was exaggerated by the dynamics
of a protracted civil war; the Israeli invasion and subsequent occupation;
and the imposition of Western political and military order.*” Hizb'allah's
hostility was most evidently demonstrated towards the American and French 
participation in the Multinational Forces, deployed after the massacres in
the West Beirut refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. The movement regarded the 
MNF not as a peace-keeping force but rather as support and protection for 
the Gemayel regime.*” In an effort designed to end any foreign military 
presence and political influence, the Hizb'allah executed a series of suicide 
attacks, with active support from Syria and Iran, most notably against the 
headquarters of the US and French contingents which led to their withdrawal 
from Lebanon in 1984. Hizb'allah also spearheaded the armed campaign which 
led to the 1985 Israeli withdrawal from the Shouf Mountains and Beirut to a 
security zone in South Lebanon, while it contributed to the political climate 
that pressured Amin Gemayel to abrogate the 1983 May 17th Agreement with 
Israel.*” Although the Hizb'allah was successful in precipitating the 
American and Israeli withdrawals from Lebanon, which earned the movement 
prestige and revolutionary credence among the Shi'a community, the achieve­
ment also underlined the close co-operation and convergence of interests
*” See: George Nader, "Interview with Sheikh Fadl Allali", Middle East Insight (June-July
1985); and La Revue du Liban, July 27 - August 3, 1985. Also see: Martin Kramer, Hezbollah's Vision 
of the West, Policv Papers, No.16 (Washington DC.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
1990).
See: John L. Esposito, (1991), op.cit.: p.252.
*” See: Middle East Contemporary Survey 1983-84: pp.545-65; al-Nahar, June 5, 1985; al-Nahar 
al-Arabi wal-Duwali, March 18-24, 1985; and David A. Kom, "Syria and Lebanon: a Fateful 
Entanglement", The World Today (August/September, 1986): pp.137-142. Also see: Edgar O'Ballance, 
"The Lebanese Sea of Trouble", RUSI (December 1984): pp.40-3.
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between Hizb'allah, Syria, and Iran. For Syria, the activity of Hizb'allah's 
activity contributed to the re-emergence of Syria's political and military 
dominance in Lebanon after its influence had been diminuated by military 
defeat, following Israel's 1982 invasion and occupation of areas formerly 
controlled by Syria, and by foreign intervention, which secured US hegemony 
in Lebanon."* For Iran, Hizb'allah's activity provided it with both a means 
to participate actively militarily in the Arab-Israeli conflict by proxy and 
a forum to confront Israeli and American designs in Lebanon and elsewhere in 
the Middle East."’
In the aftermath of the American and Israeli withdrawals from Lebanon, 
Iran's and Syria's operational co-operation against common enemies, through 
Hizb'allah as their proxy, was pursued through the abduction of foreign 
citizens, both as a means to influence Western policy in Lebanon and as a way 
to exploit the issue for their own foreign policy agendas in the regional 
context. While the abductions by Hizb'allah forced the departure of 
Westerners from Lebanon, particularly after the January 1987 incidents, the 
decision to initiate the hostage-takings was primarily based on Iranian 
foreign policy calculations and interests, which inmost cases coincided with 
Hizb'allah's own agenda."* As such, both Iran and Hizb'allah were able not
"* See: Patrick Seale, Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley, CA.: University of 
California Press, 1988); Moshe Ma'oz, Assad: Hie Sphinx of Damascus (New York, NY.: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1988) ; and R. Avi-Ran, Syrian Involvement in Lebanon (1975-1985) (Tel i).viv: Jaffee Center 
for Strategic Studies, 1986).
"’ See: al-Nahar, September 7, 1985; Washington Post, February 1, 1984; La Revue du Liban, 
July 27, 1985; and al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, February 9-15, 1987.
"* In January 1987, Hizb'allah abducted an unprecedented number of ten Western citizens 
which prompted the Syrian armed intervention into West Beirut a month later. It seems the arrest of 
one Hizb'allah member in West Germany and another one in Italy precipitated soa>e of the abductions.
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only to remove military and political obstacles for the creation of an 
Islamic state in Lebanon but also use the hostage issue against their common 
enemies for a wide array of political purposes. Although the hostage-takings 
by Hizb'allah and its militancy against Western targets was motivated by the 
movement's own agenda in Lebanon, Iran was able to use the foreign hostages 
as a useful instrument to extract political, military and financial con­
cessions from the Western world."*
Syria's acquiesence to Hizb'allah's practise of hostage-taking, as it 
controled the Biq'a area from which Iranian Pasdaran and Hizb'allah ope­
rated, was been based primarily on its relationship with Iran. Although 
Hizb'allah activity was indirectly serving Syria's ambition for local 
hegemony, by the expulsion of foreign military and political presence from 
Lebanon, the hostage issue has also proved to be a liability for Syria. In 
its vigorous efforts to establish a Pax Syriana in Lebanon, Syria's close 
identification with the Hizb'allah undermined its ability to attract economic 
support from the Western world and shed its regional and international iso­
lation. In addition, the abduction of foreign hostages by Hizb'allah, coupled 
with the movement's attacks against Israel, not only damaged Syria's ability 
to control activity within Lebanese territory but also threatened to bring 
Syria into an armed confrontation with Israel in and over Lebanon."* As a 
result, Syrian protection and support for Amal was used to counter any un­
controlled Hizb'allah militancy against Israel and in the struggle for
"* For Sheikh Fadlallah's own admission of the linkage between the Western hostages and 
regional/international affairs, see: al-Mustaqbal, December 17, 1988; and al-Mustaqbal, March 3,
1988.
"* See: William Harris, "Syria in Lebanon", in Altaf Gauhar (ed.) Third World Affairs 1988 
{London: Hiird World Foundation, 1988).
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control of the Shi'a community in southern Lebanon. This intra-Shi'i warfare 
over the control of Shi'i regions in Lebanon culminated in February 1988, 
following the kidnapping of US Marine Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins, and 
continued until January 1989 when Iran and Syria cosponsored an agreement 
between Amal and Hizb'allah, which outlined their respective "zones of in­
fluence".However, Syrian restraint towards, and at times complicity with, 
Hizb'allah hostage-taking activity underlined that Syria's tolerance was 
based on its larger converging interests with Iran, as long as an enlarged 
Iranian role in Lebanon through Hizb'allah did not threaten either to spill 
over the borders and encourage Islamic movements to challenge the Asad regime 
nor limit Syrian designs in Lebanon, rather than based on bowing to regional 
and international pressures."*
Hizb'allah's final pan-Islamic goal of linking the establishment of 
Islamic rule in Lebanon as part in the creation of a single Islamic community 
underscored not only that Hizb'allah's revolutionary struggle rejected the 
principles of Arab and Persian nationalism, which divides the Muslims along 
artificial lines, but also that the movement is incorporated in a larger 
Islamic strategy led by the just jurisconsult Ayatollah Khumayynl."* As the
For information on the kidnapping and Amal-Hizb'allah clashes, see: Ha'aretz, February 
18, 1988; Jerusalem Post, February 18, 1988; Ma'aretz, February 21, 1988; and Ha'aretz, February 
28, 1988. For the agreement between Hizb'allah and Amal, see: Radio Free Lebanon 0545 gmt 15 Jan 89 
- BBC/SWB/ME/0360, January 17, 1989; Voice of the Oppressed 0630 gmt 28 Jan 89 - BBC/SWB/ME/0371, 
January 30, 1989.
"* In fact, Syria's ties to Iran and Amal conferred the Alawites with legitimacy within the 
Shi'a community following Imam Musa al-Sadr's fatwa in its support, see: Fouad Ajami, (1986), 
op.cit. For Shi'a relations with Syria's Alawis, see: Martin Kramer, "Syria's Alawis and Shi'ism", 
in Martin Kramer (ed.), (1987), op.cit.: pp.237-254.
"* For Hizb'allah's pan-Islamic goal, see: Kavhan, July 29, 1986; al-Ahd, February 7, 1986; 
al-Ahd, February 28, 1986; al-Alid, March 7, 1986; al-Ahd, September 5, 1986; al-Ahd, April 10,
1987; al-Ahd, May 29, 1987; al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, June 10-16, 1985; and Kavhan, July 27,
1986.
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Hizb'allah viewed itself as a component of a larger movement composed of all 
downtrodden Muslims who struggle under the guidance of Ayatollah Khumayynl 
against the injustices of imperialism and colonialism, the movement's wider 
ideological outlook was a reflection of a total identification with Ayatollah 
Khumayyni's revolutionary vision and the vanguard position of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran."* Within this ideological framework, Hizb'allah viewed 
Arab nationalism as a complete failure since it has led not only to Arab 
disunity, especially in terms of a resolution to the Palestinian issue, and 
Arab accommodation with Israel, as exemplified by the 1979 Camp David 
Accords, but also to worsened socio-economic difficulties for the Arab masses 
due to weak and illegitimate Arab political systems."* A manifestation of 
Hizb'allah's rejection of Arab nationalism was the way in which the movement 
viewed the war between Iran and Iraq. In accordance with Iran, Hizb'allah 
adopted a pan-Islamic justification for Iran's continuation of its war with 
Iraq, in which the problem was viewed as a wider battle against the usurper 
of the dar al-Islam rather than within the confines of a conflict between the 
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and the Iranian government."* When Ayatollah 
Khumayyni's accepted UN Resolution 598, Hizb'allah abandoned the overthrow 
of Saddam Hussein's regime as a necessary first step to restore control of 
Quds (Jerusalem) to the dar al-Islam and substituted it with the role of
"* See: "An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program", Jerusalem Quarterly, op.cit. : pp.111-16; 
al-Alid, May 2, 1986; al-Alid, August 29, 1985; al-Alid, September 12, 1985; and Ali al-Kurani, al- 
Harakat al-Islamiwa fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984).
"* See: al-Ahd, August 29, 1985; al-Ahd, February 28, 1986; al-Ahd, September 5, 1986; ^  
Alid, May 29, 1987; al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali. June 10-16, 1985; and al-Nahar, June 5, 1985.
"* See: Mohssen Massarrat, "Hie Ideological Context of the Iran-Iraq War: Pan-Islamism 
versus Pan-Arabism", in Hooshang Amiralimadi & Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: pp.28-41; and 
al-Ahd, August 29, 1985.
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Islam in the Palestinian uprising."’ Hizb'allah's concentration on Palestine 
reinforced the movement's pan-Islamic premise as the struggle for the libe­
ration of Palestine not only drew attention to the dominance of the United 
States and Israel in the region but also because it was directly predicated 
on the liberation of Jerusalem."*
In a similar manner, Hizb'allah also rejected Persian nationalism in 
order to bridge the differences between Arab and non-Arab Muslims under the 
unified banner of Islam."* As such, Hizb'allah functioned as an important 
conduit for Iran in efforts to spread Ayatollah Khumayyni's universalist 
message across ethnic, linguistic, and sectarian barriers, both in terms of 
disseminating Iran's political views and in educating the Arab masses about 
its Islamic ideology."* Hizb'allah's refutation of secular nationalism, be 
it Arab or Iranian, as an alien ideology derived from the West and harmful 
to the unity of the Islamic umma, means that the movement repudiates the idea
"’ For Ayatollah Khcmayyni's justification for acceptance of UN Resolution 598, see: al- 
Muntalag, September 1988. Also see: al-Naliar, July 22, 1988; al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, June 10- 
16, 1985; and al-Ahd, January 23, 1987.
"* For Hizb'allah solidarity with the Intifada, see: al-Ahd, March 18, 1988; al-Anwar, 
January 1, 1988; al-Ahd, September 9, 1988; al-Ahd, September 16, 1988; al-Divar, December 4, 1989; 
Ha'aretz, January 25, 1989; and Monday Morning, June 18, 1989.
"* See: David Menashri, "Khomeini's Policy Toward Ethnic and Religious Minorities", in 
Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich (eds.), Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle 
East (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1988). Also see: al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, June 
10-16, 1985; al-Ahd, August 29, 1985; al-Ahd, February 28, 1986; and al-Ahd, September 5, 1986.
"* See: Shireen T. Hunter, "Islamic Iran and the Arab World", Middle East Insight, Vol.5,
No.3 (1987); and Shireen T. Hunter, (1987), op.cit.: pp.741-2.
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of Iran as a distinct state with its own interests."’ While Iranian pan- 
Islamists have been compelled by the constraints of realpolitik to subordi­
nate the radical philosophy of the revolution for the pragmatic interests of 
the state (as exemplified by the Iran-Contra affair and the acceptance of a 
cease-fire with Iraq in 1988), the Hizb'allah showed greater loyalty to the 
pan-Islamic vision not only by the fact that it can afford to be as a revo­
lutionary movement but also as it has been dependent on pan-Islam for its 
sense of purpose and mission."* However, Hizb'allah's pan-Islamic revolutio­
nary struggle has been predicated on Islam's triumphs in adjacent terri­
tories, spearheaded by the Islamic Republic of Iran and under the guidance 
of the Ayatollah Khumayynl."* As a result, while Iran has been forced to 
demonstrate greater flexibility in its revolutionary dogma, in terms of the 
transnational notion of a Pax Islamica, in order to safeguard the very sur­
vival of the Islamic regime, Hizb'allah not only veiled its own revolutionary 
struggle in pan-Islamic motifs but also linked it to the success of Iran's 
ability to export its revolution.
While Hizb'allah's ruling elité viewed its revolutionary struggle in 
Lebanon through the ideological prism of pan-Islam, which was reflected by 
the linkage of its activity with Islamic Iran's foreign policy within Lebanon
"’ Martin Kramer, "The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah", in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), 
op.cit.; p.118. Also see; al-Ahd, May 2, 1986; and al-Naliar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, June 10-16, 1985.
"* For the compromise between Khumayyni's ideological dogma and reality, see: David 
Menashri, "Iran: Doctrine and Reality", in Efraim Karsh (ed.), Tlie Iran-Iraq War: Impact and 
Implications (London: Macmillan, 1989). For Hizb'allah's difficulty in justyfying Iran's secret 
contact with the US and Iran's acceptance of UN Resolution 598, see: al-Ahd, November 21, 1986; air 
Ahd, July 24, 1987; al-Ahd, July 31, 1987; al-Dustiur, December 22, 1986; al-Nahar, July 22, 1988; 
Ma'aretz, August 24, 1988; al-Ahd, September 9, 1988; and al-Ahd, September 16, 1988.
"* See: Le Révue du Liban, July 27-August 3, 1985; Kavhan, July 29, 1986; al-Ahd, Mai’ch 7, 
1986; and al-Harakat al-Islamiwa fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984).
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and on the regional and international level, the rank and file of the move­
ment was also deeply affected by the realities imposed by Lebanon's con­
fessional problems, as manifested through, and exacerbated by, a decade of 
protracted warfare."* As such, Hizb'allah viewed the possibility of the 
final implementation of a Pax Islamica as occurring only through the 
completion of all constituent elements or parts of Hizb’allah's pan-Islamic 
strategy."* Unlike Iran, the confessional nature of Lebanon"*, given the 
opposition from an array of other religious communities with powerful foreign 
support, had forced Hizb'allah to readjust the movement's pan-Islamic prio­
rities in accordance with the varying conditions of feasibility."’ Although 
all pan-Islamic goals of the Hizb'allah are intertwined with each other, the 
Islamic resistance in southern Lebanon, and its eventual extension into the 
liberation of Jerusalem, served as a basic premise for the movement's 
political actions."* Apart from providing Hizb'allah with legitimacy, the 
movement's resistance activity and pursuit of the liberation of Jerusalem, 
was not only secondary to but also the pretext for a more pressing concern:
"* See: Marius Deeb, (1984), op.cit.; and Fouad Ajami, (1985), op.cit.
"* See: Chibli Mallat, (1988), op.cit.; al-Shira, September 28, 1987; al-Ahd, May 22, 1987; 
and al-Shira, November 4, 1987.
"* See: George Nader, "Interview with Sheikh Mohanmad Hussein Fadl Allah", Middle East 
Insight (June-July, 1985); and al-Hawadith, May 24, 1985.
"’ See: al-Atid, March 7, 1986; al-Ahd, November 14, 1986; al-Ahd, May 29, 1987; and Le Révue 
du Liban, July 27-August 3, 1985. Also see: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; and Ha'aretz, December 17, 
1989.
"* See: al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984) ; and Le Monde Diplccnatigue, May 
1983. Also see: al-AIid, January 23, 1987; and al-Ahd, March 18, 1988; and al-Nahar al-Arabi wal- 
Duwali, June 10-16, 1985.
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the struggle for Lebanese power and the establishment of Islamic rule."’ As 
such, Hizb'allah's resistance activity can be seen as an instrument to 
enhance the movement's popularity and credibility among the Lebanese Shi'a 
community in a wider effort to achieve the implementation of an Islamic 
regime. Hizb'allah's order of priorities must also be seen within the context 
of conducive elements that determines the level of achievement of these pan- 
Islamic goals in the near future. In terms of the liberation of Jerusalem, 
Hizb'allah recognized that the elimination of Israel was a protracted pan- 
Islamic strategy extending over many years."* Hizb'allah's re-orientation 
towards, and solidarity with, the Palestinian Intifada, through its support 
and co-operation with the Hamas and Islamic Jihad, was a manifestation of 
raised expectations within the movement for the near accomplishment of the 
liberation of Jerusalem."’ Similarly, the Hizb'allah has been divided over 
the feasibility for the transformation of Lebanon into an Islamic republic 
in the near future."* The division within Hizb'allah ranks reflected not only 
scepticism over the applicability of the Iranian model within Lebanon's 
multiconfessional system but also the necessity of a readjustment in the
"’ For Hizb'allah resistance activity as a means to the establishment of an Islamic state, 
see: Chibli Mallat, (1988), op.cit.: 35-37.
l a o See: al-Safir, May 13, 1986; and Monday Morning, September 14, 1986.
’*’ See: Elie Rekhess, "Hie Iranian Impact on the Islamic Jihad Mbvanent in the Gaza Strip", 
in David Menashri (ed.), (1990b), op.cit. pp.189-206; Robert Satloff, "Islam in the Palestinian 
Uprising", Policy Focus, No.7 (October 1988); Jean-Francois Legrain, "Islamistes et Lutte Nationale 
Palestinne dans les Territories Occupés par Israël", Révue Française de Science Politique (April
1986): pp.227-47; and Alain Navarro, "Palestiniens: l'Expansion Islamiste", Les Cahiers de 
l'Orient, No.7 (1987): pp.51-66.
’** See: al-Harakat al-Islamiwa fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984) ; al-Muntalag, May 1986; al- 
Muntalaq, Septenber 1987; al-Shira, September 28, 1987; and George Nader, "Interview with Itohanmad 
Hiisein Fadl Allah", Middle East Insight (June-July 1985).
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movement's pan-Islamic strategy to ensure its own survival, especially in 
the post-Khumayynl period and under the Ta'if Accords with the extension of 
a Pax Syriana in Lebanon."* As a result, Hizb'allah's military activity was 
confined to southern Lebanon, where it escalated its attacks against Israel 
in order to justify its armed existence as a resistance movement rather than 
a militia,"* while the movement's political wing participated in the autumn 
1992 Lebanese elections, in which they scored a surprising electoral 
success."*
2.6 Conclusion
An understanding of the historical antecedent to the formation of the 
Hizb'allah is a fundemental prerequisite for the application of crisis 
management to the hostage-crisis for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Najaf 
origins of the movement and its subsequent development within Lebanon 
provides a frame of reference for the extent to which the close personal 
friendships forged between future Iranian and Hizb'allah leaders have been 
instrumental not only in governing the Lebanese movement's ideological 
deference to Iran but also that its past and present activities are guided
"* See: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; Ha’aretz, December 17, 1989; al-Shira, November 11,
1989.
"* For insights on Hizb'allah concerns over disarmament, see: Voice of the Oppressed 0630 
gmt 24 Mar 91 - BBC/SWB ME/1030, March 26, 1991. Also see interview with Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli: 
Voice of the Oppressed 0530 gmt 8 May 91 - BBC/SWB ME/1068, May 10, 1991. For Hizb'allah's
justification of retaining its armed presence in the south, see: Voice of Lebanon 1715 gmt 21 Apr
91 - BBC/SWB ME/1053, April 23, 1991; Voice of the Oppressed 0530 gmt 4 May 91 - BBC/SWB ME/1064, 
May 6, 1991. In the first six msntlis of 1991, Hizb'allali attacks against South Lebanese Army (SLA) 
and IDF targets in southern Lebanon doubled compared to the same period the previous year, see: The 
Jerusalem Report, August 5, 1991: p.38.
"* Slieikh Abbas al-^ fusawi stated "[h]e could envisage the day when Hizb'allali would elect
deputies to parliament and have cabinet ministers to defend the interests of Lebanese Shi'a", see:
Financial Times, February 17, 1992. Also see: al-Havat, February 14, 1991. Hizb'allah and Amal, 
joined together by a "Liberation List", won overwhelming victory in southern Lebanon of the 23 
seats contested. See: Financial Times, September 9, 1992.
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more by the evolution of a series of complex clerical networks than bound by 
a duty to profess absolute obedience to any Iranian orders. Apart from the 
close allegiance between Hizb'allah's clerical elite and members of Iran’s 
clerical establishment, rooted in their shared theological experience at 
Najaf and previous assistance to the anti-Shah revolutionary activity, the 
rank and file of the movement is also far from monolithic but rather bound 
and guided by a complex web of relationships, extending from the elité 
clerical leadership down to ties with family, neighbourhoods and individual 
religious clergy."* This has meant that the movement's members have been not 
only divided over loyalty to Hizb'allah's pan-Islamic vision over their 
collective Lebanese identity but also over the nature of authority, as 
manifested through different allegiances by its members and frequent dis­
agreements within the movement as well as towards its relations with Iran."’ 
The existence of varying allegiances within the Hizb'allah and towards Iran 
are essential to gauge to the advantage of crisis management at a general 
level, to understand the depth and breadth of clerical networks, and at a 
more specific level, to monitor fundemental divisions within the movement and 
areas of disagreements with Iran. This determines the willingness of 
Hizb'allah to act on behalf of Iranian orders or more independently.
Secondly, the evolution of the movement and its ideology within the 
Lebanese environment is also a necessary prerequisite for comprehending its
"* See: Martin Kramer, "Hie Moral Logic of Hizb'allah", in Walter Reich (ed.), (1990), 
op.cit. : p. 134; and Ali al-Kurani, Tariqat Hizballah fil-Amal al-Islami (Beirut, 1986).
"’ See: Ahmad Nizar Hamzah, Conflict in Lebanon: A Survey of Opinions and Attitudes (Ph.D. 
dissertation. University of Southern California, 1986). In tliis study only 3.4% of the Shii 
respondents named the Islamic Republic of Iran as the most favourable political system in Lebanon. 
Also see: Hilal Kashan, Antiwestem Perceptions among Lebanese Shii College Students (Ph.D. 
dissertation, American ttoiversity of Beirut, 1987).
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animosity towards the West, as displayed by its violent behaviour, and its 
wider relationships with other internal actors, most notably within the 
Shi'a community. However, the anarchial Lebanese environment has led to a 
latent tension between Hizb'allah’s ideological vision for Lebanon, and its 
recent exercise of caution and restraint in safeguarding its existence and 
achievements as a militant Islamic movement. Hizb'allah’s hostage-taking
activity provides the most revealing area in which these constraints and 
opportunities have been displayed.
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CHAPTER THREE: HIZ'BALLAH AND THE HOSTAGE CRISIS WITHIN LEBANON 
Introduction:
In a ten-year period, between 1982 and 1992, a number of enigmatic and 
obscure organisations, seemingly loosely or indirectly affiliated with the 
Hizb'allah organisation in Lebanon, not only launched spectacular and deadly 
suicide operations against the Western presence but also engaged in politi­
cal acts of hostage-taking of Western citizens. While the nhndowy Hizb’allah 
movement has denied any active involvement in these acts of terrorism, though 
applauding these operations in concert with Iran, its self-pj-oclaimed main 
enemies of the United States, Great Britain, and France,’ collectively sus­
tained casualties of over 300 individuals killed by the organisation while 
it has held over 45 citizens in captivity for various lengths of time over 
a ten-year period.* While the chaos and insanity of the fifteen-year pro­
tected civil war in Lebanon contributed to the difficulty in extricating 
the Western hostages from among a multitude of confessional militias, it also 
led to the association and image of Hizb'allah in the West as a crazy and 
fanatic religious group, bent on martyrdom through suicido-operations, and 
engaged in the random abduction of foreigners, under the assumed strict 
control and direction of Iran's clerical establishment.*
Although the West crossed paths in Lebanon with the radical and mili-
’ For Hizb'allah's manifesto, see: Mass al-risla al-maftuha allatf waj iaha hizb allah 
ila mustad Afin fi lubnan wa al-alam (Text of Open Letter Addressed by Hizb Aliali to the 
Downtrodden in Lebanon and the World), February 15, 1985. Also see: "An Open letter: Hizballah 
Program", Jerusalem Quarterly, No.48 (Fall 1988): pp.111-16.
* See: Ariel Merari and Yosefa (Daiksel) Braunstein, "Shiite Terroriiam: Operational 
Capabilities and the Suicide Factor'*, TVI Journal, Vol.5, No.2 (Fall 1984): pp.7-10; and Con 
Coughlin, Hostage (London: Little and Brown, 1992).
* For Iran's domination, see: Alvin H. Bernstein, "Iran’s Low-Intensity War Against 
the United States", %bis. Vol.30 (Spring 1986): pp.149-167; Daniel Pipes, "Death to America 
in Lebanon", Middle East Insight, No.4 (March/April 1985) : pp.3-9; Bruce Hoffnvin, (1990), 
op.cit.; and Robin Wright, (1985), op.cit^ .
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tant aspects of the Shi'a community and the Islamic Republic of Iran through 
Hizb'allah's abductions of foreign citizens, the highly complex nature of the 
internecine conflict involving an array of confessional warring factions with 
foreign patrons, prevented a clearly defined understanding of the 
Hizb'allah's motives and organisation from emerging. In the murky underworld 
of Lebanon's civil war, where conduct was regulated by regional, national, 
sectarian and family interest, the nature of the shadowy groups, acting under 
the umbrella of Hizb'allah, further compounded the complexity of the hostage- 
crisis and the involvement of Iran. The ambiguous nature of the organisation 
itself and its affiliation with Iran lead to an array of misperceptions and 
miscalculations by Western governments and outside observers in their 
attempts to both understand*and confront the prolonged hostage-crisis in 
Lebanon, at times with disastrous consequences.*
The problems of looking at hostage-taking by the Hizb'allah are: 
Firstly, any complete analysis of the hostage-crisis requires a compre­
hensive understanding of Hizb'allah as an organisation and its relationship 
with elements within Iran's clerical establishment as well as interaction 
with Iranian institutions.® While information provided by hostages on their 
release yield limited insight into the way in which the Hizb'allah operates 
as well as interacts with Iran,* previous analyses dismiss the possibility
* For example, see: Abbas Alnasrawi and Cheryl Rubenberg, Consistency of U.S. Foreign 
Policy: The Gulf War and the Iran-Contra Affair (Belmont, MA. : Association of Arab-American 
University Graduates Press, 1989); Michael C. Hudson, From Lebanon to "Irangate": A Review of 
Recent American Middle East Policy, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown 
University (Washington, DC. : CCAS Publications Program, 1987) ; Nicolas Tenzer and Franck 
Magnard, (1987), on.cit.: pp.90-101.
® As advanced by Jolm Calabrese: "[f]rom the days of Musa Sadr, the Iranian-Lebanese 
Shia connection has been built on a network of personal contacts and relationships. Hezbollah 
as an 'organisation',Iran as a 'state', and the 'asscxdation' between them have been, and 
still are, impenetrable and unfathomable: knowing what they are depends on knowing who the key 
personalities are within them, and how these key players relate to one another", see: John 
Calabrese, "Iran II: The Damascus Connection", World Today (October 1990): p. 189,
* The hostages' accounts reveal limited insight on the workings of the Hizb'allah, 
see: Benjamin M. Weir, "Reflections of a Former Hostage on Causes of Terrorism", Arab Studies 
Quarterly. Vol.9, No.2 (Spring 1987): pp.155-161; Benjamin and Carol Weir, Hostage Bound,
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of unravelling the dimensions of the network of personal contacts and 
relationships between Hizb'allah and Iranian clergymen.’
Secondly, the approach of viewing both Hizb'allah and Iran as unitary 
rational actors is not only based on a misconception but ignores the poli­
tical reality of the internal dimensions of Lebanon's civil war as well as 
the permanent projection of clerical factionalism in Iran onto the Lebanese 
arena through the Hizb'allah's activity, especially in terms of hostage-
taking of foreigners.* As a militant Islamic organisation, the Hizb'allah is 
far from a uniform body as displayed by continuous clerical factionalism 
between its leading members over the direction of the movement and the con­
stant readjustments of the movement's position within Lebanon's warring fac­
tions.’ This is influenced by* the dynamics of the relationship with Iranian
Hostage Free (Philadelphia, PA.: Westminister Press, 1987); Charles Glass, Tribes With Hags 
(London: Seeker & Warburg, 1990) ; David Jackobsen, Hostage: My Nightmare in Beirut (New York, 
NY. : Donald I. Fine, 1991); Jackie and Sunni Mann, Yours Till the End ( London: Heinemann, 
1992) ; Terry Waite, Taken on Trust (London: Routledge, 1993) ; Terry Anderson, Den of -Lions 
(New York, NY. : Crown Publishers, 1993) ; and Roger Auqiie, Hh Otage A Beyrouth (Paris: 
Filipacchi, 1988).
’ See: Jolm Calabrese, (1990), op.cit.: p.189; and Martin Kramer, "La Morale du 
Hizbollali et sa Logique", Maghreb-Machrek, no. 119 (Janauary-February-March 1988): pp.39-59. 
According to Martin Kramer: "[t]he role of Iranian support and guidance in Hizballah's growth 
is obvious, although the precise linkages still constitutes secret histroy", see: Martin 
Kramer, (1990), op.cit.: p.105. According to Augustus Richard Norton: "[m]uch ink has been 
spilt on the issue of who leads Hezbollali, but the only conclusive statanent that can be made 
is that the movement subsumes many factions and cliques", see: Augustus Richard Norton, 
(1990), op.cit.: p.128. Also see: Robin Wright, (1986), op.cit.: pp.90-106.
* See: Ali al-Kurani, Tariqat Hizballah fil-amal al-islami (Beirut: 1986) ; Valeurs 
Actuelles, April 6, 1987; and Le Monde, OctolDer 25, 1986. The importance of understanding 
clerical factionalian in Iran was aptly described by Graham Riller: [t]he Iranian political 
and social systems decree that one deal with personalities and not with institutions, the 
personal relationship to this day transcends any formal or institutionalized relationship", 
see: Graliam E. Fuller, The "Center of the Universe": Hie Geolpolitics of Iran (Boulder, CO.: 
Westview Press, 1991): p.20. Also see: Reza M. Belinam, Cultural Foundations of Iranian 
Politics (Salt Lake City, UT. : Utali University Press, 1986).
’ See, for example, Hizb'allah's 1989 conference: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; Foreign 
Broadcast Information Sei'vice, Daily Report, Near East and South Asia, November 30, 1989 
Diereafter cited as FBIS]; and Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989.
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clerical factions and institutions at work within the movement."
Thirdly, the hostage-crisis is also influenced by multi-layered 
Lebanese, regional, and international politics." This influence affects the 
process of the hostage-crisis as Westerners are abducted and released for 
individual Hizb'allah motives or in convergence \fith. Iranian and, to a lesser 
extent, Syrian interests."
Fourthly, in terms of Hizb'allah as an organisation, it requires de­
ciphering the affiliation and position of the shadowy sub-groups under its 
umbrella, who claim responsibility for these abductions. It is also necessary 
to examine the nature and dynamics of Hizb'allah's command leadership and its 
decision-making with reference to the process of hostage-taking of Wester­
ners.
Finally, this must be balanced against the dynamics of Hizb'allah's in­
stitutionalized relationships with Iran and Syria in Lebanon in accordance 
with internal Lebanese factors and external developments, creating oppor­
tunities and constraints in the practise of hostage-taking.
3.2 Use of Covernames and Concealment in Hizb'allah Abduction of Foreigners
A myriad of different names have appeared attributed to organisations 
claiming responsibility for the abduction of Western hostages in Lebanon. 
This has led to a great deal of confusion among policymakers and academics 
alike in attempts to determine whether the perpetrating group has acted with­
" Although valuable, other studies on the hostage-crisis have examined the 
organisation and Iran's involvement in a vaccum without regard for the impact of clerical 
factionalism in Iran on Hizb'allah activity and the internal environment in which Hizb'allah 
operates, see: Maskit Burgin, Ariel Merari, Anat Kurz, Foreign Hostages in Lebanon, JCSS 
Memorandum no.25 - August 1988 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv iMversity, 1988). Also see: Martin Kramer, 
"Redeeming Jerusalem: The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah", in David Menashri (ed.), op.cit. ; 
p.105; and FBIS, December 5, 1989.
" As briefly demonstrated by: Farhang Jahanpour, "The Roots of the Hostage Crisis", 
The World Today (February 1992).
" See: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; al-Ahd, October 27, 1989; al-Shira, March 16, 1986; 
and Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989.
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in the framework of Hizb'allah's umbrella, semi-independently, or completely 
independently." As these groups have managed to maintain almost complete 
secrecy surrounding their identity and operations, any determination of their 
status and affiliation to Hizb'allah is a difficult task." Nevertheless, it 
is necessary and, more importantly, possible to discern the raison d'etré by 
the perpetrating organisation for the concealment of their identity as well 
as their connection with the Hizb'allah.
Although Hizb'allah's spiritual leader. Sheikh Muhammad Hussein 
Fadlallah, debunked the idea of taqiyya, or dissimulation, when he urged his 
followers to organize along party lines with the publication of Islam and the 
Logic of Force in 1976," the Shi'a tradition of concealment, as practised by 
the Shi'a minority when religiously persecuted in ancient times, has been 
frequently used by the Hizb'allah when operating covertly, especially in the 
abduction of foreigners." The use of different cover names during covert 
operations has shielded the Hizb'allah movement and its leaders from perse-
" For useful examples of the confusion within academia and policy circles in analysing 
these groups, see: Brian Michael Jenkins and Robin Wright, "Hie Kidnappings in Lebanon", TVI 
Report, Vol.7, No.4 (Fall, 1986): pp.2-11; Robin Wright, In the Name of God (New York, NY.: 
Simon & Schuster, 1989): p. 160; and John L. Espcxsito, Islam and Politics (Syracuse, NY. : 
Syracuse University Press, 1991): p.253. For a cross-section of the shifts and different views 
within the mass media, see: Ma'aretz, December 16, 1983; Ha'aretz, April 16, 1984; Le Point, 
July 30, 1987; Independent, August 30, 1989; Sunday Times, June 30, 1985; and Washington Post. 
May 15, 1990. .
" This secrecy was even critized by a leading Hizb'allah member, see: Ali al-Kurani, 
Tariqat Hizballah fil-amal al-islami (Beirut: 1986); and Davar, January 30, 1987. For the 
difficulty in mapping individual responsibility with Hizb'allah's caimand leadership see: 
Martin Kramer, "La Morale du Hizbollah et sa Logique", Maghreb-Machrek, no. 119, (janv.- mars, 
1988): pp.39-59.
" See: Mianmad Husayn Fadlallah, Al-islam wa-mantiq al-quwwa (Beirut: al-Mu'assasa 
al-Jam'iyya li-al-Dirasat wa-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawzi ', 1981): p.246-7.
" See: Le Matin, January 29, 1987; and Kevhan, February 12, 1987. For the practise of 
taqiyah, see: Juan R.I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (eds.), (1986), op.cit.: pp.28-29. For a 
useful exposition of concealment in Shi'ism, refer to lecture by Prof. Et an Kohlberg, Hebrew 
University, delivered at the Tel Aviv University, May 23, 1993. Also see: Xavier Raufer, 
"Ideology of Radical-Islamic Groups: European Implications", in Brenda Almond (ed.) Terrorism 
in the New Europe (Hull: The University of Hull, May 15-17, 1992).
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cution and reprisals, while the the cover names themselves have been employed 
not only to confuse the enemy but also to signify the currents inside the 
movement at a particular time." While the nom de guerre of Islamic Jihad, 
or "Holy War", emerged in connection with Hizb'allah's multiple suicide ope­
rations in 1983, many Hizb'allah leaders openly admitted both involvement in 
Islamic Jihad operations" and that the organisation did not exist as such, 
but rather was merely a "telephone organisation"," whose name was "used by
those involved to disguise their true identity".** The use of the term Jihad 
by the Hizb'allah denoted the combat activity against the enemies of Islam 
and lent revolutionary credence to the movement in the eyes of the Shi'ite 
community." It was also used by the Hizb'allah in the abduction of foreig­
ners from 1984 until mid-198'5, which symbolically reflected the movements 
accelerated efforts to expel any Western political and military presence in 
Lebanon." Therefore, it was not surprising that Islamic Jihad as a cover 
name ceased to be used in new abductions of foreigners after Hizb'allah's
" See: Al-Ittihad Al-Usbu'i, February 26, 1987; al-Dustur, November 6, 1989; hnd al- 
Dustur, September 11, 1989.
" For statements by Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi, admitting involvement, see: al-Nahar, 
September 7, 1985; La Revue du Liban, July 27 - August 3, 1985. According to al-Musawi, "in 
his eyes it is an honour to be called terrorist whenever the goal is to harass and expel 
oppressors", see: Nehzat, July 18, 1985.
" See: Marius Deeb, (1986), op.cit.: p.19. For statement by Sheikh Fadlallah, see: 
Monday Morning, October 15-21, 1984.
" For statement by Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, see: Al-Ittihad Al-Usbu'i, December 4,
1986. For a statement by Hussayn al-Mussawi, see: al-Nahar al-Arabi, June 10, 1985; and 
Ha'aretz, July 30, 1985. Also see: Ma'aretz, December 16, 1983; Ha'aretz, September 30, 1984; 
Associated Press, October 5, 1984; Ma'aretz, April 2, 1985; Le Point, July 30, 1987; al-Shira, 
August 28, 1988; Nouveau Magazine. July 23, 1988; and New York Times, November 13, 1986.
" The Quranic notion of Jihad signifies the battle against evil and means the struggle 
to spread and to defend Islam, see: Patrick J. Bannerman, Islam in Perspective (London: 
Routledge, 1988). For Hizb'allah's use of Jihad, see: As'ad AbuKhalil, (1991), op.cit..
" See: Kavhan, July 29, 1986; and Liberation, March 16, 1985.
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successful victory in forcing not only the earlier departure of the Multi­
national Forces but also Israel's partial withdrawal from Lebanon in June 
1985."
The emergence of another organisation, using the nom de guerre of the 
Revolutionary Justice Organisation, in claiming responsibility for the abduc­
tion of foreigners during 1986, signified Hizb'allah's concern over the im­
prisonment of a number of its members in France as most abductions involved 
French citizens. When the cover name was used in abductions of three Ameri­
cans in September-October 1986, (shortly proceeding the revelation of the US- 
Iran arms-for-hostages deal) it was believed the name signified a split with­
in the Hizb'allah which mirrored Iranian clerical factionalism." As later 
revealed by the confinement of these French and American hostages with other 
hostages held by Islamic Jihad,^  coupled with the unified position within 
Hizb'allah rejecting any US-Iranian rapproachementthis was not the case.
Apart from a single abduction of a French citizen in January 1987 by the 
Revolutionary Justice Organisation, Hizb'allah's shift towards using the nom 
de guerre Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine reflected not only 
solidarity with imprisoned Hizb'allah and Shi'ite Palestinians held by Israel 
but also the movement's political and military orientation in the struggle 
for the "liberation of Jerusalem" through armed confrontation in southern 
Lebanon." This also signified Hizb'allah's co-operation with Fatah elements
" See: Washington Post, February 1, 1984; Ha'aretz, September 30, 1984; Ha'aretz. 
April 1, 1985; and al-Dustur, March 31, 1985.
" See: New York Times, November 13, 1986; Davar, January 11, 1987; New York Times. 
December 18, 1986; and International Herald Tribune, January 30, 1987.
" For Hizb'allah's opposition, see: al-Ahd, November 16, 1986; and al-Ahd. November 
21, 1986.
" For the use of the name: Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, see* 
Ma'aretz, November 3, 1987; and Ha'aretz, November 4, 1987.
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instituted in 1987 for the escalation of the armed confrontation with 
Israel." While a number of other cover names were subsequently used by 
Hizb'allah, the common feature of these names signified the release of impri­
soned Hizb'allah members, as evident by the use of the names The Organisation 
for the Defense of Free People or Holy Strugglers for Freedom, and, more 
importantly, symbolized the fate of the Shi'a as a deprived and humiliated 
community, as evident by the use of the title Organization of the Oppressed
on E a r t h This is evidently apparent by the choice of name of Hizb'allah's 
own radio station, Voice of the Oppressed
While the employment of these cover names by Hizb'allah reflected the 
concerns and direction of the movement in Lebanon, the fact that many hos­
tages were held with other hostages taken by different groups is evidence 
that the names have not necessarily represented separate and different 
groups, either within or outside the organisational structure of the 
Hizb'allah." In fact, as demonstrated by the testimony of many former hos­
tages, the core group of kidnappers of Western hostages seemed only involved 
a dozen men from various Hizb'allah clans, most notably the Mugniyya and 
Hamadi clans." The fact that these two clans have been continuously pin­
" See; Ma'ariv, November 3, 1987; Richochets, Israel Defence Forces Spokesman, July 
1990; al-Divar, December 4, 1989; Ha'aretz, December 5, 1989; and International Herald 
Tribune, January 1, 1990.
28 See: International Herald Tribune, February 20, 1988.
" Hizb'allah's radio station. Radio of Islam - Voice of the Oppressed, is broadcasted 
from the Biq'a valley and was first monitored on January 14, 1986. Another radio station,
Voice of Faith, idiich appeared in November 1987, is supportive of Hizb'allah, see: 
BBC/SWB/ME/0024, December 12, 1987. For information on Hizb'allali's TV-station al-Manar (the 
Beacon), see: Sunday Times, July 19, 1992.
" See: Maskit Burgin, Ariel Merari and Anat Kurz, (1988), op.cit.; pp. 11-2. Also see: 
Washington Post, September 21, 1984; and Washington Post, August 1, 1985.
" See: Los Angeles Times, November 26, 1989; Independent, January 28, 1987; Israeli TV 
(NER), February 16, 1987; Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989; Independent, October 9, 1991; 
and Le Figaro, December 4, 1989. For difficulty in exactly pin-pointing the identity of 
hostage-takers, see: Independent, December 1, 1991.
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pointed by authorities for alledged involvement in the kidnappings of fo - 
reigners underlines not only the importance of the Lebanese clan system as 
a basis for Hizb'allah's organizational structure and activity but also the 
personal and ideological loyalty within the Hizb'allah to higher religious 
authority. This has led to an extremely close-knit structure capable of en­
gaging in successful covert operations." While clan loyalty" and indi­
vidual clerical relationships have provided the basis for the movement and 
the framework for its hostage-taking activity," it functions under the 
jurisdiction of a centralized and well organized leadership structure." 
Although leading Hizb'allah clergy deny the movement has a clearly defined 
organisational structure, the Hizb'allah is secretly governed on the national 
and local level by a supreme political-religious board of authority, composed 
of a small and select group of Lebanese uiu/na." Due to the absolute nature 
of the supreme religious authority of the Hizb'allah's command leadership, 
all decisions or activities relating to hostage-taking by regional or clan
" For IDF Military Intelligence (AMAN), Hizb'allah has been adraittingly difficult to 
infiltrate as the #ole organisation is based on religious or family bonds. Apart from its 
"compartmentalized ultrasecretive cells and cryptic coommications", full-fledged membership 
meant being bom into the organisation, see; Samuel M. Katz, Soldier Spies: Israeli Military 
Intelligence (Novato, CA.: Presidio Press,, 1992): p.319; and Newsweek, February 27, 1989: 
p.27. Also see: Associated Press, October 5, 1984.
See: Nouveau Magazine, July 23, 1988; Voice of Lebanon, May 15, 1988; and Hurriyet. 
November 17, 1986.
" See: Le Quotidien de Paris, January 27-28, 1990; and Le Point. June 1, 1987. For 
recruitment procedure as a non-operational Hizb'allah member, see: Ha'aretz. May 31.
" See: Le Figaro, December 4, 1989; Le Point, June 15, 1987; and Associated Press, 
October 5, 1984.
" For Hizb'allah leadem denial of an organisational structure, see: al-Harakat al- 
Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beimt, 1984); Monday Morning, January 14, 1985; and al-Naliar al-Arabi, 
June 10, 1986.
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leaders had to be approved at the highest level." As a result, the idea that 
Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity were pursued independently by individual 
Hizb'allah clans, either without the knowledge of leading clergy or not 
through a chain of command, ignores not only the nature of religious autho­
rity exercized over every aspect of the movement's activity but also the 
institutionalized cooperation and coordination with both Iran and Syria in 
some of these operations," Although a number of abductions of foreigners
were initiated in alignment with individual interests of certain Hizb'allah 
clans, all acts of hostage-taking also coincided with the collective interest 
of the organisation as a whole. As a consequence, it is necessary to analyse 
the nature of Hizb’allah’s command leadership, its decision-making structure 
as well as policy with specific reference to the movement's hostage-taking 
activity. It is also necessary fo examine the nature of the involvement of 
Iranian clergy and institutions at work in Lebanon as well as Syrian military 
and intelligence services in terms of their influence within and over 
Hizb'allah activity.
3,3. Hizb'allah's Command Leadership"
On the first anniversary of the martyrdom of Sheikh Ragheb Harb, on 
February 16, 1985, Hizb'allah publicly announced for the first time not only 
its ideological progamme and strategy in a manifesto" but also appeared as
" Uhattributable interview with senior Israeli official in Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Jerusalem, Israel, August 1991. Also see; al-Sharg al-Awsat, April 18, 1989; and al- 
Shira, March 17, 1986.
" According to Salah Khalaf (Abu lyad), all the different names adopted by Hizb'allah 
are merely covers for its operational wing, see: Le Matin, January 29, 1987; and Kevhan. 
February 12, 1987. For Islamic Jihad operations, see: Associated Press, October 5, 1984.
" For a chart of the organizational structure of the Hizb'allah, see: Appendix I.
** For a full text of the manifesto, see: Mass al-risla al-maftuha allati wajjaha hizb 
allah ila al-mustad Afin fi lubnan wa al-alam (Text of Open Letter Addressed by Hizb Allah to 
the Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World), reprinted in Augustus Richard Norton, (ed.), 
(1987), op.cit.: pp.167-87.
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a unified organisation with the assembly of the entire Hizb'allah command 
leadership.*’ Although the Hizb'allah revealed only the position of Sheikh 
Ibrahim al-Amin as its official spokesman, the movement was secretly governed 
by a supreme religious body, which had been instituted by Iran's Fazlollah 
Mahallati in 1983, fashioned after the upper echelons of Iran's clerical 
leadership." The composition of the highest authority within this supreme 
religious body in Lebanon reflected the core group of individual Shi'ite 
clergy who assisted in the foundation of the Hizb'allah in July 1982.** Apart 
from the position of Husayn al-Musawi, as the only non-clerical member of the 
religious leadership, the composition of Hizb'allah's leadership council was 
also reflective of the religious authority of these clergymen in terms of 
their command of a substantial number of followers in each of the three main 
Shi'ite regions in Lebanon: the Biq'a; Beirut; and southern Lebanon.**
In the Biq'a area, the Hizb'allah is headed by Sheikh Subhi al- 
Tufayli," who was considered the highest religious authority in Ba'albek as 
evident by his nomination of "president of the Islamic Republic" in Ba'albek 
in 1984,** and Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi. Along with Husayn al-Musawi and his
*’ Hizb'allah's cxxnmand leadership attended a meeting in Shyah in the southern suburbs 
of Beirut, where Hizb'allah's official spokesman read the "Open Letter Addressed by the 
HizbAllah to the Oppressed/Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World", see: Gilles Delafon, 
Beyrouth: Les Soldats de l'Islam (Paris: Stock, 1989): p.90.
** See: Amir Taheri, (1987), op.cit.: p.125. Also see: Shimon Shapira, (1987), op.cit..
** See: Shimon Shapira, (1988), op.cit.: pp.114-30; and al-Dustur, November 6, 1989.
** See: Israeli Defense Forces Spokesman (IDFS), February 18, 1986; and Davar, January 
11, 1987.
** Sheikh Sublii al-Tufayli was bom in 1948 in the village of Brital in the Bi'qa area, 
see: Davar, Novmber 25, 1983; al-Nashra, December 5, 1984; Ha'aretz, January 10, 1984; 
Ha'aretz, June 4, 1984; al-Dustur, March 31, 1985; Ha'aretz, April 1, 1985; and International 
Herald Tribune, March 27, 1987.
** See: Ha'aretz, June 4, 1984; and al-Nashra, December 5, 1983.
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Islamic Amal/’ these two religious figures occupied not only the most senior 
positions as spiritual leaders of the Hizb'allah in the Biq'a but also played 
an instrumental role as liaison with the Iranian Pasdaran and Iran while 
maintaining overall control over Hizb'allah's irregular and semi-regular 
military units." While Sheikh al-Tufayli acted as the head of the Hizb'allah 
headquarters in Ba'albek and was the movement’s main.liason with Teheran," 
Sheikh al-Musawi was operational head of the Hizb'allah's Special Security 
Apparatus and the movement's military wing, the Islamic Resistances^ Another 
main leader of Hizb'allah military activity in the Biq'a was Sheikh Husayn 
al-Khalil, who maintained a senior position within Hizb'allah's command 
leadership." Al-Khalil acted as operational co-ordinator of Hizb'allah's 
military units in co-operation with Islamic Amal, which was subordinated 
organisationally within Hizb'allah from 1984 onwards under the personal
*’ See: Ma'aretz, October 24, 1983; Ma'aretz, November 6, 1983; al-Nahar al-Arabi. June 
10, 1985; Washington Post, February 14, 1986; Nouveau Magazine, November 15, 1986; al-Nahar, 
November 14, 1986; Foreign Report, July 30, 1987; al-Safir, August 17, 1987; al-Shira, August 
8, 1988; and Independent, August 30, 1989. Husayn al-Misawi is related to Abbas al-Musawi, 
see: Davar, Noveniber 25, 1983.
** See: al-Dustur, March 31, 1985; al-Ittihad, December 4, 1986; International Herald 
Tribune, March 27, 1987; Ma'aretz, June 14, 1987; Ha'aretz, Novmber 29, 1987; La Revue du 
Liban, January 30, 1988; Ha'aretz, February 22, 1988; Independent. August 30, 1989; and 
Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989.
" See: International Herald Tribune, March 27, 1987; Ha'aretz, November 29, 1987; 
Ma'aretz, June 14, 1987; and Ha'aretz, February 22, 1988. Slieikh Tufayli is also responsible 
for Hizb'allah's financial assets, see: Ha'aretz, August 21, 1991.
" See: Foreign Report, July 30, 1987; Davar, October 2, 1987; Ha'aretz, October 2,
1987; Ma'aretz, June 14, 1984; al-Havat, November 27, 1989; Ha'aretz, Decmber 17, 1989; and 
Independent, March 7, 1990. Al-Musawi was head of internal security within Hizb'allah SSA frccn 
1983-85. In late 1985 until April 1988, al-Musam was the head of the Islamic Resistance. For 
Hizb'allah-Pasdaran military march in Ba'albek, see: Radio Monte Carlo, December 14, 1987. In 
June 1987, Abbas al-Musam was transferred from Biq'a area to Tyre to set up hideouts to which 
hostages could be transferred from Beirut and to weaken Amal's position in the area, see: 
Foreign Report, July 30, 1987.
" See: Independent, August, 30, 1989; al-Hayat, Noveniber 27, 1989; Ha'aretz. December
17, 1989; and FBIS, November 30, 1989. Sheikli Husayn al-Klialil became also the head of the
Politbureau in 1989/90, see: Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993).
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authority of Husayn al-Musawi." A lesser Hizb'allah figure in the Biq'a with 
an important function was Mustafa Mahmud Madhi, who is responsible for the 
arms shipments received from Iran at the Sheikh Abdallah barracks."
In Beirut and the surrounding suburbs, the Hizb'allah was headed by 
Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the overall spiritual guide of the move­
ment, who mustered a substantial following within exisiting Shi'ite religious 
institutions and other Shi'ite radical movements." While Sheikh Fadlallah 
denies any official position within Hizb'allah, the main leaders were seen 
to be Sheikh al-Amin, the official spokesman," and Sheikh Hassan 
Nasserallah, who mustered support from the activists within the movement and
were operationally responsible for certain aspects involving military and
*terrorist operations." Both Sheikh al-Amin and Sheikh Nasserallah acted as
" See; Ha'aretz, March 20, 1987; and al-Anba, February 18, 1984. The military leader 
of Islamic Amal is Abu Yahia, see: Associated Press, November 18, 1983; Israeli Defense Forces 
Spokesman, February 3, 1984.
" See: Ha'aretz, June 21, 1987. According to Augustus Richard Norton, the Hizb'allah 
had in 1985 M-113s [armored personell carriers], Sagger anti-tank weapons, GRAD-rockets, 
armored personal carriers and artillery pieces, see: Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the 
Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, op. cit.: p. 205 n.36. Also see: Xavier Raufer, (1991), 
op.cit.: p.147. On November 28, 1991, the Hizb'allah used for the first-time a shoulder-held 
SAM-7 anti-aircraft missile made in Eastern Europe at an Israeli C-47 aircraft, see: Foreign 
Report, December 5, 1991. It also uses ex-Soviet Sagger-3 anti-tank missiles and American M72 
light anti-tank weapons, see: Foreign Report, May 20, 1993. For Hizb'allah possession of LAW 
(Light Anti-Tank Weapon) shoulder-fired missiles, see: Jerusalem Domestic Service, August 28, 
1984.
®* See: Da'var, November 25, 1983; Ma'aretz, October 30, 1983; Ha'aretz, November 27, 
1983; Ha'aretz. February 2, 1984; and Ha'aretz, June 3, 1984.
" Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin was bom in 1952 in the village of Nabi Ayla near Zahle, and
educated in Najaf and Qum. Al-Amin was formerly the representative of the Amal movement in 
Iran until he attacked Nabi Berri for participating in the National Salvation Committee, see: 
Washington Post, December 13,' 1983; al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987; Independent, August 
30, 1989; and al-Hayat, November 27, 1989. Also see: al-Shira, March 17, 1986; Ma'aretz, June
14, 1986; and Liberation, March 19, 1985.
" Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah was bom in 1953 in Bazuriyah in southern Lebanon and is
considered one of the founders of Hizb'allah. He returned to Beirut in the early 1970s, after 
graduating from both the religious academy of Najaf in Iraq and Qom in Iran, see: MT, 1520 
gmt 18 Feb 92 - BBC/SWB/ME/1309, February 20, 1992; and Independent, June 15, 1992. Also see: 
Ma'aretz, June 14; al-Qabas, July 20, 1989; Ha'aretz, August 7, 1989; Independent, August 30, 
1989; al-Anba, November 27, 1989; al-Havat, November 27, 1989; Foreign Broadcast Information
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liaison officers with Iran through its embassy in Beirut," most notably with 
Mohammad Nourani, the chargé d'affair between 1981-1985." Another senior 
Hizb'allah cleric was Sheikh Muhammad Ismail Khaliq, who is the personal 
representative of Iran's Ayatollah Montazeri in Lebanon."
In southern Lebanon, the Hizb'allah was headed by Sheikh Raghib Harb 
until his death in 1984.** While he was succeded by Sheikh Abd al-Karim Obeid 
as Imam of Jibshit and occupy a position within Hizb'allah's command leader­
ship,*’ the regional leadership of the movement is divided between local 
commanders and religious clergymen in the Hizb'allah districts of Nabatiya 
and Sidon-Zahrani in southern Lebanon, most notably under the direction 
Sheikh 'Afif al-Nabulsi and Sheikh Muhammad Fannish." Hizb'allah's military 
units in southern Lebanon are headed by local commanders, who recruit young
Service, Dailv Report, Near East and South Asia, November 30, 1989; and Ha'aretz, December 17, 
1989. Nasserallah has considerable influence over Hizb'allah activists in west and south 
Beirut and in the Islamic Resistance, see: Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989.
*’ See: Independent, March 7, 1990; and al-Shira, March 17, 1986.
" See: Foreign Report, July 30, 1987 and al-Shira, September 19, 1988.
*’ See: al-Nahar, February 6, 1989. For a useful discussion of al-Khaliq's influence 
within Hizb'allah, see: Shimon Shapira, op.cit..
** Slieikh Ragheb Harb was bom in 1952 in the village of Jibshit. Apart from ha\4ng 
studied under Sheikh Muhammed Hussein Fadlallali, Sheikh Harb played a prominent role in Iran 
as one of the drafters of Iran's Constitution, see: Chibli Mallat, "Religious Militancy in 
Contemporary Iraq: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr and the Sunni-Shia paradigm", Third World Quarterly, 
Vol.10, No.2 (April 1988): p.721. Also see: Politique International, April 1984; and 
Liberation, March 19, 1985.
*’ See: al-Shira, March 17, 1986; Independent, August 30, 1989; and Jerusalem Post, 
July 30, 1989.
** See: Ali al-Kurani, Tariqat Hizballah fil-amal al-islami (Beirut: 1986); al-Shira, 
March 17, 1986; Israeli Government Press Office, July 5, 1985; al-Nahar, June 7, 1985; al- 
Nahar, June 9, 1985; Israeli Defense Forces Spokesman, February 19, 1986; al-Nahar, June 16, 
1985; and US News & World Report, February 9, 1987. Also see: Marius Deeb, Militant Islamic 
Movements in Lebanon: Origins, Social Basis, and Ideology, op.cit.: p.18-19.
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Shi'ites from the villages with in-depth knowledge of the local terrain,” 
The military units of Islamic Resistance are composed of a total of 300-400 
core fighters and at least 1,500 armed sympathisers.” While Hizb'allah's 
military actions against Israel were initiated by the local commanders, all 
military activity was subject to approval by Hizb’allah's military command, 
headed by twelve Hizb'allah clergymen.”
These prominent regional Hizb'allah clergymen and commanders were repre­
sented on the Majlis al-Shura, the supreme decision-making authority of the 
Hizb'allah on the national level, that first adjourned on May 28, 1986, on 
a regular basis.” Within the Majlis al-Shura, there are seven specialized 
committees dealing with ideological, financial, military, political, judi­
cial, informational and socihl affairs.” In turn, the Majlis al-Shura and
” See; Ha'aretz, May 13, 1987; Ha'aretz, May 15, 1987; Ma'aretz, June 15, 1987; 
Ha'aretz, June 21, 1987; Jerusalem Post, November 13, 1987; and Le Point, August 3, 1987. 
According to various estimates, Hizb'allah's military strength numbers; 2,500 in the Big'a,
I,000 in Beirut, and 500 in southern Lebanon, see; Jerusalem Post, January 8, 1988; and 
Ha'aretz, Septanber 22, 1986.
” See. Foreign Report, December 5, 1991.
” See: Ha'aretz, June 21, 1987; and Ha'aretz, May 15, 1987. In 1988, the Hizb'allah 
decided to form secret cells to execute specific military operations under cultural and 
religious cover, see; Voice of Lebanon, April 14, 1988. Decision-making authority is divided 
between section commanders and military forces headquarters in Ba'albek, see; Da'var, January
II, 1987. Until his death in August 1988, assassinated by Amal, Sheikh Ali Karim was the head 
of Hizb'allali operations center in south Lebanon, see: Foreign Report, August 13, 1988. 
Muhaiunad Faraiish has also been the commander for southern Lebanon, see; US News and World 
Report, February 9, 1987. In 1993, the Islamic Resistance became a seperate and ultra-secret 
organisation with a new command structure which conceals the identity of the three or four top 
leaders. The new structure came as a result of a security review in the aftermath of security 
breaches, see; Foreign Report, May 13, 1993.
” See; al-Shira, April 2, 1986; Ha'aretz, April 2, 1986; al-Watan al-Arabi, December 
11, 1987. Hie members of this meeting of the Majlis al-Shura mre: Ibrahim al-Amin; Ibrahim 
al-Laquim; Zuheir Kanj; Imad Mughenya; Hassan Nasserallah; Ali Yasin; Hassan Malik; Yussef 
Sbeit; Khaidar Tlais; Ali Atwa; Haj Hussein Khalil; Muhammad al-Hamsa Suleiman Yahfufi; Ali 
Karim; Abbas al-Mussawi; Siibhi al-Tufayli; Ali Yunes; Hassan Trad; Muhammad Mikdad; Waal 
Ramadan; Said Shaaban; and Hussein al-Musawi.
” See: As'ad AbuKhalil, (1991), op.cit.; p.397. Also see: Davar, January 11, 1987.
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these seven committees are replicated in each of Hizb'allah's three main
regional and operational areas. They function as the principal governing body
on local daily activity while advising the main Majlis al-Shura on the result
of their efforts.” All Hizb'allah activity is regulated by decisions taken
by the main Majlis al-Shura, which issued general directives to the regions,
which in turn were left to implement the decisions on the operational level. 
While Sheikh Fadlallah presided over the national Majlis al-Shura as its
overall leader in his capacity as spiritual leader of Hizb'allah, the main 
clergymen who excerise control over the movement are the ones responsible for 
a specific committee or portfolio.” The restructuring of the movement in 
1989 with the addition of an new organ, the Executive Shura, which ranks 
after the Majlis al-Shura as the second highest leadership authority, and a 
Politbureau, a supervisory organ which co-ordinates the work of the various 
committees under the Jihad al-Bina' (Holy Reconstruction Organ) have meant 
a "Lebanonization" of the Hizb'allah where the control of the overall organi­
sation has been made more open and expanded while the control of specific 
portfolios have become more important and increasingly subject to*factiona- 
lism,” Although Hizb'allah's newly established central decisionmaking body 
has led to a greater openess within the organisation, in conjunction with an
” See: Marius Deeb, "Shia movements in Lebanon: their formation, ideology, social 
basis, and links with Iran and Syria", Tliird World Quarterly, op.cit. : p.693. Also see: 
"Hizballah", in US Department of Defense (DOD), Terrorist Group Profiles. November 1988: p. 15.
” Private communication with Dr Ycssi Olmert, Director, Government Press Office, 
Israel, December 30, 1991. Also see: Da'var, January 11, 1987.
” Under the new structure, the Consultative Shura is composed of the following 
positions: Secretary-General; Deputy Secretary-General; Head of Exeaitive Shiwa; Head of 
BolitbiR'eau; a spokesman; and two other members. The Executive Shiura is composed of the 
follwing positions: Head of Exeaitive Shiura; Finance; Education; Health; Trades Union Affairs; 
Social Affairs; Security; Military Affairs; and Information, see: The Lebanon Report, Vol.4, 
No.3 (March 1993): p.6, Under the leadership of Sheikh al-Tufayli, the Majlis al-Shura 
expanded to over twenty members. For membership, see: al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987. 
Hiis number was reduced to eight by Sheikh al-Musawi.
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effort by Hizb'allah to raise its profile and move into mainstream Lebanese 
politics, it has continued to maintain strict operational secrecy in the 
field of military and security affairs.”
Within the military committee on Hizb'allah's main Majlis al-Shura and 
in the three regional areas, there exists a separate body, the so-called 
Special Security Apparatus (SSA), responsible for intelligence and security 
matters.” In turn, the Hizb'allah's security apparatus is divided into three
subgroups: the central security apparatus, the preventative security appa­
ratus and an overseas security apparatus.” While Sheikh al-Musawi was the 
overall head of Hizb'allah's SSA until late 1985,” the central security 
apparatus is headed by Imad Mughniya and Abd al-Hadi Hamadi and is respon­
sible for Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity of foreigners.” On the opera­
tional level, it was mainly family members from both the Mughniya and Hamadi
” It is estimated that the Islamic Resistance is composed of approximately 5,000 
fighters in 1994, see: Independent, May 8, 1994.
” For information concerning Hizb'allah's SSA, see: Rolf Tophoven, "Der Tod eines 
Terroristen - Hintergründe und Konsequenzen", Terrorismus, Nr.3 (March 1992): pp. 1-4; al- 
Havat, November 27, 1989; Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989; New York Times, March 14,
1986; Washington Post, May 15, 1990; Le Figaro, December 4, 1989; Independent, April 26, 1988; 
and Ha'aretz, January 29, 1988. In addition, informaticxi on the Hizb'allah SSA was collected 
by the author during interviews with high-ranking Israeli officials in the Ministry of Defense 
and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tel Aviv, August 25 - September 10, 1991,
” Private communication with Dr Yossi Olmert, Director, Government Press Office, 
Israel, December 30, 1991. This was also confirmed in unattributable interviews with senior 
IDF officials in Israel [August/September 1991] and a senior counter-terrorism official at the 
Department of State, Washington DC, September 4, 1993. The central security apparatus is 
further divided into two groups responsible for either East or West Beirut, see: Roger Faligot 
and Remi Kauffer, (1994), op.cit.: p.485.
” See: Ma'aretz, June 14, 1986; Independent. March 7, 1990; and al-Watan al-Arabi, 
December 11, 1987.
” See: Independent, October 9, 1991; Le Figaro, December 4, 1989; Yediot Aharanot,
June 24, 1988; Independent, April 26, 1988; al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali. January 16, 1989; 
Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989; Jerusalem Post, January 25, 1987; al-Shira, June 27, 
1987; al-Ittihad, January 31, 1988; Ha'aretz, January 29, 1988; al-Anba, November 27, 1989; 
FBIS, November 30, 1989; Ma'aretz, February 27, 1986; Ma'aretz, February 2, 1987; Independent, 
January 28, 1987; and Ij o s  Angeles Times, November 26, 1988.
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clans that were involved in the hostage-takings which ensured loyalty to the 
senior commanders and secrecy surrounding the operations.” Apart from 
Mughniya and Hamadi, other senior members of the national central security 
apparatus were Sheikh Hussein Ghabris, who acted as Mughniya’s deputy, and 
Sheikh Hussein Khalil, who was the main liaison between Hizb'allah's security 
and intelligence." This division of Hizb'allah's SSA has also been effec­
tive in the infiltration of its own members within rival movements and in the 
elimination of military and political opponents in Lebanon,” Hizb'allah's 
national preventative security apparatus was headed by Salah Nun and Muhammad 
Hammud and was in charge of the personal security of prominent Hizb'allah 
clergymen.” The functions of Hizb'allah's central security apparatus and the 
overseas security apparatus, in charge of special operations abroad, over­
lapped as Hussein Khalil, Ibrahim Aqil, Imad Mughniya, Muhammad Haydar, 
Kharib Nasser and Abd al-Hamadi, were the senior commanders of the Hizb'allah 
operations in Europe.” Waid Ramadan acted as the chief coordinator of
” See: Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989; and Le Figaro, December 4, 1989.-Another 
prominent leader is Muhammad Ali Mikdad, see: Ma'aretz, June 28, 1987; and Ma'aretz, July 8, 
1987.
" For information on Nun and Khalil, see: Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989; Davar, 
February 8, 1989; Independent, August 30, 1989; al-Anba, November 27, 1989; FBIS, November 30, 
1989; Radio Free Lebanon, January 27, 1989; al-Havat, November 27, 1989; and Ha'aretz, 
December 17; 1989. Also see: Roger Faligot and Rémi Kauffer, (1994), op.cit.: p.485. For 
Khalil's close relationship with Qassem, see: Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989.
” For example, the Amal movement dismissed a number of leading members after 
discovering their dual allegiance to Hizb'allali, see: April 13, 1988. A leading Amal
official, Mustafa Dirani, the then head of Amal's security service, defected in 1988, see: 
Ha'aretz, December 4, 1988.
” See: Radio Free Lebanon, March 22, 1986; Radio Free Lebanon, Septonber 9, 1986; and 
al-Watan al-Arabi wal-Duwali, December 11, 1987. For dismissal of Hizb'allah security after 
infiltration of Hizb'allah and a foiled assassination attenpt on Sheikh Muhammad Hussein 
Fadlallali in 1989, see: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; Hadashot, October 25, 1989; and FBIS, 
December 17, 1989.
” See: Le Point, June 1, 1987; al-Sharg al-Awsat, November 21, 1991; Le Quotidien de 
Paris, January 27-28, 1990; Yediot Aharanot, July 1, 1987; Le Point, August 3, 1987; Defense & 
Armament Heracles, November 1989; Independent, March 7, 1990; and Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, March 17, 1986.
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Hizb'allah with Iran concerning these European operations.” During the fre­
quent absence of Mughniya from Lebanon, the influence of his de facto deputy, 
Ali Karekeh, increased within the SSA.”
While Hizb'allah's SSA managed to maintain operational secrecy due to 
its employment of mainly family and clan members, this can also be attributed 
to the previous experience by some of its commanders .in Fatah Force 17, the 
PLO's intelligence and security organisation.” In particular, Imad Mughniya 
had been not only the personal bodyguard of Sheikh Fadlallah before he was 
elevated in position within the Hizb'allah after the successful hijacking of 
TWA 847, but also served with Force 17 as a lieutenant prior to Israel's in­
vasion in 1982.” The decision by Hizb'allah's SSA to abduct foreign citizens 
is usually initiated at the highest level in the main Majlis al-Shura within 
the Hizb'allah through consultation with its senior clergy and two permanent 
representatives from Iran.” After reaching consensus of the future nationa­
” See: Le Point, June 15, 1987; and Le Point, August 3, 1987.
” See: Foreign Report, August 22, 1991. For Mughniya's absence frcm Lebanon (October- 
December 1987 in northern Iran; in January 1988 in Qom; and his return to Lebanon in July 
1990), see: Voice of the Oppressed, September 6, 1991; Ma'ariv, October 11, 1991; and Reuters, 
October 4, 1991.
” See: Wall Street Journal, August 15, 1989; Ha'aretz, January 29, 1988; Jerusalem 
Post, April 14, 1988; and Ma'aretz, April 14, 1988. Another important Hizb'allah clans with 
close ties to Force 17 is the Mikdad family, see: Ma'aretz, July 8, 1987. This was also con­
firmed in an unattributable interview with a former senior Fatah advisor in Cairo, Egypt, who 
had personally known Imad Mughniya until his defection to Hizb'allah (Cairo, Egypt, April 
1994).
” For Imad Mughniya's position, see: Los Angeles Times, November 26, 1988; Davar, May 
6, 1988; Le Point, August 3, 1987; Da'var, May 6, 1988; Independent, April 26, 1988; and 
Ma'aretz, February 27, 1986. Also see: Neil C. Livingstone and David Halevy, Inside the PIO 
(London: Robert Hale Ltd, 1990): pp.262-70. For Hizb'allali's relationship with Force 17, see: 
Ma'ariv, October 17, 1986; Le Matin, January 29, 1987; Ma'aretz, March 31, 1987; and Keyhan, 
February 12, 1987.
” Unattributable interview with senior official in Israel's Ministry of Defense,
August 27, 1991, Tel Aviv, Israel.
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lity of the hostage, Hizb'allah's Majlis al-Shura delegated either specific 
details of a certain individual intended for abduction or broadly issued 
directives relating to the nationality and profession of victim to the 
commanders of Hizb'allah's national SSA.” A similar method was used with 
regard to military operations by the Islamic Resistance, formed in 1983, 
whereby the attacks were initiated by local commanders with confirmation 
from the supreme Majlis al-ShuraJ'^
In the execution of the abductions authorized by Hizb'allah's national 
SSA, the operational officers maintained close liaison with official repre­
sentatives from Iran's embassies in Beirut and Damascus as well as with 
Pasdaran officials.” While Muhammad Haydar was Hizb'allah's main liaison 
with the Pasdaran, three senior Hizb'allah operatives maintained liaison with 
Iranian intelligence, VEVAK, most notably Hussein al-Khalil.” Apart from the 
well-known and close role of Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, former Iranian Ambassador 
to Syria and Interior Minister, in both the formation of the Hizb'allah and 
continued guidance over the movement,” Iranian diplomatic staff provided 
intelligence on targets while the Iranian Pasdaran supplied weaponry and
” Ikiattributable interview with senior official in US Department of State, Washington 
DC, October 4, 1993,
” See: Shimon Shapira, (1987), op.cit.. Also see: Ha'aretz, June 15, 1987; and 
Ha'aretz, June 21, 1986.
” See: Ronald Perron, "The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps", Middle East 
Insight (June/July 1985): pp.35-39; US News & World Report, March 6, 1989; Ha'aretz, September 
30, 1984; New York Times, December 29, 1989; Ma'aretz, July 8, 1987; and Le Point, August 3, 
1987.
” See: Roger Faligot and Remi Kauffer, (1994), op.cit.: p.485.
” For Ifehtashemi's role, see: Robin Wright, (1989), op.cit.: p.122. Also see: 
Washington Post, May 15, 1990. •
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training.” While Iran's embassy in Beirut was previously active with 
Hizb'allah under the helm of Muhammad Nurani, the Iranian chargé d'affair, 
most of the liaison for security reasons between Hizb'allah and Iran occured 
through the Iranian embassy in Syria.” However, Ali Akbar Rahimi and Mohamed 
Javad of the Iranian embassy in Beirut maintained close liason with 
Hizb'allah's national SSA.” The role of the Iranian embassy in Beirut assu­
med increased importance over the mission in Damascus due to the constraints 
imposed by the Amal-Hizb'allah clashes.” While Iran's military attaché in 
Damascus co-ordinated activities between Iran's Pasdaran contingent in 
Ba'albek and its headquarters in the Syrian border village of Zebdani,” the 
Pasdaran contingent and Iran’s military attaché in Beirut were involved not 
only in supplying the cadres of Hizb'allah SSA with training and military 
equipment but also in its hostage-taking activity, as evident by their role 
in the intitiation as well as interrogation and housing of some of the 
foreign hostages.” The role of the Pasdaran with Hizb'allah was formally 
institutionalized through, and controlled by, the presence of a high-ranking
” See: Yediot Aharonot, June 24, 1988; Le Quotidien de Paris, January 27-28, 1990; 
Ma'aretz, July 8, 1987; Ma'aretz, July 7, 1987; and Ma'aretz, June 28, 1986. In particular. 
Ambassador Sastmalchian personally supervised the directives and weaponry supplied by Iran Air 
flights to Beirut. For Pasdaran establishment of military centers in the Biq'a, see: Radio 
Free Lebanon, July 6, 1984.
” See: Independent, March 7, 1990; Ha'aretz, September 30, 1984; and Foreign Report, 
July 30, 1987. Also see: Amir Taheri, Holy Terror: The Inside Story of Islamic Terrorism, 
op.cit.: p. 125-6. Muhammad Nurani served as charge d'affaires in the Iranian embassy in Beirut 
between 1981-1985. He returned to Beirut in May 1987, see: Foreign Report, July 30, 1987.
” See: Independent, March 7, 1990.
” See; Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.: p. 14 n.4.
” See: Jeime Afrique, January 25, 1984; al-Ainal, May 19, 1984; Le Point, May 11, 1987; 
and Ha'aretz, June 21, 1987.
” See: Jeune Afrique, January 25, 1984; Washington Post, January 19, 1992; US News & 
World Report, March 6, 1989; Washington Post, January 8, 1990; and FBIS, August 28, 1990.
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IRGC representative on the Majlis a l - S h u r a Despite attempts by Iran’s 
clerical establishment to impose a degree of clerical control over the 
Pasdaran,” the Lebanese contingent has shown a capacity for institutional 
autonomy and radicalism by its previous and present commanders, most notably 
under the command of Hosein Deqan,” in terms of conforming to the wishes of 
the political leadership in Iran, especially vis-à-vis the release of Western 
hostages.”* In particular, this was evident by the efforts of Iran's
Rafsanjani to assign a more loyal and pliable IRGC unit to the Pasdaran con­
tingent in 1989.”^
The Hizb'allah command leadership and its security and intelligence 
service were also in close liaison with Syrian military intelligence.”* While 
Syrian intelligence actively participated in the planning of Hizb'allah 
actions until the withdrawal of the Multinational Forces from Beirut in early
” See: al-Shira, March 17, 1986; Independent, March 7, 1990; and Da'var, January 11,
1987. For IRGC recruitment of Hizb'allah operatives in Iran's embassy in Beirut, seer IDF 
Radio, October 13, 1987.
98 See: Kenneth Katzman, The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guards, op.cit.
99 See: Middle East Reporter, September 1, 1984; and Jeune Afrique, January 25, 1984.
”* See: al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 18, 1989; Agence France Presse, May 16, 1988; al- 
Majallah, April 19-25, 1989; New York Times, April 23, 1990; Washington Post, January 8, 1990; 
New York Times, December 29, 1989; New York Times, October 10, 1989; and New York Times, May 
22, 1989. Also see: Kemeth Katzman, The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guards, 
op.cit.
See: Washington Post, January 8, 1990; Ihe Echo of Iran, No.26 (February 1990): 
p.12; and Farhang Jahanpour, "Iran I: Wars Among the Heirs", The World Todav (October 1990):
p.186,
”* In the early 1980's, Syrian officials from Rifa'at Assad's "Special Forces 
Brigades" trained Hizb'allah and Islamic Amal members in the Biq'a area, see: Middle East 
Defense News, May 16, 1988. Also see: Ma'ariv, September 22, 1986; and al-Qabas, June 15,
1988; Independent, June 22, 1988; al-Anba, April 7, 1990; and Jeune Afrique, May 7, 1986. Also 
see: Carl Anthony Wege, "Assad's Legions: Hie Syrian Intelligence Services", International 
JoiuTtal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Vol.4, No.l (Spring 1990): pp.91-100.
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1984,”* Syria pursued a calibrated policy of tacit co-operation with 
Hizb’allah and support for its abductions of foreigners, as long as they were 
in accordance with Syrian strategic interest in Lebanon. Simultaneously it 
was forced to clampdown on Hizb'allah in order to reassert Syrian hegemony 
and to limit Iran's influence and avoid a military confrontation with 
Israel.”* While Syria has pursued a public poliy of disassociation from 
Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity, its relationship with the movement's
SSA was pursued by Syrian military intelligence, under the command of 
Brigadier Ghazi Kan'an.”® As Syria has been in firm control over the Biq'a 
area from which Pasdaran and Hizb'allah operate, Syrian military intelligence 
not only facilitated the transfer of hostages to Ba'albek from Beirut, but 
also acted as a conduit for the release of the foreign hostages through the 
hands of Syrian military intelligence officers.”' A main liaison between 
Hizb'allah and Syrian military intelligence was Mustafa al-Dirani, the former
”* See: Ma'ariv, March 27, 1983; and Foreign Report, October 27, 1983. Also see: R. 
Avi-Ran, Syrian Involvement in Lebanon (1975-1985) (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic 
Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1986).
See: Yosef Olmert, (1990), op.cit.: pp.171-188; William Harris, "Syria in 
Lebanon", in Altaf Gauhar (ed.) Third World Affairs 1988 (London: Third World Foundation,
1988); Also see: al-Anwar, February 27, 1987. For example, Syria warned Hizb'allah in 1985 
about its overt activity, urging the establishment of an Islamic Republic, by threatening to 
kill Sheikh Fadlallah unless this activity was ceased, see: Ma'aretz, March 10, 1985; and 
Ma'aretz, March 19, 1985.
See: al-Dustur, March 5, 1990; Jeune Afrique, May 7, 1986; Le Nouvel Observateur, 
March 28 - April 3, 1986; IRNA, October 25, 1991; and Jeune Afrique, April 25, 1984. For a 
useful overview of Syrian intelligence, see: Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked (London: Yale 
University Press, 1991): pp.38-51.
In June 1988, a Hizb'allah delegation [Ibrahim al-Amin; Subhi al-Tufayli; Hussein 
al-Musawi; and Hussein Klialil] held consultations with senior Syrian officials on future 
operations, see: al-Qabas, June 15, 1988. For Syria's role as conduit in the release of 
hostages, see: Jerusalem Post, May 17, 1985; International Herald Tribune, November 1, 1986; 
Yediot Aharanot, May 5, 1988; Jerusalem Post, May 5, 1988; al-Aharam, March 26, 1987;
Ha'aretz, May 4, 1986; Jerusalem Post, August, 7, 1989; Die Welt, March 3, 1987; Defense & 
Foreign Affairs Weekly. September 11, 1988; Ha'aretz, April 1, 1987; Ma'aretz, March 18, 1987; 
Intemational Herald Tribune, October 4, 1988; Ma'aretz, February 24, 1989; Ma'aretz, June 22, 
1987; and Jerusalem Post, August 20, 1987.
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head of Amal’s security service who defected from Amal in late-1988 and 
joined the Hizb'allah in 1989."*
The relationship between Hizb'allah’s SSA and Syrian military intelli­
gence has been characterized by periods of conflict and cooperation, largely 
dictated by the shifting internal situation in Lebanon."* While Syrian sanc­
tion for the presence of Pasdaran and tolerance towards Hizb'allah activity 
had often been dependent on its relationship with Iran, coupled with Syrian 
complicity in drug-trafficking in Lebanon,"* the friction between Syria and 
Hizb'allah has been manifest by retaliatory abductions and the threat, or
"* Mustafa Dirani was defected frcm Amal after the February 1988 kidnapping of US 
Marine Corps officer Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins. For information of Dirani's role, 
see: Ma'aretz, February 24, 1989; Davar, February 28, 1988; Defense and Foreign Affairs 
Weekly, July 15, 1985; Davar, November 10, 1987; and Yediot Aharanot, February 25, 1988. 
Another leading Amal member, who defected to the Hizb'allah, is Akel Hamiye. He was respon­
sible for six hijackings between 1979-82 and was appointed Amal military commander in 1984. 
Hamiye emerged as a leading figure during the negotiations over IWA 847 hijacking. In 1985, he 
established with Mustafa Dirani, the Believers Resistance Movement, Hamiye defected from Amal 
in 1987 and was appointed leader in the Hizb'allah, see: Ha'aretz, February 17, 1987; Da'var, 
November 10, 1987; Da'var, November 13, 1987; Washington Post, October 8, 1988; and Yediot 
Aharanot, February 25, 1988.
"* See: Shireen T, Hunter, "Iran and Syria: From Hostility to limited Alliance", in 
Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.) Iran and the Arab World (London: Macmillan, 
1993): pp.198-216.
"* In Lebanon's Syrian-controlled Biq'a Valley, Hizb'allah clans openly cultivate 
hashish and opium, idiich are refined and sent on to be distributed through the Daliiya suburban 
district of Beirut, see: Foreign Report, October 11, 1990; and Wall Street Journal, March 24,
1988. Another transit point is Syria and Syria's Defense Minister, Mustafa Talas, revealed 
that he provided transit documents with his signature to drugtraffickers in Ba'albek in order 
to provide free passage for them between Lebanon and Syria, see: Hadashot, May 10, 1991. 
Hizb'allah clergymen encouraged the drug trade as it seryes to weaken the three great enemies 
of Islam, see: Foreign Report, October 11, 1990. For Syria's involvement in drug-trafficking, 
see: Middle East Defense News, May 16, 1988. Also see: Le Point. September 11, 1989; al-Shira, 
February 5, 1990; Yediot Aliaronot, February 5, 1992; Ma'ariv, June 26, 1987; and Le Figaro,
May 30-31, 1992. Also see: Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narcoterrorism (New York, NY.: Basic Books,
1990): pp.52-73; and U.S. Department of State, Intemational Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
(Washington, DC. : Biureau of International Narcotics Matter, March 1988): pp.218-20.
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actual use, of military force.”' Apart from direct Syrian military inter­
vention or through the use of its proxy, Amal, in the search for foreign 
hostages, Syria increased the pressure on both the Hizb'allah and the 
Pasdaran by confining them to the Biq'a area or searched for the hostages in 
Hizb'allah safe-houses in Beirut and its southern suburbs.*” However, fric­
tions between Syria and Hizb'allah over the hostage-taking of foreigners 
were the exception rather than norm, as displayed by their co-ordination of
military operations against Israel”* and co-operation in the release of 
hostages. At any rate, Syria controlled the surrounding territory of the 
Biq'a and authorized not only the presence of the Pasdaran and the 
Hizb'allah, but also their movement beyond this area.
M.
Apart from the Hizb'allah decision-making apparatus and the institu­
tionalized relationship with Irhn and Syria through military and civilian 
channels at work in Lebanon, Hizb'allah's mechanism for hostage-taking of 
foreigners was also subject to influence from clerical factionalism within 
the organisation itself and to a web of clerical relationships extending from 
members of the national Majlis al-Shura to various clergy within Iran's civi­
lian and military establishment.”* While the clerical factionalism within 
Hizb'allah can be monitored by the ascendancy or demotion of clergyman over
**' For incidents of Hizb'allali-Syrian frictions, see: Jerusalem Post, November 29, 
1987; Le Matin, November 28, 1987; Ma'aretz, February 13, 1987; Washington Post, June 30, 
1987; Intemational Herald Tribune, March 4, 1988; Observer, December 8, 1991; and Ma'aretz, 
March 2, 1987. A prominent exairple is the Syrian arrest warrent against Imad Mughniya, see: 
Ha'aretz, January 29, 1988.
*** See: December 3, 1988; Intemational Herald Tribune, June 20, 1987; and
Jerusalem Post,' August 20, 1987.
*** For exanple, Sheildi Sublii al-Tufayli meet Syrian leader, Hafez al-Assad, who 
premised support and supply of weapons for the organisation. Hue two also agreed that all 
Hizb'allah military operations would be coordinated with the Syrian headquarters in Lebanon, 
see: al-Shira, June 14, 1987; Ma'aretz, June 14, 1987; and Ma'aretz, June 15, 1987.
"* See: John Calabrese, (1990), op.cit.: p.189; and FBIS, December 5, 1989.
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the leadership of the movement, as manifest by the election of a new 
Hizb'allah Secretary-General every two years, it is also a guide to not only 
the direction of the movement in Lebanon but also to the affiliation and 
loyalty of Hizb'allah's leadership with clerical factions and institutions 
in Iran.*** Although the Hizb'allah command leadership is a cohesive organisa­
tion, the main differences between leading Hizb'allah clergymen are over 
methods rather than aims, as evidently displayed by the 1988 dispute between
Sheikh al-Tufayli and Sheikh Fadlallah over the question of the feasibility 
of the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Lebanon.**® Similarly, Sheikh 
al-Tufayli has been at the core of a dissident faction within the command 
leadership over the issue of a new leader of the movement, in the wake of the 
February 1992 assassination of Sheikh al-Musawi, and which vehemently objec­
ted to Hizb'allah members participation in the Lebanese parliamentary elec­
tions held between 23 August and 6 Septemeber 1992, in which the movement 
won 12 out of total 128 seats.**' However, the position of the Secretary- 
General and his deputy are fundamental to monitor for an understanding of 
Hizb'allah as they directly control all the affairs of the movement and are 
ex-officio in charge, and have direct access to, clerical commanders of the 
regional Majlis al-Shuras.***
*** See: Liberation, March 19, 1985; Jeune Afrique, May 7, 1986; and The Lebanon 
Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993): p.6-7.
**® While Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, supported by Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin, argued that an 
Islamic Republic should be established as soon as possible and all means should be pursued for 
this purpose. Sheikh Fadlallah disagreed, see: La Revue du Liban, January 30, 1988; Ha'aretz, 
February 22, 1988; and Ha'aretz, November 29, 1987.
**' Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli threatened that his supporters would bum voting centres in 
his home village of Brital, see: al-SIiira, August 2, 1992. For rivalry over the post of 
Secretary-General of the movenent, see: Foreign Report, April 30, 1992. For efforts by Sheikh 
al-Tufayli of undermining the position of Sheikh Nasserallali, see: Foreign Report, November 5, 
1992.
*** For example, the Deputy Secretary-General is in charge of the finançai and military 
affairs of the movement, see: Foreign Report, June 13, 1991. Hre regional commanders of the 
Hizb'allah are: Hajj Abdallah Qassir [Beirut and the southern suburbs]; Sheikh ^ îuhammad Yazbek [Biq'a]; and Slieikh Hassan Nasserallah [southern Lebanon], see: Hie Lebanon Report, Vol.4,
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While Hizb'allah's national Majlis al-Shura vas established in 1986, no 
particular leading cleric emerged as undisputed leader until the ascendancy 
of Sheikh al-Tufayli in late 1987, a noted radical with particularly close 
personal ties with Ali Akbar-Mohtashemi in Iran.*** Sheikh al-Tufayli's posi­
tion as leader of the Hizb'allah remained uncontested until the death of 
Ayatollah Khomayynl in 1989, when the organisation faced unprecedented 
challenges within Lebanon and, consequently, displayed intensified rivalry 
between Hizb'allah clergymen over the position and direction of the move­
ment.*** As a result of meetings held in Teheran in October and December 
1989, Hizb'allah submitted to a major structural changes, as evident by the 
establishment of a Executive Shura, also known as the Supreme Shura.*** While 
the composition of the new Executive Shura corresponds with the the so-called 
Consultative Shura, or the Majlis al-Shura, the former decision-making body 
assumed the second highest authority of the Hizb'allah and set mainly stra­
tegic matters in the overall administration of the movement.*** It also led
No.3 (March 1993) : p.6. Another key position within the Hizballah is the head of the Executive 
Shiura.
*** While Sheikh Fadlallah's position was tenpirarily diminished, the position of 
Sheikh al-Tufayli was bolstered as he served as a spokesman for the Iranian position in the 
organisation, see: Ha'aretz, November 29, 1987. Also see: al-Watan al-Arabi wal-Duwali, 
December 11, 1987; and MENA, November 3, 1987,
*** This led to the assembly of over 200 Hizb'allah representatives from the Biq'a, 
south Beirut, the Islande Resistance, the senior clergy within Majlis al-Shiura and others in 
Iran, see: al-Anba, November 27, 1989. For Hizb'allah factionalism in September/October 1989, 
see: Hadashot, October 25, 1989.
*** The Executive Shura consists of nine leading Hizb'allah clergy, see: al-Havat, 
November 27, 1989; and Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989.
*** Private communication with Dr Yossi Olmert, Director, Government Press Office, 
Israel, December 30, 1991. Also see: FBIS, November 30, 1989. The composition of the nine-man 
Deciding Shiwa is: Hajj Muhammd Hassan Yaghi [President]; Fadl Zayn al-Din [Finance]; Husayn 
al-Hajj Hasan [Education] ; Nabil Sulayman [Helath] ; Ghanira Salim [Trades Union Affairs] ;
Sultan As'ad [Social Affairs]; Hajj Abd al-Hadi Hamadi [Security]; Mustafa Badreddin [Military 
Affairs]; and Hajj Ali Rashid [Information], see: The Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March
1993): p.6.
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to the establishment of a "Politbureau", a supervisory committee composed 
of fifteen clergy in charge of Hizb'allah's co-ordination of recruitment, 
propaganda and support services on the regional and local level."* Although 
Sheikh al-Tufayli retained his position as Secretary-General of the 
Hizb'allah in December 1989, the meetings underlined strong clerical fac­
tionalism within the Hizb'allah's hierarchy.*** In particular, the meetings 
revealed intense rivalry between the nominated leadership and elements from 
Lebanese al-Da 'wa, the Islamic Resistance, and members of the Special Secu­
rity Apparatus, as evident by their rejection of the main Hizb'allah deci­
sions at the meeting and the delay in the reappointment for another two 
years of Sheikh al-Tufayli until the December 1989 meeting.*** The militant 
position of Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah was also revealed by his vocal oppo­
sition to compromises made to Amal in 1989 by his clerical colleagues.**® The
*** Ihe first chairman of the Politbureau was Mohamad Fannish (later Husayn al-Khalil 
and the other members correspond to the composition of the real decision-making body, see: 
Foreign Report, June 13, 1991. The other members of the Politbureau are: Sayyid Ammaf Musawi
[Vice President]; Sheikh Ali Taha; Sheikh Khodr Tlays; Sheikh Hassan Badran; Sheikh Khodr 
Nurredine; Sheikh Hassan Izzidin; Hajj Ali Amnar; Hajj Muhammad Fannish; Hajj Muhammad Ra'ad; 
Hajj Muhammad al-Khansa; Hajj Wafiq Safa; Hajj Husayn Shami, see: The Lebanon Report, Vol.4, 
No.3 (March 1993): p.6.
*** The clerical factionalism developed into three main conflicting positions supported 
by members of the movement. The first position, led by Subhi al-Tufayli; Abbas al-Musawi; and 
Hussein al-Misawi, called for a public and open declaration of Hizb'allah's position and for 
cooperation with pro-Syrian leftist organisations in Lebanon as well as with pro-Iranian 
Muslim organisations. Ihey also called for the establishment of a collective leadership. The 
second position, led by Hassan Nasserallah and Ibrahim al-Amin, called for the establishment 
of a centralized party structure, tighter party discipline, while rejecting the formation of 
an open and public leadership apparatus. This position also opposed any extension of 
Hizb'allah's involvement in the developments in the wider Lebanese arena and urged a jihad 
against those who opposed their efforts for an Islamic Lebanon. The third position, led by 
Naim Qassem; Hussein Korani; Muhammad Raad; and Hussein Khalil, rejected the suggestion of an 
overture of the leadership. For Hizb'allah factionalism at the meetings, see: al-Anba,
November 27, 1989; al-Ahd, October 27, 1989; al-Havat, October 27, 1989; and Ha'aretz,
December 17, 1989. Ihis was also confirmed in an unattributable interview with senior IDF 
official, Tel Aviv, September 1991.
*** See: FBIS, Novanber 30, 1989; and Assaf Kfoury, Arables, December 1992.
*** See: Middle East Contemporarv Survev. 1988: pp.193-4.
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structural changes within Hizb'allah's leadership also led to the dismissal 
of four leading Hizb'allah officials while it bolstered the positions of 
Sheikh al-Tufayli, Sheikh Naim Qassem, and Sheikh Nasserallah within the 
leadership of Hizb'allah's national Majlis al-Shura."' Under the renewed 
command of Sheikh al-Tufayli, the Hizb'allah leadership was considered 
closer to Iran's radical faction, led by All Akbar-Mohtashemi, than to 
Hashemi Rafsanjani,"* While the tenure of Sheikh al-Tufayli as leader of
Hizb'allah was marked by friction with Iran’s newly-elected president, the 
election of Sheikh al-Musawi as the Secretary-General of Hizb'allah, and 
Sheikh al-Amin as his deputy, in May 1991*** came after settlement of uncer­
tainty within Hizb'allah ranks concerning disarmament of all militias in 
accordance with implementation of the Ta'if agreement."* The appointment of 
Sheikh al-Musawi, the former head of the Islamic Resistance, c a m e  as a re­
sponse to a quid pro quo arrangement between the organisation and Iran and 
Syria which permitted the movement to maintain their armed presence in the 
South and in the eastern Biq'a, as it claimed to be a resistance movement
**' The four dismissed leaders were: Ibrahim al-Amin; Hussein al-Musawi; Hussein 
Khalil; and Abd al-Hadi Hamadi. In the case of Khalil and Hamadi, a major reason for their 
dismissal was security infiltrations into party ranks, discovered after a failed assassi­
nation attenpt on Sheikh Fadlallah, see: al-Anba, November 27, 1989.
*** See: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989; and FBIS, November 
30, 1989.
*** See: Voice of Lebanon, Beirut 1015 gmt 21 May 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1079 23 May 1991. For 
Hizb'allah's "democratization process", see: Jerusalem Report. August 1, 1991. Under Sheikh 
al-Tufayli's tenure as Secretary-General, the nimber of members of the Majlis al-Shura grew to 
include over twenty Hizb'allah members. However, with the appointment of Sheikh Abbas al- 
Musawi, the number was reduced to eight, see: The Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993): 
p.7.
*** For insights on Hizb'allah's concern over disarmament, see: Voice of the Oppressed 
0630 gmt 24 Mar 91 - BBC/S^ flB/ME/1030, March 26, 1991. See also interview with Sheikh Subhi al- 
Tufayli, Voice of the Oppressed 0530 gmt 8 May 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1068, May 10, 1991.
*” For al-Musawi's position as leader of Hizb'allah's military wing, see: Ha'aretz, 
October 2, 1987; and Independent, March 7, 1990.
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rather than a militia."* Unlike his predecessor, Sheikh al-Musawi appeared 
to be more pragmatic as evident by the fact that he presided over Hizb'allah 
through the dénounement of the Western hostage crisis while he readjusted the 
organisation's grand strategy from creating an Islamic Republic of Lebanon 
through armed struggle to a willingness to participate in mainstream Lebanese 
politics.*” Although his pragmatism was a reflection Of Hizb'allah's effort 
to confront the challenges posed by a post-militia phase of Lebanese poli­
tics*" and that the position of Sheikh al-Musawi was closer to the line of 
Iran's Hashemi Rafsanjani than that of his clerical collogues within the 
Hizb'allah, it was also the result of increased Iranian influence and 
pressure.*”
The assassination of Sheikh al-Musawi by Israel on February 16, 1992, 
after he and a number of other high-ranking Hizb'allah officials attended an 
annual memorial service in the village of Jihshit in order to mark the eight 
anniversary of the death of Sheikh Harb,*” strengthened Hizb'allah's mili­
tancy and allegiance to Iran's more radical clergy."' While an attempt to
*** For agreement, see: Financial Times, February 17, 1992; and Voice of the Oppressed, 
0630 gmt 30 Apr 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1061, May 2, 1991. For Hizb'allah's justification of retaining 
its armed presence in the South, see: Voice of Lebanon 1715 gmt 21 Apr 91 - BBC/SWB ME/1053, 
April 23, 1991; and Voice of the Oppressed 0530 gmt 4 May 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1064, May 6, 1991.
in See: Financial Times, February 17, 1992; and Jerusalem Report, August 1, 1991.
*" A major strategy by the Hizb'allah was to: "mold the organizational body in a 
manner that makes it compatible with the emerging regional and intemational developments and 
harmonious with the new Iranian leadership", see: al-Havat, May 25, 1991.
*” Unattributable interviews with high-ranking counter-terrorism officials at Israel's 
Ministry of Defense, Tel Aviv, Israel, August 1991, and Office for Counterterrorism, US 
Department of State, October 1993. Also see: Foreign Report, June 13, 1991.
*" For details concerning the assassination of Sheikh al-Musawi, see: Terrorismus. 
No.l, March 1992. For excerpts of Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi's speech in Jibshit, see: Radio Free 
Lebanon, 1645 gmt 16 Feb 92 - BBC/®/ME/1307, February 18, 1992.
*” See: Terrorismus, No.l, March 1992; and Foreign Report, April 30, 1992.
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assure its own cadrés that al-Musawi's death had not seriously affected the 
organisation, with immediately announcement of the election of Sheikh 
Nasserallah as its new leader,"* internal rivalry within Hizb'allah between 
Nasserallah factions and those supporting al-Tufayli became apparent by the 
influence and intervention of Iran into the appointment of the new Hizb'allah 
leader."* An unsuccessful candidate in the Hizb'allah-elections in May 1991, 
Sheikh Nasserallah had not only bolstered his own position within the Majlis 
al-Shura under Sheikh al-Musawi's leadership"’ but also maintained a far more 
closer relationship with Iran's revolutionist faction, most notably with Ali- 
Akbar Mohtashemi, than his predecessor."* However, Iranian pressure to 
appoint Sheikh Nasserallah to the post of the incumbent Secretary-General of 
Hizb'allah over the hardline contender and previous leader, Sheikh al- 
Tufayli, led to an intense dispute by dissident factions loyal to al- 
Tufayli."* In particular, the internal rivalry within the Hizb'allah leader-
*** An announcement made by the Beirut-based pro-Hizb'allah radio. Voice of the 
Oppressed, 1250 gmt 18 Feb 91 - BBC/®/ME/1308, February 19, 1992. The election had "been 
conducted by the members of the Supreme Shura at a meeting in Ba'albek, see: Agence France 
Press in Ehglish 1520 gmt 18 Feb 92 - BBC/®/ME/1309, February 20, 1992. Ihe Hizb'allah was 
careful to underline that the decision by the Supreme Shura to elect Sheikh Nasserallah was 
unanimous, see: Voice of the People 1239 gmt Feb 92 - BBC/®/ME/1318, March 2, 1992.
13S See: Foreign Report, April 30, 1992; and Foreign Report, October 8, 1992;
*" For Sheikh Nasserallah's strengthened position under the tenure of Sheikh al- 
Musawi, see: al-Havat, May 21, 1991. At the end of 1989, Nasserallah had bolstered his 
position with Iran, who wanted him to fulfill a senior role in the next stage of Iranian 
policy in Lebanon, see: al-Qabas, July 20, 1989.
*" Unattributable interview with official in Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
September 3, 1992. In an interview with Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah, he is asked to elaborate on 
his links with Ayatollah Mohtashemi,'see: Voice of the People in Arabic to Lebanon 1239 gmt 28 
Feb 92 - BBC/®/ME/1318, March 2, 1992.
*** See: Foreign Report, April 30, 1992; Foreign Report, October 8, 1992; and Foreign 
Report, November 5, 1992. Sheikh Nasserallah reshuffled some of the leaders of Hizb'allah's 
military wing to ensure loyalty. In particular, Ali Daoun replaced Hajj Hassan Hubollah as 
Hizb'allah's commander in south Lebanon, Nasserallah also promoted Sheikh Nuhad Kushman to 
head military-security affairs,
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ship came.over the decision by certain leaders to participate in Lebanon's 
parliamentary elections, held between 23 August and 6 September 1992, which 
the followers of the al-Tufayli faction vehemently objected to as evidence 
of abandonment of the movement's pan-Islamic goal of resistance against 
Israel by directing the movement's focus towards Lebanese internal poli­
tics.*" While threats of sabotage by Sheikh al-Tufayli to Hizb'allah's 
participation in the parliamentary elections failed to materialize,***
challenges to the leadership of Sheikh Nasserallah by al-Tufayli supporters 
in the Biq'a area assumed the form of independent resistance attacks against 
Israel immediately following the procurement by the Hizb'allah of 12 elec­
toral seats out of 128 in the Lebanese parliamentary elections.*** As a con­
sequence, the divisions within the Hizb'allah, in the wake of the death of 
Sheikh al-Musawi, have been between Nasserallah's efforts to reorientate 
Hizb'allah more towards political rather than military activity through 
acceptance of the realities of Lebanon's systems and the dissident faction 
led by Sheikh al-Tufayli, supported by the Iranian revolutionist faction, 
towards undermining the more moderate position of the new Secretary-General 
and to press on with a perpetual jihad against Israel at all costs.**® The
*** See: Foreign Report, April 30, 1992; Foreign Report, October 8, 1992; Foreign 
Report, November 5, 1992; Foreign Report, May 13, 1993; al-Shira, July 13, 1992; and al-Shira. 
August 2, 1992.
*** Sheikh al-Tufayli threatened to bum the voting-centres in his home-village of 
Brital, see: al-Shira, August 2, 1992.
*** For the Hizb'allah operation, initiated by Sheikh al-Tufayli, near the village of 
Kaoukaba which killed 5 IDF soldiers and wounded 5 others on October 25, 1992, see: Foreign 
Report, November 5, 1992. In the parliamentary elections, Hizb'allah won four seats in the 
Ba'albek-Hermil area (Hizb'allah politbureau members: Ibrahim al-Amin; Ali Taha; Khodr Tlaiss; 
and Mohammad Yaghi); two seats in the southern suburbs of Beirut (politbureau members: Ali 
Ammar; and Ifehairmad Burjawi); and two seats in southern Lebanon (politbureau members: Mohammad 
Fannish; and Mohammad Raad). In addition, four seats were captiured by non-Hizb’allali members 
who were loyal to Hizb'allah. For details, see: Foreign Report, September 17, 1992.
**® See: Foreign Report, October 7, 1993.
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internal rivalry between Nasserallah and al-Tufayli clearly demonstrated the 
existence of clerical factionalism within the hierarchy of the movement 
while it has also underlined the importance of understanding divisions among 
its leaders and their ability to muster a substantial number of followers as 
a guide to the activity of the movement as well as of dissident factions."' 
In the case of this particular rivalry, the fact that Sheikh Nasserallah 
comes from southern Lebanon rather than as his predecessors from the Biq'a 
area meant that he was more susceptible to losing control over the loyalty 
of commanders and fighters of the Islamic Resistance, most of whom comes from 
the Biq'a and pledge closer allegiance to Sheikh al-Tufayli."* This became 
apparent by Nasserallah's replacement of military commanders in southern 
Lebanon and to the separation of the Islamic Resistance from the political 
framework of the Hizb'allah for operational expediency and security after the 
assassination of Sheikh al-Musawi."* However, the failure of Sheikh al- 
Tufayli to regain the leadership post of the Hizb'allah in its leadership 
elections in May 1991, February 1993, and April 1993 have lead to an erosion 
in the influence of the extremist and radical camp of the movement which is 
parallel to the decline of its closest allies in Iran, the revolutionist 
faction under the leadership of Hojjatolislam Mohtashemi. As a result, 
Hizb'allah appointments of a new Secretary-General demonstrated that the
*” For example, the appointment of Hajj Husayn Khalil as the president of the 
Politbureau was in alignment with Hizb'allah's new profile in Lebanon as he was known for his 
close ties to Syria and as he had coordinated the movement's long-term relations with 
Damascus, see: The Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993): p.7.
*** See: Foreign Report, April 30, 1992. This is also apparent by the relegation of 
Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli to a petition as a mere member of the main Majlis al-Shura without any 
specific portfolio. The composition of the Majlis al-Shura and responsibility are: Sheikh 
Hassan Nasserallah [Secretary-General] ; Sheikh Naim Qassem [Deputy Secretary-General] ; Hajj 
Muhairmad Hasan Yaghdi [President of Executive Shura\ ; Hajj Hassan Khalil [Head of 
Politbureai^  ; Sheikh ^ fuhammad Yazbek [Spokesman]; Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli and Muhamnad Mikdad 
[members], see: The Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 [March 1993].
*** See: Foreign Report, May 13, 1993.
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election of a particular senior Hizb'allah cleric was not only dependent on 
the applicability of his previous experience to a current situation confron­
ting the movement within Lebanon and on the level of support and followers 
the candidate manage to muster within the movement but also to his links with 
factions and institutions within Iran's clerical establishments.*"
Apart from the influence of close personal relationships, the conduct 
of both formal and informal consultations between Hizb'allah clergymen and 
Iranian officials occurs through a variety of channels and institutions.*" 
While official Iran has attempted to exert influence over Hizb'allah activi­
ty through various Iranian agencies at work in Hizb'allah, ranging from the 
Pasdaran contingent and Iran's personal representatives in Damascus- and 
Beirut to Iran's Foreign Ministry and the Martyrs* Foundation, Hizb'allah 
clergymen are also influenced by* individual Iranian clergy with personal and 
political aspirations, at times, contrary to the official position and policy 
of Iran's ruling clerical elite.*®* The degree of divergence between 
Hizb'allah's subordination, in principle, to the supreme religious and poli­
tical authority of Ayatollah Khumayyni, and the disobedience and disagree­
ments displayed within Hizb'allah ranks towards Iran's official leadership 
and its willingness to sacrifice ideology to achieve pragmatic foreign and 
domestic policy objectives, is dependent on Hizb'allah's and individual 
clergymen's interaction with official Iranian institutions as well as on cle­
rical factionalism in Iran. In turn, any discord or harmony in Hizb'allah's 
relationship with Iran is influenced by the impact of Iranian clerical fac­
tionalism on the institutions at work in Hizb'allah.
*" See: Hie Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993): p.6. 
*®* See: US News & World Report, March 6, 1989.
*®* See: Martin Kramer, (1990), op.cit.: pp.105-31.
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3.4 Hizb'allah's Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions
As a revolutionary movement, the pan-Islamic ideological position of the 
Hizb'allah and its command leadership is naturally attuned to the revolu­
tionist faction within Iran's clerical establishment."* While this closeness 
in radical ideology stemmed from the position of Ayatollah Khumayyni, it also 
mirrors the in-volvement by several Iranian members of the revolutionist fac­
tions with prominent Lebanese Shi'ite clerics both prior to and, more impor­
tantly, in the formation and development of Hizb'allah in Lebanon."* The 
personal relationships between some Iranian clergymen and Hizb'allah's 
command leadership, forged at the religious centers in Najaf and in Qoum as
well as in Lebanon during the early 1970's, translated not only in their
*close involvement in the actual formation of Hizb'allah as an organisation 
in 1982, but also in the appointments of these Iranian clergy, to the offi­
cial Iranian institutions at work in Hizb'allah."* While this facilitated 
the rapid growth and expansion of Hizb'allah as well as forged ties to the 
inner sanctum of Iran's clerical establishment, the movement also became 
gradually susceptible to clerical factionalism in Iran, as evident by the 
dismissal and appointment of Iran's radical clergy within these Iranian
*" The more doctrinnaire and radical faction within Iran's clerical establishment is 
led by: Hojjat al-Islam Muhairmad Musavi Kho'iniha; Ayatollah Ali Meshkini; Ayatollah 
Montazeri; Mir Hussein Musavi; Hojjat al-Islam Ali-Akbar Mohtashemi; Musavi Khoeiniha; and 
Mehdi Hashemi, see: David Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision: Nationalism or World Order", in David 
Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.48. Also see: Shireen T. Hunter, "After the Ayatollah", 
Foreign Policy, Vol.66 (Spring 1987); and Nikola B. Schahgaldian, The Clerical Establishment 
in Iran, R-3788-USDP (Santa Monica, CA. : Rand Corporation, June 1989).
*" See: R.K. Ramazani, "Iran's Export of the Revolution: Politics, Ends, and Means", 
in John L. Esposito (ed.) (1990), op.cit.: p.43. Also see: Le Figaro, April 18, 1990; lettre 
Persane, No.46 (June 1986); Le Nouvel Observateur. March 28 - April 3, 1986; Valeurs 
Actuelles, April 1, 1986; al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 1989; and al-Maiallah, Novenber 5-11, 
1983.
*’* See: Xavier Raufer, (1991), op.cit.; pp.132-3; al-Maiallah. November 5-11, 1983; 
and Jeune Afrique, May 7, 1986.
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institutions.*"
Among the most influential and strongest relationship between an indi­
vidual Iranian clergyman and the Hizb'allah command leadership was the role 
of Ali-Akbar Mohtashemi, the former Iranian ambassador to Syria and former 
Interior Minister.*" Apart from his pivotal role in the creation of the 
Hizb'allah in 1982*®* and his role as liaison between Iran and the movement 
in Lebanon during his tenure in Syria until 1986,*" Mohtashemi's radical 
position in ideological terms has resonated within the movement in Lebanon, 
especially when Hizb'allah has been at odds with the official Iranian leader­
ship.*" While Mohtashemi has cultivated a broad base of support within the 
movement, his closest relationship within Hizb'allah's command leadership 
has been with the radical activists, most notably Sheikh al-Tufayli and 
Sheikh Nasserallah.*" Hizb'allah's spiritual leader. Sheikh Fadlallah, 
reportedly was not a supporter of Mohtashemi.*'* Although the promotion of
*" See: Kevhan, September 18, 1986; Valeurs Actuelles, April 6, 1987; and Le Monde, 
October 25, 1986.
See: New York Times, August 27, 1989; al-Shira, March 17, 1986; US News & World 
Report, March 6, 1989; al-Shira, September 19, 1988; and Independent, October 23, 1991. For 
Mohtashemi's stay in Najaf under Ayatollah Khumayyni and his closely forged friendships with 
future Hizb'allah leaders, see: Independent, October 23, 1991.
*®* For Mohtashemi's role in the establishment of Hizb'allah, see: al-Watan al-Arabi, 
December 11, 1987; Davar, January 11, 1987; Foreign Report, July 30, 1987; al-Shira, September 
19, 1988; Independent, March 7, 1990; US News & World Report, March 6, 1989; Ha'aretz, 
September 30, 1984; Ha'aretz, August 7, 1989; and Washington Post, July 7, 1988.
See: Foreign Report, June 20, 1985; New York Times. November 2, 1983; and New York 
Times, October 5, 1984.
See: Washington Post, January 8, 1990; al-Shira, September 19, 1988; and 
Independent, October 23, 1991.
See: Voice of the People in Arabic to Lebanon 1239 gmt 28 Feb 92 - BBC/®/ME/1318, 
March 2, 1992; FBIS, November 30, 1989; and al-Anba, November 27, 1989.
See: Jou Press, October 28, 1989; and al-Anba, November 29, 1989.
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Mohtashemi as Interior Minister within Iran's clerical establishment in 1986 
meant the loss of his position as Iranian representative within Hizb'allah's 
national Majlis al-Shura, he maintained an independent relationship with the 
movement's leadership, as evident from his frequent visits to Lebanon and 
Syria as well as his outspoken views on Hizb'allah's position with particular 
reference to the abduction and release of foreign hostages.*” While the dis­
missal of Mohtashemi in the post-Khumayyni Cabinet, under the leadership of 
Hashemi-Rafsanjani, in 1989*” weakened his influence within Iran's clerical 
establishment,*” it also translated into an attempt by Mohtashemi to upstage 
Rafsanjani's pragmatic foreign policy, through Hizb'allah, by blocking the 
release of Western hostages.*” Notwithstanding the prominent role of 
Mohtashemi in the initiation of abductions of foreigners, his influence over 
radical clergy within Hizb'allah provided him with an instrument to both 
sabotage moderate and pragmatic overtures by the Iranian leadership in the 
foreign policy arena as well as to bolster his position within the clerical 
factionalism in Iran.*" However, Mohtashemi's ability to manipulate 
Hizb'allah activity was limited by changes in Hizb'allah's position within 
the Lebanese environment, as evident by the dénounement of the hostage crisis
*“ For a debate within the Iranian Majlis on Mohtashemi's independent efforts, see: 
FBIS, September 23, 1988. Also see: Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989,
*” See: Farhang Jahanpour, "Iran I: Wars Among the Heirs", Ihe World Today (October 
1990): pp. 183-87. Also see: New York Times, August 26, 1990; and Washington Post, August 20,
1989. For a useful analysis of electoral power-struggle in Iran, see: Farzin Sarabi, "The 
Post-Khomeini Era in Iran: The Elections of the Fourth Islamic Majlis", Middle East Journal, 
Vol.48, No.l (Winter 1994): pp.89-107.
IS4 See: New York Times, October 10, 1989; and New York Times, March 14, 1990.
*” See: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; FBIS, November 30, 1989; and Ha'aretz, December 
17, 1989.
*" See: Independent. October 23, 1991; Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989; and 
Washington Post, May 15, 1990.
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in 1991 despite strong opposition from Mohtashemi, and by the presence of a 
more pragmatic Hizb'allah leader. Sheikh al-Musawi, in charge of the organi­
sation,*"
Another prominent Iranian cleric for the Hizb'allah is Khumayyni's 
designat-heir, Ayatollah Husayn Ali Montazeri.*" Apart from his early active 
role in the promotion of Iranian involvement in Lebanon through Hizb'allah, 
Montazeri's position as supervisor of the Office of Islamic Liberation 
Movements, operated by his relative Mehdi Hashemi and in charge of co­
ordination of Iran’s revolutionary support and activity abroad, provided him 
with an official channel to Hizb’allah's command leadership.*" As the Office 
of Islamic Liberation Movements had been originally a formal arm of the 
Revolutionary Guard until 1983,*" it transformed into a semi-independent 
institution of the IRGC headed hy Montazeri's protege, Medhi Hashemi, which 
coordinated the operational co-operation between Iran and the Hizb'allah.*** 
While Hashemi's efforts to foment revolutionary activity and terrorism abroad 
damaged Iran's war effort with Iraq and led to his arrest in 1986, the reta­
liatory abductions of American hostages and revelation of the US-Iranian
*" See; al-Havat, May 25, 1991; Jerusalem Report, August 1, 1991; al-Anba, November 
27, 1989; and IBIS, November 30, 1989.
*" For Hizb'allah's ties with Montazeri, see; Ha'aretz, September 30, 1984; al-Dustur, 
December 22, 1986; al-Ahd, November 31, 1986; Foreign Report, Decanber 13, 1984; Financial 
Times, December 8, 1984; and Intemational Herald Tribune, December 8-9, 1984.
*" Both Mohmtmad Montazeri and Mehdi Hashemi had obtained guerrila training in Lebanon
before the 1979 and were deeply involved in pronoting the Iranian Pasdaran's presence, see:
Paris Lettre Persane, No.46 (June 1986): pp.6-10. Also see: Shireen T. Hunter, (1988), 
op.cit. : pp.743-4; and Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad (New York, NY. : Harper Ctollins,
1994): p.284.
*" See: FBIS, November 5, 1986. Also see: Roger Faligot and Rémi Kauffer, (1994), 
op.cit.: p.412.
*** See: Hazhir Teimourian, "The Mullah Goes Back to the Mosque", Ttie Middle East (May
1989): pp.20-1; FBIS October 28, 1986; and New York Times, March 18, 1987.
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arms-for-hostages deal by Ayatollah Montazeri's personal representative in 
Lebanon, Sheikh Ismail al-Khaliq,*** coupled with the kidnapping of lyad 
Mahmoud, the Syrian chargé d'affair to Iran, was a clear manifestation of the 
connection between Iranian clerical factionalism and Hizb'allah activity.*" 
It also led to the final separation of the Office of Islamic Liberation 
Movements from the IRGC*** and its transfer to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in late 1986, in an effort by Rafsanjani to achieve a greater degree of 
Iranian control over Hizb'allah activity.**’ This was also evident by 
Rafsanjani's appointment of Hojjat al-Islam Hadi Khosrowshahi in 1987 to head 
the Office of Islamic Liberation M o v e m e n t s It meant that Hizb'allah's 
links to the revolutionary Iranian clergy were made more difficult.***
While Montazeri maintained relations with Hizb'allah through another 
Iranian institution, the Ministry of Islamic Guidance,**’ a number of radical 
Iranian clergy held senior positions within Iran's Minstry of Foreign Affairs
*** See: al-Shira, November 3, 1986; al-Dustur, December 22, 1986; and Hazhir- 
Teimourian, "The Mullah Goes Back to the Mosque", Hie Middle East (May 1989) : pp.20-1.
*** In 1982, lyad Mahmoud had played an active role in the release of the American 
hostage, David Dodge, held by the Hisi'allah, see: Middle East (April 1987): pp.15-7; and 
Washington Post, February 4, 1987. Also see: George Joffe, "Iran, the Southern Mediterranean 
and Europe: Terrorism and Hostages", in Anoushiravan Ehteshand and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), 
(1991), op.cit.:. p.85.
174 See: IRNA, March 18, 1987. Also see: Bruce Hoffman, (1990),op.cit.; p.26.
**’ See: Foreign Report, December 18, 1986; Bulvar, November 16, 1986; and Marmara, 
November 25, 1986.
**' Khosrowshahi was a noted protogé of Rafsanjani, see: Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.: 
p.262. Also see: al-Dustur, June 11, 1990.
*** See: "Inside Iran", Foreign Report, December 18, 1986; Le Monde, October 25, 1986; 
and Hazhir Teimourian, "Succession Struggle Gathers Pace", The Middle East (April 1987): 
pp.15-17.
**’ See: Sliireen T. Hunter, (1988), op.cit. : pp.743-4.
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with strong allegiance to support the movement in Lebanon, Among the most 
supportive Foreign Ministry officials of the Hizb'allah has been Director for 
Arab Affairs, Hosein Sheikh-ol-Islam, who coordinated with the Pasdaran to 
position its members in Iranian embassies abroad and participation in 
Hizb'allah operations."* Another radical Iranian ally of Hizb'allah was 
Javad Mansuri, Undersecretary for Cultural and Consular Affairs in the Mini­
stry of Foreign Affairs, who controlled the Iranian embassies abroad."* After 
the appointment of Rafsanjani in 1989, both Sheikh-ol-Islam's and Mansuri's 
positions were formally demoted in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."^ As a 
consequence, Hizb'allah downgraded the role and influence of the Iranian 
Ambassadors to Syria and Lebanon on both its Executive and Consultative 
Shuras."2 ■ *
Another influential Iranian institution at work within the Hizb'allah 
were the Martyrs' Foundation, under the command of Ayatollah Mehdi Karrubi, 
and the Foundation of the Oppressed, headed by Hojjat al-Islam Mohammad Ali- 
Rahmani."* While these two Iranian institutions have been responsible for 
helping the families of those killed in the revolution and the redistibution 
of material and financial assistance to lower class families in need,"* with
"* See: US News & World Report, March 6, 1989; Independent, July 1, 1987; Kevhan, 
December 5, 1985; Le Nouvel Observateur, October 30, 1983; and Le Monde, November 6-7, 1983. 
For the close relationship between SheiWi-ol-Islam and Mohtashemi, see: IRNA, November 7, 
1982; and Radio Danmscus, November 9, 1982.
ISO See: al-Dustur, February 12, 1990; and al-Dustur, October 16, 1990.
See: Kenneth Katzman, The Warriors of Islam (Boulder, 00. : Westview Press, 1993) 
pp.125-6. Also see: al-Dustur, February 12, 1990.
Private caiitainication mth Dr Yossi Olmert, Director, Government Pregs Office, 
Israel, December 30, 1991. Also see: IBIS, November 30, 1989.
L33 See: Xavier Raufer, (1987), op.cit.: pp.180-2. Also see: Times, June 1, 1985.
See: Ervand Abraliamian, The Iranian Moialiedin (London: Yale University Press,
1989): p.50; Shaul Baldiash, (1984), op.cit.: 1984): pp.184 and 243; Dilip Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs (London: Routledge, 1985): p.235.
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funds from the government, religious trusts and income from confiscation of 
exiled Iranians' properties, it also served as a channel for Iran's substan­
tial injection of resources to the Hizb'allah in Lebanon."* Iran's financial 
contributions, which averaged $60 million a year, were vital for the 
Hizb'allah in running an array of social and financial services for the Shi'a 
community, including religious schools, hospital clinics, agricultural co­
operatives and building projects."* While the Hizb'allah religious hawzats 
and mosques have served a vital role in the indoctrination process of count­
less young Shi'ites, reinforced by Iranian support for Hizb'allah's three 
radio stations, one television station and two publications,"' the Hizb'allah 
organ Jihad al-Bina ' (Holy Reconstruction Organ) serves as the main co­
ordinating body, divided into eight committees, for the social and financial 
needs of the movement's members."' Through Iran's generous financial support, 
the Islamic Health Committee established two major hospitals in Ba'albek and
"* See: Augustus Richard Norton, (1987), op.cit.: pp.104-5. Also see: al-Dustur, 
October 14, 1985; al-Shira, March 15, 1986; and Xavier Raufer, (1991), op.cit.: p.150.
See: Middle East International, No.315 (December 19, 1987); Financial Times. July 
25, 1987; al-Dustur, October 14, 1985; al-Shira, September 19, 1988; Jerusalem Post, July 22, 
1987; and al-Musawwar, September 17, 1987. Also see: Augustus Richard Norton, '.'Lebanon: The 
Internal Conflict and the Iranian Connection", in John L. Esposito (ed.), (1990). In 1994, it 
was estimated that Hizb'allah received £40 million annually from Iran, see; Independent, May 
8, 1994.
"' The most important religious hawzats are; the Religious Hawzat of Siddikin (south 
Lebanon) ; the Centre for Youth Education in Jibshit (south Lebanon) ; the Educational Hawzat of 
Brital (Biq'a area); the Iranian Religious Centre in Tyre (south Lebanon); the Centre for 
Islamic Martial Arts in Kabrikha (south Lebanon), see: al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, September 
19, 1989. Hizb'allah's television station is called al-Manar (the Beacon) while its three 
radio stations are called: Voice of the Oppressed] Voice of Faith] and Voice of Struggle, It's 
main publication is al-Ahd and a monthly publication al-Bilad,
For a useful overview, see: A Nizar Hamzeh, "Lebanon's Hizbullah: From Islamic 
Revolution to Parliamentary Accomodation", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 14, No.2 (1993): pp.327- 
8. The eight committees are: Technical Administrative Committee; Agricultural Committee; Power 
Resources Committee; Water Resources Committee; Islamic Health Committee; Financial Aid 
Committee; Reconstruction Committee; and Environmental Committee. Also see: The Lebanon 
Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993): .p.7.
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in the southern suburbs of Beirut in 1986 and an array of medical centres and 
pharmacies throughout the various regions in Lebanon."* The Financial Aid 
Committee, in close co-operation with the Martyrs' Foundation, distributed 
over $90 million between 1982-86 to families whose dependants had died or 
were wounded, and the Martyrs' Foundation provides approximately $225,000 
monthly to martyrs' families."* Apart from aid to those who had fallen or 
were wounded in the fight against the enemies of Islam, the Financial Aid 
Committee has extended generous loans intended for marriages, school expen­
ses, and small business ventures."* The importance of other committees have 
been obvious by the repair of over 1,000 homes in southern Lebanon damaged 
by Israeli attacks by the Reconstruction Committee in a period from 1988 to 
1991.*" Apart from Hizb’allah's dependence on Iranian financial support to 
sustain these services and projects, Hizb'allah's ability to capture the 
hearts and minds of the Shi'a community, through a skillful combination of 
financial inducements and ideological indoctrination, was partially dependent 
on the willingness by Iran to extend available resources, as the Pasdaran
*" Apart from the Khomeini Hospital in Ba'albek and Dar al-Hawra' for women and 
children in Beirut (examines and treats over 10,000 women and children annualy), the number of 
institutions operated by Hizb'allah's Islamic Health Commit tee is (medical clinics): eight in 
Beirut; six in southern Lebanon (including one mobile infirmary servicing 12 villages near the 
security zone) ; three in the Biq'a. The committee also operate two dental clinics in Beirut 
and three major pharmacies as well as six Civil Defense Centers. For a detailed overview of 
the institutions of the Islamic Health Ccmmittee, see: al-Ahd, August 1, 1989.
*" See: Middle East Contemporary Survey (1987): pp.167-8. For an interview with the 
Director of the Martyr's Foundation in Beirut, see: al-Mid, no. 135 (January 23, 1987). Also 
see: "Details about 'Hizballah' and Its Leaders", Middle East Reporter. March 22, 1986. For a 
lower figure to martyr's families, see: Times, November 14, 1987.
*** For details, see: Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: The Internal Conflict and the 
Iranian Connection", in Jolm L. Esposito (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.127.
*" See: al-Ahd, February 7, 1988; and al-Shira, August 31, 1992.
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provided the Hizb'allah with other military-related equipment and sources.*" 
While Iranian aid to Hizb'allah has steadily increased from $30 million in 
1985 to over $64 million in 1988,*" these institutions were subject to 
Iranian clerical factionalism.*" In particular, the involvement of Ayatollah 
Mehdi Karrubi in the 5 April 1988 hijacking of KU422 by Hizb'allah pointed 
to an effort by the Iranian cleric to influence the forthcoming Iranian Maj­
lis elections.*" The control over Iranian funds to Hizb'allah, through the
leader of the Martyrs' Foundation, was also used by Hashemi-Rafsanjani in 
1989 in an effort to control Hizb'allah, as evident by his move to downgrade 
support for the movement in Lebanon and by the dismissal of Ayatollah 
Karrubi, who was replaced by the only non-radical former IRGC Minister, 
Mohsen Rafiq Dust.*" In the wake and the aftermath of the release of the 
remaining Western hostages in 1991, reports indicated a substantial reduction 
in Iranian aid to the Hizb'allah, in some cases as high a reduction of ninety 
percent.*" However, while Iran has faced financial constraints after the 
1988 end of the Gulf war, the extent of Hizb'allah's expansion of its social 
services and financial assistance to the Lebanese Shi'ites would indicate
*" See: Ha'aretz, June 21, 1987; Jerusalem Post, November 13, 1987; al-Musawwar, 
September 17, 1987; Voice of Lebanon, October 29, 1987 - SWB/ME, October 30, 1987; and 
Jerusalem-Post, July 22, 1987, According to al-Dustur, approximately one-third of Iran's 
financial support for "liberation movements" is allocated to the Hizb'allah in Lebanon, see: 
al-Dustur, October 14, 1985.
*** See: Middle East Defense News, May 1, 1988; and John L. Esposito, The Islamic 
Threat: Myth or Reality? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992): p. 147.
*" See: al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 18, 1989; and Washington Post, September 22, 1988.
*" See: FBIS, June 3, 1985; and New York Times, March 18, 1987.
*" See: FBIS. September 7, 1989; Teheran Domestic Service, September 6, 1989;
Washington Post, September 22, 1988; and al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 18, 1989.
*" See: Robin Wright, "Islam's new political face". Current History, Vol.90, No.552 
(January 1991): p.28.
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otherwise.*"
Although Hizb'allah's command leadership has been affected by the avail­
ability of Iranian financial and materical resources, the institution of the 
Revolutionary Guards was least affected by Iranian clerical factionalism and 
remained the most reliable and loyal ally of the Hizb'allah."* As demonstra­
ted by the Pasdaran contingent in Lebanon, it has remained the most radical 
and least pliable Iranian institution with close ties to Iran's clerical 
revolutionist faction."* The Pasdaran's semi-institutional autonomy from the 
civilian leadership in Iran has meant that Hizb'allah has been able to resist 
attempts of co-option by Iran through support from the IRGC."* Attempts by 
Iranian political leaders to exert pressure on the IRGC contingent in 
Lebanon, as evident by proposals for its withdrawal and the release of the 
remaining hostages in Lebanon in. 1991, were unsuccessful."' The lack of con­
trol by Iran's political leadership over IRGC support for Hizb'allah was 
clearly revealed by the Pasdaran's close training and military support of the
See: Middle East, February 1993: pp.12-13; and Middle East, February 1992: p.13.
See: al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 18, 1989; al-Majallah, April 19-25, 1989; New York 
Times, April 23, 1990; New York Times, December 29, 1989; Washington Post, January 8, 1990; 
and New York Times, May 22, 1989.
"* The most notable supporters are Ahmad Khumayyl and Mohtashemi, see: Kenneth 
Katzman, (1993), op.cit.; Nikola Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic 
(Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, 1987); and Washington Post, January 7, 1990..
*** See: Jeune Afrique, January 1984; Washington Post, January 7, 1990; US News & World 
Report, March 6, 1989; Robin Wright, "A Reporter at Large", The New Yorker, September 5, 1988; 
and Nader Entessar, "The Military and Politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran", in Hosshang 
Mirahmadi and Manoucher Parvin (eds.) Post Revolutionary Iran (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 
1988).
Rafsanjani offered more weaponry and authority to the Pasdaran, which would enable 
it to pursue more hardline political and military objectives in the strengthening of the 
Islamic revolution and its spread to other countries, see: Wall Street Journal, April 27,
1990; New York Times, October 16, 1991; Washington Post, November 21, 1991; Jane's Defence 
Weekly, Novanber 16, 1991; New York Times, March 5, 1990; al-Majallali, April 19-25, 1989; al- 
Sliarq al-Awsat, April 18, 1989; and Washington Post, January 19, 1992.
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Hizb'allah in its repeated armed clashes during 1987-1990 with Amal,"* de­
spite official efforts by Iran to broker an end to the conflict in order to 
preserve its relationship with Syria."* As the IRGC's Lebanon contingent was 
led and manned by the most ideologically radical military-officials and de­
monstrated a degree of institutional autonomy from civilian political con­
trol, it enabled Hizb'allah to exercise a certain amount of independence, at 
times in violation of specific orders, in terms of its activity in Lebanon, 
especially in the abduction and release of foreign hostages."*
Notwithstanding the various influences of factionalism within Hizb'allah 
and the Iranian clerical establishment, coupled with the movement's relation­
ship with Iranian and Syrian military institutions, Hizb'allah and offical 
Iran co-ordinated some of the movement's abductions of foreigners, from a 
basis of convergence of mutual interest, through a formally defined chain of 
command from Iran to Hizb'allah."' At the highest level in Iran, the Islamic 
Republic's Supreme Defense Council, which is the central-decision making body 
of the military-security establishment,"' is the main vehicle for poliy for­
mulation, decisions and guidance to Hizb'allah relating to hostage-taking
"* It was reportedly activist members with al-Da'va allegiance which initiated attacks 
on Amal, see: al-Nahar, January 19, 1989.
"* The Iranian mediation team was lead by the Foreign Minister, Velyati and the only 
non-radical Pasdaran leader, Mohsen Rafiq Dust, see: al-Sharg al-Awsat, April 18, 1989; and 
Agence France Presse, May 16, 1988.
"* See: Independent, July 1, 1987; Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989; and 
Washington Post, May 15, 1990.
"' See: Independent, August 30, 1989; al-Shira, March 17, 1986; Ha'aretz, April 2, 
1986; and al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987.
203 See: Washington fipst, August 23, 1987; and Sean K. Anderson, (1991), op.cit.: p.29.
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in Lebanon and operations abroad."* While this Council, composed of the 
Iranian President, Majlis Speaker and IRGC commander, is formally in charge 
of the policy formulation vis-à-vis Hizb'allah, the implementation of speci­
fic operational directives was delegated to the Office of Islamic Liberation 
M o v e m e n t s In turn, the Office of Islamic Liberation Movements delegated 
the specific tasks through Iran's diplomatic representatives in Damascus and, 
to a lesser extent, Beirut as well as to the Pasdaran contingent in 
Lebanon."* Although Iran's operational policy with Hizb'allah remained 
particularly close until the removal of Mehdi Hashemi in the autumn of 1986*** 
and the reassignment of Mohtashemi from his post as Ambassador to Syria to 
Minister of Interior,*** it became increasingly subject to clerical factiona­
lism in Iran.*** The reassignment of the Office for Islamic Liberation 
Movements to Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the appointment of 
Hojjat al-Islam Khosrowshahi to head the control-mechanism of Iran's official 
contacts with Hizb'allah,**’ underlined not only the clerical factionalism in 
Iran but also that control over Hizb'allah activity was excerised both
*** See: Augustus Richard Norton, (1987), op.cit. : pp. 101-2. Also see: al-Shira. March 
15, 1986; al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987; Ha'aretz, October 12, 1989; Jerusalem Post. 
June 29, 1988; and al-Majallah, April 20, 1988.
210 See: Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.
*** See: al-Shira, March 15, 1986; Ha'aretz, September 30, 1984; and Middle East 
Reporter, March 22, 1986.
*** See: IRNA, March 18, 1987; Foreign Report, December 18, 1986; Bulvar, November 16, 
1986; and Mannar, November 25, 1986.
*** See: New York Times, August 27, 1989; Independent. October 23, 1991; and US News & 
World Report, March 6, 1989.
*** See: Jerusalem Post, June 29, 1988.
**’ See: IRNA, March 18, 1987; Foreign Report, December 18, 1986; and Pierre Pean, 
(1987), op.cit.: p.262.
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through official Iranian institutions and independent channels loyal to the 
revolutionist faction within Iran's clerical establishment."' In particular, 
it has been suggested that Iran, in an attempt to control Hizb'allah abduc­
tions, recalled senior Hizb'allah SSA commanders to Iran in April 1987 either 
because of increased disagreements between Hizb'allah and Iran over the move­
ment's claims for independence or as a safety precaution to prevent their 
capture by Syrian intelligence in Lebanon due to their involvement in attacks 
against Syrian armed forces in West Beirut."' It would seem likely that Imad 
Mughniya and Abd al-Hadi Hamadi remained in Iran for training and security 
reasons rather than for detention, as both were subsequently elevated within 
Hizb'allah's operational command leadership."' This hypothesis can be further 
supported by the parallel Iranian efforts to upgrade the Hizb'allah's mili­
tary capability through increased funding and sophisticated weaponry."*
3.5. The Abduction of Foreigners by the Hizb'allah
As demonstrated, the nature of understanding Hizb'allah activity, such 
as its abductions of foreigners, involves analysis of a complex network of 
interactions both within and external to the movement in Lebanon."' Apart 
from the Hizb'allah's centralized decision-making apparatus, clerical fac­
**' Accordingly, it is incorrect, as stated by Sean K. Anderson, that the revolutionist 
faction operated through the Office of Islamic Liberation Movements after 1987, see; Sean K. 
Anderson, (1991), op.cit.: p.29. However, he is correct in his assessment that Hizb'allah 
operated on "personal loyalty within Iran's clerical establisment rather than to bureaucratic 
offices as such". Also see: Ha'aretz, March 20, 1987; Ha'aretz, November 10, 1987; and 
Ha'aretz, November 29, 1987.
**' See: al-lttihad, January 31, 1988; Da'var, February 1, 1988; Ha'aretz, January 29, 
1988; al-Ittihad, January 15, 1988; and Da'var, November 13, 1987.
**' See: Le Figaro, December 4, 1989; Independent, April 26, 1988; al-Ittihad, January 
15, 1988; al-Itthiad, January 15, 1988; and Radio Free Lebanon, July 5, 1990.
*** See: al-Ray, December 27, 1987; and Jerusalem Post, November 13, 1987.
See: Jotm Calabrese, (1990), op.cit.: p.189.
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tionalism within the command leadership of the organisation was compounded 
by the influence of an array of Iranian and Syrian individuals and institu­
tions at work within the movement."* In turn, these external influences on 
the movement affected its activity to varying degrees, as Hizb'allah showed 
disobedience and disagreement towards both Iran and Syria at different 
times."* Although Hizb'allah activity often converged with the interests of 
Iranian and Syrian official policy, it is necessary to examine the movement's 
hostage-taking activity in Lebanon in terms of its own organisational re­
quirements and individual motivations by Hizb'allah members as well as inte­
rests by Iran and Syria."*
The majority of abductions of Western citizens by the Hizb'allah, with 
very few exceptions, occured within the framework of a specific and limited 
time period."* As these abductions occured within concentrated time periods, 
the decision by Hizb'allah's command leadership to abduct individual foreign 
citizens was intitiated in direct response to an array of factors affecting 
the organisation within Lebanon. Although these factors can be identified 
as a direct response by the organisation to a number of major events affec­
ting its own position within Lebanon's civil war over a ten-year period, 
either for the purposes of survival or for the advancement of its pan-Islamic 
goals, it is equally important to recognize that Hizb'allah activity, as
*** Apart from individual Iranian clergy, these include: Iranian Pasdaran; Iran's 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Iran's Office of Islamic Liberations Movements; the Supreme 
Defense Council; Iran's Ministry of Guidance; Iran's Martyr Foundation; Iran's diplomatic 
representatives in Beirut and Damascus; and Syrian military and civilian Mukhabarat.
*** In particular, see: Martin Kramer, "Redeeming Jerusalem: The Pan-Islamic Premise of 
Hizballah, in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.113-117.
*** This was made evidently clear by: John Calabrese, (1990), op.cit.; p.189; Middle 
East Reporter, March 22, 1986; al-Shira, March 15, 1986: Xavier Raufer, (1991), op.cit.: 
pp.147-51; Yossi Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik", in David 
Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.171-188; and Sean K. Anderson, (1991), op.cit.: pp.19-34.
*** See: Maskit Burgin, Ariel Merari & Anat Kurz, (1988), op.cit. : pp.7-11.
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manifested by the abduction of foreigners, was directly related to the 
collective as well as individual interests of high-ranking Hizb'allah 
clergy."’ As a result, it is necessary to examine Hizb'allah hostage-taking 
activity not only in relation to the evolution of the organisation itself 
within Lebanon but also to the individual interests of high-ranking 
Hizb'allah clergy."’
Apart from the often converging interests between Hizb'allah as an orga­
nisation and the individual interests of its leading clergy, it is necessary 
to examine the influence and involvement of Iranian clergy and institutions 
at work in Lebanon on Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity. The convergence 
or divergence of Iranian interests in the abduction of foreigners by 
Hizb'allah must be understood within the context of the array of official 
and unofficial interaction between Iran and the Hizb'allah as manifest 
through hostage-taking."' The participation of Iranian clergy and institu­
tions in Hizb'allah activity needs to be examined in order to understand the 
nature of these abductions in terms of being in alignment with the motiva­
tions of official Iran or as a manifestation of Iranian clerical factiona­
lism."’ In turn, this assessment must be balanced against Hizb'allah's own 
requirements for its position within the internal Lebanese environment."* 
The abduction of American, French, and British citizens by the 
Hizb'allah have occured within specific phases:
See: Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: The Internal Dimension and the Iranian
Connection", in John L. Esposito (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.116-137.
**’ See: Shimon Shapira, (1987), op.cit.
"' See: Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.
"’ See: Bruce Hoffman, (1990), op.cit.
"* In particular, see: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989; and
FBIS, November 30, 1989.
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* July 1982 - February 1984: the expansion of the movement and attacks 
against foreign presence;
* February 1984 - January 1985: the arrest of Lebanese al-Da'wa members |% 
Kuwait;
* March 1985 - June 1985: the successful actions of the movement in seeking 
to bring about the expulsion of Western presence and Israel's withdrawn] 
from Lebanon;
* February 1986 - May 1986: accelerated confrontation with Israel and UNTV'ij, in southern Lebanon;
* September 1986 - October 1986: undermining US-Iranian rapproachment throng], 
the revelation of the Iran-Contra scandal and anti-American abductions;
* January 1987 - January 1988: arrest of leading Hizb'allah members in 
Germany and increased armed confrontation with Amal in Lebanon;
* February 1988 - February 1989: challenges to Amal's authority in southom 
Lebanon;
* April 1989 -April 1991: confronting major internal challenges and cleric,,] 
factionalism in Iran;
* May 1991 - December 1992: preparation for a post-militia phase of Lebanojjf; 
politics, participation within the democratic process, and confrontaii 
with Israel.
These phases have reflected not only the movement's own position within l},% 
Lebanese environment as a confessional group, but also the individual as woj] 
as the collegiate interests by leading Hizb'allah clergy in the abduction of 
Western foreigners. Apart from Hizb'allah's own requirements, these phaso% 
also reflect the interaction between Hizb'allah and Iranian clergy and insij - 
tutions as well as Syrian influence over its activity. As a result, the exa­
mination of Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity provides a composite pictiiro 
of the various influences imposed on Hizb'allah's decision-making process i% 
decisions to abduct individual foreigners as well as the underlying raison 
d'etre for these abductions. This picture becomes increasingly complex % 
Hizb'allah developed within Lebanon and was subjected to an array of intern.,1 
and external constraints as well as opportunities in its hostage-taking 
activity.
First Phase: July 1982 - February 1984
The first abduction by the Hizb'allah of a foreign Western citl/t-n
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occurred on July 19, 1982, with the kidnapping of David Dodge, the acting
president of the American University of Beirut (AUB)Apart from being the
most prominent American citizen in Lebanon next to the US Ambassador, the
abduction of David Dodge came directly in response to the previous kidnapping
of four employees of the Iranian Embassy in Beirut by the Israeli-backed
Phalangist militia."* The importance of these Iranian hostages for Iran
became apparent with the revelation of their identity, most notably Ahmad
Motevaselian, the Ba'albek commander of the Pasdaran contingent, and Mohsen
Musavi, the Iranian chargé d'affaires to Lebanon."* While it seems clear that
the abduction of David Dodge was initiated by the Pasdaran contingent in
Lebanon in an effort to exert American pressure on the Phalangist militia to
*release their commander, Ahmad Mohtaveselian, the operation was executed by 
Husayn al-Musawi's Islamic A m a l The involvement of the Islamic Amal in the 
abduction of David Dodge was seen not only by the fact that the militia 
spearheaded Hizb'allah's first military units but also by the confinement of 
the Pasdaran to the Biq’a area.*" In particular, the close co-operation bet­
ween Islamic Amal and Pasdaran was revealed by the immediate transfer of 
David Dodge from Beirut to the Biq'a area, where he was handed over to the
*" For information concerning the incident, see: Ma'aretz, July 20, 1982;
International Herald Tribune, July 23, 1982; Observer, December 8, 1991; and Washington Post. 
July 20, 1982.
*** Hie kidnapping of the four Iranians occured on July 4, 1982, see: Independent,
March 26, 1990; and Washington Post, July 24, 1982.
*** See: Middle East Reporter, July 22, 1983; and Middle East Reporter, November 14, 
1990. The other two Iranians were Akhaven Kazem and Taqi Rastegar Moqaddam. Also see: Farhang 
Jahanpour, "The Roots of the Hostage Crisis", The World Today (February 1992): p.33.
*" For early allegations of the involvement of Islamic Amal, see; International Herald 
Tribune, July 23, 1982; Ma'aretz, September 20, 1983; New York Times, October 13, 1991; and 
Middle East Reporter, July 22, 1983.
*** See: Israeli Defense Forces Spokesman (IDFS), February 18, 1986; and International 
Herald Tribune, January 1, 1984.
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Pasdaran contingent in the Syrian border village of Zebdani."’ Furthermore, 
the transfer of David Dodge to Iran in April 1983, where he was interrogated 
by senior Pasdaran officials while held at Evin prison, is evidence that the 
abduction of Dodge was not only closely coordinated by Islamic Amal and the 
Pasdaran but also initiated solely in accordance with Iran's interest in 
securing the release of its own captives,"’
Although the abduction of David Dodge, who subsequently was released 
after Syrian intervention, on July 21, 1983, failed to achieve the release 
of the Iranian captives, it had no immediate repercussions and remained an 
isolated incident of hostage-taking by an Hizb'allah-affiliated organisa­
tion."' A main reason for the absence of any abductions of other foreign 
citizens, until the beginning*of 1984, can be attributed to the concentration 
of efforts by the Hizb'allah in.the expansion of the movement from Ba'albek 
into Beirut and southern Lebanon."’ While Hizb'allah was able to recruit 
rapidly and indoctrinate a large number of Shi'ite followers in these areas, 
assisted by the expansion of the Pasdaran from Ba'albek into Beirut in April 
1983,"’ the movement's activity was closely aligned with Iran. Notwith­
standing the close co-ordination between Hizb'allah and the Pasdaran in the
"’ For Involvement of Islamic Amal, see: Augustus Richard Norton, "Political Violence 
and Shi'a Factionalism in Lebanon", Middle East Insight, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1983): pp. 9-16. See: Hhe 
Times, July 22, 1987.
See: Con Coughlin, (1993), op. cit. ; pp. 27-39; and Brian Michael Jenkins, (1986), 
op.cit.: p.2.
"' For the release of David Dodge by Syrian military intelligence, see: Ma'aretz, 
September 20, 1983; and Associated Press, September 20, 1983; and Wall Street Journal, 
September 20, 1983.
See: Augustus Richard Norton, "Shi'ism and Social Protest in Lebanon", in Juan R.I. 
Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (eds.), (1986), op.cit.: pp.172-3.
See: Israeli Defence Forces Spokesman (IDFS), February 18, 1986; International 
Herald Tribune, January 1, 1984; and Ha'aretz, June 3, 1984.
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consolidation of the Hizb'allah movement's activities in Ba'albek and in 
Beirut, the major role of Iranian support and guidance over the movement was 
revealed by the co-operation between Hizb'allah's leading clergy and Iran's 
official representatives in Beirut and Damascus."' In particular, the pattern 
of Hizb'allah activity during this period, with special concentration on bomb 
attacks against foreign targets, underscored not only close alignment and 
convergence with Iran's foreign policy in Lebanon but also the heavy in­
fluence of certain Iranian revolutionary clergy within and over Hizb'allah's 
decision-making process."* This influence was also clearly demonstrated by 
the subsequent infrequent meetings of Hizb'allah’s national Majlis-al-Shura 
from 1983 until 1986 during the tenure of Iran's Ambassador to Syria, Ali 
Akhbar Mohtashemi."* Apart from his prominent and active role in the esta­
blishment of the Hizb'allah, Mohtashemi appears to have played an active 
role, with the Pasdaran and Syrian military intelligence, in the supervision 
of Hizb'allah's suicide bomb attacks against the American embassy in Beirut 
in April 1983, the American and French contingents of the Multinational Force 
(MNF) in October 1983 and the American embassy annex in September 1984.*" 
While this close influence over Hizb'allah activity by Iran continued until 
the reassignment of the Office of Islamic Liberation to Iran's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in 1986, Hizb'allah's activity was also aligned with it's
**' See: Ha'aretz, February 7, 1984; US News & World Report, March 6, 1989; Ha'aretz, 
September 30, 1984; New York Times, December 29, 1989; and Le Point. August 3, 1987.
*" For further explanation of the close alignment, see: Bruce Hoffman, (1990), 
op.cit.: pp.15-19.
*** See: Amir Taheri, (1987), op.cit.: p.125; al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987; 
Davar, January 11, 1987; Foreign Report, July 30, 1987; al-Shira, September 19, 1988; 
Independent, March 7, 1990; US News and World Report, March 6, 1989; Ha'aretz, September 30, 
1984; Ha'aretz, August 7, 1989; Washington Post, August 1, 1985; and Washington Post, July 7, 
1988.
*" See: Foreign Report, June 20, 1985; New York Times, November 2, 1983; and New York 
Times, October 5, 1984.
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pan-Islamic strategy of expelling foreign influence and presence in 
Lebanon."*
Although Hizb’allah's open warfare against Western political and cultural 
imperialism in Lebanon began with the bombing of the American embassy on 
April 18, 1983,**’ which coincided with the arrival of Pasdaran to Beirut, the 
decision by Hizb'allah to confront the United States, France, United Kingdom 
and Israel in Lebanon was based not only on their status as the four prin­
cipal enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran but also on their political 
and military intervention within Lebanon's civil war.**’ Apart from the tradi­
tional American and French support for the Christian-dominated Lebanese 
government**', US and French military participation in the MNF, deployed after 
the massacres in the West Beirut refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, not only 
exacerbated Shi'i hostility but also served to obstruct any efforts to over­
throw the confessional system and towards the establishment of an Islamic
*** See; IRNA, March 18, 1987; Bruce Hoffman, (1990), op.cit.; p.26; and Pierre Pean, 
(1987), op.cit.: p.262. Also see: al-Ahd, December 5, 1986; and "An 0 ^  Letter: Hizballah 
Program", Jerusalem Quarterly, op.cit.: pp. 111-16.
*** Immediately after the incident, Lebanese authorities arrested four suspects and 
identified them as: Hussein Saleh Harb; Mahamnoud Ifoussa Dairaki; Mohammad Nayef Jadaa; and 
Sami Muhmoud al-Hujji, see: July 25, 1987. The Hizb'allah selected to strike at the US
embassy as high-level CIA-officers convened with Lebanese operatives, #ose mission was to 
steal a Soviet-supplied SA-5 missile in Syria, on April 18. Also, senior US diplomats Philip 
Habib and Morris Draper mediating an Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty were expected to meet in 
the embassy on that day. For information, see: G. Delafon, Beirut: The Soldiers of Islam 
(Paris: Stock, 1989): p.45; and A. Basbous, Secret Wars in Lebanon (Paris: Gallimard, 1987): 
p.253.
**’ See: Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, "Islam and Violence in Political 
Reality", Middle East Insight, Vol.4, No.4-5 (1986): pp.4-13; and Martin Kramer, "Hizbullali: 
The Calculus of Jihad", in Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.) Fundementalisms and the 
State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
**' For a useful overview, see: Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political 
Modernization in Lebanon (New York, NY.: Random House, 1968); Helena Cobban, "The Growth of 
Shi'i Power in Lebanon and Its Implications for the Future", in Juan R.I. Cole and Nikki R. 
Keddie (eds.) Shi'ism and Social Protest (London: Yale Ikiiversity Press, 1986): pp.137-155; 
and Jonathan Randall, The Tragedv of Lebanon (London: The Hogarth Press, 1990).
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State in Lebanon.*" For Hizb'allah, American and, to a lesser degree, French 
military participation, inserted to maintain peace between the warring fac­
tions in the absence of an effective Lebanese army, became increasingly asso­
ciated with support for the discredited Gemayel regime as they became gra­
dually drawn into the civil war as active participants.*" The rejection by 
Hizb'allah of the American-sponsored 17-May agreement*", coupled with direct 
military engagement between Hizb'allah and the American MNF contingent,
backed by the presence off shore of massive US naval support,*" led to a 
comprehensive effort by the Lebanese Shi'ite organisation to destroy any 
foreign military presence and political influence in Lebanon. Hizb'allah's 
execution of a series of suicide attacks, with the active support of Iran and 
Syria, against the American and French MNF contingents in Beirut on October 
23, 1983, resulted not only in. the disintegration of the MNF through the 
withdrawal of both the American and French contingents in the early months 
of 1984, but also earned the movement prestige and revolutionary credence in
*" See: al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan (Beirut, 1984); al-Ahd, September 5, 1986; 
al-Shira, September 28, 1989; La Révue du Liban, January 30, 1988; and al-Safir, August 29, 
1987.
*" See: George Nader, "Interview with Sheikh Fadl Allah", Middle East Insight (June- 
July 1985); John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics (New York, NY. : Syracuse University Press, 
1991): p.252; Roger Owen, "The Lebanese Crisis: Fragmentation or Reconciliation?", Third World 
Quarterly, Vol.6, No.4 (October 1984): pp.934-47; and "An Open Letter: Hizb'allah Program", 
Jerusalem Quarterly, No.48 (Fall 1988): pp. 111-16. For Shi'i hostility towards the MNF in 
Lebanon, see: US DOD Coimission Report on Beirut, Intelligence, 20 December 1983, Part 4;
Luigi Caligaris, "Western Peacekeeping in Lebanon: Lessons of the MNF", Survival, Vol.26, No.6 
(November/December 1984) : pp.262-68; and John Mackinlay, "MNF2 in Beirut: Some Military 
Lessons for Peacekeepers", Conflict Quarterly, Vol.6, No.4 (Fall 1986): pp.15-26.
*" See: al-Nahar, June 5, 1985; al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, March 18-24, 1985; and 
David A. Kom, "Syria and Lebanon: a Fateful Entanglement", The World Today (August/September, 
1986): pp. 137-42.
*" For incidents of Hizb'allah's confrontation with MNF's, see: Bruce Hoffman, (1990), 
op.cit.; pp.9-12.
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its battle with Amal for the hearts and minds of the Shi'a community.*” While 
the withdrawal of the MNF from Lebanon represented a major victory for the 
Hizb'allah, in terms of achieving its pan-Islamic goal of liberating Lebanon 
from all forms of political and military intervention by the Great Powers*” , 
the organisation accelerated its efforts to confront Israel's military pre­
sence through an armed campaign*" while it concentrated on the removal of any 
remaining Western presence through attacks on, and kidnappings of, foreig­
ners. This determination by Hizb'allah was clearly manifested in conjunction 
with the departure of the American MNF contingent through the assassination 
of Malcolm Kerr, who had replaced the kidnapped David Dodge as president of 
the AUB.*” While the assassination of Malcolm Kerr occurred as a retaliatory 
response to Hizb'allah's arme& conflict with the US Marines and the US Navy's 
6th Fleet, it also served both as a direct affront on AUB, as the most clear 
remnant bastion of the United States' cultural and political presence in 
Lebanon, and as a message that all Western foreign citizens were no longer 
safe.*”
Although the Hizb'allah would subsequently abduct an array of Westerners 
as a means of removing any remaining Western presence from Beirut, the orga­
nisation's next campaign of abductions was inextricably tied to the parti-
*” For a detailed overview of the competition between Hizb'allah and Amal, see: Martin 
Kramer, "Sacrifice and Fratricide in Shiite Lebanon", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.3, 
No.3 (Autumn 1991): pp.23-46; and Andreas Rieck, Die Schiiten imd der Kampf urn den Libanon. 
Politische Chronik 1958-1988 (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1989).
*” See: al-Ahd, December 5, 1986; and Nass al-risala al-mafthua allati wajjahaha ila 
al-fflustad'afin fi Lubnan wal-alam, reprinted in Augustus Richard Norton, (1987), op.cit. ; 
pp.167-87.
*" See: Chibli Mallat, (1988), op.cit.
*" See: Los Angeles Times, June 21, 1984.
*” For an interview with Sheikh Fadlallah, see: al-Khalij, June 28, 1986. Also see: 
Sandra Mackey, Lebanon: Death of a Nation (New York, NY. : Doubleday, 1989): pp.212-13.
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cipation of individual Hizb'allah members with Iraqi al~Da'wa al-Islaiuiyya 
elements in the multiple terrorist attacks in Kuwait, on December 12, 1983, 
most notably against the US and French embassies.”' In particular, 
Hizb'allah's abduction campaign, between February and March 1984, of three 
American citizens and a Frenchman was initated in direct response to the
arrest and conviction of two Islamic Amal members in Kuwait, who were rela­
tives of high-ranking Hizb'allah and Islamic Amal officials in Lebanon. Not­
withstanding Iran’s close involvement in the Kuwaiti incidents with Iraqi 
al-Da'wa al-Islamiyyi'^^ and in the abduction of the five Westerners in 
Lebanon by the Hizb'allah, the individual interests by some leading 
Hizb’allah clergy in the case of their imprisoned relatives in Kuwait domi­
nated the decision by the organisation of regarding the nationality of future 
hostages as well as the ideal time for their abduction. In particular, all 
of these abductions in the next phase occurred as a direct response to deci­
sions made concerning the fate of imprisoned Hizb'allah members.
Second Phase: February 1984 - January 1985
The second phase of Hizb'allah abductions in Lebanon came as a response 
to the arrest by Kuwaiti authorities, in the wake of the December 1983 
multiple terrorist attacks, of 25 suspects, three of whom were Lebanese 
Shi'ites.”’ While it soon became apparent that the Iraqi al-Da'wa al~
Apart from the US and French embassies, the 90-minute series of explosions occurred 
at Kuwait International Airport; a US compound; the Ministry of Electricity and Water; and the 
Sliu'ayba industrial oil refinery. These explosions killed four and injured 87 individuals. For 
further infonnation on the incident, see; Arab Times, December 13, 1983; al-Watan, December 
13, 1983; International Herald Tribune, December 13, 1983; The Times, December 13, 1983; Aral) 
Times, February 11, 1984; and International Herald Tribune, February 22, 1984.
For involvement by Iran, see: Joseph Kostiner, "Shi'i Unrest in the Gulf", in 
Martin Kramer (ed.), (1987), op.cit: pp.180-83.
”’ The three Lebanese were named as: Elias Fouad Saab (23 years old: unemployed); 
Hussein al-Sayed Yousef al-Musawi (28 years old: employed at credit and saving biuik as data 
processing supervisor); and Azam Khalil Ibrahim (28 years old: anployed as car painter in the 
Finance Ministry garage). Saab was specifically charged with setting timers and detonators for 
the explosives while al-Musawi and Azam Klialil were charged mth planting the bombs at the 
American offices and residential buildings, see: Kuwait Times, January 24, 1984; Kuwait Time<^ . 
January 25, 1984; and Kuwait Times, March 28, 1984. Apart from the three Lebanese suspects,
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Islamiyya, headquartered in Iran, was responsible for the attacks,”' two of 
the three Lebanese Shi'ites arrested were related to Husayn al-Musawi, leader 
of Islamic Amal, and Imad Mughniyah, formerly a bodyguard of Sheikh Fadlallah 
as well as the operational leader of Hizb'allah's SSA.*" While the involve­
ment of these Lebanese al~Da'wa members, operating within the framework of 
Islamic Amal and Hizb'allah, in the Kuwaiti bomb attacks pointed not only to 
close co-operation with the Iraqi al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya but also to co­
ordination with Iranian officials, Hizb'allah's decision to abduct foreign 
citizens in Lebanon closely followed the conclusion of trial of the 21 al- 
Da'wa defendants in Kuwait.”* In connection with the initiation of the trial 
of the 21 al-Da'wa defendants, on February 11, 1984, Hizb'allah retaliated 
with the abductions of American Frank Regier and Frenchman Christian Joubert
Kuwaiti authorities arrested 17 Iraqis, 3 Kuwaitis and two stateless persons, see: al-Khalij, 
December 13, 1983; International Herald Tribune, December 19, 1983; and January 23, 1984.
*” For al-Da'wa's responsibility, see: Arab Times, December 19, 1983; Financial Times, 
December 19, 1983; Le Monde, April 8, 1984; Middle East Report; and Teheran in Arabic for 
abroad 1430 gmt 31 Mar 84 - BBC/SWB/ME/7670/A/10, April 2, 1984.
*" Hussein al-Sayed Yousef al-Musawi was a first-cousin to Islamic Amal leader Husaim 
al-Musawi. Elias Fouad Saab is the brother-in-law and cousin to Imad Mughniya. See: Ids 
Angeles Times, November 26, 1988; Le Point, August 3, 1987; Ma'aretz, February 27, 1986; 
Da'var, May 6, 1988; and Ma'aretz, April 14, 1988. See: International Herald Tribune, January 
7-8, 1984; Financial Times, January 13, 1984; and International Herald Tribune, February 22,
1984. For information concerning Imad Mughniya's prominent role within Hizb'allah's Special 
Security Apparatus (SSA), see: Ma'aretz, February 2, 1987; Christian Science Monitor, June 25, 
1987; Le Point, August 3, 1987; Da'var, November 13, 1987; US News & World Report, February 9, 
1987; Da'var, February 1, 1988; Da'var. May 6, 1988; Independent, August 30, 1989; and Neil C. 
Livingstone and David Halevy, (1990), op.cit.: pp.265-275.
*’* Evidence would suggest that the planning for the Kuwaiti attacks began in October 
1983 in the Bi'qa area, the same month the bombing plans for the US Marine and French in­
stallations in Beirut were completed and executed. In particular, the evidence was supported 
by the unscheduled arrival in Syria of Hossein Sheikh-ol-Islam Zadeh, Iran's deputy foreign 
minister and head of the Pasdaran contingents outside Iran, and his departure in conjunction 
with both the bomb attacks in Lebanon, on October 23, and in Kuwait, on December 12, 1983.
See: International Herald Tribune, February 22, 1984; International Herald Tribune, September 
22-23, 1984; International Herald Tribune, October 1, 1984; Foreign Report, October 27, 1983; 
and Foreign Report. December 15, 1983.
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in Lebanon.*" The decision' by Hizb'allah to abduct an American and a French 
citizen mirrored not only alignment with Iran’s foreign policy, most notably 
in an attempt to deter both the American and French administrations as well 
as Persian Gulf governments from extending financial and military assistance 
to Iraq,*" but also as a means by the organisation to place dual pressure on 
Kuwait for either the release of the al-Da'wa defendants or, at least, re­
ceive leniency in treatment and sentencing.*" As the al-Da'wa trial prog­
ressively moved towards conclusion, at the end of March 1984, Hizb'allah ab­
ducted two other American citizens, Jeremy Levin*" and William Buckley*". 
In comparison to the previous kidnappings of Regier and Joubert, the 
Hizb'allah abduction of Levin and Buckley revealed not only careful selection 
of targets in order to maximize the pressure on Kuwait from the American 
administration but subsequently also close Iranian involvement, especially 
in the case of the abduction of William Buckley, the chief of CIA's Lebanese
*" For information cmceming the abduction of Frank Regier [Professor of Electrical 
Engineering at AUB] on February 12, 1984, see: International Herald Tribune. March 17, 1984; 
New York Times, May 28, 1984; Washington Post, September 21, 1984; al-Mustagbal, May's, 1984; 
Associated Press, March 16, 1984; International Herald Tribune, April 16, 1984; and Washington 
Post, May 9, 1984. For information concerning the abduction of Christian Joubert [a French en­
gineer working on a housing construction project] on February 14, 1984, see: Washington Post. 
March 17, 1984; Associated Press, April 15, 1984; International Herald Tribune, April 16,
1984; and Washington Post, May 9, 1984.
*" See: Shahram Chubin, "Iran and the Persian Gulf States", in David Menashri (ed.), 
(1990), op.cit.: pp.73-84; and Bahman Baktiari, "Revolutionary Iran's Persian Gulf Policy: The 
Quest for Regional Supranacy", in Hooshang Amirahmadi & Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), 
op.cit.: pp.69-93.
See: Financial Times, April 24, 1984.
*" For information concerning the abduction of Jeremy Levin [CNN Bureau Chief] on 
March 7, 1984, see: New York Times, March 17, 1984; International Herald Tribune, April 16, 
1984; International Herald Tribune, May 10, 1984; al-Mustaqbal, May 8, 1984; and Jerusalem 
Post, February 17, 1985.
*" For information concerning the abduction of William Buckley [CIA Station Chief] on 
March 16, 1984, see: International Herald Tribune, March 17, 1984; Washington Post, September 
21, 1984; al-Mustagba, May 8, 1984; al-Qabas, March 28, 1985; Ha'aretz, October 6, 1985; 
International Herald Tribune, December 14, 1985; and Washington Post, December 13, 1985.
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operations.*" While the Hizb’allah abductions were motivated by the family 
connections between leading Islamic Amal officials and their imprisoned re­
latives held in Kuwait,*" the nature of the close co-operation between 
Hizb'allah and Iran was reinforced by the transfer of William Buckley to 
Iran, through the hands of the Pasdaran contingent in the Biq'a area.*”
In conjunction with the conviction of the al-Da'wa defendants, on March 
27, 1984, most notably with the imposition of a death sentence on Elias Fuad 
Saab,*” the Hizb'allah threatened to kill its hostages in an effort to pre­
vent the Kuwaiti government from carrying through the planned execution of 
the al-Da'wa prisoners.*'* While the Hizb'allah kidnapped American Benjamin 
Weir in May 1984,*'* in another effort to pressure Kuwait to accede to its 
demands of freedom or leniency for the prisoners, there then followed a brief 
period in which no other Westerners were abducted until December 1984.
*" See: Washington Post, September 21, 1984; al-Mustagba, May 8, 1984; Da'var, April 
13, 1984; and New York Times, March 17, 1984. For details on Buckley's position at the US 
Bnbassy in Beirut, see: Washington Post, November 25, 1986.
*" For demands, see: Washington Post, March 17, 1984; International Herald Tribune, 
April 16, 1984; Washington Post, May 9, 1984; and New York Times, May 28, 1984.
*” See: al-Qabas, March 28, 1985; al-Taqrir, March 28, 1985; Free Voice of Iran in 
Persian 1500 gmt 27 May 85 - FBIS, May 29, 1985; US Congress. Joint Ccmmittee. The Iran-Contra 
Affair. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Cbntra Affair. 100th 
Cong., 1st sess. 1987.
*'^ On March 27, 1984, Kuwait's State Security Court sentenced Elias Fuad Saab to 
death, together with four Iraqi al-Da'wa members, while Hussein al-Sayed Yousef al-Misawi 
received life-imprisonment and Azam Khalil Ibrahim received 15 years imprisonment. See: Arab 
Times, March 28, 1984.
*" See: al-Nustagbal, May 8, 1985; Washington Post, September 21, 1984; and Jerusalem 
Post, May 17, 1985.
*'* For information concerning the abduction of Benjamin Weir [pastor at the Near East 
School of Theology, AUB], on May 9, 1984, see: Mustaqbal, May 8, 1984; Washington Post. May 9, 
1984; International Herald Tribune, May 10, 1984; Jerusalem Post. May 17, 1985; Yediot, 
September 19, 1985; Ha'aretz, September 20, 1985; Washington Post, October 13, 1985; and New 
York Times, December 25, 1986. Also see: Ben and Carol Weir, (1987), op.cit.
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Although Hizb'allah's respite can be attributed to the lack of suitable 
Western citizens, as manifested by the drastic reduction of US official pre­
sence in Lebanon,*” and to the focus by the movement on guerilla attacks 
against Israel, the resumption of kidnappings by the Hizb'allah occurred in 
connection with the hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner, KU 221, by four members
of the al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya on December 4, 1984, in another concerted effort 
to obtain the release of the imprisoned al-Da'wa 17 members in Kuwait.*” The
Kuwaiti hijacking and the abduction of Briton Peter Kilburn, which occurred
the previous day in Lebanon,*" appears to have been perpetrated by Islamic
Amal with close Iranian involvement.*" Evidence of close co-operation between
Islamic Amal and Iran in the case of the Kuwaiti hijacking was supported by
the hijackers' use of falsified Lebanese passports and, more importantly, by
the previous presence of Islamic Amal representatives in Iran in a meeting
with Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri under the auspices of the Office of
Liberation M o v e m e n t s Despite alleged Iranian involvement with Islamic Amal
in the hijacking, which explained the rapid conclusion of the incident as
**’ By October 1984, official US presence in Lebanon had been reduced to six persons as 
compared with 190 the previous year, see: Robin Wright, (1986), op.cit. : p. 110.
*" For detailed information concerning the hijacking, see: Middle East Report,
December 6, 1984. For a full statement by the hijackers, see: Teheran in Arabic for abroad 
1536 gmt 7 Dec 84 - SWB/g/ME/7822/A/2, December 10, 1984.
*" For information concerning the abduction of Peter Kilbum [AUB librarian] on 
December 3, 1984, see: Jerusalem Post, January 9, 1985; International Herald Tribune, January 
15, 1985; International Herald Tribune, December 14, 1985; Washington Post, April 18, 1986; 
and New York Times, March 2, 1987.
*" For allegations of Iranian complicity, see; International Herald Tribune, December 
17, 1984; The Guardian, December 7, 1984; International Herald Tribune, December 8, 1984; and 
Paul Wilkinson, "Hezbollali: A Critical Appraisal", Jane's Intelligence Review, August 1993: 
p.369.
*" This meeting occured on November 23, 1984, with representatives of al-Da'wa al- 
Islamiyya and Islamic Amal present in Iran. See: Foreign Report, December 13, 1984; Financial 
Times, December 8, 1984; International Herald Tribune, December 8-9, 1984; and Observer, 
December 9, 1984.
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well as Iran's refusal to either prosecute or extradite any of the perpe­
trators, the next abduction of American Lawrence Jenco,*" on January 8, 
1985, by the Hizb'allah was initiated not only as an effort to increase the 
pressure on Kuwait with respect to the al-Da'wa prisoners but also proceeded 
an earlier effort by the Hizb'allah to abduct a French citizen. As manifested 
by the mistaken abduction of Eric Wehrli, Swiss chargé d'affaires in Lebanon, 
who was released after only four days in capitivity on January 7.*” Apart
from the close proximity of the Swiss embassy to the French embassy in 
Beirut, other evidence would suggest that Hizb'allah deliberately target 
Wehrli in order to obtain the release of Housein al-Talaat, a Hizb'allah 
member arrested at Zurich airport on December 18, 1984, with explosives in 
his possession intended for ân attack on the American embassy in Rome.*”
This phase of Hizb'allah ab^ductions revealed the close connection bet­
ween the hostage-takings and the fate of the 17 al-Da'wa prisoners in Kuwait. 
As these Lebanese al-Da'wa members, in co-operation with exiled elements from 
Iraq's al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya, were acting on behalf and with the support of 
Iran, the involvement of Iran was not only evident in some of these abduc­
tions but also converged with the individual interests of leading Hizb'allah 
security officials, most notably Imad Mughniya.
Third Phase: March 1985 - June 1985
The third phase of Hizb'allah abductions of foreigners in Lebanon, bet­
ween mid-March until the beginning of June 1985, was related to an accelera-
*" For information concerning the abduction of Lawrence Jenco [Priest at Catholic 
Relief Centre], see: Jerusalem Post, January 1, 1985; Jerusalem Post, May 17, 1985; 
International Herald Tribune, November 15, 1985; Ha'aretz, July 28, 1986; Ma'aretz, July 30, 
1986; New York Times, July 27, 1986; and New York Times, December 25, 1986.
*" For information, see: Jerusalem Post, January 6, 1985; and Jerusalem Post, January 
8, 1985.
*” See: Jerusalem Post, January 6, 1985; Jerusalem Post, January 8, 1985; and E. 
Büchler, "Terrorismus in der Schweiz: Waff en- und Sprengstoffbeschaffung fiir den 
Intemationalen Terrorismus?", Saninararbeit MS 11/86, Zurich, 1986: p.24-5.
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ted effort by the movement to expel any remaining Western foreign influence 
or presence from Lebanon. Hizb'allah's release of an official manifesto in 
February 1985, in conjunction with the first commemoration of the death of 
Sheikh Ragheb Harb,”* was symbolic of the major accomplishments by the move­
ment in forcing not only the earlier departure of the MNF from Lebanon but 
also the gradual and unilateral retreat of Israel to the narrow security- 
zone in southern Lebanon.*" While Hizb'allah's successful and relentless 
guerilla activity bolstered the movement's support and image, as an impla­
cable foe of Israel and other enemies of Islam, the kidnapping of Westerners 
by Hizb'allah were directly related to issues surrounding the completion of 
Israel's retreat in Lebanon, mpst notably the transfer of hundreds of impri­
soned Shi'ites from Ansar prison camp in Lebanon to Atlit in Israel.*" Apart 
from Hizb'allah efforts to achieve the release of these imprisoned Shi'ites 
held by Israel, the abduction of Westerners was initiated not only as a re­
sponse to the failure by Western governments to condemn Israel's military 
practises in occupied southern Lebanon, as manifested by the American veto 
of a Lebanese-sponsored UN resolution to that end, but also to the unsuccess­
ful assassination attempt on Sheikh Fadlallah, on March 8, 1985, in the Bir 
al-'Abed quarter in the southern suburbs of Beirut.*"
*’* Apart from the central role of Sheikh Harb in Hizb'allah's resistance activities 
against Israel, he was known among the rank and file of the movement as "sheikh of the 
martyrs", see: Martin Kramer, "The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah", in David Menashri (ed.), 
(1990), op.cit.: p.128; and Sliimon Shapira, (1988), op.cit.: pp.128-29. Also see: The Times, 
July 10, 1984.
*" See: Nass al-risla al-maftuha allati wajjaha hizb allah ila al-mustad Afin fi 
lubnan wa al-alam (Text of Open Letter Addressed by Hizb Allah to the Downtrodden in Lebanon 
and in the World), February 16, 1985, reprinted in Augustus Richard Norton, (1987), op.cit. 
Also see: al-Ahd, July 25, 1985; al-Nahar, June 5, 1985; and al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, 
March 18-24, 1985.
*" See: John L. Esposito, (1991), op.cit.: pp.254-5; Financial Times, July 2, 1985; 
and The Times, July 4, 1985.
*" See: The Guardian, March 8, 1985; and The Guardian, March 11, 1985.
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The alleged involvement of Lebanese intelligence units, backed by the 
CIA, in the carbomb explosion near the residence of Sheikh Fadlallah, which 
killed at least 80 people and injured 200 others,”’ led to the Hizb'allah 
retaliatory abductions of two British hostages, Geoffrey Nash and Brian 
Levick.”' While the early release of Nash and Levick, two weeks later, seems 
to indicate that their abductions had been made on the mistaken assumption 
that they were American citizens,”* the attempt on Sheikh Fadlallah's life,
in combination with the American veto of a Lebanese-sponsored resolution in 
the United Nations Security Council on March 12,”’ led to the abduction of 
American Terry Anderson on March 16, 1985.*”
As the Hizb'allah intensified its anti-Israeli operations, mirrored by 
Shams al-Din's declaration of a defensive jihad against Israel,*’* French
*” For CIA co-operation with Lebanese intelligence in the attack, see: The Guardian, 
May 13, 1985; Wall Street Journal, May 13, 1985; Guardian, May 14, 1985; Middle East Reporter, 
May 17, 1985; International Herald Tribune, May 17, 1985; Guardian, May 18, 1985; and Wall 
Street Journal, May 20, 1985.
*” For information concerning the abductions of Geoffrey Nash, on March 14, and of 
Brian Levick, on March 15, 1985, see: Da'var, March 15, 1985; New York Times, March 16, 1985; 
Jerusalem Post, March 17, 1985; New York Times, March 17, 1985; Jerusalem Post, March 18,
1985; Ma'aretz, March 28, 1985; New York Times, March 28, 1985; and International Herald 
Tribune, March 28, 1985.
*” See: The Times, April 1, 1985 Financial Times, March 28, 1985; and Middle Fast 
Report, March 19, 1985.
*” Great Britain abstained from voting. For interview with Sheikh Fadlallah condemning 
British voting in the UN, see: Middle East Reporter, April 2, 1985. Also see: March 22,
1985.
*” For information concerning the abduction of Terry Anderson [AP journalist], see: 
Jerusalem Post, March 17, 1985; Jerusalem Post, May 17, 1985; Ma'aretz. November 8, 1985; 
International Herald Tribune, November 15, 1985; Ma'aretz, October 14, 1986; Ma'aretz, 
September 27, 1987; and International Herald Tribune, December 26, 1987.
*’* The declaration, issued in March 1985, made it a religious duty for all Muslims to 
fight against Israel as long as it occupied any part of Lebanon, see: FBIS, March 5, 1985; and 
Ali al-Kurani, Tarikat. Hizballah fil-Amal al-Islami (Beirut, 1986). Between 1984 and 1985, 
over ninety percent of attacks against Israel was conducted by Hizb'allah's Islamic 
Resistance, see: al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Duwali, March 18, 1985.
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condemnation of Israel's military practises in southern Lebanon failed to 
prevent the abduction of three French embassy employees, on March 22, 1985.*” 
Although the decision by the Hizb'allah was motivated by considerations more 
aligned with Iran's foreign policy, most notably related to France's con­
tinued arms shipments to Iraq and outstanding financial debt to Iran,*” it 
was also taken as a response to the presence of the French UNIFIL contingent 
in southern Lebanon and its perceived practise of failing to provide adequate 
protection to the local Shi'ite population.*”
Another reason for Hizb'allah's concentration on the abduction of French 
citizens, as became evident by the kidnapping of Jean-Paul Kaufmann and 
Michel Seurat on May 22, 1985,*” was an effort to obtain the release of Anis 
Naccache, imprisoned in France for the attempted assassination of the Shah's 
former Prime Minister Shapour Bâkthiar in Paris in July 1980.*” Apart from
*” For infoimation concerning the abduction of Marcel Fontaine; Marcel Carton; and 
Danielle Perez, Carton's daughter, see; New York Times, March 23, 1985; Jerusalem Post. May 
17, 1985; Ma'aretz, August 11, 1985; Ha'aretz, March 24, 1985; Ha'aretz, November 20, 1985; 
Ha'aretz, April 1, 1985; and Da'var, March 29, 1985.
*” Apart from repayment of a $1 billion loan made by the Shah to the French Atomic 
Energy Commission in 1974, the kidnappers demanded the cancellation by France of a deal with 
Saudi Arabia for the procurement of Mirage 2000 aircrafts, see: al-Watan, April 27, 1985; 
Jerusalem Post, October 7, 1986; Ha'aretz, March 24, 1985; and Middle East Reporter, March 28,
1985.
294 See: Ha'aretz, March 24, 1985; and Middle East Reporter, March 28, 1985.
*” For information concerning the abduction of Jean-Paul Kaufman [a correspondent for 
the French weekly L'Evénement Du Jeudi], see: Washington Times, June 18, 1985; Ha'aretz, 
September 24, 1985; Jerusalem Post. October 7, 1986; Ma'aretz, March 12, 1986; Yediot, May 5, 
1988; Da'var, May 8, 1988; Jerusalem Post, May 18, 1988; International Herald Tribune, 
February 8, 1989; and Ha'aretz, August 18, 1989. For information concerning the abduction of 
Michel Seurat [researcher], see: Ma'aretz, March 12, 1986; Ma'aretz, March 7, 1986; Ma'aretz, 
May 8 1988; Jerusalem Post, December 7, 1989; and Ha'aretz, August 18, 1989. Also see: Mary 
Seurat, Les Corbeaux d'Alep (Paris: L'Age d'Homme, 1988).
*” See: Liberation, June 5, 1985; Ha'aretz, September 24, 1985; Jerusalem Post. March 
12, 1986; Le Matin, January 29, 1987; Ha'aretz, January 30, 1987; Yediot, December 1, 1987; 
Ma'aretz, May 8, 1988; International Herald Tribune, February 3, 1989; and International 
Herald Tribime, February 8, 1988. Apart from Anis Naccache, his four other accomplices were: 
Iranians Mehdi Nejad Tabrizzi and Mohamad Jawat Jeneb; Palestinian Fauozi Muhamad el Satari; 
and Lebanese Salaheddine el Kaara, see: Kayhan, July 28, 1990; and Teheran Times, July 28, 
1990.
165
Bakhtiar’s overall leadership status of the exile opposition movements to the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, the main interest by the Hizb'allah in the release 
of Anis Naccache stemmed from both his role as head of the Iranian assassi­
nation team and his close personal friendships with both Ahmad Khumayynl, son 
of the Iranian revolutionary patriarch,*” and Mohsen Rafiq Dust, IRGC com­
mander in Lebanon.*” Furthermore, factions within Hizb'allah's SSA had a 
close interest in achieving the release of Naccache as he was allegedly 
affiliated with Fatah Force 17,*” and as several key operational leaders of 
Hizb'allah's own intelligence network had longstanding experience within 
Force 17.*” Due to Imad Mughniya’s close personal friendship with Naccache’” , 
coupled with official Iranian interest in the case, the Hizb'allah focused 
its efforts to achieve his release through the abduction of these five French 
citizens.
Apart from the individual interest of leading Hizb'allah clergy in the 
release of the al~Da'wa prisoners in Kuwait and Anis Naccache in France,
297 See: International Herald Tribune. July 28-29, 1990.
*” See: L'Express, July 13, 1984; and Le Nouvel Observateur. March 28-April 3, 1986. 
Also see: Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.
299 See: Independent, October 27, 1991.
Imad Mughniya, bom in 1942/1950? in the south Lebanese village of Dair Daba, grew 
up in the Bir al-Abed section of Beirut and was recruited by Fatah in 1975. Mughniya was 
selected to join Fatah Force 17 where he remained until 1982 under the guidance of Mahmud 
Natur (Abu Tayeb). Due to his experience in Force 17, Mughniya was recruited by the Hizb'allah 
under the influence of Slieikh Ahmad Mahamud Muglmiya, the family's leading cleric who had 
studied with Kliumayyni in Najaf. Mughniya became the personal bodyguard to Sheikh Mohamad 
Hussein Fadlallah and later became the head of the operational unit within Hizb'allah's SSA. 
For Mughniya's affiliation within Force 17, see: M ,  February 16, 1987; Da'var, May 6, 1988; 
Los Angeles Times, November 26, 1988; Jou Press, March 7, 1989; Ma'aretz, April 14, 1988; and 
Ha'aretz, January 1, 1988.
*” Imad Mughniya visited Paris a few times in 1983 and meet with Muslim fundamenta­
lists closely affiliated with the Iranian anbassy, see: Le Point, August 3, 1987; Independent, 
April 26, 1988; Le Quotidien de Paris, February 27, 1986; and Le Figaro, March 7, 1986.
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Hizb'allah focused its efforts on the release of 766 mainly Lebanese 
Shi'ites, transferred to Israel in conjunction with its withdrawal from 
Lebanon, through the abductions of mainly American citizens, as demonstrated 
by the further kidnapping of David Jacobsen and Thomas Sutherland.”* This was 
revealed most clearly by the Hizb'allah hijacking of TWA 847, which immedia­
tely followed the completion of Israel's departure from Lebanon, on June 14, 
1985, the last and holiest Friday of Ramadan.”* While the release of the 766
imprisoned Shi’ites dominated Hizb'allah demands, Iranian, involvement with 
the hijackers, both in the supervision and planning of the incident itself*” 
and as an active participant in the defusion and resolution of the hijacking 
through the intercession by Iran's Rafsanjani,’” overshadowed the competition 
between Amal and Hizb'allah in the incident. Although the TWA-hijacking was 
executed by leading Hizb'allah members,*” the incident was not only part of 
an effort to obtain the release of the 766 Shi'ite prisoners but also of a
”* For information concerning the abduction of David Jacobsen [AUB Administrator] on 
May 28, 1985; and Thomas Sutherland [AUB professor] on June 9, 1985, see: International Herald 
Tribune, June 11, 1986; Yediot, May 29, 1985; Ma'aretz, November 8, 1985; Jerusalem Post, 
November 10, 1985; lime, December 2, 1985; and al-Divar, August 8, 1988.
”* See: Robin Wright, (1989), op. cit.: pp.134-35; and Bruce Hoffman, Shi'a Terrorism, 
The conflict in Lebanon-.and the Hijacking of TWA Flight 847 N-711685 (Santa Monica, CA. : Rand 
Corporation, 1987).
*” For evidence of alledged Iranian involvement in the hijacking, see: Foreign Report, 
June 20, 1985. A month prior to the hijacking, a number of Hizb'allah clerics had frequent 
meetings with high-ranking Iranian official clergy, most notably Hojatoleslam Khaleghi 
[Khomayyni's advisor on Arab Affairs] ; Hojatoleslam Mahdi-Kharoubi [Director of the Martyrs' 
Foundation] ; and Abbas Ramazani [first commander of the Iranian revolutionary guards in 1979]. 
Members of Hizb’allah's operational unit meet with Khaleghi and îMiairmad Nurani, Iranian 
chargé d'affaires in Beirut, in April 1985.
>01 See: Washington Post, July 5, 1985.
*” The Hizb'allah core group of hijackers was: Hassan Iz el-Din, who was also involved 
in the later hijacking of KU 422 in 1988; and Muhammad Ali Hamadi, wiiose brother was the head 
of Hizb'allah's Special Security Apparatus, see: Sunday Times, April 24, 1988; Jerusalem Post, 
January 1, 1987; al-Shira, June 27, 1987; Ha'aretz, January 29, 1988; and New York Times,
April 16, 1988.
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wider strategy by Hizb'allah to discredit Amal leader Nabih Berri in the 
Amal-Hizb'allah competition over southern Lebanon in the power-vacuum created 
by the withdrawal of Israel.*” This intra-Shi’ite feud intensified with 
Amal's attack on Palestinians in the "war of camps"*” , under Syria's in­
fluence, and Hizb'allah's alliance with the PLO, supported by Iran, in order 
to keep the military option active against Israel in southern Lebanon.*” 
Consequently, the abduction campaign was related not only to the interests 
of individual Hizb'allah clergy, as evident in the case of the al~Da'wa pri­
soners and Anis Naccache, but also to the movement's broader efforts to con­
front Israel in southern Lebanon and assume the role of protector of the 
Shi'ite community at the expense of the Amal movement.*” Although the 
subsequent cessation in the abduction of Westerners by the Hizb'allah, which 
resumed in February 1986, has been explained by the secret dealings sur­
rounding the Iran-Contra affair,*” Hizb'allah's concentration of resistance 
in southern Lebanon and its competition with Amal over the Shi'ite community 
eclipsed any need for the capture of other Westerners. As demonstrated by the 
revelation of the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages affair, Hizb'allah showed 
disillusionment regarding the prospects of any rapproachemant between Iran
*” See: Foreign Report, June 20, 1985; and Foreign Report, September 5, 1985. Also 
see: John L. Esposito, (1992), op.cit.: p.150; and Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.: pp.117-19.
*” See: Marius Deeb, (1988), op.cit.: p.697. Also see: The Guardian. July 8, 1985.
*” See: Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and 
Constraints", in Hooshang Amirahmadi & Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: 187-88.
*” See: James P. Piscatori, "The Shia of Lebanon and Hizbullah, the Party of God", in 
Christine Jennett and Randal G. Stewart (eds.) Politics of the Future: The Role of Social 
Ifevements (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1989); and W.A. Terrill, "Low Intensity Conflict in Southern 
Lebanon: Lessons and Dynamics of the Israeli-Shi'ite War", Conflict Quarterly, Vol.7, No.3 
(1987): pp.22-35.
*” See: Theodore Draper, (1991), op.cit.
168
and the United States,”*
Fourth Phase: February 1986 - May 1986
The fourth phase of Hizb'allah abductions of Westerners, between 
February and May 1986, was directed mainly at French citizens and came as a 
response to the decision by France to expel two exiled members of al-Da'wa 
al-Islamiyya to Iraq and continued demands by the Shi’ite movement for the 
release of Naccache and other Shi'ite prisoners held in France. The abduction 
of seven French citizens was also initiated for the advancement of Iranian 
foreign policy in a range of outstanding disputes with France, which occurred 
in conjunction with a Hizb'allah bomb campaign in Paris in February and 
September 1986 and against the French UNIFIL contingent in southern Lebanon. 
Consequently, the concentration on the abduction of French citizens under­
lined the close co-operation between Hizb'allah's SSA and Iran. Apart from 
the French hostages, Hizb'allah also abducted two British citizens in repri­
sal for the American raid on Libya in April 1986.
Hizb'allah's decision to abduct Marcel Coudry”* and a French four-man 
Antenne-2 television crew, on March 3,*” was directly initiated in response 
to the expulsion of two pro-Iranian Iraqi dissidents to Iraq, Fawzy Harmza
”* For Hizb'allah reactions, see: al-Ahd, November 21, 1986; al-Ahd, July 24, 1987; 
al-Ahd, July 31, 1987; and al-Dustur, December 22, 1986.
*” For information concerning the abduction of Marcel Coudry in February 1986, see: 
Newsweek, October 6, 1986; Yediot, November 12, 1986; Ha'aretz, November 11, 1986; Ha'aretz, 
November 11, 1986; Ha'aretz, November 12, 1986; International Herald Tribune, November 12, 
1986, and New York Times, November 12, 1986.
314 four Antenne-2 crewmen were: Phillipe Rochot; Georges Hansen; Aurel Cornea; and 
Jean-Louis Normandin. For information concerning their abduction, see: Ha'aretz. March 10, 
1986; Jenisalan Post, March 10, 1986; Ma'aretz, March 12, 1986; Ma'aretz, March 13, 1986; 
Ha'aretz, June 22, 1986; Newsweek, June 23, 1986; Ma'aretz, June 22, 1986; International 
Herald Tribune, June 24, 1986; Ma'aretz, December 25, 1986; Ma'aretz, March 17, 1987; Yediot, 
March 15, 1987; Ha'aretz, January 30, 1987; Yediot, November 29, 1987; Le Monde, November 29, 
1987; International Herald Tribune, Novanber 27, 1987; and Jerusalem Post, December 7, 1987.
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and Hassan Kheir al-Din, belonging to the Iraqi Although the
Hizb'allah abductions were a reaction to the expulsions of 13 Muslims, inclu­
ding the two opponents of the Iraqi regime, coupled with the announcement 
by the Hizb'allah of the retaliatory execution of Michel Seurat*” , it under­
lined not only the continued close relationship between the Shi'ite movement 
in Lebanon and the Iraqi al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya but also that the Hizb'allah 
was well-attuned to the political climate in France, as the abductions and 
the Paris bombing campaign occurred in conjunction with the French national 
elections in March 1986, This maximized the pressure on the French government 
to accede to Hizb'allah demands not only with respect to the fate of the ex­
pelled Iraqis and in the case of Naccache but also for the advancement of 
Iranian foreign policy in a fange of outstanding issues with France.*”
Apart from the abduction o:^  Marcel Coudry and the four Antenne-2 crew­
men, the Hizb'allah applied additional pressure on the French government 
through its parti-cipation in a series of bomb attacks in Paris between 
February and September 1986.*” While a shadowy group, using the nom de guerre 
of the "Comité de solidarité avec les prisonniers politiques arabes et du 
Moyen-Orient" (C.S.P.P.A), demanded the release of FARL leader George Ibrahim 
Abdallah; Anis Naccache; and Varadjian Garbidjian, the direct involvement of 
the Hizb'allah became clear with the arrest of its presumed members in March
*” See: Guardian, March 13, 1986; and Ha'aretz, March 10, 1986.
*” For a full text of the announcement by Islamic Jihad, see: March 10, 1986;
Jerusalem Post, March 9, 1986; and Ma'aretz, March 13, 1986; Also see: Pierre Pean, (1987), 
op.cit.
*” See: Hie Economist, March 15, 1986; International Herald Tribune, March 7, 1986; Le 
Nouvel Observateur, March 28 - April 3, 1986; Le Monde, September 17, 1987; and Le Figaro, 
October 28-29, 1989. Also see: Luc Qiavin, "French Diplomacy and the Hostage Crises", in Barry 
Rubin (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.91-106.
*” See; Time, October 6, 1986; Le Monde, July 15, 1986; and Le Monde, September 7-8,
1986.
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1987, most notably Mohammad Mouhajer, a nephew of Hizb'allah leader Sheikh 
al-Amin*” , and Fouad Ali Saleh, a leader of Hizb'allah's network in France.”* 
As Hizb'allah's involvement in the Paris bombings had been revealed by the 
previous arrest of Mohammad Ali Hamadi in West Germany,evidence of compli­
city between Hizb'allah and Iran in the incident was clearly demonstrated by 
the involvement of high-ranking Hizb'allah intelligence officials, most not­
ably Abd A1 Hadi Hamadi and Ibrahim Aqil,*” in co-operation with Iranian
For Mohairmad Mouhajer's relationship with Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin, see: Steve M. 
Berry, "The Release of France's Last Hostages in Lebanon: An Analysis", TVI Report, Vol.8,
No.3 (1989) : p.21; Le Soir, March 1987,% International Herald Tribune, March 28-29, 1987; 
Liberation, March 26-27, 1988; Le Point, June 15, 1987; Le Nouvel Observateur, April 3-10, 
1987; Le Nouvel Observateur, June 12-18, 1987; Ma'aretz, May 8, 1988; and Le Figaro, October 
28-29, 1989. Mouhajer, who played a prominent role in Association islamique en France (AIF), 
was released on March 24, 1988, due to insufficient evidence, see: Washington Post, April 6,
1988; Ha'aretz, April 6, 1988; and Xavier Raufer, (1991), op.cit.: p.102.
*” Fouad Ali Saleh, a Tunisian-bom French citizen and Hizb'allah member, was the on­
site commander of Hizb'allah's operations in France and was arrested together with Mohairmad 
Muhajer. He was convicted of involvement in the 1985-6 bombings in Paris on March 9, 4990, and 
sentenced to a maximum of 20 years in prison. For information on Saleh, see: International 
Herald Tribune, March 27, 1987; Hadashot, March 29, 1987; al-Watan al-Arabi. November 12,
1989; Le Monde, April 27, 1987; International Herald Tribune, May 19, 1987; Jeune Afrique,
November 30, 1988; International Herald Tribune, June 2, 1987; Le Point, June 15, 1987; 
International Herald Tribune, November 24, 1988; Le Nouvel Observateur, June 12-18, 1987; l£ 
Figaro, October 28-29, 1989; Liberation, March 17, 1988; and International Herald Tribune. 
March 10, 1990.
*” In connection with the arrest of Hamadi, West-German authorities discovered a 
series of phone numbers leading to the arrested Hizb'allah suspects in Paris. Under the 
leadership of Waid Ramadan, the Hizb'allah smuggled explosives from Lebanon, through Cyprus 
and West-Germany, and narcotics in order to finance their activity in France, see: Le Monde, 
April 27, 1987; Ma'aretz, April 26, 1987; Le Point, June 15, 1987; Ma'aretz, April 26, 1987; 
al-Watan al-Arabi, November 12, 1989; and Le Point, August 3, 1987. The Hizb'allah network was 
also ex-posed by the defection of a Tunisian, code-named Lofti, in February 1987, see;
L'Evénement du Jeudi, June 11-17, 1987; Le Monde, September 17, 1987; Le Point, June 15, 1987; 
and Le Nouvel Observateur, June 12-18, 1987.
*” On April 27, 1989, a French magistrate issued arrest warrants for seven leaders of
Hizb'allah involved in the Paris bombings. Apart from Hamadi and Aqil, the five other members 
were named as: Hassan Gliosn; Hussein Mazbou; Hassan Ali; Mizar Lelzein; and Muhammad Mehdi 
Diab. See: Jerusalem Post, April 24, 1989. For Iran's involvement, see: Le Monde, April 27, 
1987; Ma'aretz, April 26, 1987; International Herald Tribune, June 6, 1987; Newsweek, June 8,
1987; Ha'aretz, July 22, 1987; Ha'aretz, July 24, 1987; Le Point, August 3, 1987; and
Jerusalem Post, November 30, 1987.
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embassy officials, Wahid Gordgy,”* and Pasdaran officials, most notably 
Mohammad Salek and Ahmad Kan'ani.”* This close relationship between 
Hizb'allah operatives and Iranian officials revealed that the Paris bombing 
campaign and the abduction of French citizens in Lebanon were motivated by 
the converging interests between Hizb'allah's own agenda in seeking the free­
dom of its imprisoned members and Iran's own foreign policy agenda aimed at 
extracting political and financial concessions from the French government.”* 
This was confirmed by Sheikh Fadlallah, who linked the issue of the French 
hostages with French-Iranian relations.”* Furthermore, Hizb'allah maximized 
efforts to pressure France by the abduction of another French citizen in 
Lebanon on May 7, 1986,*” and, more importantly, through the initiation of 
an armed campaign against the French UNIFIL contingent in southern Lebanon. 
In the latter case, Hizb'allah's^armed efforts was not only motivated by the 
desire to increase pressure on France to accede to its own and Iranian de­
mands for the withdrawal of UNIFIL and abrogation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 425 but also mirrored the organisation's decision to confront
”* Wahid Gordji, a senior translator in the Iranian embassy in Paris, was the SAVAMA 
resident in France and overall supervisor of Hizb'allah's network in France for these 
terrorist operations, see: Le Point, June 15, 1987; Le Nouvel Observateur, June 12-18, 1987; 
■and Jeune Afrique, November 30, 1988.
For the involvement of Mohammad Salek, deputy head of IRGC, and Ahmad Kan'ani,
former IRGC commander in Lebanon, see: al-Watan al-Arabi, November 27, 1992; and Le Nouvel
Observateur, March 28 - April 3, 1986.
”* See: Newsweek, June 23, 1986; International Herald Tribune, December 26, 1986; 
Jerusalem Post, December 1, 1987; Observer, December 6, 1987; Le Point, June 15, 1987; and Iæ  
Nouvel Observateur, March 28 - April 3, 1986.
*” See: al-Nahar, March 24, 1986. Sheikh Fadlallah also stated that: "the abductors of 
the French hostages will release their captives as soon as the socialist regime in France 
collapsed.", see: al-Miistagbal, March 23, 1986.
*** For information concerning the abduction of Camille Sontag, see: Jerusalem Post,
May 8, 1986; Ha'aretz, August 31, 1986; Yediot, November 12, 1986; International Herald
Tribune, November 12, 1986; and New York Times, November 12, 1986.
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actively Israel in southern Lebanon.”*
While Hizb'allah's decision to abduct these French hostages was in 
alignment with both Iran's and the movement's collective interest, the deci­
sion to kidnap two British citizens, John McCarthy and Brian Kennan, in 
April 1986*” was less clear beyond its retaliatory nature in response to 
Britain's tacit participation in the American raid on Libya.*** However, the 
fate of the British hostages became intertwined with demands for the release 
by Israel of 260 Shi'ites held in al-Khiam prison in the security zone in 
South Lebanon and the release of the three Iranian hostages who disappeared 
in 1982.***
Fifth Phase: September 1986 - October 1986
A next short series of Hizb'allah abductions were directed against 
American citizens, beginning with the kidnappings of Frank Reed on September 
9, 1986*** and Joseph Ciccipio three days later,*** and reached its culmination
*** See: Alan James, Interminable Interim: The UN Force in Lebanon (Lmdon: The Centre 
for Security and Conflict Studies, April 1988), No.210: pp.21-24; and The Economist, September 
27, 1986. For Hi:d)'allah's position on UNIFIL, see statements by Sheikh Fadlallah: Ha'aretz, 
October 30, 1986; Monday Morning, December 12, 1986; Ha'aretz, January 12, 1987; al-Shira, 
September 28, 1987; and Ha'aretz, November 4, 1987.
*** For information concerning the abduction of John McCarthy and Brian Keenan, see:
New York Times, April 19, 1986; al-Nahar, November 22, 1986; Ha'aretz, December 9, 1986; al- 
Shira, December 31, 1987; Ma'aretz, August 6, 1989; and Jerusalem Post, August 26, 1990.
*** See: Con Couglin, (1992), op.cit.
*** See: Hadashot, June 23, 1988; Times, August 12, 1988; Times, August 12, 1988; and 
Washington Post, August 12, 1988.
*** For information concerning the abduction of Frank Reed [Director of American 
College], see: September, 9, 1986; New York Times, September 14, 1986; International
Herald Tribune, September 10, 1986; and International Herald Tribune, October 29, 1987.
*** For information concerning the abduction of Joseph Ciccipio, see: Washington Post, 
September 13, 1986; New York Times, September 13, 1986; Jerusalem Post, September 15, 1986; 
International Herald Tribune, September 13, 1986; and Ha'aretz, February 17, 1987.
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with the seizure of Edward Tracy on October 21, 1986.*** While Hizb'allah's 
decision to resume the hostage-taking of Americans, after a fifteen-month 
period of cessation, must be viewed in the context of efforts to replace 
released American hostages within the framework of the so-called Iran-Contra 
Affair, evidence suggests Hizb'allah had at best only limited knowledge of 
the arms-for-hostages deals, as evident by the organisation's vehement oppo­
sition to any US-Iranian rapproachement.*** It seems more likely, however, 
that the abduction of these three Americans reflected clerical factionalism 
in Iran as the incidents shortly proceeded the revelation of the Iran-Contra 
Affair on November 3, 1985, by Ayatollah Montazeri's representative in 
Lebanon, Sheikh Ismail al-Khaliq, a leading Hizb'allah cleric.*** Although it 
may be the case that Hizb'allah abducted these American citizens in an effort 
to both replace previously released hostages and discredit Rafsanjani's po­
sition in Iran, the alledged involvement of Hizb'allah leader Imad Mughniya 
in these abductions suggests that concern over the 17 al-Da'wa prisoners in 
Kuwait was a strong motivation for the resumption of the kidnapping of 
American citizens.’**
These three anti-American abductions also signalled a growing rift bet­
ween Hizb'allah and Iran, as evident by the reassignment of the Office of
*** For information concerning the abduction of Edward Tracy, see: Ma'aretz, October 
22, 1986; New York Times, October 22, 1986; New York Times, January 18, 1987; Jerusalem Post, 
March 9, 1989; and Ma'aretz, August 6, 1989.
*** For Hizb'allah's opposition, see: al-Ahd, November 16, 1986; and al-Ahd, November 
21, 1986. Also see: Kenneth Katzman, (1993), op.cit.; pp.137-8.
*** Hie US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal was revealed by the Beirut-based al-Shira 
magazine. For the role of al-Khaliq, see: al-Dustur, December 22, 1986; and Arab News,
December 6, 1986. Also, information about Robert McFarlane's visit to Iran had been previously 
printed in a small newsletter published by Hizb'allah-followers of >fontazeri in Ba’albek, see: 
U.S. Congress, Coimittes Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 1987.
*” See: Report of the President's Special Review Board, February 26, 1987: p.B-153, 
note 90.
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Islamic Liberations Movements to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
arrest of its commander Mehdi Hashemi.”* This made Hizb'allah's leadership 
more susceptible to Iranian clerical factionalism and provided the opportu­
nity for some leading Hizb'allah operatives to pursue a more independent 
agenda in the abductions of foreigners.”*
Sixth Phase: January 1987 - January 1988
The decision by Hizb'allah leaders to abduct a number of Western citi­
zens in January 1987 came directly in response to the arrest of three leading 
Hizb'allah members in Europe. While the abduction of Frenchman Roger Auque, 
on January 13, appears to be related to the previous day’s arrest of Bashir 
al-Khodour in Milan by Italian authorities, other abductions of Western 
foreigners came directly in response to the arrest of Mohammad Ali Hamadi in 
Frankfurt by West-German authorities.”* Apart from his prominent role in the 
June 1985 TWA 847 hijacking, Mohammad Ali Hamadi's elevated position within 
the Hizb'allah was revealed not only by the retaliatory abductions of two 
West-German citizens, Rudolph Cordes and Alfred Schmidt,”* but also by the 
fact that his brother, Abdul Hadi, was the chief of security for 
Hizb'allah.”’ The connection between the Hamadi clan's high-ranking position
”* See: FBIS, November 5, 1986; IRNA, March 18, 1987; and Bruce Hoffman, (1990), 
op.cit.: p.24.
”* See: Foreign Report, December 18, 1986; Bulvar, November 16, 1986; Marmara,
Novanber 25, 1986; and Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.: p.10.
”* Bashir Khadr was arrested on January 20, 1987, after 11kg of Semtex and 36 sophi­
sticated detonators was discovered on him on arrival in Milan. He was sentenced to 13 years 
imprisonment. For details see: New York Times, February 20, 1987; Le Point, June 15, 1987; 
Valeurs Actuelles, April 6, 1987; Ha'aretz, January 18, 1987; Le Figaro, October 28-29, 1989;
I Slmerini, August 20, 1986; and Independent, Febraury 20, 1987.
*” For Abbas Ali Hamadi's involvement in the kidnapping of Cordes and Schmidt, see: 
Ma'aretz, January 1, 1987; Ha'aretz, April 29, 1988; and Ma'aretz, April 20, 1988.
For information related to Abdul Hadi Hamadi as security chief of Hizb'allah, see: 
Jerusalem Post, January 25, 1987; Da'var, June 28, 1987; al-Shira, June 27, 1987; Yediot, 
January 7, 1988; Da'var, February 1, 1988; Ha'aretz, January 29, 1988; Jerusalem Post, May 29, 
1988; Jerusalem Post, April 28, 1989; and al-Anba, November 27, 1989. On June 27, 1989, a
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within Hizb'allah's SSA and the abduction campaign of foreigners in Lebanon 
was made even clearer with the arrest of Mohammad Ali Hamadi's younger 
brother, Abbas, in West Germany.”* The arrest of the two Hamadi brothers in 
January 1987, coupled with American extradition requests, led to the kid­
napping of four American teachers in Beirut.*” While Hizb'allah's abduction 
campaign was motivated by individual interests of leading Hizb'allah clergy, 
it was also a reflection of clerical factionalism in Iran in the aftermath 
of the revelation of the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal,”* as evident by 
the unprecedented number of abductions of foreigners by the organisation 
during January 1987.*” This clerical factionalism was evident by the sepa­
ration of the Islamic Liberation Movements from the IRGC in Iran in December 
1986,*” in an effort by Rafsanjani to strengthen Iran's control over
French magistrate issued arrest warrants for Abdul Hadi Hamadi and six other leaders and 
members of Hizb'allah for staging a series of bombings in Paris in 1986, see: Jerusalem Post, 
April 28, 1989.
*” See: Le Point, June 15, 1987; Valeurs Actuelles, April 6, 1987; Ha'aretz, January 
18, 1987; and Le Figaro, October 28-29, 1989.
*” For information concerning the abduction of Jesse Turner; Alan Steen; Robert 
Polhill; and Sing Mithileshwar, see: Jerusalem Post, January 25, 1987; Ma'aretz, January 25, 
1987; Jerusalem Post, January 30, 1987; Da'var, January 30, 1987; International Herald 
Tribune, January 26, 1987; and Ma'aretz, January 30, 1987.
For clerical factionalism in Iran, see: International Herald Tribune, January 30, 
1987; and Bruce Hoffman, (1990), op.cit.: pp.31.
*” Between January 12-26, Hizb'allah abducted ten foreign citizens in Lebanon.
*” See: IRNA, March 18, 1987; and Foreign Report, December 18, 1986.
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Hizb'allah activity in Lebanon.*” Although the abduction of Terry Waite,*” 
an Anglican clergyman mediating independently in the hostage-crisis, by the 
Hizb’allah may have been caused by his indirect association with the US-Iran 
arms-for-hostages deal, (which he publicly denied prior to his kidnapping)*** 
it was mainly a consequence of his inability to affect the fate of the im­
prisoned 17 al-Dawa prisoners in Kuwait.***
Hizb'allah's demand for the return of 400 Shi'ite and Palestinian im­
prisoned in Israel as a precondition for the release of these hostages also 
mirrored the movement's escalatory efforts to confront militarly IDF and SLA 
positions in southern Lebanon. The concentration of Hizb'allah efforts was 
underlined by the organisations use of a hiterto unknown nome de guerre, the 
Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, in claiming responsibilty for 
the abduction of Western foreigners. In response to these abductions, direct 
military intervention by Syria into the Muslim areas of Beirut in February 
1987, in which twenty-three members of Hizb'allah were killed,*** demon­
strated not only a rift with Syria over Hizb'allah's hostage-taking acti­
*” See: G. Delafon, Beirut: The Soldiers of Islam (Paris: Stock, 1989): p.175; 
Marmara, November 25, 1986; and Bulvar, November 16, 1986.
*” For information concerning the abduction of Terry Waite, on January 20, 1987, see: 
Ma'aretz, January 28, 1987; al-Shira, January 31, 1987; Yediot Aharanot, February 1, 1987; 
Ma'aretz, March 24, 1987; Ha'aretz, April 1, 1987; and Yediot Aharanot, April 5, 1987.
*** On December 16, 1986, Terry Waite issued a written statement denying any 
involvement in dealings with money or arms in connection with hostages, see: Washington Post, 
December 17, 1986.
*** See: Gavin Hewitt, Terry Waite: Wliv Was He Kidnapped (London: Bloomsbury, 1991); 
and Ma'aretz, Febiuai'y 4, 1987.
**^ See: Washington Post, February 12, 1987; New York Times, Febniary 16, 1987; 
Washington Post, February 21, 1987; Middle East Economic Digest, February 28, 1987; and N e \ v '  
York Times. March 11, 1987.
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vity”* but also the increased hostility between the Hizb'allah and its compe­
titor Amal.*** Apart from an isolated abduction of an American journalist, 
Charles Glass, in June 1987, the Syrian-imposed security plan in Beirut, 
coupled with Hizb'allah-Amal armed clashes in Beirut, the Biq'a and southern 
Lebanon, contributed to a reorientation of Hizb'allah's focus away from 
hostage-taking towards armed confrontation with both Amal, over the support 
of the Shi'a community, and Israel, in the struggle for the "liberation o| 
Jerusalem".*** This was particularly evident by Hizb’allah’s display of soph I. 
sticated armaments during its parades in southern Beirut, Ba'albek, Sidon and 
Tyre on 14 May (anti-Zionist day) and on 22 May, "Jerusalem Day".**^  While 
Hizb'allah's shift towards armed struggle was supported by Iran's allocation 
of $90 million to the organisation in late 1987 for its military enhance­
ment,*** it was also evident by the existence and display of regular 
Hizb'allah Islamic Resistance military units, equipped with anti-tank and 
anti-aircraft missiles.*** The recall of several regional operational leaders 
of Hizb'allah from southern Lebanon to Ba'albek for extensive retraining in
*** See: New York Times, March 27, 1987; and Arab News, April 27, 1987.
*** See: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.
*** See: Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1987: pp.418-19; 643-45. For clashes between 
Anal-Hizb'a]lali, see: FBIS, May 21, 1987; Approximately 40,000 Hizb'allali supporters marched 
through Ba'albek to mark Jenisalm Day in May, see: Arab News, May 24, 1987. For Hizb'allah's 
resistance activity against IDF and SLA, see: Washington Post, April 19, 1987; Arab News, May 
28, 1987; Washington Post, June 1, 1987; and Arab News, June 2, 1987.
See: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.: p.129-30.
*** See: al-Ray’, December 27, 1987; and Jerusalem Post, November 13, 1987. Also see: 
Xavier Raufer, (1991), op.cit.: p.147.
*** See: Davar, January 11, 1987; Ma'aretz, June 15, 1987; Ha'aretz, June 21, 1987; 
Foreign Report, July 30, 1987; al-Nahar, January 19, 1989; al-Anba, November 27, 1989; 
Jerusalem Post, November 13, 1987; Foreign Report, August 15, 1988; Ma'aretz, August 30, 1989; 
and Newsweek, August 24, 1987.
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the latter half of 1987 indicated the employment of new tactics which combi­
ned guerilla warfare with regular military operations.”*
This phase of Hizb'allah abductions revealed a more independent line of 
greater independence from Iran as the hostage-takings were aligned with the 
interests of individual high-ranking Hizb'allah SSA operatives over the fate 
of imprisoned relatives abroad and for the movement as a whole in its con­
frontation with both Amal and Israel. The lack of other additional abduc­
tions, with the exception of American Charles Glass, can be attributed to the 
Amal-Hizb'allah confrontation in Beirut and the South as well as the move­
ment's concentration in the enhancement and projection of its military capa­
bility against Israel in southern Lebanon.
Seventh Phase: February 1988 - January 1989
Hizb'allah's military and political confrontation with Amal over Beirut 
and southern Lebanon escalated with the abduction of Lt.Col. William Higgins, 
the American Chief of the UN Truce and Supervision Organisation's observer 
group in Lebanon (UNTSO) on February 17, 1988.*” Apart from the symbolic 
importance of the abduction, occurring on the fourth annual commemoration of 
the death of Hizb'allah leader Sheikh Ragheb Harb, Hizb'allah's decision to 
abduct Lt.Col. Higgins was not only directed against UNIFIL for impeding 
armed attacks against the Israeli occupation of the south but, more im­
portantly, constituted a direct challenge to Amal's authority to maintain 
a stable security environment in southern Lebanon.*” As the Amal launched a
*** See: Jerusalem Post, November 13, 1987.
*” For details of the abduction of Lt. Cbl. Higgins, see: Ha'aretz, February, 18.
1988; Jerusalem Post, February 18, 1988; Jerusalem Post, February 21, 1988; Ha'aretz, February
23, 1988; International Herald Tribune, February 20, 1988; Ha'aretz, February 19, 1988; 
Ha'aretz, April 10, 1988; and Foreign Report, March 17, 1988.
*” In partiailar, Lt.Col. Higgins was abducted from his UN vechicle between Tyre and
Nakara after a meeting with Abd al-Majid Salali, Amal's political leader of southern Lebanon, 
see: February 18, 1989. Amal informed UNIFIL that Lt.Col. Higgins was held in the village
of Jibshit, see: FBIS, March 29, 1988.
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major campaign to eliminate the Hizb'allah presence in the south, it became 
clear that Sheikh al-Musawi, the commander of Hizb'allah’s Islamic Resi­
stance, had been personally responsible for the abduction of Lt.Col. Higgins 
in close co-operation with both Sheikh Abdul Karim Obeid, the local commander 
of Hizb'allah's military wing, and Mustafa al-Dirani, the former head of 
Amal's security service.*” Although the abduction of Lt.Col. William Higgins 
remained an isolated incident, executed by Hizb'allah to challenge Amal's 
authority in the South and to obtain the release of Israeli-held Shi'ite pri­
soners,*** the decision by the movement to hijack Kuwaiti airliner KU422 on 
April 4, 1988, highlighted the continued importance of the fate of the 17 al- 
Da'wa prisoners in Kuwait for leading members of Hizb'allah.*** Apart from 
close Iranian involvement in the hijacking, the incident reflected a shift 
in Hizb'allah tactics as the movement's activity was constrained not only by 
Amal's control over Beirut but also through its armed confrontation with Amal 
in the South.
Although the abduction of Lt.Col. William Higgins served as a triggering 
mechanism for the armed confrontation between Amal and Hizb'allah, the intra- 
Shi'ite warfare in Beirut and southern Lebanon dominated Hizb'allah's agenda 
at the expense of any further abduction of Western foreigners. As Amal scored 
decisive military victories in the South against the Hizb'allah in the spring 
of 1988, leading to the expulsion of a number of Hizb'allah clergy to the
*** For Abbas al-Musawi's position as leader of Islamic Resistance, see: Davar, 
September 2, 1987; Ha'aretz, September 2, 1987; For al-Musawi's involvement in the kidnapping, 
see: Jerusalem Post, February 21, 1988; Ma'aretz, February 21, 1988; and Ha'aretz, February 
28, 1989. For involvement of Sheikh Obeid, see: Foreign Report, March 17, 1988; and 
International Herald Tribune, August, 3, 1988.
H 3 For Hizb'allah demands, see: FBIS, February 22, 1988.
3S4
see: New York
For information concerning the hijacking and its relation to the 17 al-Da'wa case, 
.  Times, April 6, 1988; Washington Post, April 7, 1988; Washington Post, April 8, 
1988; New York Times, April 8, 1988; New York Times, April 11, 1988; New York Times, April 13, 
1988; New York Times, April 16, 1988; New York Times, April 20, 1988; Washington Post, April 
24, 1988; and Washington Post, May 3, 1988.
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Bi’qa, Hizb'allah itself reorganized its efforts towards armed confrontaticn. 
with Amal in the southern suburbs of Beirut.*” This led not only to the mili­
tary defeat of Amal in Beirut in May, and to the infiltration within iu 
ranks by Hizb'allah members and the defection of Amal members,*** but also t: 
Syrian political and military intervention in June 1988, in order to rescue 
Amal from defeat and to influence the forthcoming presidential elections ii 
September 1988.*** After Iranian proposal for the insertion into Beirut of i
joint Syrian-Iranian force were rejected by both Syria and Amal, Hizb'allai 
leaders were assured that Syria would not clamp down on the movement if i: 
left the Western hostages unharmed.*** As a result, Hizb'allah leader Sheiti 
al-Amin claimed that this arrangement between Iran and Syria allowe: 
Hizb'allah to resume activities in the south, the main objective by the move­
ment for challenging Amal in the suburbs of Beirut.’** As Hizb'allah's posi­
tion was weakened in Beirut, it turned its attention to the challenge cf
*** Elements within Hizb'allah and the Iranian Pasdaran established a joint ccmtiand to 
assassinate high-ranking Amal officials and carry out operations against Amal checkpoints and 
centres, see: Voice of Lebanon, 0615 gmt 18 Apr 88 - BBC/SWB/ME/0131, April 21, 1988; and 
Ha'aretz, April 18, 1988. For interview with Sheikh Fadlallah on the Amal-Hizb'allah warfare, 
see: Radio Monte Carlo, 1750 gmt 13 May 88 - BBC/SWB/ME/0152, May 16, 1988. For Amal- 
Hizb'allah conflict, see: New York Times, May 7, 1988; Washington Post, May 9, 1988; New York 
Times, May 12, 1988;
*** For infiltration of Amal by Hizb'allah members, see: FBIS, February 28, 1988. For 
Amal defections, see: Ha'aretz, April 1, 1987; Da'var, November 10, 1987; Ha'aretz, February 
29, 1988; and Ma'aretz, November 10, 1987.
’** For a useful discussion, see: Yossi Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between 
Islam and Realpolitik", in Martin Kramer (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.184; and Middle East 
International, March 2, 1990.
*** Under the agreement, Hizb'allah and Amal bureaus were converted into "political and 
information offices". While Syria would maintain a cease-fire, both militias withdrew their 
gunmen and would maintain a military presence on the contact lines. See: New York Times, May 
23, 1988; New York Times, May 27, 1988; IBIS, May 23, 1988; and al-Safir, May 27, 1988.
*** See: New York Times, May 29, 1988; Voice of the Oppressed 0545 gmt 27 May 88 - 
BBC/SWB/ME/0163, May 28, 1988; and Radio Free Lebanon 0545 gmt 28 May 88 - BBC/SWB/ME/0164, 
May 30, 1988.
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confronting Amal's supremacy in southern Lebanon.”* The protracted conflict 
between Amal and Hizb'allah for the control of the major Shi'a areas in the 
South and Beirut continued with ferocity until late January 1989, when Syria 
and Iran intervened and announced an agreement between Amal and Hizb'allah.”  ^
Under this agreement, Amal's authority over the security of southern Lebanon 
was recognized while Hizb'allah was permitted to maintain only a nonmilitary 
presence through political, cultural, and informational programmes.”’
The intensification by the Hizb'allah, through its military wing, of 
armed confrontation in southern Lebanon reflected not only the competition 
with Amal over military and political influence in the region but also the 
substitution of Hizb'allah's grand pan-Islamic strategy from the failure to 
achieve Islamic victory in adjacent territories, as demonstrated by the 
announcement of a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq in July 1988,”’ to soli­
darity with the revival of Islamic fundementalism within the Palestinian 
intifada in the Israeli occupied territories.”* This was demonstrated not 
only by Hizb'allah's closer co-operation with local anti-Arafat Palestinian 
elements for operational expediency in the resistance struggle against 
Israel,”’ but also through involvement with Islamic groups within the
”* See: Voice of the Oppressed 0930 gmt 2 Jim 88 - BBC/SWB/ME/0169, June 4, 1988.
See: John L. Esposito, (1991), op.cit.: p.256.
”’ For a full text of the Amal-Hizb'allah Accord, see: SANA in Arabic 1435 gmt 30 Jan
89 - BBC/Sl®/ME/0373, February 1, 1989.
”’ For Hizb'allah reaction to Iran's acceptance of UN Resolution 598, see: al-Nahar,
July 22, 1988; al-Muntalaq, September 1988; and Ma'aretz, August 24, 1988.
”* For Hizb'allah's pan-Islamic identification with the liberation of Jerusalem as
displayed by the Palestinian intifada, see: al-Harakat al-Islandwa £i Lubnan (Beirut: 1984); 
al-Ahd, September 5, 1986; al-Ahd, May 29, 1987; al-Ahd, January 23, 1987; al-Anwar, January 
1, 1988; and al-Mid, March 18, 1988.
”’ See: Ha'aretz, March 24, 1989; Foreign Report, September 15, 1989; Ma'aretz, 
November 3, 1987; Ha'aretz, January 25, 1989; al-Naliar al-Arabi, January 9, 1989; and 
Ma'aretz, November 4, 1987.
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Israeli-controlled occuppied territories.”*
As shown by Hizb'allah's rapproachement with Amal in January 1989, which 
was facilitated by Iranian-Syrian diplomacy, the change in Hizb'allah's posi­
tion came under the threat of Syrian military intervention as Syria moved 
to extend its hegemony over Lebanon.”* Apart from Hizb'allah's disillusion­
ment with Iran's reversal of policy towards Iraq, it became clear that the 
Hizb'allah-Iranian relationship showed certain signs of strain as Iran moved
to extend its relationships with Amal and other less militant Shi'ite organi­
sations in Lebanon.”* Although Iran's attempt to minimise Amal-Hizb'allah 
differences was made in order to close ranks against Iraq's accelerated in­
jection of military support to militias in Lebanon after the cease-fire in 
the Gulf war, it failed as Amal remained the unconditional ally of Syria and 
Hizb'allah resumed its armed confrontation with Amal over the control of 
southern Lebanon.”* The expansion of Hizb'allah's presence in the South 
proved important for both Iran and the movement itself as despite having a 
well-entrenched position in Beirut, it was unable to significantly exert 
political influence beyond the suburbs and as the movement's strong-hold in
*** Hizb'allah claimed it established an active arm in the territories and distributed 
a leaflet in east Jeiusalem and Beit Lehan, urging the escalation of the Palestinian intifada, 
see: Ma'aretz, August 30, 1988. Also see: al-Anwar, January 1, 1988; al-Ahd, March 18, 1988; 
al-Ahd, September 9, 1988; Ha'aretz, January 25, 1989; al-Divar, December 4, 1989; and Monday 
Morning, June 18, 1989.
*** See: Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and Syria: From Hostility to Limited Alliance", in 
Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar* (eds.) (1993), op.cit.: p.210.
”* In mid-1989, Iran assembled fourteen Lebanese and Palestinian groups in Teheran 
with a wide variety of idelogical orientation and allegiances, see: Independent, August 29, 
1989; Teheran Times, July 27, 1989. Also see: Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: 
Opportunities and Constraints", in Hooshang Aidralimadi and Nader Entessar (eds.) Iran and the 
Arab World, op.cit.: pp.188-9; and Al-Mustaqbal, February 25, 1989.
”* See: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.: p.167; and Ha'aretz, December 20, 1987.
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Ba'albek vas encircled by Syrian military presence.”* Apart from providing
Iran with a direct means to participate in the politics of the Arab-Israeli
conflict, Hizb'allah's military option and political presence in the South
would become increasingly significant, especially as Hizb'allah's position
remained uncertain in the aftermath of the death of Ayatollah Khumayynl in
June 1989 and the conclusion of the Ta'if Accords for political reform in 
Lebanon in October 1989.”*
Eight Phase: April 1989 - April 1991
Hizb'allah's abduction of British citizen, Jack Mann, in May 1989, was 
response to Iran's fatwa against Salman Rushdie for the publication of his 
book The Satanic Verses and, more specifically, for his refuge and protection 
in the United Kingdom.”’ The'incident itself was soon overshadowed for the 
Hizb'allah movement by the death of Ayatollah Khumayynl on June 3, 1989, and 
the abduction of Sheikh Abd al-Karim Obeid, a senior Hizb'allah cleric and 
regional military commander of the Islamic Resistance, by elite Israeli 
military units on July 28, 1989.”’
Apart from Hizb'allah's disagrement with Iran's clerical establishment
”* See: Ha'aretz, May 4, 1986; Jeune Afrique, January 25, 1984; and New York Times, 
January 23, 1990.
”* See: Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon After Ta'if: Is the Civil War Over?", Middle 
East Journal, Vol.45, No.3 (Suim^ r 1991): pp.470-1. For text of the Ta'if Accord, see: FBIS, 
October 24, 1989.
For Iran's fatwa against Salman Rushdie, see: John L. Esposito, (1993), op.cit. : 
pp.190-93. For Iran's animosity towards Britain, see: FBIS, August 7, 1989. Hizb'allah's 
SlieiMi Fadlallah endorsed Khumayynl's call for assassination of Rushdie as: "[t]his book 
represents a method of aggression against Islam and the Prophet Mihanmad. Our retaliation 
should be aggressive. A violent slap is necessary to all the aggression against Islam in the 
West.", see: International Herald Tribune, February 23, 1989; and New York Times, February 23, 
1989. Also see: Independent, October 23, 1991.
For details of IDF's military operation in the abduction of Sheikh Obeid, see: 
Samuel M. Katz, Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism (London: Arms and 
Armoiur Press, 1990): pp. ; and Samuel M. Katz, Soldier Spies: Israeli Military Intelligence 
(Novato, CA.: Presidio Press, 1992): pp.344; and Yediot Aliaranot, July 30, 1989.
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over the devolution of Ayatollah Khumayynl's spiritual and political autho­
rity, following the dismissal of the designated heir Montazeri in March 
1989,”* the death of Ayatollah Khumayynl left the movement in disarray over 
its future position in Lebanon.”’ The ouster of Hizb'allah's most staunch 
ally within Iran's clerical hierarchy, Ali-Akbar Mohtashemi, by Iran's new 
president Rafsanjani,”* came at a time when Hizb'allah experienced Iranian 
moves to downgrade its support for the movement while it felt increased 
pressure from Syria to release the Western hostages. In particular, Syria 
pressured the Hizb'allah through the limited prevention of additional or re­
placement IRGC from passing through Syria into Lebanon, while Iran's 
Rafsanjani attempted to replace the exisiting IRGC contingent with one more 
loyal to the political leadership in Iran.”* In addition, Hizb'allah's posi­
tion within Lebanon was directly threatened by the Saudi-brokered Ta'if 
Accord, concluded with Syrian support in October 1989, which the movement 
vehemently opposed.”* In response to the challenges facing the organisation 
inside Lebanon, the Hizb'allah assembled a major meeting to discuss the 
challenges the movement faced both within Lebanon and beyond in its rela-
”* See: Sunday Times, April 16, 1989; New York Times, May 22, 1989; Shimon Shapira, 
(1988), op.cit.: p.127; and al-Ahd. November 31, 1986.
”’ See: al-Anba, November 27, 1989; al-Havat, November 27, 1989; and Ha'aretz, 
December 17, 1989.
”* In Rafsanjani's inaugural speech to the Majlis, he warned that hardliners would 
have to forego their 'extremism' for new political and economical program, see: Washington 
Post, August 18, 1989. For a petition, signed by 138 Majlis deputies, urging Rafsanjani to 
retain Ali-Akhbar ^ bhtashoni as minister of interior, see: Washington Post, August 20, 1989; 
and FBIS, August 21, 1989. For Mohtashemi's dismissal, see: Washington Post, August 28, 1989; 
and Iran Times, March 29, 1991. Also see: Anoushriavan Ehteshami, "After Khomeini: the 
Structure of Power in the Iranian Second Republic", Political Studies, Vol.34 (1991): pp. 148- 
57.
See: Washington Post, September 22, 1988; al-Majallah, April 19-25, 1989; New York 
Times, January 23, 1990; and Washington Post, January 8, 1990.
”* See: Augustus Richard Norton, (1991), op.cit.: pp.457-73.
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tionship with Iran and the revolutionist faction within the clerical esta­
blishment.”* While the meeting resulted in the ascendancy of Sheikh al- 
Tufayli as leader of Hizb'allah's command leadership, it also revealed deep 
splits within the organisation over the future direction of the movement in 
Lebanon.”*
While the movement remained divided over its futdre direction, the ab­
duction of Sheikh Obeid, a leading figure within the Islamic Resistance,
represented not only a major security problem for the organisation, as 
Jibshit was a key organisational center for Islamic Resistance in its 
attacks against IDF and SLA positions, but also a shift in tactics by Israel 
in its confrontation with Hizb'allah. As the Hizb'allah had previously not 
been immune from Israeli kidnappings of its operational members, as demon­
strated by the abduction of Sheikh Jawad Kafsi and three of his colleagues 
from the south Lebanese village of Tibnin on December 15, 1988,”* the ab­
duction of Sheikh Obeid forced the organisation into negotiations with Israel 
over the return of six missing IDF soldiers held by the organisation.”’ While
”* In particular, the movement discussed the visit of Mohtashemi to Lebanon prior to 
the meeting, see: FBIS, November 30, 1989.
”* See: al-Anba, Novanber 27, 1989; al-Ahd, October 27, 1989; Ha'aretz, December 17, 
1989; Independent, August 10, 1991; and FBIS, November 30, 1989.
For the kidnapping of SheiMi Kafsi, see: Hie Times, August 1, 1989. Also see:
Samuel M. Katz, Hie Elite (London: Pocket Books, 1992): pp.270-1. Hie decision to target 
Sheikh Kafsi followed information of his role as an operational officer in the Believers 
Resistance Ifovenmt, which was holding a missing IDF serviceman, Ron Arad, see: Jerusalem 
Post, August 2, 1989. Sheikh Kafsi was also a close friend of Mustafa Dirani, see: Foreign 
Report, Jaiiuaiy 9, 1992; and Jerusalem Post, May 14, 1990. In retaliation, the Believers 
Resistance Movement kidnapped seven Irish UNIFIL officers in Tibnin. The hostages were 
released by Amal militiamen, who mounted searches throughout southern Lebanon and arrested 
almost 200 members of the Believers Resistance Movement, see: Ha'aretz, December 18, 1988; and 
Jerusalem Post, December 18, 1988.
Hie idea of kidnapping Hizb'allah leaders, as a way of forcing the organisation 
into negotiations over the iïdssing Israeli servicemen in Lebanon, was originally made by Uri 
Slonira and General Matan Vilami, who were appointed to cooidinate attonpts to rescue the 
missing IDF seivicemen in 1987. Hie two officials presented their proposal in a meeting, held 
in November 1988, \dth Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who approved the plan and authorized 
military planners to select potential Hizb'allali targets, see: Hie Times, August 6, 1989; and 
The Sunday Times, August 1, 1989. Also see: R. Reuben Miller, "Political Kidnapping: A Case
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the IDF kidnapping of Sheikh Kafsi failed to yield any prisoner exchange, due 
to the semi-independent status of the Believers Resistance Movement and his 
low-ranking position within this organisation,”’ the decision to abduct 
Sheikh Obeid was not only due to his leading position as a regional commander 
within the Islamic Resistance but also for his personal involvement in the 
abductions of two IDF servicemen in February 1986 and Lt.Col. William 
Higgins in February 1988.”* Although the fate of the Hizb'allah-held missing 
Israeli servicemen”’ remained conditional on any Israeli release gesture of 
Shi'ite Lebanese detainees from Atlit or al-Khiam prisons,”* Hizb'allah
Study of Israeli Practice", Low-Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement. Vol.2 (1993).
In 1985, Mustafa Dirani created an autonomous militia force in Tyre, the Believers 
Resistance Movement, in order to launch resistance attacks against Israel in southern Lebanon. 
After his involvement in the kidnapping of Lt.Col. William Higgins in February 1988, Dirani 
left Amal and took the captured lAF navigator Ron Arad in custody and transferred him under 
the control of his new organisation. After Amal's attacks against Hizb'allah in the south and 
the conclusion of the Amal-Hizb’allah accord in 1989, Mustafa Dirani and members of the 
organisation joined Hizb'allah and transferred Ron Arad to the Pasdaran in the Biq'a valley, 
see: Wall Street Journal, October 22, 1986; Middle East Reporter, November 14, 1986; Jerusalem 
Post, May 31, 1991; and MidEast Mirror. August 29, 1991. At the same time as the IDF 
kidnapping of Kafsi, Israel discovered that Dirani's brother, Oiassan Faris Dirani, y&s held 
by the Maronite Christian forces lead by Samir Geagea and he was transferred into Israel's 
custody as a bait for information on the fate of Ron Arad, see: Foreign Report, August 22, 
1991; and Foreign Report, January 9, 1992. Information concerning Ron Arad's detention was 
provided by a pamphlet published by his family [Free Ron Arad, November 1990] provided by 
Israel's Ministry of Defence. On May 21, 1994, Israel abducted Dirani from his home in 
Kasemaba in the eastern Biq'a to gain information about Ron Arad, see: Independent on Sundav, 
May 22, 1994; and Sundav Times, May 22, 1994.
”* The two IDF soldiers, Joseph Fink and Rahamim Levi AlsheiWi, had been kidnapped on 
February 17, 1986, while patrolling the security area between Bint Jbeil and Beit Yahun, see: 
Ma'aretz, Febraury 26, 1986; Middle East Reporter, February 18, 1986; February 20, 1986; 
Times, February 20, 1986. For involvement by Sheildi Abbas al-Musam, see: Ma'aretz, September 
23, 1987. For admission by Slieikh Obeid in these kidnappings, see: Jerusalem Post, August 3, 
1989.
The other thiue IDF soldiers listed as missing-in-action were: Zvi Feldman, Zachary 
Baumel, and Yehuda Katz, who were captiu'ed during a battle in the Sultan Yakoub of the Biq'a 
valley on June 11, 1982. For information concerning their abductions, see: Free Our Sons: 
document published by the families of the soldiers missing-in-action, February 1989. Also see: 
Associated Press, June 11, 1982; la Stampa, June 12, 1982; and Time, June 21, 1982. Also see: 
Samuel M. Katz, (1992), op.cit.: pp.260-78.
”* Israel's position was outlined in an interview with Benjamin Netanyaliu, Deputy 
Foreign Minister: "We mil insist on getting the minimum we deserve, namely: information and, ultimately, the release of our men in exchange for the assets we are holding. Otliendse, we
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remained adamant over its refusal both the release of any IDF soldiers as 
well as any Western hostages under the more militant leadership of Sheikh al- 
Tufayli
Although the more radical elements within Hizb'allah's leadership had 
control over the movement's activity, it was clear that the organisation 
faced increased confrontation with both Iran and Syria over its position 
within a rapidly changing political and military environment in Lebanon.”* 
In particular, it became clear that the new Iranian leadership wanted to 
pursue a more controlled policy in its relationship with the Hizb'allah, as 
evident by Rafsanjani's appointment of his brother, Mahmud Hashemi, to head 
the Lebanon desk within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”* However, it was 
also clear that Iran had gredt difficulty in rest-raining Hizb'allah in its 
clashes with Amal, despite the January 1989 agreement between the two mili­
tias and continued Iranian mediation efforts,*” and that the Pasdaran re­
mained a staunch ally of Hizb'allah throughout its conflict with Amal and 
in its opposition for the release of foreign hostages, despite efforts by 
Iran to effect its withdrawal from Lebanon or assign more pragmatic Pasdaran
will take no action; I promise you that." Israel Educational TV, Tel Aviv 1400 gmt 12 Aug 91 - 
BBC/SWB/MEyil50, August 14, 1991.
”* See: al-Havat, November 27, 1989; Independent, August 10, 1991; Ha'aretz, December 
17, 1989; and PBIS, November 30, 1989.
For Hizb'allah's opposition to the Ta'if Accords, see: FBIS, November 5, 1989. Also 
see: Asad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.: pp.1-20. For Syrian raids of the homes of Hizb'allah 
members in Beirut's southern suburbs, see: FBIS, March 21, 1990.
”* See: Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and 
Constraints", in Hosshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit. : p. 188. For 
Hashemi's involvement in the hostage-crisis, see: New York Times, March 5, 1990; and Middle 
East International, May 11, 1990.
*” The Iranian mediation team was lead by Foreign Minister Velayati, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Besharati and former Guard Minister Rafiq Dust, see: Agence France Presse, May 16, 
1988; and al-Sliarq al-Awsat, April 18, 1989. Also see: Kenneth Katzman, (1993), op.cit.: 
p.135.
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units in order to make it more pliable and loyal to the political leadership 
in Iran.*” While Hizb'allah, in co-operation with Pasdaran and radical 
clergy, effectively managed to obstruct the release of hostages in many 
cases, it's position within Lebanon was dependent on Iran's relationship 
with Syria.*” As a result, the hostage-issue for Hizb'allah became increa­
singly intertwined with insurance for its own survival in a post-militia 
phase of Lebanese politics under Syrian hegemony.*” In particular, this was
evident by the Syrian-Iranian rapproachement between Hizb'allah and Amal in 
November 1990 and the re-position of Hizb'allah forces from Beirut to the 
Biq'a and the South.*** As the foreign hostages were increasingly used by the 
Hizb'allah in negotiations with Iran and Syria to ensure its position within 
Lebanon, the mechanism for tlTeir release was facilitated by the resolution 
of the case of the 15 al-Da'wa prisoners in Kuwait, who escaped following 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990.**’ While the release of the 15 
al-Da'wa prisoners had eliminated one of Hizb'allah's principal demands, the 
foreign hostages were used to reach an agreement between Iran and Syria over
*” See: New York Times, January 23, 1990; Washington Post. January 8, 1990; al- 
Majallah, April 19-25, 1989; New York Times, April 23, 1990; and Washington Post, January 19, 
1992.
**’ See: Asad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.: p.16.
*” See: August Richard Norton, (1991), op.cit.: p.471.
*** See: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.: p.183. Also see: Ha'aretz, July 16, 1991; and 
Ha'aretz, July 4, 1991.
**’ Hie 15 al-Da'wa prisoners were among 1,300 prisoners from Kuwait's Salidia central 
prison who escaped during the turmoil of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Iraqi officials took them 
into custody in Iraq and released them to Iran. A few of these prisoners obtained Iranian and 
Lebanese documents provided by Iranian embassies in Kuwait and other Gulf states, and made 
their way back to Lebanon, see: Keyhan, August 23, 1990; Independent, August 5, 1990; Radio 
Monte Carlo, August 5, 1990; MENA, August 6, 1990; al-Shira, September 10, 1990; and Time, 
December 16, 1991. Also see: R. Jacquard, The Secret Cards of the Gulf War (Paris: Edition'1, 
1991): pp.209-10; and Farhang Jahanpour, (1990), op.cit.: p.186.
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the future of Hizb'allah in Lebanon, which was concluded on April 21, 1991 
Under this agreement, Hizb'allah was allowed to remain armed as a resistance 
m o v e m e n t I n  turn, Hizb'allah would facilitate the release of all its 
foreign hostages within the framework of fulfillment of its own requirements 
as well as in alignment with Iranian and Syrian interests In order to en­
sure Hizb'allah's part of the agreement and in line with the movement's posi­
tion, the command leadership of Hizb'allah decided to elect a new Secretary- 
General of the movement in May 1991/'*
Ninth Phase: May 1991 - December 1992
The election of Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi as Secretary-General of the 
Hizb'allah resulted in a new leadership not only closer to the position of 
Iran but, more importantly, more equipped to deal with both an escalation in 
the resistance activity against^Israel, as he had commanded the movement's 
military wing, as well as facilitating the release of the hostages by 
Hizb'allah's SSA, as he had headed the movement's internal security in 
Beirut/^' While Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi seemed more pragmatic and less mili-
For Hizb'allah concerns over disaimament in accordance with Ta'if agreement, see: 
Voice of the Oppressed 0630 gmt 24 Mar 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1030. March 26, 1991; and Voice of the 
Oppressed, 0530 gmt 8 May 91 - BBC/SWB ME/1068, May 10, 1991. For agreement see: Voice of the 
Oppressed, 0630 gmt 30 Apr 91 - g/SWB ME/1061, May 2, 1991.
For Hizb'allah's position as a "resistance" movement, rather than a militia, see: 
Voice of the Oppressed, 0530 gmt 4 May 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1064, May 6, 1991; and Voice of 
Lebanon, 1715 gmt 21 Apr 91 - BBC/sm/ME/1053, April 23, 1991.
See: al-Hayat, May 25, 1991. This was confirmed in interviews by the author with 
unattributable PID soiurces close to the Hizb'allah leadership, Cairo, Egypt, April 5, 1994. 
Also see: Malise Ruthven, "Islamic Politics in the Middle East and North Africa", in The 
Middle East and North Africa 1993 (tondon: Europa Publications Ltd, 1992): pp.121-2.
See: Voice of Lebanon, Beirut 1015 gmt 21 May 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1079, May 23, 1991; 
Independent, October 9, 1991; and al-Havah, May 25, 1991.
See: Ha’aretz, October 2, 1987; Independent, March 7, 1990; Foreign Report, July 
30, 1987; Davar, October 2, 1987; Ma'aretz, June 14, 1984; al-Havat, November 27, 1989; al- 
Anba, November 30, 1989; and Jerusalem Report, August 1, 1991.
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tant than his predecessor, throughout the dénounement of the hostage- 
crisis under the auspices of the office of UN Secretary-General Javier Perez 
de Cuellar, Hizb'allah under his command escalated its confrontation with 
Israel in southern Lebanon.Although Sheikh al-Musawi managed to receive 
important concessions, most notably the release of Hizb'allah members from 
al-Khiam in order to satisfy his followers in southern Lebanon,in the 
comprehensive hostage-negotiations,^" any sign of pragmatism was matched by 
the movement's militancy in the struggle for the "liberation of Jerusalem". 
While Hizb'allah's militancy reflected the movement's new position within 
Lebanon, it was also a joint effort by Iran to sabotage the scheduled Middle 
East peace process."' The closer relations between Hizb'allah's command
411 For exairple, see: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit. : pp.198-99.
Ihe inportance of the Lebanese Shi'ite detainees held by Israel for the Hizb'allah 
was discussed during an interview by the author with Uri Lubrani, Co-ordinator of IDF activity 
in Lebanon, Ministiy of Defense, Tel Aviv, Israel, August 28, 1991. In total, Israel released 
77 prisoners and nine Hizb'allali bodies after receiving confirmed information that two IDF 
soldiers, missing since February 17, 1986, were dead.
See: Time, December 16, 1991. In the hostage-negotiations, Mustafa Badraddin (one 
of the al-Da'wa prisoners in Kuwait who was released following Iraq's invasion) was a key 
figure in the opening phase. He upset Iran by introducing new elements in the Iranian-UN 
agreement to end the hostage affair. As a step to boost his standing within the organisation, 
he expanded any exchange of hostages and prisoners to include Palestinians (not just Lebanese 
Shi'ites) and imprisoned members held in Europe and the US, see: Foreign Report. November 7,
1991.
In the first six months of 1991, Hizb'allah attacks against SIA and IDF targets in 
southern Lebanon doubled compared to the same period the previous year, see: Jerusalem Report. 
August 1, 1991. For Hizb'allah's position, see: Voice of the Oppressed 0530 gmt 17 Jul 91 - 
BBC/SWB/ME/1127, July 18, 1991; and Voice of the Oppressed 0530 gmt 10 Aug 91 - 
BBC/SWB/ME/1149, August 13, 1991. For a useful insight to Hizb'allah's view on the 
achievements,of hostage-taking, see: Voice of the Oppressed 0550 gmt 16 Aug 91 - 
BBC/SWB/ME/1153, August 17, 1991; and Voice of the Oppressed 21 Nov 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1236. 
November 22, 1991.
For meetings between Hizb'allah and Iran, see: Voice of the Oppressed 1430 gmt 9 
Sept 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1176, September 13, 1991; Voice of the Oppressed, 0630 gmt 30 Oct 91 - 
BBC/SWB/ME/1217, October 31, 1991; and Voice of Israel, Jerusalem 0700 gmt 29 Oct 91 - 
BBC/SWB/ ME/1216, October 30, 1991. For statement by Mohtashemi, see: Voice of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Teheran 0450 gmt 30 Oct 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1217, October 31, 1991.
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leadership and official Iran was also revealed by substantial Iranian 
injection of financial resources in southern Lebanon affected by retaliatory 
warfare between IDF and the Islamic Resistance/"
The conclusion of the Western hostage-crisis, with the release of the 
last American hostage Terry Anderson on December 4, 1991, revealed the con­
vergence of interest between Hizb'allah and Iran in response to the trans­
formed political climate in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East/"
Hizb'allah's volte-face over the hostage-crisis, and its subsequent parti­
cipation within Lebanon's democratic process, demonstrated not only an abi­
lity by Hizb'allah's command leadership to adapt rapidly to shifts in its 
environment and in its relationship with Iran, as long as hostage-taking 
served its useful political purposes, but also that the hostage-crisis itself 
was intimately dependent on the internal position of the movement in Lebanon 
as well as its relationship within Iran's clerical establishment/" While 
Iranian hardliners had no real desire to block the release of Western 
foreigners as their value had been reduced due to the course of political 
events,"* the appointment of Hojjat al-Islam Mohtashemi as Chairman of the
"* Tlie Iranian delegation [Hamayun Alizadeh, Iranian charge d'affaires in Lebanon; 
Mohammad Kazem Khansari, Director-General of the Middle East and North African Affairs at the 
Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Dr Vahid-Dastjerdi, Director of the Islamic Red Crescent 
Society] visited the western Bi'qa region and southern Lebanon for the supervision of Iranian 
food assistance and distribution, see: Voice of the Oppressed 0630 gmt 12 Nov 91 - 
BBC/SWB/ME/1228, November 13, 1991. It distributed 380 tons of food and medicine to 5,000 
families "who had suffered in the recent Israeli bombardments", see: Radio Free Lebanon, 
November 13, 1991. Also see: Middle East, February 1993: p.12-3.
See: Maskit Burgin, "^ testem Hostages and Israeli POWs in Lebanon", in Shlomo Gazit 
(ed.) Tlie Middle East Militan^  Balance 1990-91 (Boulder, 00. : Westview Press, 1992): pp.195- 
97.
"* See: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kiu'z and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit. Also see: Jeune 
Africnie, March 19-25, 1992; al-Watmi al-Arabi, May 8, 1992; al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 18, 
1991; and SUNA, January 2, 1992.
"* For statement by SheiWi Fadlallah, see: Radio Lebanon, Beirut 1530 gmt 9 Aug 91 
BBC/SWB/ME/1148, August 12, 1991.
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Defense Committee of the Iranian Majlis, in August 1991, not only increased 
his political power in Iran but also neutralized any reason for the obstruc­
tion of the release of hostages."'
Although Hizb'allah obtained substantial concessions from Israel, in the 
form of the release of 77 imprisoned members from Israel in return for provi­
ding information on the fate of missing IDF soldiers,' the return of Sheikh 
Obeid remained deadlocked as long as Hizb'allah refused to make any progress 
in the case of missing lAF navigator, Ron Arad."' After the return of the 
bodies of Americans, William Buckley and Lt.Col. William Higgins, in late 
December 1991,"* Israel's disappointment"* with the stalemate of negotiations 
on Israeli POWs and MIAs between Israel and Hizb'allah, through the offices 
of the UN's special hostage'envoy, was expressed by the assassination of 
Hizb'allah Secretary-General She^ ikh Abbas al-Musawi on February 17, 1992."'
See: IRNA, August 11, 1991; Radio M^ nte Carlo, October 20, 1991; and Foreign 
Report, May 16, 1991.
"' For an interview with Sheikh Abd al-Karim Obeid, see: Israel Broadcasting Author!tv 
TV, Jerusalem 1900 gmt 9 Dec 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1252, December 11, 1991. This recording was 
transferred by Israel to the Hizb'allah two weeks prior to its official show to the public.
For Hizb'allah denials of holding Ron Arad, see: Radio Free Lebanon 1545 gmt 4 Dec - BBC/SWB 
ME/1248, December 6, 1991. Wliile there has been contention whether Ron Arad is held under the 
control of Hizb'allali and the IRGC in the Bi'qa valley or in Iran, Israel hold Iran solely 
responsible for his safety, see: IDF Radio, Tel Aviv, 1500gmt 17 Feb - BBC/SWB ME/1308, 
February 19, 1992. For information on the whereabouts of Arad, see: Israel Broadcasting 
Authoritv TV, Jerusalem 18 Feb 92 - BBC/SlfB/ME/1309, February 20, 1992; and Associated Press, 
September 8, 1991.
422 See: Con Coughlin, (1992), op.cit.: p.448.
"* For interview mth Uri lubrani, see: Jerusalem Post, January^  4, 1992. Also see: 
Jerusalem Post, January 11, 1992. Also see: Middle East International, December 20, 1991; and 
Foreign Report, January 9, 1992.
Sheikh al-Musawi and a number of other high-ranking Hizb'allah clergy attended an 
annual memorial service to mark the eighth anniversary of the death of Sheikh Raghib Harb in 
the village of Jibshit. After the ceremony, Slieikh al-Musawi was assassinated by an Israeli 
helibome rocket attack in the Touffatha area in southern Lebanon. For details, see: 
Terrorismus, No.l, March 1992. For excerpts from Abbas al-Musawi's speech in Jibshit prior to 
his death, see: Radio Free Lebanon, 1645 gmt 16 Feb 92 - BBC/S1VB/ME/1307, February 18, 1992. 
For his funeral, see: Tlie Times, February 18, 1992.
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While Hizb'allah had previously voiced concern over the possibility of any 
form of American-led military or legal retribution against its SSA members 
and guards involved in the abduction of foreigners,"* the selection and 
timing of the assassination of Sheikh al-Musawi by Israel was symbolic in 
many ways of his previous responsibility in the kidnapping and death of 
missing IDF servicemen on February 16, 1986 and in the case of the abduction 
of American Lt. Col. William Higgins on February 16, 1988."*
The immediate election of Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah, an unsuccessful 
candidate in the Hizb'allah elections in May 1991,"* signalled an attempt 
by the command leadership to unify the movement and control their reaction 
to the death of Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi."' Although the death of Sheikh al- 
Musawi increased the militancy of Hizb'allah in its resistance attacks 
against Israel, the movement's* retaliatory response, a car-bomb outside 
Israel's Embassy in Buenos Aires on March 17, 1992, which caused 30 deaths 
and 252 injuries,"* was not only claimed by Islamic Jihad in the name of "the
"* For moves by US authorities of legal indictements of hostage-takers, see: 
Independent, December 11, 1991. For Hizb’allah concerns of retributicm, see: Independent, 
November 21, 1991; and Radio Lebanon, Beirut 1030 gmt 15 Oct 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1205. October 17,
1991. For transfer of Hizb'allah SSA to Iran for security reasons, see: Sundav Times, December 
8, 1991; al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 21, 1991; and Ha'aretz, October 27, 1991.
For Sheikh al-Musawi's responsibility, see: Ma'aretz, September 23, 1987; Jerusalem 
Post, February 21, 1988; and Ha'aretz, February 28, 1989.
"* At the funeral of al-Musawi, Nasserallah's prominent role, especially within 
Hizb'allali's military wing, was evident since he delivered a speech on behalf of the Islamic 
Resistance. It is also interesting to note that Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, a noted hardliner 
within the leadership delivered a speech on behalf of the Hizb'allah command leadership, see: 
Voice of the Oppressed, 0630 gmt 19 Feb 92 - BBC/SWB/ME/1309, February 20, 1992.
"' For election, see: Voice of the Oppressed, 1250 gmt 18 Feb 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1308, 
February 19, 1992. The election had been conducted by the members of the Supreme Shura at a 
meeting in Ba'albek, see: g  in English 1520 gmt 18 Feb 92 - BBC/SWB/ME/1309, February 20,
1992. The Hizb'allah was careful to underline that the decision by the Suprme Shura to elect 
Sheikh Nasserallah was unanimous, see: Voice of the People, 1239 gmt 28 Feb 92 - 
BBC/SWB/ME/1318, Mardi 2, 1992.
See: Noticias Argentinas, May 6, 1992; and Ha'aretz, Mardi 20, 1992.
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Martyr Child Hussein", Sheikh al-Mussawi's son, and occurred symbolically on 
al-Quds day,'" but the subsequent investigation also revealed close Iranian 
involvement in the operation.'" However, the Hizb'allah under the helm of 
Sheikh Nasserallah demonstrated a firm commitment to not jeopardize its own 
new position within Lebanon's political environment as well as Iran's foreign 
policy through hostage-taking and terrorism against’ the West, rather the 
movement pursued a carefully coordinated dual-track approach of participation 
within the democratic process while focusing its resistance activity towards 
the liberation of Jerusalem through armed attacks against Israel,"* Although 
Sheikh Nasserallah was more closely aligned with the line of Iran's radical 
hardliner Hojjat al-Islam Mohtashemi than his predecessor, the political 
necessity of close affiliation with Iran's official leadership for its sur­
vival in Lebanon took precedence over any other individual or collective 
agendas within the Hizb'allah as well as motivations by Iran's revolutionist 
faction-'" Under the Ta'if agreement, Hizb'allah handed over the Sheikh 
Abdallah barracks to the Lebanese army in the summer of 1992 while it re­
tained a base for training and weaponry storage in the eastern Biq'a."'
Under the leadership of Sheikh Nasserallah, Hizb'allah's decision to 
participate in the Lebanese parliamentary elections in August/September 1992
'" See: Ha'aretz, May 1, 1992; Noticias Argentinas, March 18, 1992; and March 19,
1992.
For assistance by Iran's embassy in the Hizb'allah operation, see: Yediot Aharanot, 
March 27, 1992; and New York Times, May 9, 1992. For Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah's meetings in 
Iran for operational co-ordination, see: Radio Teheran, March 2, 1992; al-Watan al-Arabi, 
March 13, 1992; and Ha'aretz, March 20, 1992.
432 See: Hie Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993).
'" See: Voice of the People in Arabic to Lebanon 1239 gmt 28 Feb 92 - BBC/SWB/ME/1318, 
March 2, 1992; FBIS, November 30, 1989; and al-Anba, November 27, 1989.
See: al-Nahar, July 31, 1992. ffore than 100 Pasdaran guards act as advisors in 
1994, see: Independent, May 8, 1994.
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and its achievement of winning 12 seats out of a total 128 was not only the 
result of a necessary adaptation to a new military-security and political 
environment in Lebanon after a decade of civil war but also recognition that 
the path towards the pan-Islamic goal of an creating an Islamic state in 
Lebanon would be more easily achieved through the democratic process rather 
than simply through a militant revolutionary approach/" Under the main 
slogan "faithfullness to Islamic Resistance", Hizb'allah's electoral victory 
was not only achieved by the increased popularity of the movement's vastly 
expanded infrastructure of social and financial services to the impoverished 
Lebanese Shi'ite community'" but also through a carefully calibrated stra­
tegy, in close co-operation with Iran, of using its massive electoral machine 
in the various districts by transporting voters located in remote areas and 
by assessment of chances for victory running either independently or in coa­
lition with others/" The Supreme Shura also issued a fatwa urging members 
to vote for Hizb'allah candidates in the election/" While the Hizb'allah 
has pushed in the Lebanese parliament for improvement of the social condi­
tions in the neglected Shi'ite areas of Lebanon, it has also concentrated on 
demands for the elimination of the confessional system and official recog­
nition of the Islamic Resistance/" Although Hizb'allah has shown a willing­
'" For interviews with Hizb'allah leaders, see: al-Shira, July 13, 1992; al-Ahd, April 
10, 1992; and al-Havat, August 25, 1992.
in See: al-Shira, August 31, 1992.
'" For a ccmprehensive overview of Hizb'allah's strategy and electoral results, see: A 
Nizar Hamzeh, (1993), op.cit.: pp.321-37. Also see: al-Shira, July 13, 1992; al-Safir, 
September 7, 1992; al-Havat, August 25, 1992; and al-Shira, August 31, 1992. For claims of 
Hizb'allali tampering of election, see: Farid El Khazen, "Lebanon's First Postwar Parliamentary 
Elections, 1993", Middle East Policy, Vol.3, No.l (1994).
'" See: Al-Ahd, August 14, 1992.
'" See: al-Safir. October 17, 1992.
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ness to work within the political system rather than from the outside, the 
revolutionary forces within the movement are dependent on developments in 
Lebanon and subject to the relationship between Iran and Syria in terms of 
ties to the movement and strategies for the Middle Eastern arena/"
3.6 Conclusion
Analysis of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon yield that Hizb'allah was 
undisputably responsible for the aforementioned abductions of Westerners
despite attempts to shield its complicity through the employment of cover- 
names. Its organisational framework was not only sophisticated and assimi­
lated according to Iranian clerical designs but also closely integrated with 
several key Iranian institutions which provided it with both necessary 
weaponry and training to successfully confront self-proclaimed Islamic 
enemies and invaluable financial* support for it to generate as well as sus­
tain massive support and recruitment among the Shi'a community at the expense 
of other confessional groups. Hizb'allah's close working relationship with 
Iranian clergy and official institutions suffered also from major inherent 
constraints in the projection of Iranian clerical factionalism onto the 
organisation and in relation to the changing dynamics of Lebanon's civil 
war environment. These influences were most evidently manifest through 
Hizb'allah's practise of hostage-taking of Westerners, most notably in the 
release process rather than decisions to initiate these acts.
The initiation of abduction of Westerners have demonstrated a strong 
causal linkage between events (internal Lebanese, regional or international) 
and motivation for hostage-taking acts by the Hizb'allah and often on behalf 
of Iran. A close convergence of interests between Hizb'allah and Iran go­
verned hostage-taking activity in Lebanon until the end of 1986 without any
For a useful general overview of the strategy of Islamic movements, see: Dr 
Millward, "Hie Rising Tide of Islamic Fundementalism (II)", Commentarv, No.31, (April 1993). 
Also see: Independent, May 8, 1994. Also see: Malise Ruthven, "Islamic Politics in the Middle 
East and North Africa", in Hie Middle East and North Africa 1993 (London: Europa Publications, 
1993): pp.121-2.
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signs or impact of any clerical factionalism either within the organisation 
or from Iran in the process of abductions or releases of hostages. Subsequent 
Hizb’allah discord with Iran was a manifestation of rivalry within Iran's 
clerical establishment which affected the organisation directly as its clo­
sest Iranian allies were demoted from positions in institutions at work 
within the organisation in Lebanon. However, the imposition of Iranian cle­
rical factionalism on the movement's activity has been most notable in the 
process of the release of Western hostages rather than in the actual ab­
ductions. Factional rivalry in Iran was also translated into clerical in­
fighting within the Hizb'allah and disobedience towards Iran, governed by 
longstanding individual relationships stemming from the Najaf period in 
Iraq.'" While efforts to Obstruct the release of Western hostages by Iranian 
opposition factions were designed to undermined more moderate Iranian foreign 
policy towards the West, the motivations to delay any releases by Hizb'allah 
was motivated by its preoccupation towards re-adjustment of its position 
within the Lebanese civil war and internal clerical rivalry within the move­
ment over its present and future direction. As insurance of its position 
within Lebanon and against retribution by Western governments, the hostage- 
issue became increasingly dependent on guarantees of Hizb'allah's own sur­
vival in post-civil war Lebanon. Hizb'allah's volte face over the hostage 
issue in 1991 was largely the result of a quid pro quo arrangement with Iran 
and Syria that strengthened the organisation's position within Lebanon. A 
reduction of the influence of the more radical Iranian clergy in Iranian 
politics paralleled a demotion in positions of its closest allies within 
the Hizb'allah.
The influence of the internal Lebanese environment on any progress for 
the release of hostages underlines the dynamics of Hizb'allah's relationship
'" For differences between leading Hizb'allah clergy, see: Ha'aretz, April 1, 1985; 
International Herald Tribune, January 30, 1987; Ha'aretz, March 30, 1987; Ma'aretz, November 
10, 1987; and al-Anba, November 27, 1989.
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with Syria, closely determined by the status of the Iranian-Syrian relations 
in the Lebanese, regional and international arena.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE INFLUENCE OF THE IRANIAN-SYRIAN RELATIONSHIP OVER THE HIZB'ALLAH
4.1 Introduction
The close involvement by Iran and Syria in the hostage-taking of Western 
foreigners by the Hizb'allah has been evident in their roles as both active 
participants in some of the abductions and as facilitators in all negotia­
tions for the release of hostages.* Although the Iranian-Syrian partnership 
over Hizb'allah activity has been a useful foreign policy instrument in the 
extraction of political and economic concessions from Western governments 
whose citizens are held hostage, the relationship between Iran and Syria 
cannot be viewed as monolithic but rather marked by co-operation and fric­
tion, at times, projected onto the Lebanese arena. While Iran and Syria 
found some common ground for operational co-operation against common enemies, 
most notably against Iraq and Israel, the Iranian-Syrian alliance has also 
been marked by irreconcilable differences with respect to their interests and 
aspirations over the future of Lebanon. While Syria's ambition to gain local 
hegemony over Lebanese affairs stands opposed to Iran's and Hizb'allah's 
ideological vision of an Islamic Republic of Lebanon, any strain in their 
relationship also stems from the underlying and contradictory political 
ideologies of the two regimes.* Although the nature of the supra-national 
pan-Islamic regime of Iran is inherently incompatible with the secular and 
socialist-oriented pan-Arabism espoused by the Alawite political leadership 
of Syria,* the Iranian-Syrian nexus has converged in a marriage of con­
* See: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.: pp.20-40.
* See: Yair Hirschfeld, "The Odd Cbuple: Ba'athist Syria and Khomeini's Iran", in 
ffoshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv (eds.) Syria under Assad:, Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks 
(London: Groom Helm, 1986): pp.105-24.
* For a useful discussion of pan-Islam versus pan-Arabism, see: b^hseen Massarrat,
"The Ideological Context of the Iran-Iraq War: Pan-Islamism versus Pan-Arabism", in Hooshang 
Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (ed.), (1993), op.cit.: pp.28-41. Also see: Charles Caret,
"L'alliance contre-nature de la Syrie basiste et de la République Islanique d'Iran", Politique 
Étrangère, Vol.52, No.2 (1987): pp.381-87.
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venience against common enemies in an atmosphere of crisis and political 
isolation in the Middle East/ As such, an understanding of the basis for and 
evolution of the Iranian-Syrian relationship over the last decade with refe­
rence to Lebanon is necessary as it is not only a direct determinant of the 
position of the Hizb'allah and it's hostage-taking activity. It also in­
fluenced the process of the release of foreign hostages as well as the 
motivation of the two regimes in the resolution of the hostage-crisis in 
accordance with achievement of economic and political concessions from 
Western governments.'
By admission from many leading Hizb'allah and Iranian clerical offi­
cials, the issue of the foreign hostages has not only been intertwined with 
the nature of the movement's relationship with its patrons over Lebanese 
issues but also deeply influenced by the dynamics of the Iranian-Syrian 
relationship either in alignment with, or opposition to, their regional and 
international agendas.*
4.2 The Basis of the Iranian-Syrian Relationship
In the post-revolutionary period of Iran, Syria has remained Iran's 
closest and only ally in the Arab world. While Syrian-Iranian relations were 
marked by animosity in the pre-revolutionary period, the basis for the newly- 
found relationship, which gradually developed into a full-fledged working 
alliance, was rooted in historical antecedents and regional political deve­
lopments in the Middle East.
' See: Christin Marschall, "Syria-Iran: a Strategic Alliance, 1979-1991", Orient, 
Vol.33, No.3 (September 1992): pp.433-46; Christopher Dickey, "Assad in His Allies: 
Irreconcilable Allies", Foreign Affairs, Vol.66, No.l (Fall 1987): pp.58-76.
' See: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz, and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit. : pp.20-40.
' Admission of this linkage was evident, for example, by Sheikh Fadlallah, see: al- 
Mustaqbal, December 19, 1988.
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Prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the hostility between 
Syria's Ba'ath regime and the Shah's Iran was primarily based on Iran's close 
relationship with Israel, Syria's self-proclaimed arch-enemy,* within the 
context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Shah's friendly relations with 
pro-Western Arab states hostile to Syria/ It was, therefore, only natural 
for Syria to cultivate links with emerging Iranian Shi'a opposition movments 
led by Ayatollah Khumayyni/ While Syria supported individual opponents of 
the Pahlavi regime, most notably Ibrahim Yazdi, Mustafa Chamran and Sadeq 
Qotbzadeh," the challenge by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood to the non- 
Islamic character of the al-Asad regime in 1973 forced the Alawite elite to 
consolidate links with emerging Shi'a individuals and movements outside 
Syria/* The cultivation of Syrian relations with the leader of the Shi'a 
community. Imam Musa al-Sadr, proved useful as it extended Syrian involvement 
with an emerging and important confessional group within Lebanon, a vital
* For Iranian relations under the Shah with Israel, see: Sohrab Sobhani, Tlie Pragmatic 
Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988 (New York, NY.: Praeger, 1989); R.K. Rdmanzani, 
"Iran and the Arab-Israeli Conflict", Middle East Journal, Vol.32, No.4 (Autumn 1978); and 
Nader Entessar, "Changing Patterns of Iranian-Arab Relations", Journal of Social, Political, 
and Economic Studies, Vol.9, No.3 (Fall 1984).
' See: R.K. Ramazani, "Energing Patterns of Regional Relations in Iranian Foreign 
Policy", Orbis, Vol.19 (Winter 1975): pp.1043-69.
* See: Joseph Alpher, "The Khcmeyni International", The Waslnngton Quarterlv, Vol.3 
(1980): pp.58-63.
*° See: John Calabrese, (1990), op.cit.; p.188; and Patrick Seale, Asad of Svria: Tie 
Struggle for the Middle East (London: I.E. Tauris, 1988): p.352.
** For discussions on the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, see: R. Hinnebush, "The Islamic 
Movement in Syria: Sectarian Conflict and Urban Rebellion in an Authoritarian Populist 
Regime", in A.E. Hillal Dessouki (ed.) Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (New York, NY.: ): 
pp. 138-69; Hanna Batatu, "Tie Muslim Brethren", MERIP Report, No.110 (November-December 1982); 
pp. 12-20; Hans Günter Lobmeyer, "Islamic Ideology annd Secular Discourse: the Islamists of 
Syria", Orient, Vol.32, No.3 (September 1991): pp.395-418; Adrienne L. Edgar, "The Islamic 
Opposition in Egypt and Syria: A Comparative Study", Journal of Arab Affairs, Vol.6, No.l 
(Spring 1987): pp.82-110; and Ticmas Mayer, "The Islamic Opposition in Syria, 1961-1982", 
Orient (December 1983): pp.589-609.
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component of Syria's political ambitions." More importantly, Syria's ami­
cable relations with Musa al-Sadr enhanced the religious credentials of the 
Syrian ruling regime as al-Sadr issued a fatwa in 1973 which conferred legi­
timacy on the Alawites as bona fide Shi'i Muslims." Syria's relationship 
with Musa al-Sadr enhanced not only the positions of both the Alawite regime 
and the Lebanese Shi'a community but also provided Syria with an important 
Islamic ally in efforts to consolidate its influence over Lebanon." In fact, 
Syria's close affiliation with Musa al-Sadr and the training of Iranian 
oppositionists by the Amal movement facilitated and consolidated co-operation 
between Syria and the future Iranian clerical leadership." As a result, the 
Amal movement became an important instrument for Syrian policy in Lebanon."
Syria's vital interests ih Lebanon, extending from military and security 
needs to the political and economic realm, led to unrelenting moves by al- 
Asad to exploit the Lebanese civil war as a pretext to extend Syrian hegemony 
over Lebanon and as a means to promote broader aspirations on the inter-Arab 
scene and against its Zionist enemy, Israel." While Amal remained Asad's
" See: Gudrun Kramer, "Syriens Weg zu regionaler Hegemonie", Europa-Archiv, Vol.42,
No.22 (November 25, 1987): pp.665-74.
" See: Fouad Ajami, (1986), op.cit.: pp.174-5.
" See: Avi-Ran, Svrian Involvement in Lebanon (1975-1985). [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: 
Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 1986): pp.77-125.
" See: Salim Nasr, "Mobilisation Cormunautaire et Symbolique Religieuse: Imam Sadr et 
les chi'ite du Liban (1970-75) in Olivier Carré et Paul Dumond (eds.) Radicalismes Islamiques: 
Iran, Liban, Turquie (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1985); and Augustus Richard Norton, (1987), 
op.cit.; al-Maiallali, November 5-11, 1983; Valeurs Actuelles, April 1, 1985; and Sobhani 
Sohrab, The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988 (New York, NY.: Praeger, 
1989): p.106.
" For a comprehensive overview of Syria's relationship with the Shi'a movements in 
Lebanon, see: Asad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.: pp.1-20.
" For useful analysis of Syrian policy towards Lebanon, see: Moshe Ma'oz, Assad: The 
Sphinx of Damasais (New York, NY. : Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1988); Daniel Pipes, "Damasais 
and the Claim to Lebanon", Orbis, Vol.31, No.4 (Winter 1987): pp.670-80; Dilip Hiro, (1993), 
op.cit.; and Itamar Rabinovich Tlie War for Lebanon (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press,
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loyal proxy In Lebanon, Syrian moves to exploit the Lebanese civil war 
through continuous realignment with an array of Lebanese confessional fac­
tions, in order to maintain a Syrian-controlled military balance between 
the warring factions which served to preserve and enhance it's interests in 
Lebanon, was undermined by friction in Syria's inter-Arab relationships 
during the late 1970s." In particular, Syria felt increasingly isolated 
following the Egyptian-Israeli rapproachement with the conclusion of the Camp 
David accord in 1977 and its rapidly deteriorating relations with Jordan and 
Iraq." As a result, the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 provided Syria 
with an ideal opportunity to redress the imbalances of its intra-Arab rela­
tions, to rejuvenate the rejectionist camp in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as 
well as to forge and ensure* closer ties and continued influence with the 
Lebanese Shi'a community."
A common opposition against Iraq's ascendancy in inter-Arab politics 
served as the unifying axis for the newly-found alliance between Ba'athist 
Syria and Shi'ite Iran." For Syria, an alliance with Iran provided it with 
a useful means to counter Iraqi subversive activity within both Lebanon and 
Syria while discrediting the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood." Also, Iraq's in­
1985)
" See: Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volumes 1976-1977 & 1978-1979 (Boulder, CO. : 
Westview Press).
" See: Patrick Seale, (1988), op.cit.
" See: Shireen T. Hunter, (1993), op.cit.: p.208-9.
** See: Asad AbuKhalil, (1990, op.cit.: p.16. Also see: Mohammad-Reza Djalili, 
"Téhéran-Damas: une alliance équivoque". Politique internationale. Vol.24 (1984): pp.261-69; 
and New York Times, May 14, 1984.
" For the thi'eat of Iraq's ascendancy, see: Phillipe Rondot, "L'Irak: Une Puissance 
régionale en devenir", Politique Étrangère, Vol.45, No.3 (1980). For the intense Syrian-Iraqi 
rivalry in Lebanon, see: Marius Deeb, (1986), op.cit.: p.3. For S^ Tia's reasons to discredit 
the Syrian Phislim Brotherhood through alliance with Iran, see: Umar F. Abdallah, Ttie Islamic 
Struggle in Svria (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1983); and Martin Kramer,
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vasion of Iran in 1980 not only threatened the regional balance of power 
but also detracted from the Arab-Israeli conflict." For Iran, the problem of 
developing relations with Syria's secular regime quickly disappeared with 
the implications of Iraq's invasion, especially for strategic expediency in 
Iran's foreign policy." An alliance with Syria against Iraq eliminated the 
perception of the Iran-Iraq war as a conflict purely" between the Arabs and 
the Persians." Syrian support against Iraq also provided Iran with in­
valuable political support and material assistance in its war with Iraq, 
especially in terms of providing a distraction for Iraq's armed forces for 
the defence of its other border with Syria and providing alternative channels 
for the supply of armaments." Apart from the valuable role of Syria as 
mediator between Iran and the Persian Gulf states," Syria joined Iran in 
anti-Iraqi economic warfare, most evidently displayed by the closure of the 
Syrian border to Iraq and cutting off the passage of Iraqi oil via Syria on
"Syria's Alawis and Slii'ism", in Martin Kramer (ed.), (1987), op.cit.: p.251.
" For Syrian statement, see: BBC/SWB, September 26, 1980.
" See: Graham E. Fuller, The "Center of the IMiverse": The Geopolitics of Iran 
(Boulder, 00. : Westview Press, 1991): pp.125-28. For Iran's Foreign Minister's views of Iran's 
relationship with Syria as based on strategic considerations, see: FBIS, April 1, 1983.
*' See: Mohssen Massarrat, "The Ideological Context of the Iran-Iraq War: Pan-Islamism 
versus Pan-Arabism", op.cit. : pp.28-41; and International Herald Tribune, November 16, 1982.
Syria provided in the Iran's arms diversification effort $300 million in weaponry 
during the Iran-Iraq war, see: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI 
Yearbook 1989. Syria also provided Iran with Soviet arms, see: al-Ma1allah, March 27, 1982.
For Syria's contribution to Iraq's military insecurity, see: Yair Hirschfeld, "Tie Odd Couple: 
Ba'athist Syria and Khomeini's Iran", in Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv (eds.) Syria under Assad: 
Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks, op.cit. : p. 107.; Middle East Ctontemporary Survey, 
1981-82: p.308-13; and Mark A. Heller, The Iran-Iraq War: implications for Third Parties,
Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University and the Center for International 
Affairs, Harvard (diversity. Paper no.23 (January 1984): p.25.
** For an overview, see: Yosef Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and 
Realpolitik", in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.176-78.
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April 8, 1982." Due to Syrian dependence on Iraqi oil, this measure followed 
the conclusion of a formal economic agreement between Iran and Syria a month 
earlier, whereby Iran agreed to supply Syria with 8 million tons of free- 
bartered crude oil per year." Syria’s action was also due to a significant 
reduction in its financial subventions from Arab regimes hostile to Syria’s 
pro-Iranian policy." While the joint economic agreement between Iran and 
Syria as well as the closure of the Syrian pipeline transformed the Iranian- 
Syrian relationship into a full-fledged partnership, Syrian substitution of 
dependence on Iraqi oil for Iranian oil left it vulnerable to Iranian 
pressures." As Syria's anti-Iraq policy led it to increased political and 
economic isolation in the Arab world, it’s economic dependency on Iran and 
its closely pledged allegiance to Teheran's foreign policy produced friction 
and tension in the Syrian-Iraniap alliance as Syria had difficulty in balan­
" While Syria used Iraq’s support of the Syrian Pîuslm Brotherhood as a pretext for 
the closure of Iraq's pipelines, it caused a major econonic crisis in Iraq. Iraq's export of
1.4 million barrels per day in August 1981 was reduced to 600,000 barrels per day via Turkey, 
see: Dilip Hiro, The longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (London: Paladin, 1990) : 
pp.57-58. Also see: Samuel Segev, The Iranian Triangle: The (Mtold Story of Israel's Role in 
the Iran-Cbntra Affair (New York, NY. : The Free Press, 1988). This curtailed $ 5 billion per 
year in Iraq's foreign exchange earnings, see: Dilip Hiro, The Iran-Iraq War, in Hooshang 
Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.) Iran and the Arab World, op.cit.: p.48. Also see: An- 
Nahar Arab Report and Memo (April 1982) ; and Arab World Weekly (April 17, 1982).
" The agreement was for Iran to supply 1 million tons of oil per annum free of charge 
and 5-7 million tons at a discount of one-third of posted prices. See: David Menashri, Iran: A 
Decade of War and Revolution (London: Holmes & Meier, 1990): p.253; and R.K. Ramazani, 
Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East (Baltimore, MD. : Jolm Hopkins 
University Press, 1986): p.81. Also see: Middle East Economic Digest, March 13, 1982; Middle 
East Economic Digest, April 20, 1984; Middle East Economic Digest, May 6, 1983; Mideast 
Markets, May 3, 1982; The Economist, April 30, 1983; and Middle East Economic Survev, May 7, 
1984.
" See: Middle East Econonic Digest, September 8, 1989. Uhder the Baghdad sunmit of 
1978, Syria was pledged to receive $1.8 billion a year from Arab oil states in recognition as 
its status as a frontline state in the struggle with Israel but actual amounts received have 
been much lower, see: The Middle East Review 1988: p.162.
" For example, disputes over prices and payment lead to a reduction in Iran's supply 
of oil to Syria, see: Derek Hopwood, Syria, 1945-86: Politics and Society (London: Unwin 
Hyman, 1988): p.109; and Foreign Report, June 19, 1986. Also see: Middle East Economic Digest, 
April 20, 1984.
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cing Iran’s confrontational foreign policy and polemics within the framework 
of its own relations with the Arab world." Despite this difficulty, Syria 
has successfully managed to exploit its relationship with Iran by serving as 
a bridge between Iran and the Arab world, both in terms of providing valuable 
mediation between the two sides and in persuading Gulf states that Iran's 
relationship with Syria guarantees their own security."
While Syria's raison d’etre for its alliance with Iran against Iraq was 
based on the detraction of Iraq's defection from Arab ranks in their struggle 
against Israel, particularly as Iraq’s military strength could not only be 
used against Israel but would also ensure "strategic parity" between the 
Arabs and Israel," the Arab world remained passive and left Syria to its 
own devices to confront Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982." Syria's 
increased isolation in the Arab world, coupled with Iranian calls for the 
transformation of the war in Lebanon into a total war against Israel," led 
to a military agreement between Iran and Syria which allowed the entry of 
Iranian Pasdaran contingents into Lebanon."
" Among the most evident examples is Syria's participation in the Islamic Conference 
in Kuwait in January and in the Arab League Summit in Jordan in November 1987 despite vehement 
Iranian opposition, see: Le Monde, November 13, 1987; Le Monde, October 27, 1987; and IRNA, 
January 6, 1987.
" See: Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (London: I.E. Tauris,
1988): p.183.
" See: Yosef Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik", in
David Menashri (ed.) (1990), op.cit.: p.176.
" According to al-Asad: "The Iran of Khomeini is anti-Israel. Iran was the only 
country to send forces \dien Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982", see: al-Qabas, January 24, 1987. 
Also see: Financial Times, July 8, 1982; Middle East Contemporary Survev, 1981-82; and 
Husseiyn Sirriyeh, Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict, Adelphi Papers No.243 (Oxford: Brassey's, 
Autumn 1989): p.45.
" See: David Menashri, (1990b), op.cit.: p.253; and FBIS, June 16, 1982.
" For Syrian-Iranian military agreement, see: al-Naiiar, May 26, 1986. Also see: Marius
Deeb, (1988), op.cit.: pp.697. Also see: Le Point, May 11, 1987; and L'Orient le Jour,
November 25, 1982.
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The decision by Iran to dispatch a military contingent to Lebanon was 
a reflection of the success of Iran's massive military offensive in the Gulf 
war in which all Iraqi-occupied Iranian territory had been recovered while 
Iraq appeared weak as it used Israel's invasion of Lebanon as an excuse for 
suggesting an end to hostilities in order to confront the common enemy, 
Israel." While the diversion of IRGC units from the Iraqi front to Lebanon 
was intended to reveal for domestic and foreign consumption that Iran's war 
with Iraq was in progress and in total control, it was also an opportunity 
for Iran to demonstrate its serious commitment to the "export of the revo­
lution" and its support to all Islamic liberation movements worldwide." As 
such, the anarchcial environment of Lebanon's civil war, coupled with Iran's 
close relationships within the Shi'a community, provided Iran with an ideal 
opportunity to exert its influence and construct a Shi'ite power-base beyond 
its borders." From Lebanon, Iran could transcend the Persian-Arab linguistic 
barriers through the Hizb'allah and reach out to a larger Arab audience in 
the preaching of Islamic ideology and government," More significantly, the 
presence of an Islamic Pasdaran contingent in Lebanon provided Iran with a 
window of opportunity to not only actively participate militarily in the
" See: Dilip Hiro, "The Iran-Iraq War", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar' 
(eds.), (1993), op.cit.: p.47.
" See: David Menashri, (1990b), op.cit.: p.295. Also see: R.K. Ramazani, "Iran's 
Export of the Revolution: Politics, Ends, and Means", in Jolm L. Esposito (ed.), (1990), 
op.cit.: pp.40-62. Also see: Iran Press Digest, April 19, 1983.
" See: Martin Kramer, (1988), op.cit.: pp.39-59; and Shimon Shapira, (1988), op.cit.: 
pp.115-30. Also see: Andreas Rieck, "Abschied vom 'Revolutionsexport'? Expansion und Rückgang 
des iranischen Einflusses Im Idbanon 1979-89, Beitrâge zur Konfliktforschung, Vol.20, No.2 
(1990): pp.81-104; Politique International, April 1984; al-Naliar, November 27, 1982; and Iran 
Press Digest, May 3, 1983.
" See: Sliireen T, Hunter, "Iran and the Spread of Revolutionary Islam", Third World 
Quarterly, op.cit.: p.741-42; and Middle East Economic Digest, (September 1987): pp.12-18.
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Arab-Israeli conflict via proxy but also to affect the Arab-Israeli and, 
consequently, wider Middle East conflicts and politics." Iran's presence 
and influence would also be used to manipulate the behaviour and policies 
of regional and international actors in any way connected with Lebanese 
politics through acts of terrorism and hostage-taking."
The establishment of an Iranian headquarters .in the Syrian border 
village of Zebdani and the arrival of the first 800 Pasdaran, later re­
inforced by another 700 Pasdaran dispersed among villages in the Biq'a, came 
at the invitation of Syria." For Syria, Iran's incursion into Lebanon pro­
vided invaluable support in its efforts to counter both the Western and 
Israeli presence and intervention in Lebanon." This became increasingly 
vital in order to oppose the American-endorsed Gemayel regime in Lebanon and 
to sabotage the Lebanon-Israel Agreement of May 17, 1983." While neither 
Syria nor Iran wished to engage these enemies directly in Lebanon, the con- 
tinous harassment by Hizb'allah against the Israeli and American military 
forces provided them with a valuable instrument to maintain and accomplish 
their strategic interests in Lebanon, most notably the expulsion of the
" See: Massif Hitti, "labanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and 
Constraints", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: p. 186.
" See: John L. Esposito, (1991), op.cit.: p.250; and John L. Esposito, (1992), 
op.cit.: pp.150-1.
" The Iranian Majlis had approved the dispatch of a Pasdaran unit to southern Lebanon 
to fight Israel in June 1981. See: R.K Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in 
the Middle East, op.cit.: p.156. Also see: Robin Wright, (1990), op.cit.: pp.108-9; and Le 
Point, May 11, 1987.
" See: Augustus Richard Norton, External Intervention and the Politics of Lebanon 
(Washington, DC. : Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1984). Also see: IRNA, 
November 7, 1982; and Radio Damascus, November 9, 1982.
" See: Middle East Contonporary Survev, 1983-84; and "The Path of Shi'ite Militancy", 
Middle East International (March 22, 1985): pp.6-7.
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West's political and military presence from Lebanese territory." The 
emergence of the Hizb'allah provided Iran and Syria with a viable alternative 
as well as a solution to its previous support of Fatah." Although Iran's 
military presence supported Syria's strategic objectives in countering 
internal political developments contrary to its interests and foreign pre­
sence on Lebanese soil, Syria remained in firm control over Iran's access 
to Lebanon in terms of numbers and frequency of visits, as the Pasdaran was
dependent on being inserted to the Biq'a via Syria."
The Iranian-Syrian alliance has been manifest in the Lebanese arena, 
through the Pasdaran's support of the Hizb'allah, as a fluctation between 
close co-operation and friction determined by internal as well as regional 
developments while it has demonstrated the conflicting ideological positions 
of Iran and Syria and their vision for the future of Lebanon." In parti­
cular, the conflicts between Iran and Syria basically stemmed from threats 
to Syrian hegemony and designs over Lebanon in the form of Hizb'allah acti­
vity." Apart from the fact that the Hizb'allah's vision of Lebanon stands 
against the ideological foundations of the Syrian regime, tension in the
" For Mohtashemi's emphasis of the voluntary nature and peaceful presence of the 
Pasdaran units in Lebanon, see: Iran Press Digest, April 19, 1983, Ali Khameini stressed that 
the IRGC units would remain in Lebanon "as long as Iran would think it necessary", see:
L'Orient le Jour, November 25, 1982.
" For Syria's relationship with Fatah, see: Reuven Avi-Ran, "The Syrian-Palestinian 
Conflict in Lebanon", Jerusalem Quarterly, No.42 (Spring 1987): pp.57-82.
" Syrian fears of the dispatch of additional Pasdaran units to Lebanon was exacerbated 
by the clashes between the Pasdaran and the Lebanese army in November 1982, see: Monday 
Morning, November 29, 1982; and Iran Press Digest, Deconber 7, 1982.
" See: Haleh Vaziri, "Iran's Involvement in Lebanon: Polarization and Radicalization 
of Militant Islamic Ifevements", Journal of South Asia and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 16, No.2 
(Winter 1992): pp.1-16.
" See: Augustus Richard Norton, "Religious Resurgence and Political Mobilization of 
the Shi'a in Lebanon", in Ehiile Saliliyeh (ed.) Religious Resurgence and Politics in the 
Contemporary World (New York, NY.: State iMversity of New York Press, 1990): pp.239-40.
210
Syrian-Iranian axis have come from unpredictable Hizb'allah activity which 
have worsened Syria's image in the Arab world and in the West." As a result, 
Syria has not only attempted to distance itself from involvement with, or 
control over, the Hizb'allah but has also kept the nature of its relationship 
with Iran low-profile." In some cases, Syria's political and economic re­
lations have been seriously damaged by Hizb'alla]i^,hostage-taking activity 
as Syria has been closely identified with the movement and its patron."
While Syria has been forced to crackdown against the Hizb'allah in order to 
limit its expansion and domination over the Shi'a community, it has also 
attempted to keep the Hizb'allah under control in order to avoid the 
possibility of a direct military confrontation with Israel, provoked by the 
movement's uncontrolled resistance attacks." In turn, friction between the 
Hizb'allah and Syria must also be measured against the nature of the Syrian- 
Iranian relationship over time and the impact of Hizb'allah activity on 
Iran's own geostrategic interests in Lebanon and elsewhere." While the 
strains between Iran and Syria naturally impacted on the issue of the release 
of Western hostages, periods of close co-operation have also led to the de-
" See: Middle East Contemporary Survev, 1986: pp.619-621; and Asad AbuKhalil, (1990), 
op.cit.: p.15. Also see: New York Times, June 27, 1987.
" As acaurately pointed out by Yosef Olmert, Syria's low-profile of its ties with Iran 
can be seen by the higher frequency'' of high-level visits by Iran to Syria than the other way 
around, see: Yosef Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik", in David 
Menashri (ed.), (1990a), op.cit.: p.178. While Syria's low-profile stems from a desire to not 
offend the other Arab states, Asad's first visit to Iran, after the Islamic revolution, was in 
September 1990, see: FBIS, September 18, 1990.
" See: IMted States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1986 
(Washington DC.: Office of Counterterrorism, 1987). Also see: The Middle East Review 1988: 
p.164-65.
" See: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.: pp.129-33.
" See: John Chlabrese, (1990), op.cit.: pp.188-190; and Graham E. Fuller, (1991), 
op.cit.: pp.130-33. Also see: Financial Times, August 9, 1991;
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cisiou by Hizb'allah to abduct Western citizens in accordance with the ad­
vancement of specific foreign policy objectives by both Iran and Syria," 
Apart from Hizb'allah’s own agenda in the abduction of foreigners, the impact 
of the often troublesome Syrian-Iranian alliance and its superimposition on 
the internal Lebanese scene must be viewed in the context of individual 
motivations by these states to either intitiate hostage-taking or facilitate 
its resolution in order to advance a specific foreign policy objective within 
or external to the Lebanon." While the Iranian-Syrian relationship within 
Lebanon can be characterized by close joint co-operation in the struggle 
against the Israeli and Western presence until their withdrawal in 1985 and 
subsequent increased friction due to Syria's attempt to exert its hegemony 
over Lebanon, it is necessajry to balance their internal Lebanese agenda 
against the Syrian-Iranian requirements in the foreign policy arena on the 
regional and international level."
4.1 Phase I: Iranian-Syrian Co-operation Against Common Enemies (1982-85) 
The introduction of the Pasdaran contingent to Lebanon's Biq'a area was 
accomplished by the imminent threat posed by Israel's 1982 invasion to Syria 
and do interests in Lebanon." While the first Hizb'allah abduction of David 
Dodgo came at the behest of the Pasdaran contingent as a result of the pre­
vious kidnapping of four Iranian officials of the Iranian Embassy in Beirut,
StH': Maskit Burgin, Ariel Merari, and Anat Kurz (1988), op.cit.: 20-35.
" Maskit Burgin, "Foreign Hostages in Lebanon - An Update", in Inter:
Inteniat Terrorism in 1988 (Jerusalem: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1989) ; and 
Maskît I'utqiu, "Slii'ite International Terrorism", in Inter: International Terrorism in 1989 
(JerusuUw: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1990): pp.36-60.
Discussions in the panel group on the Middle East, during: Dialogue Europe 
Occident->lc - Iftiion Soviétique en Matière de Terrorisme et de Lutte Anti-Terroriste, Paris, 
June 10,
î'.tH'*. Avi-Ran, Syrian Involvement in Lebanon (1975-1985), op.cit.; and Le Point, May
11, 198/.
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most notably IRGC commander Ahmad Moteveselian," the major concern of Syria 
and Iran was joint co-operation against their external enemies within Lebanon 
in order to confront Israel and the regime of Amin Gemay-el, perceived by 
Hizb'allah to be protected by the presence of the MNF." The imminent con­
clusion of the American-sponsored peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel, 
the 17 May 1983 agreement, precipitated the first car bomb attack on the U.S. 
Embassy in Beirut on April 18, 1983, which clearly revealed the hallmarks of
a jointly Iranian-Syrian supervised Hizb'allah operation." While the 
Hizb'allah, with close Syrian co-operation, continued to confront the MNF in 
an effort to expel Western influence from Lebanon and to undermine the 
Gemayel regime, Iran had other foreign policy motivations related to its war 
with Iraq which accounted for its close involvement in the October 1983 
Hizb'allah twin-suicide attacks^ against the American and French MNF con­
tingents in Lebanon.*^ Although Iran's hostility towards the U.S. administra­
tion stemmed from its support for Israel in attacking Lebanon and its direct 
political and military involvement within the civil war, Iranian concerns 
over American and French support for Iraq, mainly through the supply of arms, 
contributed to the decision to strike at these enemies through proxy in
" Sèe: Independent, March 26, 1990; Washington Post, July 24, 1982; Middle East 
Reporter, July 22, 1983; Middle East Reporter, Novanber 14, 1990; and Farhang Jahanpour, "The 
Roots of the Hostage Crisis", The World Todav (Febraury 1992); p.33.
" This was clearly revealed in Hizb'allah's manifesto, see: "An Open Letter: Hizballah 
program", Jerusalem Quarterly, No.48 (Fall 1988): pp. 111-16. For an interview with Sheikli 
Muhairmad Hussein Fadlallah, see: George Nader, "Interview with Sheikh Fadl Allah", Middle East 
Insight (June-July 1985).
" For details of Iranian-Syrian ccmplicity in the operation, see: Also see: Jeune 
Afrique, January 24, 1984; Jerusalem Post, October 27, 1983; Le Monde, November 6-7, 1983; 
Liberation, March 19, 1985; Valeurs Actuelles, April 1, 1985; Voice of Lebanon. March 26,
1983; Radio Free Lebanon, April 15, 1983; and New York Times, April 19, 1983.
" For details of Iranian-Syrian involvement in the Hizb'allah operations, see: al- 
Watan al-Arabi, December 14-20, 1984; Voice of Lebanon, October 26, 1983; Le Nouvel 
Observateur, October 30, 1983; Le Monde, November 6-7, 1983; Ha'aretz, October 23, 1983; 
Ha'aretz, October 26, 1983; AFP, October 23, 1983; IRNA, November 15, 1983;
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Lebanon," In particular, the main point of friction was over French arms 
deliveries to Iraq of Super-Etendard aircraft equipped with Exocet missiles 
which Iran viewed as the main reason for the survival of the Ba'athist regime 
and the prolongation of the war." In fact, Iraq owed $7 billion to France 
and absorbed almost forty percent of all French arms export." At the same 
time, Iran was particularly angered over the refusal by the French government 
to pay between $1-1.5 billion owed from the days of the Shah and supply Iran 
with military-related equipment." Iranian hostility was also due to the 
decision by the American administration to launch Operation Staunch in 1983, 
halting all shipments of arms to Iran, while it extended $2 billion in trade 
credit to Iraq.** Prior to the suicide operations by Hizb'allah in Lebanon 
against the American and French MNF contingents, Iran warned that the pro­
vision of armaments to Iran's enemies would provoke retaliatory punishment." 
In particular, Iran charged France to be a co-belligerent in the war after
See: Newsweek, January 2, 1984; and Econanist, October 29, 1983.
" For Iranian opposition, see: Kayhan, October 10, 1983; Kayhan, October 13, 1983; and 
Kayhan, Septanber 19, 1983. Also see: Walter de Bock and Jean-Üiarles Deniau, Des Armes Pour 
L'Iran; L'Iranqate Européen (Paris: Gallimard, 1988).
" See: Le Monde, January 8, 1983; Wall Street Journal, August 19, 1983; and Economist, 
February 23, 1983. Between 1977 and 1985, France sold more than $11.8 billion of high-techno­
logy weaponry to Iraq, including 113 Mirage FI fighter aircrafts and three quarters of French 
total exports of Exocet missiles, see: Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1987. Also see: Mark 
Heller, (1984), op.cit.
" For Iranian claims, see: Kayhan, March 12, 1983; and Ettela'at, August 23, 1983.
" See: Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security 1984-1987: 
Strategic Implications and Policy Options (London: Jane's Publishing Company, 1987): p.79; and 
Eric Hooglund, "Tie Policy of the Reagan Administration Toward Iran", in Nikki Keddie and Mark 
Gasiorowski (eds.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.269-93. Also see: MERIP Reports (July-September 1984): 
p. 45.
*“ For Iran's threat of retalitory measures, see: Ettela'at, September 17, 1983;
Kayhan, September 17, 1983; Kayhan, September 24, 1983; Kayhan, October 13, 1983; Ettela'at, 
October 8, 1983; and Kayhan, October 26, 1983.
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France leased five Super-Etendard aircraft with Exocet missiles to Iraq in 
October 1983
While the American and French MNF contingents in Lebanon provided Iran 
with the ideal targets for retaliation through proxy, Iran also used combined 
elements from Iraq's al~Da'm al-Islamiyya and the Lebanese Islamic Amal to 
strike at U.S. and French targets in Kuwait, among' the most loyal Arab- 
monarchies extending military and financial support to Iraq, in December
1983.” This subversion by Iran was also intended to persuade Arab Persian 
Gulf states not to provide financial assistance to the Iraqi war effort.” 
While the arrest and conviction of the 17 al-Da 'wa terrorists motivated 
Hizb'allah to abduct five American citizens and one Frenchman, as evident by 
the connections of the abductions with the progress of the trial in Kuwait, 
the nature of the targets mirrored also close alignment with Iranian foreign 
policy in its confrontation with the American and French administrations 
over support to Iraq.” In particular, the close convergence between 
Hizb'allah abductions and Iranian foreign policy was not only revealed by the
” See: José Garçon, "La France et le conflit Iran-Irak", Politique Etrangère. Vol.2
(1987).
” For Iran's subversive activities in the Persian Gulf-states, see: Joseph Kostiner, 
"Shi'i Unrest in the Gulf", in Martin Kramer (ed.), (1987), op.cit.: pp. 173-86; James Bill, 
"Resiugent Islam in the Persian Gulf", Foreign Affairs, Vol.63, No.l (Fall 1984): pp. 108-27; 
R.K. Ramazani, "Iran's Islamic Revolution and the Persian Gulf", Current History. Vol.84 
(January 1985): pp. 1-41. Between 1983-84, Kuwait provided $7 billion in financial assistance 
and was second to Saudi Arabia in aiding Iraq, see: Bahman Baktiari, "Revolutionary Iran's 
Persian Gulf Policy: The Quest for Regional Supremacy", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader 
Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: p.77. In 1985, Persian Gulf states provided Iraq with 
financial contributions in the reange of US$ 40-50 billion, see: Iran and Iraq: Hie Next Five 
Years (London: Ihe Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 1987): p.20. .
” See: Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade 
(Bloomington, IN.: Indiana University Press, 1990): p. 117. Also see: Ariel Merari and Yosefa 
(Daiksel) Braunstein, (1984), op.cit.: p.8.
” See: George Joffe, "Iran, the Southern Mediterranean and Europe: Terrorism and 
Hostages", in Anoushiravan Eliteshand and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), (1991), op.cit. : pp.86-8. 
Also see: Alex von Dornoch, "Iran's violent diplomacy", Aussenpolitik, (May/June 1988).
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abduction of William Buckley, the CIA-station chief in Beirut,” but also by 
the kidnappings of two Kuwaitis and a Saudi citizen in 1984,”
In Lebanon, Iranian-Syrian co-operation in Hizb'allah's attacks against 
the MNF was awarded by their withdrawal in February 1984 and the Gemayel 
regime's abrogation, under heavy Syrian pressure, of the 17 May 1983 accord 
between Lebanon and Israel.” The close bilateral relations between Iran and 
Syria was evident by the frequency of high-level visits between the two 
states and by Iran's promised delivery of one million tons of oil free of 
charge to Syria in 1984.” Having accomplished a major victory with the 
expulsion of the MNF contingent, Hizb'allah concentrated on confrontation 
with the Israeli presence in southern Lebanon, with the active support of 
both Iran and Syria.” While (he Hizb'allah held three American hostages, as 
an American and a French citizen had been rescued and released by Amal in 
April 1984,” the movement's respite in the abduction of foreigners reflected 
its concentration in the resistance against Israel while Syria and Iran 
remained pre-occupied with Lebanon and the war effort with Iraq respecti-
” See: Da'var, February 8, 1985; MENA, March 28, 1985; International Herald Tribune.
December 14, 1985; and Washington Post, November 25, 1986.
” The abduction of the Saudi consul was directly related to Iran's outstanding 
differences with Saudi Arabia. He was released two days after the Saudi foreign rrdnister
visited Iran to settle Iranian-Saudi differences, see: Yediot Aharanot, July 9, 1985. For
information on the abduction of Kuwaiti citizens, see: International Herald Tribjne. April 16,
1984.
” See: Helena Cobban, "The Growth of Slii'i Power in Lebanon", in Juan R.I. Cole and 
Nikki R. Keddie (eds.), (1986), op.cit.: p.151; and Middle East Contemporary Sur/ey, 1983-84.
” See: David Menashri, (1990b), op.cit.: p.334; Middle East Economic Digest. April 20, 
1984; and Ettela'at, May 24, 1984.
” See: al-Ahd, July 25, 1985; al-Nahar, June 5, 1985; and al-Nahar al-Arahi val- 
Duwali, March 18-24, 1985.
” For the rescue of American Fran]\ Regier and Frenchman Christian Jouber:, see: 
International Herald Tribune, April 16, 1984; and Washington Post, May 9, 1984.
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vely.”
At the end of 1984, Iran’s involvement with the hijacking of a Kuwaiti 
airliner by Islamic Amal and the abduction of two American hostages in 
December 1984 and in January 1985 reflected solidarity with Hizb'allah's 
concern over the fate of the 17 al-Da'wa prisoners held in Kuwait.” While 
Iran's relations with Kuwait continued to be tense due to the treatment and 
expulsion of Iranian citizens in Kuwait and over its co-operation with 
Iraq,” the concentration on American citizens as targets reflected the in­
fluential position of the U.S. over Kuwait in an effort to pressure for the 
release of the al-Da'wa prisoners.” It may have also been due to the US re­
sumption of diplomatic relations with Iraq on November 26, 1988." While 
these efforts failed, Hizb’allah emerged victorious with the announcement of 
Israel's decision of a three-phase unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, 
between January 20 and June 6, 1985." Accordingly, the Hizb'allah escalated 
its abduction campaign of Western foreigners while it accelerated its con-
" See: Robin Wright, (1986), op.cit.: p.110.
” See: International Herald Tribune, December 17, 1984; The Guardian, December 7,
1984; International Herald Tribune, December 8, 1984; Paul Wilkinson, "Hezbollah: A Critical 
Appraisal", Jane's Intelligence Review, August 1983; Foreign Report, December 13, 1984; 
Financial Times, December 8, 1984; and Observer, December 9, 1984.
" See: Joseph Kostiner, "Shi’i Unrest in the Gulf", Martin Kramer (ed.), (1987), 
op.cit.: pp.173-88; and James A, Bill, "Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf", Foreign Affairs 
(1984).
” See: Financial Times, April 24, 1984.
" For US-Iraqi rapproachement, see: Dilip Hiro, (1990), op.cit.: pp.159-63.
" See: Nass al-risla al-maftuha allati waiiaha hizb allah ila al-mustad Afin fi lubnan 
wa al-alam, reprinted in Augustus Richard Norton, (1987), op.cit. Also see: al-Nahar al-Arabi 
wal-Dimli, March 18-24, 1985; and al-Nahar, June 5, 1985.
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frontation with Israel.” Although the escalatory Hizb'allah's attacks on 
Israel suited the strategic designs of both Syria and Iran, a few signs ol 
tension emerged in the Iranian-Syrian relationship. Apart from Syrian 
differences with Iran over the continuation of the Gulf war and Iran's 
persistant attacks on Ba'athist ideology, a source of tension stemmed from 
Syria's rejection of Iranian offers of both sending more IRGC units to 
Lebanon and allowing those present an active combat role against Israel.” 
However, any tension in their relationship was overshadowed by the Iranian 
Majlis' approval in 1985 to supply Syria yearly with one million tons oj 
crude oil, free of charge, and five million tons at the discount of $2.5 
per barrel over a ten-year period to lessen the impact of reduced Aral 
support.”
Apart from Hizb'allah's own reasons for the abduction of Western 
foreigners, it co-ordinated the kidnappings with Iran as a leverage in its 
patron's foreign policy disputes with both the American and French admini 
strations.” The abduction of five American citizens by the Hizb'allah was 
not only in response to the continued imprisonment of the al~Da[wa members 
in Kuwait but also to U.S. support for Iraq, in terms of the renewal ol 
diplomatic ties and continued military and financial assistance, and the U.S. 
refusal to recognize Iranian compensation's claims before the Hague Joint.
” See: Martin Kramer, "Sacrifice and Fratricide in Shiite Lebanon", Terrorism and 
Political Violence, Vol.3, No.3 (Autumn 1991); and Andreas Rieck, (1989), op.cit.
” See: Robin Wright, "Lebanon", in Shireen T. Hunter (ed.) The Politics of Islamic 
Revivalism (Indianapolis, IN.: Indiana University Press, 1988): p.68; US News & World Report, 
March 6, 1989; Ronald Perron, (1985), op.cit.; and al-Naliar, November 9, 1987.
” See: Iran Press Digest, August 12, 1985; Dilip Hiro, (1990), op.cit.: p.157; and 
David Menashri, (1990b), op.cit.: p.372-3.
” See: Maskit Burgin, Ariel Merari and Anat Kurz, (1988), op.cit.: pp.22-3; 37-39.
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Committee.” Furthermore, tensions between Iran and the U.S. were exacerbated 
by the American administration's claims of Iran's role in the sponsoring of 
terrorism.” While the abduction of American citizens represented a mixture 
of interests by both Hizb'allah and Iran, the case of the abduction of five 
French citizens was clearly aligned with Iranian foreign policy motivations. 
Apart from Iranian demands on repayment of the $1 billion loan, made by the 
Shah's government in 1974 to the French Atomic Energy Commission for a 
uranium separation plant (Eurodiff p r o j ect)the  abduction of French 
citizens was connected with France's continued arms shipments to Iraq and 
Arab Persian Gulf states, most notably the supply of Mirage 2000 aircraft to 
Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and the harbouring of exiled Iranian opposition groups 
in France.” It also represented an effort by Iran to obtain the release of 
Anis Naccache from France due *to his longstanding friendship with Ahmad 
Khumayynl and Mohsen RafiqDust as well as with leading Hizb'allah members," 
In order to increase the pressure on France to concede to Iranian demands, 
the Hizb'allah attacked the French UNIFIL contingent in southern Lebanon."
After the completion of the American and Israeli withdrawals from 
Lebanon, which culminated with Hizb'allah's hijacking of TWA-847 in June
” See: MERIP Reports, Nos. 125-26 (July-September, 1984): pp.44-48.
” See: Robin Wright, (1989), op.cit.
” See: al-Watan al-Arabi, April 27, 1985; Jerusalen Post, October 7, 1986; Ha'aretz, 
March 24, 1985; and Middle East Reporter, March 28, 1985.
” See: International Herald Tribune, January 5, 1989; Newsweek, June 23, 1986; le 
Itonde, May 6, 1988; Jerusalem Post, December 2, 1987; Yediot Aharanot, May 5, 1988; Jerusalem 
Post, May 5, 1988; Jenisalem Post, October 7, 1986; and Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1987.
" See: International Herald Tribune, July 28-29, 1990; L'Express, July 13, 1984; le 
Nouvel Observateur, March 28-April 3, 1986; Independent, October 27, 1991; Kavhan, July 28, 
1990; and Teheran Times, July 28, 1990.
See: Alan James, (1988), op.cit.: pp.21-24.
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1985, Iranian-Syrian differences became apparent over Syria's attempt to im­
pose political hegemony over Lebanon. In an effort to derail Syria's attempt 
to end the civil war and transform Lebanon into a Syrian satellite, through 
the so-called Tripartite Agreement,” Iran urged the Muslims in Lebanon to 
rise and establish an Islamic Republic." This marked the beginning of tacit 
rivalry between Syria and Iranian efforts to expand their influence over 
Lebanon through Hizb'allah activity.” As a result, while Syria moved to
confront and crackdown on Hizb'allah activity in order to advance its own 
political agenda in Lebanon, the movement became increasingly dependent on 
Iranian support and, more importantly, its ability to influence Syria's 
policy and position vis-A-vis the Hizb'allah.”"
4.4 Phase II: Increased Iranian-Syrian Rivalry Over Hizb'allah (1985-92) 
While the American administration pursued a confrontational policy 
towards Iran, the initiation of a clandestine policy of providing armaments 
to Iran via Israel in August 1985 led to a cessation in the abduction of 
American hostages by Hizb'allah in co-operation with Iran.”  ^ Instead, Iran 
focused on its confrontation with France as it had failed to meet any of its 
previously stated foreign policy demands for the release of French hos-
97 See: Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1984-85: pp.535-6.
" See: Chibli Mallat, (1988), op.cit.; Davar, November 11, 1987; and Ha'aretz, 
February 22, 1988.
” See: Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and Syria: Frcm Hostility to limited Alliance", in 
Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: 209-10.
190 See: Asad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.: pp.13-16.
For useful analysis of Iran's efforts to secure weaponry from the American 
administration, see chapter 9: "Teheran and the American Arms" in: David Menashri, (1990b), 
op.cit.: pp.374-85. Also see: Nikki R. Keddie, "Iranian Imbroglios: Who's Irrational?", World 
Policy Journal, Vol.5 (Winter 1987-88): pp.29-54.
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tages.”: This became manifest in an Iranian-Hizb'allah orchestrated terrorist 
campaign in France between December 1985 and September 1986, which led to 13 
deaths and 303 injuries. This was motivated by Hizb'allah's own organisa­
tional requirements and, more significantly, by Iran in an effort to alter 
French foreign policy.”" While the abduction of eight French citizens, bet­
ween February and May 1986, was initiated by Hizb'allah in response to the 
expulsion of two Iraqi al~Da'wa members from France to Iraq, the timing of 
Iran's escalation of terrorism against France occurred within the framework 
of the general elections in the country in an effort to force concessions in 
terms of repayment of the French outstanding debt to Iran and in order to 
block French arms shipments to Iraq.”" As Iran also demanded a complete 
volte-face in French foreign, policy in the Middle East,”’ it placed addi­
tional pressure on France through Hizb'allah attacks against its UNIFIL con­
tingent in southern Lebanon.”’ The abduction campaign of French citizens
See: Kayhan, May 22, 1988; Kavhan, October 30, 1985; and Iran Press Digest, October
21, 1985.
”’ See: Jerusalem Post, Septeniber 3, 1986; Jerusalem Post, October 7, 1986; 
International Herald Tribune, August 3, 1987; and International Herald Tribune, December 24,
1986.
”" The Hizb'allah emphasized the speed with which the French government responded to 
their demands prior to the French elections, see: Jerusalem Post, March 12, 1986; Le Nouvel 
Observateur, March 28 - April 3, 1986; al-Nahar, March 24, 1986; and al-Mustaqbal, March 23,
1986. This tactic was clearly revealed in the 1988 French elections, see: Ha'aretz, April 6, 
1988. Hizb'allali's al-Ahd declared that: "the price for the security of Fmnchman all over the 
world is the defeat of Mitterrand's government", see: Le Ifcnde, May 6, 1988. Also see: 
Jerusalem Post, October 7, 1986; International Herald Tribune, August 3, 1987; International 
Herald Tribune, February 8, 1989; Ha'aretz, March 10, 1986; Newsweek, June 23, 1986; 
International Herald Tribune, Decoriber 26, 1986; Ma'aretz, March 17, 1987; and Jerusalem Post, 
December 1, 1987.
For demands of a change in France's Middle East policy, see: Jerusalem Post, May 8, 
1986; June 20, 1986; Jerusalem Post, September 3, 1986; International Herald Tribune, 
December 26, 1986; and Ha'aretz, August 31, 1986.
”’ See: Ha'aretz, October 30, 1986; Monday Morning, December 12, 1986; al-Shira, 
September 28, 1987; and Ha'aretz, November 4, 1987.
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was also motivated by an accelerated effort to gain the release of Anis 
Naccache as well as to force the expulsion of leading exiled Iranian opposi­
tion leaders living in France.”’
Iranian relations with the member-states of the Steadfastness Front, 
especially Syria and Libya, were brought even closer as a result of the
accusations by the West against these three states' for their support of 
terrorism, especially in the aftermath of both the American raid on Libya and 
the imposition of political and economic sanctions against Syria for its 
involvement in the Nizar Hindawi affair, of April 1986.”" Due to the central 
role of Great Britain in these operations, the Hizb'allah abducted two 
British citizens with the active support of both Syria and Iran while Syria 
continuously emphasized the restoration of diplomatic relations as a pre­
requisite for any attempt to facilitate the release of British hostages.”" 
While the West's accusations of Syrian and Iranian involvement in terrorism 
increased their isolation and strengthened their bilateral relations, areas 
of disagreement surfaced from Syria with Iran, especially over Hizb'allah 
activity in Lebanon.’” Apart from an Iranian-Syrian dispute over oil prices 
and Syria's inability for repayments, which at the time amounted to over $2
”’ For the release of Naccache, see: Le Matin, January 29, 1987; Ha'aretz, January 30, 
1987; Yediot Aharanot, December 1, 1987; Ma'aretz, May 5, 1988; Ha'aretz, March 10, 1986. The 
Hizb'allah also requested the expulsion of Mujaheddine al-Khalq leaders and Bani Sadr, the
last prime minister under the Shah, see: Newsweek, June 23, 1986; Observer, Decmber 6, 1987;
JerusalŒi Post, December 7, 1987; and Ha'aretz, April 6, 1988.
Great Britain broke diplomatic relations with Syria after the conviction of Nizar 
Hindawi on October 10, 1986, see: New York Times, October 25, 1986; and Arab News, September 
11, 1986. On November 5, 1986, all EC governments adopted sanctions against Syria, see: 
Washington Post, November 11, 1986; and Washington Post, November 27, 1986. Only France failed
to join in the common action against Syria, see: Christian Science Monitor, Deconber 2, 1986.
”" See: Ha'aretz, October 10, 1988.
See: Sliohram Chubin and diaries Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, op.cit.: pp.182-4.
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billion’” and led to a reduction in Iran's supply of oil to Syria in mid- 
1986, Syrian disagreement with Iran came as a response to the escalation in 
Hizb'allah activity in southern Lebanon which highlighted the lack of control 
Syria exercised over Lebanon while it directly threatened to bring Israel 
into an all-out confrontation with Syria.’” Furthermore, Hizb'allah's ab­
duction of Westerners, with the active support of Iran, also undermined the 
internal and external perception of Syria's firm control over Lebanese
affairs while it damaged its international image in Syrian efforts to re­
habilitate its relations with Western governments.”" As a result, it is not 
surprising that tension in the Syrian-Iranian relationship surfaced publicly 
with the leak of the U.S.-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal in the pro-Syrian 
weekly al-Shira in Lebanon.Consequently, while Iran and Syria maintained 
good relations on the strategic level, ensured by Syria's dependence on 
Iranian oil which was resupplied after Syrian veiled signals of a possible 
rapproachement with Iraq,’” they differed increasingly on the ground in
’” The dispute came over Syrian objections to Iran's high prices of discount^ oil and 
Iran's complaints over Syrian non-payment of a $2.3 billion oil debt. See: Foreign Report,
June 19, 1986. Also see: Economist, May 3, 1986; International Herald Tribune, June 10, 1986; 
Middle East International, June 27, 1986; and Associated Press, April 25, 1988. For 
intelligence on Iranian-Syrian dispute, see: Peter Kombluh and Malcolm Byrne, (1993), 
op.cit.: p.293.
’” See: Yosef Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik", in 
David Menashri (ed.) (1990), op.cit.: p.183.
See: Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1986, pp.619-21. While Syria remained 
isolated, Iran continued negotiations with the US over the release of Iranian assets in 
American banks between December 1986 and mid-1987, see: New York Times, December 26, 1986; and 
Ha'aretz, October 16, 1987.
For the revelation, see: al-Dustur, December 22, 1986; Arab News, December 6, 1986; 
al-Ahd, November 16, 1986; and al-Ahd, Novmber 21, 1986.
After Syria's veiled threat, Iran supplied Syria with 2.5 million tons to cover a 
period of six montlis until March 1987, see: BBC/SWB, July 22, 1986; and Middle East 
International, June 27, 1986. However, Syria's threat of rapproachement with Iraq led also to 
the kidnapping of Maiimud Ayat, the Syrian charge d'affairs in Iran, see: Middle East, April 
1987; and Washington Post, February 4, 1987.
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Lebanon over Hizb'allah's activity and designs for the future of Lebanon.”’ 
This was exacerbated by Syrian disillusionment with Iranian dealings with 
the US through secret arms-for-hostages deals as well as Iran's significant 
extension of financial and military support to the Hizb'allah and its rapid 
expansion of recruitment within the Lebanese Shi'a community at the expense 
of pro-Syrian Amal.”’
Although the al-Shira revelation of the U.S.-Iranian arms-for-hostages 
signified tension in the Iranian-Syrian relationship, it also revealed the 
imposition of Iranian clerical factionalism over Hizb'allah activity in 
Lebanon.”* Apart from the three anti-American abductions by Hizb'allah in 
September-October 1986, which undermined any U.S.-Iranian rapproachement, 
Hizb'allah's unprecedented campaign of abductions in January 1987 led to a 
direct Syrian military intervention and clashes with Hizb'allah fighters in 
Beirut.”" While the abductions of four Americans, a Frenchman, and a British 
citizen were motivated as a response to the arrest of leading SSA operatives 
in Europe, which coincided with a series of Iranian attempts to undermine 
Kuwait's hosting of the Islamic Conference Organization,”" Syria-'s action
See: Asad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.: pp.13-6.
”’ See: International Herald Tribune, July 20, 1987; The Sunday Times, December 13, 
1987; Teheran Times, February 16, 1984; Middle East International, No.315 (Decanber 19, 1987); 
Financial Times, July 25, 1987; al-Dustur, October 14, 1985; Jerusalon Post, July 22, 1987; 
and al-Musawwar, September 17, 1987.
”* See: FBIS, November 5, 1986; Bulvar, November 16, 1986; Marmara, November 25, 1986; 
and IRNA, March 18, 1987. Also see: Shireen T. Hunter, "After the Ayatollali", Foreign Policw 
Vol.66 (1987).
”" See: Ma'ariv, March 2, 1983; and Ha'aretz, July 23, 1987. It was also prompted by 
Hizb'allah abduction of Syrian soldiers, see: Ma'aretz, Febraury 13, 1987; New York Times, 
February 13, 1987; and Times, August 12, 1988.
”" On January 19, 1987, explosions against Kuwaiti oil installations led to the arrest 
of eleven Slii'ite Kuwaitis with Iranian origin, see: New York Times, Febraury 1, 1987; and 
Arab News, April 5, 1987. Hie abduction of Western foreigners by Hizb'allah was used to 
threaten the Islamic sunniit due to be held on January 26, 1987, see: New York Times, January' 
18, 1987. Hizb'allali also kidnapped a Saudi diplomat in Beirut connected with the Islamic 
Summit in Kuwait, see: Yediot Aharanot, January 14, 1987; and International Herald Tribune,
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against the movement, without prior discussions with Iran, signalled an 
effort to restore its relations with Western governments by acting to resolve 
the hostage-problem as well as to reassert its authority over Lebanon by 
limiting the movement's activity in Beirut.”’ These tensions assumed the form 
of protracted Amal-Hizb'allah warfare in Beirut and in southern Lebanon and 
retaliatory attacks between Hizb'allah and Syrian military units.’” The 
restrictions on the Hizb'allah's freedom of movement and activity led it to 
a re-orientation from hostage-taking activity to armed confrontation against 
Israel, as evident by the substantial military and financial support from 
Iran for the movement's shift from clandestine guerilla operations to semi­
regular military units.’” As evident by the abduction of an American citizen 
in June 1987, Syria opposed*any challenges to its control of Beirut and 
mounted extensive searches for Jthe hostages while placing pressure on the 
Pasdaran contingent by confining it to the Biq'a area.”" While the abduction
March 19, 1987,
”’ Syria killed 18 Hizb'allah members in Beirut, see: Middle East Economic Digest, 
February 28, 1987; and al-Anwar, February 24, 1987. For Iran's vehement opposition to Syrian 
action, see: Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1987: pp.643-5; and BBC/SWB, June 27, 1987. Also 
see: New York Times, June 27, 1987; and Daniel Pipes, "Terrorism: The Syrian Connection", 
National Interest No.15 (Spring 1989): pp.15-38.
See: Newsweek, February 23, 1987. Hizb'allah also attacked and kidnapped 14 SiTian 
soldiers in the Shi'ite suburb of al-Basta, see: Ma'aretz, February 13, 1987; Washington Post, 
February 12, 1987; New York Times, February 13, 1987; and Times, August 12, 1988.
See: Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1987: pp.418-19; 643-45; al-Rav', December 
27, 1987; Jerusalem Post, Novmber 13, 1987; Ha'aretz, June 21, 1987; and Newsweek, August 24,
1987. As a conciliatory measure to Iran, Syria promised support to Hizb'allah in its war with 
Israel in the South by supplying weaponry to the movement, to allow Hizb'allah fighters to be 
deployed in the South and allow Iranian Pasdaran to establish coatnand posts in the South, see: 
Ma'aretz, June 14, 1987; and Ma'aretz, June 15, 1987.
See: Wasliington Post, June 30, 1987; and International Herald Tribune, June 20,
1987. In fact, the Syrian military signalled a preparedness to attack the Iranian Qnbassy in 
Beirut to rescue hostages, see: Ma'aretz, March 18, 1987. For Syrian threats of the use of 
force against Hizb'allah to free hostages: Ma'aretz, June 22, 1987; and SANA, August 18, 1987. 
As revealed by the hostages, the Hizb'allah also increased the security in the detention of 
hostages following Syrian military intervention against the movement in 1987, see: Le Matin, 
January 29, 1987; and Ha'aretz, January 30, 1987. The French hostages were held under stricter 
supervision following Syrian intervention in February 1987, see: Jerusalem Post, December 7,
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was considered to be a reaction by Iran to the U.S. expanded role in the Gulf 
(protecting reflagged Kuwaiti, tankers)”’ it signified that Hizb'allah ab­
duction of Western foreigners was directly incompatible with Syrian efforts 
to consolidate its hegemony over Lebanon.”’ As a result, Hizb'allah could no 
longer count on Syrian tacit co-operation in the abduction of Western 
foreigners as Syria threatened direct military action against the movement 
while it made gestures to improve its relationships with Western governments
and pressure Iran in negotiations over oil supply,”’ The friction between 
Iran and Syria over the limitation on Hizb'allah activity and Syrian efforts 
to break its own isolation, not only towards the West but also Arab states,”’ 
was clearly evident by Iranian requests for assurances that any hostage 
release would circumvent th&* possibility of Syrian custody and credit for 
their release.”’ It also led to the establishment of a Hizb'allah unit in
1988.
According to US officials, the abduction was in response to the "reflagging" policy 
the US started to conduct in the Persian (Ailf and it had intercepted radio messages from Iran 
ordering the abduction of Charles Glass, see: Washington Post, June 20, 1987; Ma'aretz, July 
10, 1987; and Washington Post, June 21, 1988.
According to the Syrian foreign minister, the abduction of the hostage was an 
"unacceptable challenge" to Syria, see: SANA, August 18, 1987.
While Iran's agreement with Syria over oil supply was due for negotiation and
renewal in March 1987, Syria and Iran had disagreements over Syria's failiure to repay its oil
debt to Iran, see: Economist, March 14, 1987; and Financial Times, May 5, 1987. In April 1987, 
a one-year agreonent was reached for the supply of Im tons of oil free of charge to the Syrian 
army and 2n tons at OPEC prices on a cash-payment basis, see: OPEC Bulletin, June 1987; and 
New York Times, May 5, 1987.
”’ For Syria's exploitation of its relationship with Iran through economic inducements 
from the Arab world, see: International Herald Tribune, July 18-19, 1987. As a result, Iran 
extended Syria's debt payments and agreed to supply 20,000 barrels/day of free oil, see: 
Observer, November 1, 1987; Hie Times, November 5, 1987; and Economist, Septenber 26, 1987.
”’ Iran specifically promised France the release of two hostages if they were not
taken to Damascus in order for Syria to claim that it gained their release, see: al-Watan al-
Arabi, December 11, 1987.
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Beirut to challenge Syria through direct military operations.”" Consequently, 
due to the tight Syrian security over Beirut, the Hizb'allah was forced to 
abstain from any new abduction of Western foreigners rather, it used pre­
viously kidnapped hostages as a useful leverage against Iran's enemies, 
especially in the case of it's intensified dispute with France in June 1987 
over French arrests of a Hizb'allah network”’ and siege of the Iranian 
Embassy in Paris, which lead to the rupture of their diplomatic relations on 
July 17, 1987.”" Although the diplomatic confrontation between Iran and 
France was ostensibly over the release of Wahid Gordji and arrested 
Hizb'allah members, it also concerned demands by Iran for the repayment of 
a $1.5 billion Eurodiff loan and the halt of future French arms shipments 
to Iraq, especially the delay in delivery of twenty Mirage fighter aircraft 
due in Iraq in 1988.”" Furthermore, Iran also requested a reduction in the 
French naval presence in the Persian Gulf as well as the expulsion of a 
number of anti-Khumayynl activists and Iranian opposition leaders living in
”" See: Davar, November 11, 1987.
”’ For the arrest of the Hizb'allah network, most notably SheiJdi Ibrahim al-Amin's 
nephew, see: International Herald Tribune, March 27, 1987; Le Nouvel Observateur, June 12-18, 
1987; L'Evénement du Jeudi, June 11-17, 1987; Le Soir, March 1987; Ha'aretz, April 5, 1988;
The diplomatie crisis emerged after French authorities demanded to investigate an 
Iranian representative, Wahid Gordji, who was hiding in the Iranian Embassy in Paris, for his 
involvement in the 1986 September bombings in Paris, see: Le ftonde. May 6, 1988; Hadashot,
July 19, 1987; Jeune Afrique, November 30, 1988; Le Point, June 15, 1987; Le Nouvel 
Observateur, June 12-18, 1987; New York Times, July 17, 1987; Washington Post, July 18, 1987; 
Wall Stræt Journal, July 23, 1987; New York Times, July 24, 1987; and Yediot Aharanot. July 
20, 1987. Also see: |BIS, July 24, 1987.
”" Iran claimed the Eurodiff loan exceeded $2 billion, including interest, see: 
Jerusalem Post, December 1, 1987. Iran also demanded an end to the oil boycott for purchases 
by France of Iraniai oil, see: New York Times, December 12, 1987. France ended its oil embargo 
with Iran in early December 1988, see: New York Times, December 5, 1988. Also see: Observer, 
December 6, 1987; Economist, May 7, 1988; International Herald Tribune, May 19, 1988;
Ma'aretz, May 8, 1988; International Herald Tribune, May 6, 1988; Jerusalem Post, December 7, 
1987; and Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1987.
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France,”" The Iranian-French "embassy war" was defused after the exhange of 
Wahid Gordji for the retaliatory detention of French consul, Paul Torri, in 
Iran in November 1987.”’
While the Hizb'allah abduction of British citizen, Terry Waite, in 
January 1987 had occurred in response to the intermediary's inability to make 
any progress in the case of the al-J)a'wa prisoners in Kuwait,”’ it resulted 
in serious friction between Syria and Iran, most notably through threats of 
Syrian military action against Iran's Embassy in Beirut where Waite was 
allegedly held before transferred to the Biq'a.”’ Although Syria attempted 
to obtain the release of Terry Waite in an effort to restore its relations 
with Great Britain (Anglo-Iranian relations deteriorated with a diplomatic 
crisis in May 1987),”’ it became clear that the fate of all British hostages 
was intertwined with Iranian demands for the release of the four Iranians 
missing since 1982 as well as the withdrawal of British warships from the
”" See: Washington Post, December 8, 1987; New York Times, December 9, 1987; FBIS, 
January 15, 1988,
las See: Washington Post, November 30, 1987; and Arab News, December 1, 1987.
”’ The abduction of Terry Waite occurred symbolically only four days before the 
hosting by Kuwait of the Islamic Conference Organisation. For reasons relating to the 
abduction of Waite, see: International Herald Tribune, January 28, 1987; and International 
Herald Tribune, February 5, 1987.
”’ For Syrian threats against Iran, see: International Herald Tribune, February 9, 
1987; and Ma'aretz, Mardi 24, 1987.
”’ The diplomatic crisis, the so-called "Chaplin Affair", steamed from the abduction 
and beating of Edward Chaplin, Britain's second ranking diplomat, by Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards in Iran, on May 28, after the arrest of an Iranian diplomat in Manchester on charges of 
shoplifting, see: FBIS, May 29, 1987. In response, Britain closed the Iranian consulate in 
Manchester and expelled five Iranian diplomats which led to the retaliatory expulsion of five 
British diplomats from Iran, see: New York Times, June 5, 1987; FBIS, June 9, 1987; and 
Washington Post, June 11, 1987.
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Persian Gulf and the resumption of normal and full diplomatic relations,”’ 
As Iranian hostility towards Britain's participation in US naval Gulf ope­
rations in August 1987 resulted in the closure of Iranian arms procurement 
offices in London,”’ Iran focused on the issue of the four missing Iranians 
as a means of leverage to restore Anglo-Iranian diplomatic relations.”’
While Syria also linked efforts to release the British hostages with 
resumption of diplomatic relations, it concentrated on pressuring the
Hizb'allah on the issue of the American hostages through coercion as a means 
of normalising relations with the American administration as well as con­
taining Hizb'allah's con-tinued expansion and incompatible activity with 
Syrian interests in Lebanon.”" In the case of the abduction of four American 
hostages in January 1987, it would appear that the Hizb'allah initiated these 
kidnappings for its own organisational reasons, which was marked by its close 
solidarity with the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories as shown 
by the nature of the demands as well as by the emergence of a new nom dé 
guerre.”" Rather than in alignment with Iranian motivations, especially as 
the movement's most loyal radical allies within Iran's clerical establishment
See: International Herald Tribune, March 17, 1987; g ,  April 11, 1988; Jerusalem 
Post, August 2, 1988; and Hadashot, June 23, 1988.
See: George Joffe, "Iran, the Southern Mediterranean and Europe: Terrorism and 
Hostages", in Anoushiravan Elitesharai and Manshour Varasteh (eds,), (1991), op.cit.: p.80. For 
Iranian demands for the renewal of British weapons supplies, see: Ma'aretz, December 6, 1987.
”’ For Hizb'allah's demands in the case of the British hostages concerning the release 
of the four' missing Iranians, see: International Herald Tribune, March 17, 1987; BBC, January 
12, BBC/SWB April 11, 1988; Teheran TV, March 24, 1988; Jerusalem Post, August 22, 1988; 
Hadashot, June 23, 1988; and Ma'aretz, November 4, 1988;
See: Asad AbuKlialil, (1990), op.cit.: p. 14.
For the demands by the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine for the 
release of 310 Shi'ites and 90 Palestinians in Israel, see: Jerusalem Post, February 1, 1987; 
Yediot Aharanot, February 8, 1987; International Herald Tribune, February 11, 1987; Jerusaletn 
Post, December 20, 1987; and International Herald Tribune, February 2, 1988.
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were relegated to the background”" at a time when Iran attempted to exert 
more control over the Hizb'alllah while it was engaged in negotiations with 
the American administration over the release of Iranian assets.”’ As these 
abductions were clearly incompatible with Syrian efforts to extend its hege­
mony over Lebanon, leading to tension and friction in the Iranian-Syrian 
alliance, the Hizb’allah's new-found solidarity with the Palestinian up­
rising, by connecting Israel to the hostage-issue, suited Iranian interests 
as leverage in the economic and political realm against the American admi­
nistration's refusal to release frozen Iranian assets and to limit its 
military intervention in the Persian Gulf.”’
Notwithstanding the convergence of motivations between Hizb'allah and 
Iran in these abductions, the movement's hostage-taking activity was not only 
a direct challenge to Syrian efforts to consolidate control over Lebanon but 
also served to highlight the underlying friction between Syria and Iran, 
especially in terms of using Lebanon in their own individual foreign policy 
agendas.”’ Iran's diplomatic intervention in the "war of the camps" in late 
1986”* and its support for anti-Syrian Sunni movements in Lebanon, most
”" This relates to the disputes of controlling the Office of Islamic Movements between 
radical and more pragmatic Iranian clergy in December 1986, see: Bruce Hoffman, (1990), 
op.cit.
”’ See: Ha'aretz, October 16, 1987; and Times, June 8, 1988,
”’ See: International Herald Tribune, July 29, 1988; International Herald Tribune,
July 6, 1987; Times, June 8, 1986; and Ha'aretz, August 29, 1988. Also see: Eric Hooglund,
"The Islamic Republic at War and Peace", Middle East Report, Vol. 19, No.l (January-February
1989).
”’ See: Yosef Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik", in
David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.184-5.
”* See: Voice of Lebanon, December 10, 1986.
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notably the Tawhid movement in Tripoli/” reinforced the fact that Iran and 
Syria often worked without consideration for each other's individual agendas 
in Lebanon.”’ While tension between Iran and Syria over Lebanon was high­
lighted by requests from Syria to Iran of the handing over of Imad 
Mughniyya/” Iran's challenge to Syrian hegemony was most evident by the 
protracted warfare between Amal and Hizb'allah, which was initiated with the 
abduction of Lt, Col. William Higgins by the Hizb'allah in February 1988.”" 
While the Amal-Hizb'allah warfare surfaced the tensions between Iran and 
Syria in the challenge by their proxies for control over Beirut and southern 
Lebanon, Iranian control over the movement was increasingly difficult to 
maintain as revealed by Hizb'allah's continued confrontation with Amal 
despite Iranian efforts to médiate a solution between the warring Shi'a fac­
tions.”’ Apart from being a direct affront to Amal's security position, this 
was clear from the fact that Hizb'allah concentrated on internal Lebanese 
issues directed against Israel, most notably the withdrawal of Israel's 
military from Lebanon and the release of all Lebanese and Palestinians held
For a useful overview of Harakat al-ta^Md al-islam and its links with Iran, see: 
Marius Deeb, (1988), op.cit.: pp.7-10.-Also see: Radio Free Lebanon, December 24, 1986.
ISO See: Asad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.: pp.14-6.
For Syrian requests to Iran and warrant against Mughniyya, see: FBIS, January 25, 
1988; and Ha'aretz, January 29, 1988. For Mugniyya's stay in Iran, see: al-Itthiad al-Ubushi, 
January 15, 1988; al-Itthiad al-Ubushi, January 31, 1988; Davar, February 1; and Independent, 
April 26, 1988.
See: Augustus Richard Norton, "The Internal Conflict and the Iranian Connection", 
in John L. Esposito (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.130-32. Also see: FBIS, March 29, 1988; Foreign 
Report, March 17, 1988; International Herald Tribune, February 20, 1988; and Ha'aretz.
February 18, 1988.
See: Kenneth Katzman, (1993), op.cit.: p.135; and al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 18,
1989.
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by Israel and SLA in the detention camps in south Lebanon/” and to undermine 
the possibility of any Syrian participation in a US-led Middle East peace 
initiative/" In particular, Hizb’allah members protested against the tour 
of US envoys to Syria and Lebanon by marching in the streets while calling 
for the execution of kidnapped Lt.Col. William Higgins/" Although the kid­
napping of the American hostage seems to have been initiated by the move­
ment itself in order to confront Amal's hegemony in southern Lebanon and the
presence of UNIFIL,’" it was also used by Hizb'allah and Iran in an attempt 
to sabotage the rapproachement between Syria and the American administration, 
as evidenced by the visit of Richard Murphy, the US undersecretary for the 
Near East, to Syria in February-March 1988/" Furthermore, the concentration 
in use of American hostages by Iran was also a reflection of the release of 
France's last hostages in May 1988, on the eve of the French presidential 
elections, after agreement between Iran and France to settle certain out­
standing differences/"
For demands, see: Jerusalem Post, February 19, 1988; Jerusalan Post, February 21, 
1988; International Herald Tribune, February 23, 1988; International Herald Tribune, February 
20, 1988; and Ha'aretz, February 19, 1988.
’" See: TO, February 29, 1988. This is supported by the fact that the Hizb'allah 
repeatedly rejected any American envoys (Slrultz) or intervention in Lebanon in an "effort to 
contain the uprising in the occupied territories, see: Voice of Resistance, February 19, 1988; 
and-Washington Post, April 4, 1988.
IÎ5 See: Washington Times, February 25, 1988.
Apart frcm obstructing Hizb'allah's resistance against Israel, UNIFIL was accused 
of serving as a front for Western intelligence agencies. In particular. Sheikh Fadlallah 
claimed the French UNIFIL team was conducting large-scale surveys on the political and 
sectarian affiliations of the inhabitants of south Lebanon, see: Voice of Hope, February 27, 
1988.
For discussions on political reform for Lebanon between Asad and Murphy, see: Dilip 
Hiro, (1993), op.cit.: pp.130-32.
France repaid over $300 million in a second tranche of the Eurodiff loan in May 
1988 (the first ocauTed in early 1987), see: Ma'ariv, May 8, 1988; Newsweek, May 16, 1988; 
and Steve M. Berry, "The Release of France's Last Hostages in Lebanon: An Analysis", TVE 
Report, Volume 8, No.3 (1989): pp.19-22; and Luc Chavin, "Fi’ench Diplomacy and the Hostage
232
While the abduction of Lt.Col. William Higgins served as a pretext for 
a Syrian effort to crackdown on the Hizb'allah through its proxy Amal in the 
South, in order to advance its designs in Lebanon by demonstrating to the 
American administration that it was firmly committed to confronting Shi'a 
extremism in the form of Hizb'allah abductions of foreigners and uncontrolled 
attacks against Israel, Syria was forced to intervene militarily in order to 
rescue Amal from defeat in Beirut.”’ Despite the fact that Syria rejected 
Iranian offers of the insertion of a joint Iranian-Syrian security force in 
Beirut, Syria had to pursue a conciliatory policy towards the Hizb'allah in 
order to avoid an escalation of tension in the Iranian-Syrian relationship, 
evidenced by the Syrian-sponsored May 1988 agreement which implicitly allowed 
the Hizb'allah to resume its activities in southern Lebanon.”’ The Amal- 
Hizb 'allah cease-fire agreement, sponsored by Syria and Iran, came after the 
conclusion of a renewed one-year oil agreement in April 1988, in which Iran 
agreed to supply one million tons of oil free of charge to Syria.”’ However, 
the continued intra-Shi'ite warfare between Hizb'allah and Amal over the 
control of southern Lebanon revealed that the movement displayed-a greater 
degree of autonomy from previosuly excerted Iranian influence as Iranian
Crises", in Barry Rubin (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.99-104. According to Slieikh Fadlallah, the 
United States as well as the United Kingdom and other states should adopt the policies 
conducted by France, which brought about the release of all its hostages, see: al-Dustur,
March 9, 1989.
”’ See: Middle East International, March 2, 1990. For Hizb'allah's hostile reaction to 
the Syrian deployment of military forces in Beirut, see: Jerusalem Post, March 9, 1987.
See: FBIS, May 23, 1988; New York Times, May 13, 1988; and al-Safir, May 27, 1988. 
Also see: Voice of the Oppressed 0930 gmt 2 Jun 88 - BBC/SWB/ME/0169, June 4, 1988. In 
particular. Sheikh Fadlallali announced Hizb'allah had "no strategic disagreenent" with Syria, 
see: Ha'aretz, May 16, 1988; and al-Shira, June 5, 1988.
162 See: Associated Press, April 25, 1988.
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attempts to mediate between the two warring factions proved unsuccessful/" 
Apart from the continued importance of Iran's supply of oil to Syria for the 
Iranian-Syrian alliance/” any differences between Iran and Syria were 
reduced by a common agenda to confront Iraq's involvement with various mili­
tias in Lebanon, in the aftermath of Iran's acceptance of UN Resolution 598 
for a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war, by unifying Amal-Hizb'allah differences 
against a common enemy.”’ While the Iranian volte-face over its war with Iraq 
and elsewhere, under the consolidated leadership of Rafsanjani, created 
dissilusionment within the ranks of the Hizb'allah over the achievement of 
its broader pan-Islamic goals,”* Iran's more moderate officials had diffi­
culty in restraining Hizb'allah against Amal in order to avoid tension in its 
relationship with Syria.”’ In addition, Iranian pressure on Syria through 
earlier dependence on oil had lost most of its effect as Syria had received 
no deliveries of free oil from Iran since the end of 1988 and intended no
”’ See: FBIS, August 28, 1990. For information on the role of Iranian Besharati as the 
main mediator of negotiations between Amal and Hizb'allah, see: New York Times, December 29, 
1989; and al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 18, 1989. For Iranian-Syrian mediation, see: FBIS, April 
28, 1988; and Washington Post, May 9, 1988. For Hizb'allah clashes with Syrian military, see: 
New York Times, May 14, 1988.
See: Middle East Economic Survey, Vol.32, No. 17 (January 30, 1989); Eteonoraist 
Intelligence Unit, Syria Country Profile, 1989-90: p.32; and Volker Perthes, "The Syrian 
Economy in the 1980s", Middle East Studies, Vol.46, No.l (Winter 1992): p.57.
On Iraq's involvanent in Lebanon, see: FBIS, November 18, 1988; Middle East Report, 
July 28, 1988; Hie Guardian, October 19, 1988; Asad AbuKhalil, (1991), op.cit.: p.400.
”* See: al-Nahar, July 22, 1988; al-Muntalaq, September 1988; and Ma'aretz, August 24, 
1988. However, Sheikli Fadlallali softened his tone towards the US after Iran's acceptance of a 
cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war and ceased calling it the "big satan", see: Ma'aretz, August 
24, 1988.
”’ For Rafsanjani's own admission of the difficulty of restraining Hizb'allah as well 
as its loyalty to Mohtashemi, see: Washington Post, Januaiy 7, 1990; and Washington Post, 
January 8, 1990. Also see: Middle East International, January 20, 1989. For example, 
Hizb'allali also pursued an assassination attempt on the most senior Syrian military officers 
in May 1988 despite Iranian-SiTian agreement for the deployment of Syrian forces into Beirut, 
see: Washington Post, May 27, 1988.
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additional purchases of Iranian oil at preferential OPEC prices, a reflec­
tion of increased Syrian self-sufficiency from the Deir ez-Zor oil production 
fields.”*
The common interests between Iran, which desperately needed to attract 
foreign investment and improve relations with the West in order to repair its 
war-ravaged economy, and Syria, which also needed to compensate for the 
reduction of Soviet support by better relations with the US administration 
and for the consolidation of its hegemony over Lebanon, led to a united front 
against the Hizb’allah, under the threat of Syrian military intervention 
which forced the movement to accept a political and military agreement with 
Amal in January 1989.”* Under the accord, Hizb'allah was hindered in any 
planned future abduction of any more Western foreign hostages as it would 
directly contravene the clauses granting security control in Beirut to Syria 
and in the South of Lebanon to Amal.”’ It would also appear that Syria 
pressed the Hizb'allah for the prevention of any release of British hostages 
as long as Britain was unwilling to restore full diplomatic relations with 
Syria.”’ At the same time Iran had moved to broaden its relations with other 
Shi'ite movements in Lebanon in an effort to unify forces against Iraq's in-
”* For a statement by the Syrian Minister of Petroleum, see: For a detailed account of 
Syrian indigenous oil supply and production, see: Middle East International, March 31, 1989; 
and Financial Times, June 6, 1989. For Syrian-Iranian relations and oil, see: Middle East 
International, November 17, 1989.
”’ See: Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and Syria: From Hostility to Limited Alliance", in 
Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: p.210; John L. Esposito, 
(1991), op.cit.: 1991): p.256; New York Times, May 17, 1988; and Middle East International, 
February 3, 1989. For the agreement, see: SANA in Arabic 1435 gmt 30 Jan 89 - SWB ME/0373, 
February 1, 1989, Also see: Middle East International, February 3, 1989; and Middle East 
International, March 31, 1989.
”’ See: Abbas al-Misawi stated that the agreement signed between Amal and Hizb'allah 
permits them to "canplement each other in anti-Israeli activities in southern Lebanon. We are 
going to help Amal in their political struggle and they will support us in (anti-Israeli) 
resistance, see: Jerusalem Post, February 3, 1989.
”’ See: Middle East International, February 17, 1989.
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volvement in Lebanon/” while it also attempted to exploit internal divisions 
within the Hizb'allah in an effort to achieve the release of some Western 
hostages as a leverage to advance its more moderate foreign policy/” 
However, both strategies proved difficult to accomplish for the Iranian po­
litical leadership as other Shi'ite movements were less susceptible than
Hizb'allah to Iranian influence and as the then current Hizb'allah leadership 
under the command of Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli was more inclined to take orders
from the Iranian revolutionist faction than from Rafsanjani/”
Iran's problem of excerting pressure on the Hizb'allah to release a few 
of its Western hostages for foreign policy gains in the international arena 
was over-shadowed by more important developments in Lebanon, most notably by 
challenges to Syrian hegemony and the conclusion of the Syrian-sponsored 
Ta'if agreement, and within Ira*n itself, most importantly by the death of 
Ayatollah Khumayynl and the ascendancy of Rafsanjani to the political leader­
ship at the expense of the revolutionist faction/” Although the issue of 
the Western hostages was briefly elevated by Israel's kidnapping of Sheikh 
Obeid in the summer of 1989, it was also relegated against the background of 
Syria's preoccupation with the challenges presented by General Aoun's "war 
of liberation" against the Syrian presence in Lebanon and the changes in
’” For Iranian efforts for intra-Shi'a unity, see: Middle East International. October 
20, 1989. Also see:
See: Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and 
Constraints", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar, (1993), op.cit. : pp.188-9. Also see: 
Ma'aretz, August 23, 1988.
See: al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989; Independent, August 
10, 1991; and Middle East International, January 20, 1989. The killing of Lt.Col. Higgins has 
been seen by analysts as carried out on the oixlers of Mohtashemi within the framework of an 
Iranian power-struggle to undermine any improvement in Iranian-US relations as well as in 
Iranian-Amal relations, see: Middle East International, August 4, 1989.
See: Washington Post, August 18, 1989; and al-Anba, November 27, 1989. Also see: 
Augustus Richard Norton, (1991), op.cit.: pp.457-73.
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Iran's political leadership as well as by the Salman Rushdie affair.”* While 
a closer Iranian-Syrian alliance emerged in Lebanon to counter Iraq and 
support for the regime of Aoun/” a common rejection of the Ta'if agreement 
unified the positions of Iran and the Hizb'allah in Lebanon, especially as 
the movement would become the main casualty of the Syrian-sponsored agreement 
and Iran would lose most of its influence in Lebanon'.*”*
On the ground, however, Iranian-Hizb'allah relations diverged over the 
issue of continued intra-Shi'ite warfare between the movement and Amal in 
southern Lebanon as well as over refusals by the Hizb'allah's to release any 
foreign hostages.”* As a result, tension between the Hizb'allah and Iran was 
heightened by the decision of Rafsanjani to both downgrade financial support 
for the movement while ousting radical Iranian elements advocating the export 
of the revolution, most notably ]%izb'allah's mentor Ali Akhbar Mohtashemi who 
lost his position as interior minister in 1989.”* However, the clerical 
factionalism within Iran was projected not only onto the issue of the foreign
”* See: Middle East International. October 20, 1989. Prior to his death in 1989, 
Ayatollah Khomayyni's fatwa against the Indian-born British author led to serious 
confrontation in Iranian-British relations, see: James P. Piscatori, "Ihe Rushdie Affair and 
the Politics of Ambiguity", International Affairs, Vol.66 (1990): pp.767-89.
See: Middle East International, July 21, 1989; and (kiardian, October 12, 1988.
Abbas al-Musam, Amal's Nabih Berri and the Foreign Ministers of Iran and Syria met in 
Damascus to discuss cooperation against the Christian militia and General Aoun, see: Davar, 
April 3, 1989.
”* For Iran's criticism of Ta'if, see: FBIS, November 7, 1989; and John Calabrese, 
"Iran II: the Damascus Cbnnection", World Today, op.cit.: p.189. For Hizb'allah's rejection of 
the Ta'if agreement, see: New York Times. September 27, 1989; New York Times, October 5, 1989; 
and FBIS, October 25, 1989. Also see: Middle East International, October 6, 1989; and Middle 
East International, Jæuary 5, 1990.
”* See: Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989; al-Hayat, Novmber 27, 1989; and FBIS, Novonber 
30, 1989.
”* According to reports, Iran reduced its financial support to Hizb'allah from $5 
million a month to $1 million a month, see: Washington Post, January 1, 1990. Also see: Middle 
East International, August 4, 1989; Middle East International, August 25, 1989; Middle East 
International, November 17, 1989;
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hostages in Lebanon but was also mirrored in Hizb'allah's clerical leader­
ship, divided by the position and future direction of the movement in a post- 
civil war phase of Lebanon's political and military environment under 
stricter Syrian control.”’
Hizb'allah's opposition to the Ta'if agreement was not only based on the
creation of a barrier to the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon but 
also to the plan for comprehensive disarmament of all militias.”’ While the
Hizb'allah came under pressure from Syria, through military intervention 
against the movement in search for the hostages while it blocked the movement 
of the IRGC units in the Biq'a, and from Iran, through the reduction of 
financial and military support and the attempt to control the IRGC by 
assignment of loyal units to Rafsanjani,”’ it became apparent that Syria was 
staunchly committed to the implementation of the Ta'if agreement to the 
extent that it would be willing to sacrifice Hizb'allah's political and 
military presence in the process.’” At the same time, it was equally clear 
that Iran was unwilling to abandon the Hizb'allah to the wolves of Lebanese 
politics, mainly because of its enourmous financial investments in the move­
ment for the expansion of the Shi*a base and as it represented the only 
means to participate effectively in the Arab-Israeli conflict.’” Although
”’ See: Middle East International, May 11, 1990; al-Anba, Novmber 27, 1989; al-Hayat, 
November 27, 1989; and Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989.
See: Voice of the Oppressed 0630 gmt 24 Mar 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1030, March 26, 1991.
’” For Syrian and Iranian pressure, see: Washington Post, September 22, 1988; New York 
Times, Januaiy 23, 1990; Hie Echo of Iran, February 1990; al-Maiallah, April 19-25, 1989; New 
York Times, January 23, 1990; Washington Post, January 8, 1990; and Middle East 
International, March 16, 1990.
184 See: Augustus Richard Norton, (1991), op.cit.: pp.470-3.
’” See: Middle East International, October 6, 1989; Middle East International, March 
2, 1990; and Middle East International, July 26, 1991.
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this prevented Syria from any immediate attempts to eliminate the Hizb’allah, 
the hostage issue became increasingly subject to Iranian clerical factiona­
lism while vital as a bargaining instrument for the movement to ensure its 
position within Lebanon, especially as Syria gradually moved towards full 
implementation of the Ta'if accord/” This became evident by the renewed
efforts to enforce an agreement by Syria and Iran in the intra-Shi'ite con­
flict between Hizb'allah and Amal on November 5, 1990, which reaffirmed the
earlier principles and agreements reached in 1988 and 1989/" However, the 
dramatic shifts in the regional political context following Iraq's invasion 
of Kuwait in August 1990, coupled with the extension of Syrian hegemony in 
Lebanon, overshadowed temporarily any urgency for either Iran and Syria to 
force the Hizb'allah to hand over its Western hostages/”
Apart from providing the Hizb'allah with a detraction from the hostage- 
issue in Lebanon while it displayed strong solidarity with the fate of Iraqi 
Shi'ites,”* the Gulf crisis also provided Iran and Syria with a window of 
opportunity to break their isolation by repairing relations with Arab states
”* For Iranian factionalism on Hizb'allah in early 1990, see: Middle East 
International, May 11, 1990. For hostages as bargaining instrument, see: Middle East 
International, May 3, 1991;
”’ For a text of the agreement, see: Syrian Arab TV, Damascus 1840 gmt 5 Nov 90 - 
BBC/SWB/ME/0915, Novenber 7, 1990. For Amal-Hizb'allah agreement, see: Middle East 
International, November 9, 1990; Syrian Arab Republic Radio, Damascus 0515 gmt 6 Nov 90 - 
BBC/SWB/ME/0915, Novonber 7, 1990; Middle East Reporter, November 16, 1990; and Vision of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 1600 gmt 6 Nov 90 - BBC/SWB/ME/0916, November 8, 1990.
”* For a brief overview of developments, see: Farhang Jalianpour, (1992), op.cit. : 
pp.33-36. Also see: Financial Times, August 9, 1991.
”* For Hizb'allah's concern for their co-religionists in Iraq, see: Voice of the 
Oppressed 1250 gmt 5 Apr 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1040, April 8, 1991. Also see: Amatzia Baram, "From 
Radicalism to Radical Pragmatism: The Slii'ite Fundementalist Opposition Movements of Iraq", in 
James Piscatori (ed.) Islamic Findementalisms and the Gulf Crisis (Chicago, 111: The American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991): pp.28-51.
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and improve their image and position in the W e s t W h i l e  Syria had pre­
viously moved to improve relations with US regional allies, most notably 
Egypt, it exploited the Gulf crisis to gain recognition of its suzerainty 
over Lebanon and to extract financial aid and support from the Persian Gulf 
states by joining the US-lead coalition against Iraq and by using its in­
fluence over Iran to ensure either neutrality or, at least, non-cooperation 
between Iran and Iraq. In exchange, Syria facilitated mediation for Iran in 
an effort to improve the latter's relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. 
Iran managed also to benefit economically from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, 
as evident by the removal of sanctions by the EEC in October 1990 and in­
creased trade activity with Western governments.Although Iran and Syria 
managed to exploit the Gulf crisis for their own ends, a new source of in­
creased tension in the Iranian-gyrian alliance was revealed by Iran's cri­
ticism of the continous improvement in the US-Syrian relationship, while 
the US-Iranian remained frozen, and by Syrian flexibility towards Israel as 
well as its willingness to participate in the US-initiated Middle East peace 
p r o cess.In particular, Iran was fully aware that any improvement in 
Iranian-US relations, even gestures of reconciliation towards Iran, depended
See: Ephraim Kam, "The Gulf Crisis and the Arab Arena", in Shlcmo Gazit (ed.). The 
Middle East Military Balance (1990-1991), (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 
1992): pp.82-96. In November 1990, the United Kingdom resumed diplomatic relations with Iran 
broken off in March 1989 over fatwa on Rushdie, see: Middle East International, December 7, 
1990.
For Syrian mediation in Iranian-Egyptian and Iranian-Saudi relations, see: Middle 
East International, April 3, 1992; and Middle East International, June 12, 1992. For Iranian 
comments on the resumption of Iranian-Saudi relations on March 26, 1991, see: IRNA in English 
0916 gmt 26 Mar 91 - BBC/sm/ME/1033, March 29, 1991.
192 See: Middle East Economic Digest, Vol.34, No.45 (November 16, 1990).
For Iranian reactions to Syria's backing of US plans for a Middle East peace 
conference, see: Middle East International, July 26, 1991; and Voice of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, Teheran 1430 gmt 2 Aug 91 - SWB ME/1143, August 6, 1991. For Hizb'allah's condemna­
tion of any peace talks, see: Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 1430 gmt 2 Aug 91 
- SWB ME/1143, August 6, 1991.
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on obtaining the release of American hostages in Lebanon.As a result, 
Syria decided to permit the Hizb'allah to remained armed as a resistance 
movement, while it completed the disarmament of all other Lebanese militias 
in April 1991, in an agreement with both Iran, to reduce Iranian-Syrian 
tensions,^* and the Hizb'allah, as a means to find a resolution to the 
hostage crisis and to suit its strategic designs in Lebanon as well as within 
the framework of the Arab-Israeli peace conferences.^* The convergence of 
interest between Iran and Syria was also evident by Syria's permission to 
allow the presence of Pasdaran in Lebanon contrary to the Ta'if agreement.^” 
As Hizb'allah's dénouement of the hostage affair reflected the move­
ment's re-adjustment within Lebanon's post-war environment, by substituting 
hostage-taking and terrorism for armed resistance and a willingness to parti­
cipate within the democratic process, the comprehensive nature of the settle­
ment of the hostage problem revealed close co-operation between Syria and 
Iran, albeit for their own individual interests.Although Syria's decision 
to allow the Hizb'allah to remain armed coincided with the formal recognition 
of Syrian hegemony over Lebanon, through the conclusion of the Treaty of
See: Middle East International, June 28, 1991; Radio Lebanon, West Beirut 1715 gmt 
2 Apr 91 - BBC/SWB/MEA037, April 4, 1991; Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 
1600 gmt 5 Apr 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1040, April 8, 1991.
See: Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and Syria: From Hostility to Limited Alliance", in 
Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit. : p.210.
For the agreement, see: New York Times, April 30, 1991; Middle East International. 
May 3, 1991; and Voice of the Oppressed 0630 gmt 30 Apr 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1061, May 2, 1991.
197 See: New York Times, April 30, 1991.
For Hizb'allah comments on closer Iranian-Syrian ties, see: Voice of the Oppressed 
0630 gmt 27 Apr 91 - BBÇ/S#/^ ÎE/1058, April 29, 1991. Also see: Middle East International, 
August 16, 1991; In return for Hizb'allah's willingness to release hostages, Iran paid the 
movement US$ 86 million, see: Rolf Tophoven, "State-Supported Terrorism After Tlie Gulf War: 
The Role of Iran, Iraq and Libya", 9th International Conference on "Democracv Challenged and 
Put To The Test - The Problem of Combatting Terrorism, Drugs and Organized Crime" (London: 
Harms Seidel Foundation, August 1992): pp.226.
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Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination in May 1991,”’ Syria had a natural 
interest in securing a resolution to the foreign hostage problem, mainly in 
order to assure its role in the new regional order within the Arab-Israeli 
peace conferences as well as to attract Western economic relations and assi­
stance.”* In particular, this commitment was revealed by the unprecedented
Syrian security moves in Beirut in search for a kidnapped French citizen, 
abducted by a dissident Hizb'allah faction after the initial release of an
American and a British hostage in early August 1991.”*
While Iran's vehement opposition, in concert with the Hizb'allah, to 
Syrian endorsement of the US-sponsored Middle East peace negotiations,”* was 
manifest by a marked escalation in Hizb'allah attacks against Israel, Iranian 
interests in seeking a comprehensive resolution to the foreign hostage crisis 
was aligned to a carefully calibrated policy in the foreign policy arena. In 
an effort to achieve rapproachement with the West,”* Iran's decision to in­
volve the good offices of the UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, 
was not only chosen as the only available face-saving instrument for all 
parties involved in an overt process but also served to detract-from both 
Iranian and Hizb'allah subversive activity elsewhere as well as to advance 
Iran's own position vis-à-vis Iraq in disputes over the terms of UN
*” See: Middle East International, May 31, 1991. For Hizb'allah's praise of the 
agreement between Syria and Lebanon, see: Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 0930 
gmt 25 May 91 - BBC/S#/ME/1082, May 27, 1991; and Voice of the Oppressed 0530 gmt 23 May 91 - 
BBC/®/ME/1082, May 27, 1991.
200 See: Middle East International, October 11, 1991; and Time, August 19, 1991.
”* See: New York Times, August 8, 1991; New York Times, August 12, 1991; and Middle 
East International, August 16, 1991; and Guardian, August 10, 1991.
202 See: Middle East International, July 26, 1991.
See: The Times, August 13, 1991. For Iranian praise of Britain's handling of the 
hostage crisis, see: Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 0950 #t 13 Aug 91 - 
BBC/SWB/ME/1151, August 15, 1991.
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Resolution 598.*** While the involvement of the United Nations in the hostage 
negotiations provided the Hizb'allah with a useful shield, in the form of 
international attention, against unrestrained Israeli reprisals to the move­
ment's resistance activity,*** it also provided Iran with a diversion from its 
assassination campaign of political opponents abroad, as clearly evident by 
the killing of the Shah's last prime minister, Shapour Bakhtiar, in Paris 
which coincided with the initiation of the hostage release process in
Lebanon.*** Apart from also providing its proxy in Lebanon with tangible 
achievements, in the form of the exhange of Western hostages for Lebanese 
Shi'ites through pressure on Israel,*** Iran involved not only the United 
Nations from its previous successful mediation in the Gulf war between Iran 
and Iraq but also, more importantly, as a measure to bolster its position 
with the UN Secretary-General regarding the findings of UN Resolution 598, 
in particular the question of responsibility for starting the Iran-Iraq war.
*** See; Middle East International, August 16, 1991; Independent, October 22, 1991; The 
Times, September 12, 1991; Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 0930 gmt 30 Aug 91 - 
BBC/®/ME/1166, September 2, 1991; Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 1004 gmt 11 
Sep 91 - BBC/SWB/ME/1176, September 13, 1991; and The Echo of Iran, August/September 1991.
**’ For useful overview of Hizb'allah attacks both prior to and after the initiation of 
the hostage release process, see: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.: pp.198-9; and Jerusalem Report, 
August 1, 1991.
*** Around 1988, under the leadership of Ahmad Khomeini, an organisation was created 
with links to SAVAMA/VEVAK (the Vezarat-e Etela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar or the Ministry of 
Intelligence and Security) for the liquidation of political opponents abroad. After the Gulf 
war in 1991, Iran gave priority to the assassination of enemies to the Iranian regime, as 
evident by the killing of Abd al-Rahman Burumand, a close friend of Bakhtiar. For details of 
the Iranian assassination of Shapour Bakthiar, see: Ha'aretz, August 9, 1991; Le Figaro, 
October 4, 1991; L'Express, August 22, 1991; Le Quotidien de Paris. August 17-8, 1991; Middle 
East International, August 16, 1991; Le Figaro, Septanber 3, 1991; Middle East International, 
September 27, 1991; Le Point, October 5, 1991; Financial Times, August 9, 1991; Newsweek,
March 29, 1993; and Foreign Report, March 18, 1993.
*** The text of a coimentary entitled "Hostages: Message Received" by Hizb'allah radio 
provides an overview of the movement's own sense of achivement by holding hostages, see: Voice 
of the Oppressed 0550 gmt 16 Aug 91 - BBC/®/ME/1153, August 17, 1991.
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prior to his departure from the post at the end of 1991.”* This became 
evident by the final report by the UN Secretary-General, on December 10, 
1991, which found Iraq responsible for starting the Iran-Iraq war and made 
it legally responsible for claims by Iran for damages incurred during the 
eight-year war.*”
Although Iran failed to achieve assurances from the American admini­
stration of non-retaliatory measures against the Hizb'allah once it re­
linquished all foreign hostages, acting on behalf of Hizb'allah's command 
leadership through the offices of the UN, Iran's consolidated strong 
influence over the movement became apparent after the Israeli assassination 
of Secretary-General Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi in February 1992.*” In parti­
cular, this was revealed by Tranian exerted moves in the appointment of al- 
Musawi 's successor and restraining Hizb'allah retaliatory measures against
*” Under UN Resolution 598 [paragraph 6], the UN Secretary-General had been asked to 
explore, in consultation with Iran and Iraq, the question of entrusting an impartial "body with 
inquiring into the responsibility for the Iran-Iraq war. When Giandomenico Picco, the UN 
Secretary-General's representative on the hostage issue, met with Iranian officials in 
Teheran, the issue of UN Resolution 598 was frequently discussed and it was clearly a high 
priority for Iran, see: Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 0930 gmt 30 Aug 91 - 
SWB ME/1166, September 2, 1991; Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 1445 gmt 12 Sep 
91 - SWB ME/1177, September 14, 1991. For Iran's demands that UN Secretary-General must 
enforce resolutions against Iraq, see: Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Teheran 1004 gmt 
11 Sep 91 - SWB/1176, September 13, 1991. Apart from Picco's involvement in the hostage 
negotiations, he had successfully mediated an end to the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. The Times, 
November 19, 1991. Iran attempted to exploit the linkage between these two issues before Perez 
dé Cuellar's term as Secretary-General expired at the end of 1991. Both Hizb'allah and Iran 
had distrust for the new UN Secretary-General, Boutros Ghali, because of his close relation­
ship with Egypt's Anwar Sadat and his involvement with the Camp David peace process. See: The 
Independent, December 20, 1991.
*” See: Independent, December 11, 1991; and Washington R)st, December 11, 1991. On 
January 1, 1992, the United Nations released a report which claimed Iran had suffered $97.2 
billion in damages during the Iran-Iraq war and that it needed international assistance, see: 
Wall Street Joiunal, January 2, 1992. For the importance of Iranian financial claims against 
Iraq, see: Hooshang Amirahmadi, "Iran and the Persian Gulf Crisis", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and 
Nader Entessar, Iran and the Arab World, op.cit.: p.111.
*” See: Independent, November 21, 1991; Ha'aretz, October 27, 1991; Foreign Report, 
October 8, 1992; Foreign Report, May 13, 1993; and Foreign Report, June 13, 1991.
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Israel in southern Lebanon.*” While Iran's greater control over the 
Hizb'allah was a reflection of the movement's readjustment within a post- 
civil war Lebanese environment, particularly by the movement's decision to 
participate in the parliamentary elections, it was equally clear that Syrian 
hegemony took precedence over any Iranian or Hizb'allah plans which would 
.threaten Syria's designs within Lebanon and elsewhere in the region.*”
4.5 Conclusion:
The comprehensive conclusion of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon revealed 
the common interests of Hizb'allah, Iran, and Syria which converged from the 
advancement of their own individual agendas in Lebanon, in the region, and 
in relations with Western governments.*” While monumental changes in the 
internal Lebanese and regional environment in the Middle East served to con­
tribute to the complete dénouement of the hostage affair, in a manner con­
ducive and expedient for all parties concerned, it also clearly underlined 
the nature and importance of the triangular Hizb'allah-Iran-Syria relation­
ship in order to discern the influences and mechanisms exerted by Iran and 
Syria, both individually and collectively, over the process of abduction and 
releases of foreign hostages by the Hizb'allah. As demonstrated, this process 
was subject to the continuous changing relationship and alliance between Iran 
and Syria over a decade, itself subjected to either confluence or conflict 
in their own individual political and economic agendas in the Middle East 
affected by a wide variety of internal Lebanese, regional, and international 
events. Although the Iranian-Syrian alliance was born out of mutual tactical 
convenience to confront common enemies in the Middle East, cementedby Syrian
211 See: Foreign Report, October 8, 1992; and Foreign Report, May 20, 1993.
*” See: A. Nizar Hamzeh, (1993), op.cit. : pp.321-37. Hizb'allah handed back the Sheikh 
Abdallah barracks, its single largest base, in July 1992, see: Independent, July 28, 1992.
*” See: Farhang Jahanpoiu', (1992), op.cit.: Rolf Tophoven, (1992), op.cit.: pp.223-9.
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economic dependence upon Iran in a hostile Arab environment, the relationship 
between Iran and Syria has experienced serious tension in conjunction with 
shifting political and economic conditions in the region. While the larger 
problems in the Iranian-Syrian nexus highlighted their contradictory poli­
tical ideologies, they have also been superimposed on the ground in Lebanon 
over Hizb’allah activity. An understanding of the basis for the Iranian- 
Syrian alliance, and its subsequent evolution in Lebanon, is necessary not
only in terms of examining the way in which the Iranian-Syrian relationship 
has affected the position and activity of the Hizb'allah in Lebanon but also 
in the provision of a useful framework for the application of crisis manage­
ment principles and techniques by Western governments to the hostage-crisis, 
outlining opportunities and constraints in their application in accordance 
with tension and co-ordination in the alliance between Iran and Syria over 
Hizb'allah activity.
The status of the political and economic dimensions of the Iranian- 
Syrian alliance was closely mirrored in all aspects of Hizb'allah activity 
in Lebanon. While both Iran and Syria were adept at exploiting theTrelation- 
ship for their own benefit in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region, the collu­
sion between Iran and Syria remained uniform in Lebanon in the confrontation 
against common foreign enemies, coupled with the complete obedience by the 
Hizb'allah to Iranian orders. This was particularly evident in Syrian and 
Iranian rejection of the agreement of 17 May 1983 between Lebanon and Israel 
as well as by their close involvement with Hizb'allah's efforts to strike at 
the Western and Israeli military presence in Lebanon. After the departure of 
the MNF in 1984 and, more importantly, Israel in 1985 from Lebanon, the in­
compatibility of the aims of Iran, seeking to establish an Islamic republic 
on Iranian lines, and Syria, seeking to consolidate hegemony over Lebanese 
affairs, came to the surface through intense competition by their clients, 
Hizb'allah and Amal, over the hearts and minds of the Shi'1 te community. 
The friction between Iranian and Syrian attempts to seek political and
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military dominance in Lebanon, as manifest through armed clashes between Amal 
and Hizb'allah, intensified with an array of other difficulties in their 
relationship both internal and external to Lebanon. In particular, the under­
lying economic bond between Syria and Iran, especially Syrian dependence on 
Iranian oil supplies, experienced several rifts over Syrian refusals to 
settle outstanding debts over oil payments to Iran between 1986 to 1988 and 
over subsequent Syrian efforts to lessen its economic dependency on Iran 
through development of internal Syrian oil production. Although Syria proved 
adept at exploiting the economic difficulties with Iran to its own advantage, 
as it positioned itself as a bridge between a politically isolated Iran and 
the rest of the Arab world, other differences between the two regimes over 
Lebanon stemmed from incompatibility between Syrian attempts to consolidate 
its control over Lebanon while seeking a political and economic rapproache­
ment with Western governments after accusations of Syrian involvement in 
terrorism, and Iranian exploitation of Hizb'allah abductions in the pursuit 
of specific foreign policy objectives and in the expansion of the movement 
at the expense of Amal. While both Syria and Iran had an interest in defusing 
any serious conflict in Lebanon in order to preserve their relationship, 
the pursuit by the Hizb'allah of a greater independent line from Iran, in the 
aftermath of Iranian clerical factionalism in late 1986, compounded the 
problems in any attempts to make the movement answerable to either Iran or 
Syria for both the control over and the limitation of its activities. 
Although Syria has avoided a complete crackdown on the Iranian proxy, 
whenever the Hizb'allah has seriously challenged Syrian authority, the Syrian 
regime has moved to exercise control over the activity of the Hizb'allah 
through a blockade of the transfer of Iranian Pasdaran in the Biq'a area and 
the control of movement of the Hizb'allah in the Biq'a and Beirut areas. 
However, Syrian restraint in the elimination of the military and political 
presence of the Hizb'allah was based on its nonexpendable relationship with 
Iran. Neither Syria nor Iran were willing to sacrifice their alliance on
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account of any Hizb'allah activity, rather both regimes have been forced to 
excerise restraint in their relations with Hizb'allah at various times as to 
not offend each other. When Hizb'allah activity was harmful to the Iranian- 
Syrian alliance, as evident by Amal-Hizb'allah armed clashes and certain 
hostage-taking incidents, both Iran and Syria acted in concert to enforce 
agreements between their two proxies as well as to place limitations on the 
abduction of foreigners. While the former was revealed by the three enforced 
agreements between Amal and Hizb'allah by Iran and Syria (1988-1990), the 
latter became apparent by the Syrian-Iranian imposed cessation of any 
abductions by the movement after the January 1987 wave of kidnappings by the 
Hizb'allah. However, the Iranian-Syrian alliance experienced particular 
problems in conjunction with the projection of Iranian clerical factionalism 
onto the Hizb'allah command leadership in attempts by Iran and Syria to use 
extraction from the hostage-crisis as an instrument in the foreign policy 
arena.
The unequivocal support for the Hizb'allah from Iran and, to a lesser 
extent acceptance by Syria, changed concurrently with the changes in the 
Iranian leadership, following the death of Ayatollah Khumayynl, and with 
Syrian efforts to consolidate its control over a post civil-war Lebanon with 
the Ta'if agreement in 1989. While the defeat of the revolutionist faction 
in control over the political authority in Iran translated into diminished 
possibility for a radical leadership of the Hizb'allah to be able to confront 
Syrian efforts to establish political and military hegemony in Lebanon, it 
also became clear that Syrian designs within Lebanese territory took prece­
dence over any official Iranian interests. Syrian concessions to Hizb'allah 
and Iran, in the form of allowing the movement to remain armed and for the 
continued presence of the Pasdaran contingent on Lebanese territory, meant 
not only that the movement was forced to submit to a reorientation in acti­
vity in alignment with Syrian interests in order to survive within Lebanon's 
post civil-war environment but also underlined the increasingly asymmetrical
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nature of the Iranian-Syrian relationship both within and external to 
Lebanon.
The identification of the individual and the collective motivations as 
well as an understanding of the process of the triangular Hizb'allah-Iranian- 
Syrian relationship behind the abduction and the release of Western foreign 
citizens had profound significance in the application of crisis-management 
principles and techniques. Apart from deciphering the underlying motivations
in incidents involving the abduction of foreigners by the movement, either 
for internal organisational requirements or in alignment with Syrian and 
Iranian interests, comprehension of the process of the changing interaction 
between Hizb'allah and the Iranian-Syrian relationship becomes necessary in 
order to determine not only €he direction but also the timing of the appli­
cation of certain crisis-management principles and techniques.
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CHAPTER FIVE: WESTERN RESPONSES TO THE HOSTAGE CRISIS AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT
"Government is about crisis management.
Governments do not think."*
5,1 Introduction
The responses by the American, French, and British governments to the ab­
duction of its citizens in Lebanon have underlined the inherent difficulty 
in striking a balance between their moral obligation towards providing safety 
and protection for their citizens abroad without having to sacrifice national 
interests in the conduct of foreign policy.* While all three states have pur­
sued a firmly held and co-ordinated public position of no-negotiations with 
terrorists and no-concessions to their demands in the Lebanese hostage- 
crisis, the reality of actual conduct behind this facade has revealed not 
only the conduct of secret negotiations, either directly with the Hizb'allah, 
Iran, and Syria or indirectly through third party intermediaries, over the 
release of hostages, at times resulting in complex and murky deals,* but also 
that the hostage-issue was intimately influenced by the conduct of foreign 
policies by these Western states in the Middle East.* Although the two 
Western European states and the United States have shared similar types of 
problems and challenges in efforts to manage and secure the extraction of its 
citizens from captivity in Lebanon, each individual state has pursued their
* Sir Jolm Nott, former Tory defence secretary, quoted in Tie Independent, May 16,
1994.
* See: Jeffrey Simon, (1987), op.cit.; New York Times, August 17, 1987; and 
Independent, August 11, 1989.
* See: Annie Laurent and Antoine Basbous, Guerres Secretes au Liban (Paris: Gallimard,
1987); Peter Kombluh and Malcolm Byrne (eds.), (1993), op.cit.; Nicholas Tenzer and Franck 
Magnard, (1987), op.cit.
* See: George Joffe, "Iran, the Southern Mediterranean and Europe: Terrorism and 
Hostages", in AnousMravan Eliteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), (1991), op.cit.: pp.72-90; 
and Bruce Hoffman, (1990), op.cit.
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own overt and covert policies to accomplish this task.’ Apart from their 
almost equal standing in Hizb'allah's anti-Western demonology,® largely due 
to their colonial past and present involvement in the Middle East,’ the 
divergence of approach to the hostage-crisis reflected not only the indivi­
dual experiences of these Western states in confronting terrorism within 
their own borders, but also the nature and status of their relationships with 
both Iran and Syria as well as their policies in the Middle East, driven by 
different sets of political motivations as well as economic considerations.* 
The differences from state to state in the frequency, time periods, and 
number of its citizens abducted by the Hizb'allah, coupled with the specific 
nature of demands, also contributed to the way in which the Western govern­
ments have crafted individual or concerted strategies to the problem of 
obtaining the release of their citizens from captivity.’ As a consequence.
’ For a brief overview, see: MaskLt Burgin Anat Kurz, and Ariel Merari, (1988),
op.cit.
’ While the United States retained its position as the "big satan" according to 
Hizb'allah's official manifesto, the United Kingdom and France were considered "lesser 
satans", see: Nass al-risala al-maftuha allahti wain aha hizb allah 11a mustad âfin fi lubnan 
wa al-alam (Text of the Open Letter Addressed by Hizb Allah to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and 
the World), February 16, 1985.
’ See: Hussein Sirriyeh, (1989), op.cit.
* See: Brian Michael Jenkins and Robin Wright, (1986), op.cit.: pp.2-11; Robin Wright,
(1986), op.cit.: pp.90-106; Robin Wright, (1989), op.cit.; and Con Coughlin, Hostage (London: 
Little, Brown, 1993).
’ American citizens have been most frequently abducted by the Hizb'allah [total of 18 
hostages] over extended and distinct time periods. Apart from a single abduction in 1982, five 
US citizens were kidnapped in 1984, most of which occured in the first six months. Another 
four US hostages were taken throughout 1985 and another three citizens were kidnapped in late- 
1986. In January 1987, abductions peaked with three more US hostages. Two other isolated 
abductions occured in mid-1987 and in early 1988. The abduction of French citizens has been 
more concentrated than other nationalities [total of 14 hostages]. Apart from a single 
abduction in 1984, five abductions occured in early 1985 and seven occured in early 1986. A 
single abduction occured in January 1987. While a total of 11 British hostages have been ab­
ducted by the Hizb'allali, only four have been held for an extensive period. Two of these were
abducted in April 1986 and a single abduction ocau'ed in January 1987. The last abduction of a
British citizen took place in May 1989. For a detailed overview, see: Appendix I.
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any examination of the pendular responses by the United States and the two 
West European states to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon within the framework 
of crisis management must not only take into account the broader environment 
of Western foreign policy towards the region but also the specific dynamics 
of the triangular relationships between Hizb'allah and Iran as well as Syria 
as a key component in the application of successful crisis management. Apart 
from the evaluation of the performance of Western governments according to 
the previously outlined requirements for effective crisis management, these 
will also serve as the framework of this analysis. The underlying criteria 
for the "successful" application of crisis management is not only close 
adherence to the seven essential requirements of effective crisis management 
balanced against inherent constraints for Western governments in the conduct 
of domestic and foreign policy but also the performance of their approach in 
the hostage-crisis based on the previous case-study on the dynamics of the 
relationships at work between Hizb'allah, Iran and Syria.
5.2 Crisis management: The Limitation of Political Objectives
The responses by the United States and the two West European^states to 
the hostage-crisis in Lebanon have been governed by a uniform policy of re­
fusal to negotiate or make concessions to terrorists under any guise.” This 
policy of no-negotiations and no-concessions to terrorists has been emboddied 
in a series of unilateral or joint declarations of principles which reflects 
not only the previous experience of liberal democracies in countering terro­
rism at home, based on the principled position that hostage-taking consti­
tutes an unforgivable act that must not be rewarded through concessions and 
that a readiness to negotiate as well as a willingness to concede to demands 
only encourages further terrorits acts, but also that state support for
** See: US News & World Report, December 8, 1985; Independent, May 7, 1990; Times, 
November 19, 1991; and International Herald Tribune, March 12, 1987. Also see: L. Paul Bremer 
III, "The West's Counter-Terrorist Strategy", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4 
(Winter 1992): pp.255-62.
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terrorism in any form constitutes unacceptable international behaviour sub­
ject to punishment.” While principles of US no-concessions policy have been 
unilaterally proclaimed by policymakers on countless occasions in response 
to new hostage-takings of American citizens, as outlined by public policy 
statements and documents,” the European states have adopted not only uni­
lateral policies in alignment with the uniform principles of no-concessions 
but also a concerted European approach to the hostage-problem, as evident by 
their solemn promise to make "no concessions under duress to terrorists or 
their sponsors" at the 1986 EC summit in London.” The inconsistency between 
the declaratory policy of not negotiating or conceeding to any demands and
the actual conduct by Western governments in dealing with the hostage-crisis
*in Lebanon can be attributed to the often incompatible nature of firmly held 
counterterrorism principles as an integral component of foreign policy in the 
Middle East towards Iran and Syria, who exercise any degree of control over 
the Hizb'allah movement.” Despite the fact that both Iran and Syria have 
concealed the exact nature of their close relationship with the Hizb'allah, 
the recognition of Iran and Syria as intermediaries for Western governments 
in dealing with the Hizb'allah posed problems in upholding a non-flexible 
no-concessions policy as these states benefitted indirectly from concessions 
made to influence the movement despite their own complicity in some of the
” See: Paul Wilkinson, (1986), op.cit.; and Independent, May 7, 1990.
** For a concise outline of US policy, see: Public Report of the Vice President's Task 
Force on Combatting Terrorism (Washington, DC. : USGP, February 1986) ; and US Department of 
State, International Terrorism: U.S. Policy on Taking Americans Hostage (Washington, DC. : 
Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1986).
** See: Gilbert Guillaume, "France and the Fight Against Terrorism", Terrorism and 
Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1992): p.134.
** See: Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit.: pp.65-75.
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movement's terrorist acts.” While most Iranian or Syrian demands of con­
cessions for any intercession with Hizb'allah centered on specific out­
standing disputes or a shift in foreign policy behaviour by Western govern­
ments towards these states,” the issue of any deviation from the principles 
of a no-concessions policy became dependent on the conduct of conciliatory 
foreign policy by Western states towards either Iran or Syria in alignment 
with shifts in the regional environment creating opportunities and con­
straints in the pursuit of wider foreign policy interests.” Any perceived 
breach of the no-negotiations and no-concessions policies must be related to 
the desire by Western governments to extract its citizens from captivity, 
heavily influenced by domestic political pressures, and its unwillingness to 
maintain a non-conciliatory position at the expense of the pursuit of wider 
foreign policy opportunities in the region.” As such, the shifts in the 
elevation of the political objective to secure the release of hostages must 
not only be related to the importance of the hostage-issue on the political 
agenda at home and its impact on the conduct of foreign policy but also in 
alignment with changes in the Middle East regional environment which deter­
mines whether Western governments can afford to discard other foreign policy 
interests with Iran and Syria over principles of counterterrorism.” In turn.
*’ See: MaskLt Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.; and Conor Gearty, 
Terror (London: Faber and Faber, 1991): pp.73-96.
** For a broad overview of demands, see: Brian Michael Jenkins and Robin Wright,
(1986), OP.cit.: p.2
*’ See: Eric Hooglimd, "The Policy of the Reagan Administration toward Iran", in Nikki 
R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski (eds.), (1990), op.cit.; p.180-200; and R.K. Ramazani,
(1986), OP.cit.
** See: Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, "Western Responses to Terrorism: A 
Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1992): 
pp.307-40.
*’ See: Martin Kramer, The Moral Logic of Hizballah, Occasional Papers no. 101 (Tel Aviv 
University: Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, August 1987); Dilip Hiro, 
Islamic Fimdementalism (London: Paladin, 1989); and Xavier Raufer, (1987), op.cit.
254
this evaluation must also be based within the context of the opportunities 
and constraints in the environment which governs the relationship between 
Hizb'allah and Iran as well as Syria in order to evaluate the effectiveness 
of policy initiatives on efforts to secure the release of hostages.”
The importance of the hostage-issue on the domestic political agenda and 
in the conduct of foreign policy has varied between Western states and over 
specific time periods. This has been subject to the legacy of previous 
national experience and success of countering internal political violence as 
well as state-sponsored international terrorism with Middle Eastern origin 
as well as to the public perception of the adversary and the fate of the 
hostages as projected through political pressure on decision-makers to act 
or abstain from any action for the resolution of the hostage-crisis. While 
the relative absence of Middle East terrorism on American soil has reflected 
the great impact of the Lebanese hostage-crisis on the US domestic and 
foreign policy agendas,” the calmer treatment of the hostage-crisis by West 
European public opinion was not only a reflection of past occurences and 
treatment of indigenous and international terrorism within their borders 
but also to awareness of the necessity for a more restrained response by 
their governments to the hostage-crisis in light of the fear of retribution 
to any over-reactions given the geographical proximity of the Middle East as 
well as to careful consideration of any responses in view of their effective­
ness and potential consequences for the conduct of overall foreign policy
” For a useful example, see: Yosef Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam 
and Realpolitik", in David Menashri (ed.), op.cit.: pp.171-88.
** See: David C. Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of 
America's War Against Terrorism (New York, NY. : Harper & Row, 1988) ; and Neil C. Livingstone 
and Terrell Arnold (eds.) Fighting Back: Winning the War Against Terrorism (Lexington, MA.: 
Lexington Books, 1986).
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towards the region.”
Apart from the impact of the previous hostage-crisis in Iran which 
resulted in paralysis of the Carter administration for 444-days, the issue 
of American hostages in Lebanon was elevated on the US domestic and foreign 
policy agenda against the backdrop of both the Hizb'allah suicide-attack on
the US Marine barracks in October 1983, which inflicted the single worst 
number of casualties for the US military since the Vietnam war,” and exacer­
bated by the media spectacle surrounding the TWA-hijacking in June 1985.” 
The multiple abduction of four American citizens in early 1984 highlighted 
not only the impotence of any US efforts to confront the threat of Islamic 
militancy but also was elevated as a major national security issue as one 
of the hostages was the CIA station-chief in Beirut, William Buckley.” While 
the media exacerbated the pressure on the Reagan administration to act with 
resolve to secure the release of all American hostages, as manifest through 
the modification of US counterterrorism policy in April 1984 through National 
Security Directive (NSDD) 138 authorizing pre-emptive strikes and reprisal
” For a useful comparison, see: Stanley S. Bedlington, Ctombattinq International 
Terrorism: U.S.-Allied Cooperation and Political Will (Washington, DC.: The Atlantic Council 
of the United States, November 1986): pp.34-7. Also see: Ghassan Salamé, "Tom Between the 
Atlantic and the Mediterranean: Europe and the Middle East in the Post-Cold War Era", Middle 
East Journal, Vol.48, No.2 (Spring 1994): pp.237-40.
” See: Robin Wright, (1989), op.cit.: pp.119-120; and Robert Fisk, (1992), op.cit.: 
pp.522-3.
” See: Nonnan Antokol and Mayer Nudell, No One A Neutral: Political Hostage-Taking in 
the Modem World (Medina, Œ. : Alpha Publications, 1990): pp.125-7; and Sunday Times, June 39,
1985.
” For Buckley's position as CIA station chief, see: Washington Post, Novenber 25,
1986. Wliile the Hizb'allali announced it had executed Buddey in response to Israel's attack on 
PLO headquarter in Tunis on October 5, 1985, evidence would suggest that he died fran illness 
on June 3, 1985, see: Intemational Herald Tribune, March 3, 1987. In January 1987, US State 
Department confirmed the death of Buddey, see: Ma'aretz, January 22, 1987.
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raids against terrorists abroad,” the US government assigned extraordinary 
priority to extract William Buckley from captivity as evident from the in­
fluence of his case for the initiation of the secret efforts pursued through 
contacts within Iran’s clerical establishment which later culminated in the 
US-Iranian arms-for-hostages scandal.” However, the issue of the US hostages 
was successfully downplayed by the Reagan administration in the 1984 presi­
dential election campaign.” Although the US government resisted pressure
from the individual campaigns by hostage's families in the media, even with 
the addition of more abductions of American citizens in early 1985,” it was 
forced to response to the June 1985 TWA-hijacking which not only highlighted 
the inaction of efforts on behalf of the US hostages in Lebanon but also
■kmarked the beginning of a clandestine policy shift towards a willingness to 
negotiate with Iranian clergy in a wider effort to improve its relationship 
with a post-Khomayyni Iran.” As the increased pressure from hostage's 
families exacerbated the problems for the Reagan administration to secure the 
release of US captives, especially as the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deals 
failed to yield the return of hostages as others were captured to replace 
those released,” the revelation of the affair in November 1986 undermined
” See: Washington Post, April 18, 1984; Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1985; New York 
Times, June 6, 1984; and Wall Street Journal, March 12, 1984.
” See: al-Qabas, March 28, 1985; and Time, August 14, 1989. Also see: Bob Woodward,
(1987), op.cit.
” See: Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, Landslide: The Ikimaking of the President 1984-88 
(Boston, MA.: Houghton Mifflin, 1988).
” See: Intemational Herald Tribune, August 1, 1985; and Intemational Herald Tribune, 
November 15, 1985.
” See: Scott Armstrong, Malcolm Byrne, and Ton Blanton, (1987), op.cit.; and Peter 
Komblum and Malcolm Byme (eds.), (1993), op.cit.
” See: David Jacobsen, My Life As a Hostage: The Nightmare in Beimt (New York, NY. :
S.P.I BoolvS, 1993); and Michael Leeden, Perilious Statecraft (New York, NY.: Macmillan, 1988).
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not only the political credibility of the Reagan presidency and its hardline 
posture against international terrorism at home and with its allies abroad, 
but also the total viability of any efforts to secure the release of hostages 
as it was relegated to a more sub-ordinate position in relation to efforts 
by the Reagan administration to survive politically.” The de facto departure 
from US publicly stated policy led not only to the most serious domestic 
challenge and political turmoil facing the Reagan presidency for its con­
tinued survival but also created confusion and anger among its European 
allies, which had received repeated US pleas not to negotiate with terrorists 
and not to breach a US sponsored worldwide arms embargo on Iran.” Apart from 
raising questions about US credibility abroad, the coherence of its foreign 
policy and the management of its intelligence operations,” the revelation of 
the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deals also created serious tensions in 
American relations with more moderate Arab states.” As a consequence, the 
hostage-issue was effectively abandoned for the remainder of the Reagan 
administration's tenure in office and confined to token shows of military 
force against the movement with the spate of abductions of US citizens in
” See: Ben Bradlee Jr., Guts and Glory: The Rise and Fall of Oliver North (New York, 
NY.: Donald I. Fine, 1988); Theodore Draper, (1991), op.cit.; and Lawrence E. Walsh, Final 
Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters - US Court of Appeals for the 
District of Colombia Circuit, Vol.I-III (1994).
” For domestic crisis of confidence in the Reagan presidency, see: New York Times, 
November 11, 1986; and New York Times, Novmber 19, 1986. For European criticism, see: Dilip 
Hiro, (1989), op.cit.
” See: Bahman BaJctiari, "American Foreign Policy and the Iran-Contra Hearings", 
Comparative Strategy, Vol.7 (1988): pp.427-38; and Congressional Quarterly, The Iran-Contra 
Puzzle (Washington, DC.: Congressional Quarterly, 1987).
” For the implications of the Iran-Contra affair on US relations with Arab states, 
see: Joseph A. Kechichian, "Tie Impact of American Policies on Iranian-Arab Relations", in 
Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: pp.136-7; Samuel Segev,
(1988), op.cit.: pp.27-8; and Eric Hooglimd, "Tie United States and Iran", in Anoushiravan 
Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), (1991), op.cit.: p.42.
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January 1987 despite continued pressure from the hostage's families and the 
media.”
The ascendancy of Bush to the US presidency inherited the previous 
legacy of political constraints to enter into negotiations that would re­
semble any deal-making. While the Bush administration showed a more 
conciliatory attitude towards Iran in the aftermath of Ayatollah Khumayynl's 
death, it downplayed the hostage-issue in order to advance its wider foreign 
policy objectives in the region in the vacuum created by the end of the Iran- 
Iraq war.” Although the kidnapping of Lt.Col. William Higgins became the 
first test for the Bush presidency, the response was confined to the show of 
military force as the hostage-issue became increasingly more dependent on the 
shifting political environment of the Middle East and elsewhere than to any 
concerted effort to secure the\r release in response to media and public 
campaign pressures,” The devaluation of the hostage-issue in the foreign 
policy agenda reduced the political vulnerability of the Bush administration 
as it adjusted to the Middle East environment during and after the Gulf-war 
of 1990/91.” Any pressure to act for the release of the US hostages dimi­
nished completely as an issue with the UN involvement which resulted in the 
comprehensive denounement of the hostage-crisis by December 1992.”
” See: Newsweek, May 18, 1987.
” See: Eric Hooglund, "The United States and Iran, 1981-9", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami 
and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), (1991), op.cit.: p.45; Guardian, April 24, 1990; Time, August 
14, 1989; Independent, April 23, 1990; Time, August 19, 1991; and Independent, May 7, 1990.
” See: Independent, August 5, 1989; Independent, August 4, 1989; and Observer,
December 8, 1991.
” See: Hooshang Amirahmadi, "Iran and the Persian Gulf Crisis", in Hooshang Amirahmadi 
and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: pp.94-125.
” See: Farhang Jahanpour, (1992), op.cit.: pp.33-6; and MaskLt Burgin, "Western 
Hostages and Israeli POWs in Lebanon", in Shlomo Gazit (ed.) The Middle East Balance 1990-1991 
(Boulder, CD.: Westview Press, 1992).
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The high-priority assigned by two successive Republican administrations 
to secure the release of its citizens in Lebanon was symptomatic not only of 
a desire to limit the effects of hostage-taking on the US presidency, as 
epitomized by the downfall of President Carter over the Iranian hostage- 
crisis,” but was also the result from an overexpectation of US ability to 
achieve the rapid release of its citizens through reliance on coercion with­
out any special consideration for the constraints and opportunities of the
political environment in the Middle East which was regulated by its conduct 
of foreign policy in the region, specifically US policy towards Iran and 
Syria, and governed by the dynamics of Iran's and Syria's ability to inter­
vene with the Hizb'allah as well as their willingness to intervene in return 
for tangible rewards.” Apart from the strong influence of the media and 
pressure groups on US policy towards the hostage-crisis, the discrepancy 
between raised public expectations of the ability by the government to re­
solve the hostage-incidents rapidly and effectively, created partly by US 
official hardline policies, and the actual reality of the extremely limited 
maneuverability of the US government, given the constraints, and by the 
failure to pursue a consistent and coherent Middle East policy and by the 
political consequences of the disastrous US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deals, 
contributed to the failure of any success in the achievement of US political 
objectives.** These problems were exacerbated by the US approach to link the 
hostage-issue as a precondition for wider normalization of its relationship 
with Iran while it pursued a policy of containment towards Iran and without
** For a useful analysis of the impact of the crisis on Carter's presidency, see: Gary
Sick, (1985), op.cit.; and Gary Sick, (1991), op.cit.
** See: Jolm L. Esposito, (1991), op.cit. : pp.254-6; and Independent, August 5, 1989.
** See: Grant Wardlaw, "Terror As An Instrument of Foreign Policy", in David C.
Rapoport (ed.) Inside Terrorist Organizations (New York, NIL : Cblumbia University Press,
1988): p.242.
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consideration for Iran's actual ability to coerce the Hizb'allah to release 
its hostages, compounded by an unwillingness to make any concessions of a 
substantial nature in return.”
The issue of the French hostages assumed a highly elevated position on 
the domestic and foreign policy agenda as evident by its exploitation by 
political parties in the 1986/1988 national elections as well as by its 
integral role in the conduct of foreign policy towards the region and speci­
fically with Iran and Syria.*’ Although the abduction of a number of French 
journalists, most notably Jean-Paul Kauffman in May 1985 and four TV crew- 
members of Antenne-2 in March 1986, increased the pressure on the French 
government to act on behalf of the hostages as their fate was highlighted by 
a highly visible campaign *in the media,” it was exacerbated by the 
Hizb'allah bomb campaign in Paris which occured in conjunction with the March 
1986 French national elections.*’ While the hostage-issue was used as an in­
strument in the election campaign by the respective presidential candidates 
to discredit the opponent in efforts to obstruct or secure the release of the
** For the overall failure of US policy, see: James A. Bill, "The US Overture to Iran, 
1985-1986", in Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski (eds.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.176-7. Also 
see: Con Coughlin, (1993), op.cit.; and Counter-Terrorism in the 1990's, US State Department, 
January 1990.
*’ See: MaskLt Burgin, "Shi'ite Intemational Terrorism", in Anat Kurz et.al. Inter 
1989 (Tel Aviv University: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1989): pp.46-7; and Luc 
Cliavin, "French Diplomacy and The French Hostage Crises", in Barry Rubin (ed.), (1990), 
op.cit.: pp.91-106.
*’ See: Pierre Fean, (1987), op.cit.; and Roger Auque, (1988), op.cit. Inspired by the 
American news coverage of the 444-day captivity of US hostages in Iran, the French TV channel, 
Antenne-2, broadcasted daily the pictures of the French hostages and the number of days they 
had been held by kidnappers, see: New York Times, September 20, 1987.
*’ See: Jerusalem Post, March 12, 1986; Le Monde, May 6, 1988; Ha'aretz, April 6, 1988; 
al-Naliar, March 26, 1986; al-Mustaqbal, March 23, 1986; The Economist, March 15, 1986; 
Intemational Herald Tribune, March 7, 1986; Le Nouvel Observateur, March 28 - April 3, 1986; 
Le Matin, January 29, 1987; Ha'aretz, January 30, 1987; Intemational Herald Tribune, Febmary 
3, 1989; Le Monde, July 15, 1986; and Le Monde, September 7-8, 1986. For a useful overview of 
French arms sales, see: Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1987. There was initial confusion about 
who was responsible for this bombing campaign, see: Xavier Raufer, (1991), op.cit.: pp.100-3.
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hostages prior to the dual elections in France for the presidency and the 
National Assembly,” the French hostages assumed increasing importance after 
the elections with the rivalry between President Mitterrand and Prime 
Minister Chirac within the French cohabitation government.” This political 
rivalry was apparent by the employment of various emissaries in individual 
efforts to secure the release of hostages.”
The French hostage-issue was also symptomatic of its conduct of foreign 
policy in the Middle East, most notably in relation to its close support for 
Iraq and in any outstanding disputes with Iran.” As a major issue in the 
conduct of French foreign policy in the Middle East, the importance of the 
hostage-crisis was clearly evident in the decision of the Chirac government 
to abandon its traditional sifpport and close co-operation with Iraq, crafted 
by his socialist predecessors, jn favour of improved relations with Iran, 
most notably in order to limit the impact of French public fears of Iran as 
a major threat.” It was also revealed by the reluctance of the French 
government to impose any sanctions on Syria and Iran despite appeals from
** See: Liberation, May 7-8, 1988; International Herald Tribune, March 7, 1986; Times, 
March 20, 1985; and Le Figaro, March 7, 1986. During the election campaign, Chirac condemned 
President Mitterrand’s Socialist government for turning France into a "weakened and worried" 
nation. While Mitterrand's hostage-negotiation efforts failed, conservative candidates 
indicated that they would adopt a stronger and tougher attitude towards dealing with 
terrorism, see: Time, March 24, 1986; and Time, March 24, 1986.
*’ See: Independent, November 8, 1989; Le Nouvel Observateur, May 6-12, 1988; Le Nouvel 
Observateur, May 13-19, 1988; Sunday Times, June 8, 1986; and Time, June 30, 1986.
” See: MaskLt Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit. : pp.28-9; al-Qabas. 
April 28, 1988; Yediot Aharanot, May 5, 1988; Le Mbnde, May 6, 1988; and Times, May 6, 1988.
” See: Ma'aretz, May 8, 1988; Intemational Herald Tribune, May 19, 1988; Jerusalem 
Post, May 5, 1988; Intemational Herald Tribune, August 3, 1987; Ha'aretz, April 6, 1988; and 
Jerusalem Post, November 30, 1988.
” See: L'Express, February 23, 1987; and Independent, November 8, 1989. Also see: Fred 
Halliday, "An Elusive Normalization: Western Europe and the Iranian Revolution", Middle East 
Journal, Vol.48, No.2 (Spring 1994): p.313.
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its European allies and the United States.” As French policy towards Iran 
vacilliated between accomodation and confrontation in response to the con­
flicting positions of various political representatives with different in­
stitutional responsibility and approach to the hostage-affair,” its impact 
on the French political climate was also evident by the exploitation of the 
hostage-issue in the build-up to the French presidential elections in May
1988.” This was particularly demonstrated by Chirac’s last-minute attempt to
boost his chances of electoral victory, trailing in the French presidential 
race, by interrupting a campaign speech in Strasbourg on May 4, 1988, 
announcing his government achieved the dramatic double releases of French 
hostages in Beirut and New Caledonia.”
The elevated importance of the French hostage-issue on the political 
agenda has been largely the result of the rivalry between Chirac and 
Mitterrand for political expediency in the battle for the presidency as well 
as by Iranian willingness to exact punishment on French soil for its support 
to Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war.” This institutional rivalry between French
” See: New York Times, October 30, 1986,
” See: Washington Post, July 11, 1987; Independent, November 8, 1989; Le Ifonde, May 6, 
1988; and Ma'aretz, April 26, 1987.
” See: Newsweek, May 16, 1988; Ma'aretz, May 5, 1988; Washington Post, May 5, 1988; 
Time, December 14, 1987; and Liberation, May 7-8, 1988. As stated by Interior Minister Pasqua: 
"[w]e did what we had to do. The hostages are free. We're happy. That's all", see: Time, May 
16, 1988.
” See: Newsweek, May 16, 1988; Le Monde, May 5-11, 1988; Times, May 5, 1988;
Economist, June 11, 1988; Sunday Times, May 8, 1988; and Time, May 16, 1988. As aptly observed 
by Berry: "[t]he French press has focused quite heavily on this issue, and not without 
justification. Only a few days before the election, it seemed possible that the hostage 
release would give Chirac the boost he needed to defeat Francois Mitterrand... [t]he French 
were initially jubilant, and Chirac happily accepted public plaudits. But uneasiness about the 
terms of the release soon turned into a political liability", see: Steve M. Berry, (1989), 
op.cit.: p.22.
” For rivalry, see: Ma'aretz, May 8, 1988; Yediot Aharanot, May5, 1988; Observer, 
December 6, 1987; and Le Figam, November 4, 1988. For French support to Iraq, see: José 
Garçon, "La France et le Conflit Iran-Irak", Politique Etrangère, Vol.2 (1987); Pierre Pean, 
(1987), op.cit.; and Dilip Hiro, (1990), op.cit.
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political factions as manifest through the exploitation of the hostage-issue 
for their own political advantages made any hostage release dependent not 
only on the ability of different political emissaries to exert their in­
fluence over the kidnappers and its patrons through offers of concessions 
but also on the nature of their political agendas as to whether any release 
would occur in return for concessions either before or after French national 
elections.” Apart from the dependence of the political objective to secure 
the release of hostages on French institutional and political rivalry, the 
hostage-issue was assisted by the subordination of the French judiciary to 
political authorities in alignment with the traditional sanctuary doctrine 
and by the unique French approach to Middle East politics and to inter­
national terrorism with a proven ability to resist outside pressures from 
allies while the only serious v challenge to any action came from media 
pressures.”
The issue of the British hostages was never of any higher priority for 
the British government: they were effectively abandoned to their own fate 
bound by the constraints in the Middle East environment, by the official 
refusal to either conduct any negotiations with Hizb'allah or its patrons and 
to concede to any demands.” While this hardline position was acceptable to 
most strands within the government and in the public arena, it was sympto­
matic of the British experience with, and tough attitudes towards, terrorism 
on its own soil by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) over the last
” See: Steve M. Berry, "The Release of France's Last Hostages in Lebanon: An 
Analysis", TVI Report, op.cit.: pp.19-22; and Independent, November 8, 1989.
” See: Luc diauvin, "French Diplomacy and The Hostage Crises", in Barry Riibin (ed.), 
(1990), op.cit. : pp.91-104; and Nicholas Tenzer and Franck Magnard, (1987), op.cit.
” See: Times, November 19, 1991; Independent on Sunday, May 6, 1990; Independent, May 
7, 1990; and Independent, August 11, 1989,
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two decades.“ The hostages in Lebanon also received low-priority as an issue 
not only because of Britain's limited involvement in Middle East politics but 
also as the government operated without any real pressure from either the 
media or hostage's families, the latter urged by government officials to re­
main silent to allow progress through quiet diplomacy.
The abandonment of silence with the formation of "Friends of John 
McCarthy" in January 1988, with no progress in achieving any releases through
an official policy of quiet diplomacy, contributed to some public pressure 
on the British government, most notably after the release of the remaining 
French hostages in May 1988.” While this visible and public media campaign 
kept the issue of the hostages in the public domain, and highlighted what 
it claimed to be the inadequacy of any official efforts to extract its citi­
zens from captivity, it failed, to yield substantial pressure for a re- 
evaluation of its hostage-policy as the British government, under the helm 
of Mrs Thatcher, refused to seek rapproachment with either Iran or Syria.” 
As a consequence, the low-priority assigned to secure the release of hostages 
by the British government, coupled with its refusal to negotiate with inter­
mediaries connected with the Hizb'allah, was consistently applied until the
” For an overview, see; David Bonner, 'TMited Kingdom: Hie United Kingdom Response to 
Terrorism", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1992): pp. 171-205; and Paul 
Willdnson (ed.) British Perspectives on Terrorism (London: Allen and Ikiwin, 1987).
” See: Independent, August 9, 1991; Independent, August 25, 1991; and Independent, 
August 11, 1991. Also see: John Dickie, Inside The Foreign Office (London: Chapmans, 1992).
” See: John McCarthy and Jill Morell, Over Some Other Rainbow (London: Crown, 1993); 
Jackie and Sunni Mann, (1992), op.cit.; Times, June 17, 1987; Times, June 16, 1988; and Terry 
Waite, op.cit., 1993); and Brian Keenan, An Evil Cradling (London: Vintage, 1993). After the 
release of the Frendi hostages in May 1988, the French hostage, Jean-Paul Kaufmann critized 
openly the US and British goverrment policy by stating in interviews: "I don't understand the 
American and the British. Hie hostages must be rescued as soon as possible. The theory that 
keeping quiet about hostages will speed their release is sterile, even grotesque", see: Time, 
May 23, 1988. Also see: Sunday Times, May 22, 1988.
” See: Jolin Dickie, (1992), op.cit.: pp.302-3; Times, December 9, 1987; and Times, May 
6, 1988.
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ascendancy of Douglas Hurd to the post of Foreign Secretary and, ultimately, 
with the resignation of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1990.” While the 
change from Howe to Hurd as Foreign Secretary was significant in the new 
approach to British relations in the Middle East, it was due more to the 
opportunities created by a changed Middle East environment in 1990-91 than 
to any change of ministerial office-holders. Although the new leadership 
under PM John Major devalued the hostage-issue, it accelerated the necessary
process of reconciliation and rapproachment with Iran and Syria in the 
changed Middle East environment with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait which created 
a window of opportunity for the resolution of the British hostage-crisis. As 
in the case of American hostages, any pressure on the British government to 
act on behalf of its citizens in captivity disappeared with the UN involve­
ment providing a comprehensive resolution to the hostage-crisis in 1991.” 
The complete devaluation of the British hostage-crisis by its government 
was a reflection not only of previous national experience in effectively 
countering terrorism at home and abroad which reinforced the public accepta­
bility of the no-negotiations and no-concessions policy, embodied by the 
hardline policies under Mrs Thatcher,” but also of the tacit acceptance by 
the British government that the fate of the hostages could only be affected 
by its ability to offer concessions, as evident by the nature of demands, in 
order to compensate for its reduced influence in the Middle East.” Although
” See: Independent, August 9, 1990; Times, November 19, 1991; Independent, August 9,
1991; and Independent on Sunday, August 25, 1991.
” See: Independent, December 6, 1991; Independent, November 19, 1991; and Observer, 
November 24, 1991.
” See: New York Times, November 24, 1985; Washington Post, December 17, 1985;
Independent, August 11, 1989; and Ha'aretz, February 1, 1987. Also see: George Joffe, "Iran,
the Southern Mediterranean and Europe: Terrorism and Hostages", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and 
Manshour Varasteh (eds), (1993), op.cit.: pp.89-90.
” See: Econondst, June 11, 1988.
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the British government upheld its publicly stated principles of counter­
terrorism successfully without entering into any deal-making, it achieved 
this at the expense of prolonging the confinement of the hostages without any 
major benefits in the foreign policy arena.” However, this can be attributed 
to the fact that Britain faced unforeseen insuperable obstacles beyond it's 
power to control, most notably the row with the US government over the Iran- 
Contra debacle and the consequences of the Rushdie-affair. As a consequence, 
any criticism for the lack of progress in the release of British hostages 
must not only account for the approach of British policy but also, more 
importantly, the constraints imposed by the political environment in the 
Middle East, creating obstacles for any British government efforts.
5.3 Crisis Management: Limitation of Means in Pursuit of Political Objectives 
The use of the military option by Western governments has been confined 
to efforts to either punish the Hizb'allah for previous terrorist actions 
through retaliatory strikes, as a deterrent to prevent the execution of 
hostages through demonstration of military power or in attempts to rescue 
hostages from captivity.” While both the United States and France have used 
military actions against known Hizb'allah bases in the Biq'a area as punish­
ment for the October 1983 twin suicide attacks against their MNF contingents, 
these actions have revealed the major weakness of applying military force as 
an instrument to extract retribution for terrorist acts in a manner which 
would seriously undermine the operational activity of the movement.” This
” See: Independent, May 7, 1990; Independent on Sunday, May 6, 1990; and Independent, 
August 11, 1989.
” For the major types of military operations, see: Brian Jenkins, Combatting Terrorism 
Becomes War (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, 1984); p.4. Also see: Rex A. Hudson,
"Dealing with International Hostage-Taking: Alternatives to Reactive Counterterrorist 
Assaults", Terrorism, Vol.12, No.5 (1989); and Lawrence H. Garrett, "Terrorism and the Use of 
Military Force", Defense 87 (May-June 1987): pp.26-32.
” For difficulty in affecting or penetrating the operational activity of Hizb'allah, 
see: Times, October 5, 1984; Ha'aretz, November 3, 1986; Da'var, January 11, 1987; Ali al- 
Kurani, Tariaat Hizballah fil-amal al-islami (Beirut: 1986); Newsweek, February 27, 1989; and 
Martin Kramer, (1988), op.cit.: pp.39-59.
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was demonstrated by the failure of the French raid against an Hizb'allah 
training camp, the Sheikh Abdallah barracks, south of Ba'albek on November 
17, 1983,” and the shelling by American naval aircrafts against Syrian and 
Hizb'allah positions in the Biq'a area in December 1983.” The identification 
of the Sheikh Abdallah barracks as a main center for co-ordination between 
Hizb'allah and Iranian Pasdaran was accurate, but a major failure for these 
military operations stemmed from the inherent difficulties in the conduct 
of military actions within an extremely hostile civil-war environment.” 
Apart from the lack of precise intelligence on the location of Hizb'allah 
command centers, this was compounded by the need to employ only limited 
levels of military violence against the movement in order to avoid a wider 
confrontation with Syria in and over Lebanon.” The utility of using retalia­
tory military actions against tl^ e Hizb'allah had diminished in conjunction 
with extreme measure of operational secrecy adopted by the Hizb'allah, the 
nature of the organisational structure of the Hizb'allah, and, more importan­
tly, with the abduction of foreigners by the movement, held at several 
different locations as a shield against military retribution by Western
” For details of this operation, see: Annie Laurent and Antione Basbous, (1987), 
op.cit.: pp.299-304. Also see: Pierre Marion, La Mission Impossible (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 
1991): p.233.
” For a detailed account, see: David C. Martin and John Walcott, op.cit.: pp.133-44.
” See: Ha'aretz, June 21, 1987; International Herald Tribune, January 10, 1984; al- 
Dustur, November 6, 1989; Time, August 14, 1989; Independent, July 28, 1992; and al-Watan al- 
Arabi, December 11, 1987. According to Reagan: "I wholeheartedly agree with the Long 
Gommssion's finding that the military is not adequately equipped to fight state-sponsored 
terrorists. The US needs to systematically redevelop our approach to the problem", see: New 
York Times, February 9, 1984.
” For the difficulties in the collection of intelligence on Hizb'allali targets, see: 
New York Times, August 6, 1989; Ma'aretz, February 2, 1987; Newsweek, February 27, 1989; and 
Foreign Report, March 8, 1990.
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governments.” Although Israel was successful in the abduction of senior 
Hizb'allah leaders and members in southern Lebanon in December 1988 and in 
July 1989 and in the assassination of its Secretary-General in February 1992, 
the increased militancy of the Hizb'allah in response to these IDF operations 
demonstrated not only that the military approach failed to yield any of the 
underlying political objectives but also that it contributed to a spiral of 
escalation.” Infact, uncoordinated military action against any Hizb'allah 
base or member, especially through a third state, may have severe adverse 
consequences for the fate of Western hostages, as revealed by the murder of 
Lt.Col. William Higgins following the IDF kidnapping of Sheikh Obeid in 
southern Lebanon.” The case of the assassination of Sheikh Raghib Harb in 
February 1984 demonstrated êarly that the death of any Hizb'allah leader 
exacerbates the Shi'ite sense of^martyrdom and the willingness by Hizb'allah 
fighters to sacrifice their own lives in the struggle against Israel and the
” For example, PLO's Salah Khalef stated that Hizb'allah maintained the foreign 
hostages as insurance against retaliation by; the US, Syria or any other force, see: Washington 
Post, February 21, 1987..Also see: Independent, October 22, 1991; and Independent, Decenber 1, 
1991.
” According to Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi: "America should think a million times before 
carrying out any foolish action: There will be no limits whatsoever to our reprisals", see: 
Independent, August 3, 1989. See: Independent, June 15, 1992; Yediot Aharanot, July 30, 1989; 
New York Times, August 1, 1989; Times, August 29, 1986; Washington Post, July 31, 1989; and 
New York Times, July 31, 1989. For Hizb'allah warning of retribution against the US, see: 
Independent, November 21, 1991. Also see: Dilip Hiro, (1988), op.cit.: pp.224-5. Hre IDF 
assassination of Sheikh Abbas al-Miisawi led to the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Argentina 
the following month, see: Ha'aretz, March 20, 1992; and Ha'aretz, March 20, 1992.
” See: New York Times, August 3, 1989; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily 
Report, August 4, 1989; Washington Post, August 8, 1989; and Washington Post, August 3, 1989. 
In response to the rniuder of Lt.Col. William Higgins, US officials revealed military plans to 
attack Hizb'allali strongholds had another US hostage been killed, see: New York Times, August 
4, 1989.
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West.” The extreme operational security adopted by Hizb'allah SSA members 
and its institutional position within the organisational structure of the 
movement, coupled with the decentralized nature of Hizb'allah's command 
leadership, have contributed to the difficulty in the selection of available 
targets as well as the limited effectiveness of military strikes against in­
dividual leaders or command centers to undermine the actual operations of 
the movement.” This was clearly demonstrated by the IDF assassination of 
Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi in 1992, which strengthened the radicalism of 
Hizb'allah's command leadership and contributed to increased operational 
security of the Islamic Resistance, its military wing, in the conduct of 
anti-Israeli attacks, and in due course led to the major bombing attack on 
the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires.”
Apart from the failed retaliatory response to the twin-suicide attacks 
against the American and French MNF contingents in 1983, the reluctance by 
Western governments to use military force in retribution has not only been 
based on inadequate access to good intelligence on the location of 
Hizb'allah leaders and command centers but also closely linked to the politi­
cal restraints of avoiding any military involvement in a civil war environ­
ment at the expense of their political agenda towards Lebanon and Syria as 
well as Iran.” As a consequence, the emphasis by the American administration
” See: Times, Febniaiy 2, 1984; Politique International, April 1984; Liberation, March
19, 1985; al-Nahar, October 5, 1984; and Liberation, September 26, 1985. The absence of
Hizb'allali leaders through kidnappings or deaths are more valuable for the movement than 
living leaders. Hiis was disaissed in an interview with Dr Martin Kramer, Jaffee Center for 
Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv IMversity, Tel Aviv, Israel, August 1991.
” For example, the abduction of Sheikh Abdul Karim Oieid failed to reduce any of the
movement's militaiy activity against Israel. For Hizb'allali attempts to devalue the importance 
of Sheikh Obeid for the movement, see: New York Times, August 6, 1989.
” See: Indepeiidenl:, February 18, 1992; Foreign Report, May 13, 1993; and Foreign 
Report, April 30, 1992. Also see: Ha'aretz, March 20, 1992; and March 19, 1992.
” See: Tiiæ, August 14, 1989; and David C. Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit.
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on the use of military means to preempt and counter terrorism, embodied by 
U.S. National Security Directive 138,” was not only ill-suited to the actual 
environment of the hostage-takings in Lebanon and to the actual military as 
well as intelligence capabilities in support for such operations but also 
served to erode the credibility of the Reagan administration in conjunction 
with unfulfilled threats of US military actions against the kidnappers de­
spite continuous hostage-taking acts of American citizens by the 
Hizb'allah.”
The demonstration of military force as a deterrent measure to the ab­
duction of foreigners was only used by the United States in response to the 
multiple kidnappings of American citizens in January 1987 and in response to 
threats against the lives of hostages after Israel's kidnapping of Sheikh 
Obeid in July 1989.” While the United States signalled a military threat to 
the Hizb'allah in 1987, through the position of the Sixth Fleet off the 
Lebanese coastline, it led to a serious escalation of the hostage-crisis 
whereby the movement threatened the execution of Western hostages in the 
event of the employment of American military force in Lebanon.” Unwilling­
ness to use the show of military force against unknown targets and for un­
known political objectives again undermined the credibility of the American 
administration and its overall response to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon.”
” See: Marc A. Celmer, Terrorism. US Strategy, and Reagan Policies {London: Mansell 
Publishers, 1987) ; George Bush, "Prelude to Retaliation: Building a Governmental Consensus on 
Terrorism", SAIS Review, (Winter-Spring 1987): pp. 1-9; and New York Times, April 24, 1986.
” See: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.
” See: Middle East International, August 25, 1989; and Times, February 2, 1987.
” See: Washington Post, January 30, 1987; Wall Street Journal, February 5, 1987; and 
Washington Post, February 5, 1987.
” See: Time, December 16, 1991; Independent, August 3, 1989; Independent, August 5, 
1989; In contrast, any French fleet presence in the area has been coupled with assurances to 
the Muslim community that they had no plans to intervene militarily in Lebanon, see: New York 
Times, August 22, 1989.
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Although US officials claimed that its show of military force against the 
Hizb'allah in 1989 actually prevented the execution of American hostages, 
its main effectiveness must be placed within the context of an overall re­
luctance by the movement to execute its hostages,” and can be attributed to 
veiled threats of using US military force against Iran in order to control 
the movement's actions in Lebanon.” However, the effectiveness of use of 
military force against Iran to prevent the execution of foreign hostages in 
Lebanon is questionable as Hizb'allah's murder of Lt.Col. Higgins alledgedly 
occured from orders issued by Iranian radicals, most notably Mohtashemi, in 
an effort to derail any improvement in the US-Iranian relationship.”
The use of military rescue operations by the Western governments for the 
release of foreigners have al^o suffered from the constraints of the complex 
civil war environment in Lebanon.” A major problem for Western intelligence 
agencies was the identification of the exact locations where the hostages 
were being held, compounded by the fact that many hostages were dispersed in 
the three regional areas of Lebanon and continously moved by the Hizb'allah
” Although it was reported that Bush had ordered the aircraft carrier Coral Sea to 
launch strikes against Hizb'allah strongholds in Ba'albek if any hostages were executed, other 
reports claim there were no definite plans to use military force, see: New York Times, August 
3, 1989; International Herald Tribune, August 6, 1989; and Washington Post, August 6, 1989.
For low ratio between threats and actual executions by Hizb'allali, see: Maskit Burgin, Anat 
Kurz, and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.: pp.14-17.
” For US threats against Iran, see: FBIS, August 7, 1989; Independent, August 5, 1989; 
Independent, August 7, 1989; and New York Times, August 5, 1989.
” See: New York Times, August 2, 1989; and Independent, August 3, 1989. Although 
Iran’s Rafsanjani cannot control the exact activity of the Hizb’allali, the absence of further 
executions of foreign hostages can be attributed to Iranian threats to cut financial and 
military assistance if the movement took any actions without prior consultation from Iran, 
see: Independent, August 5, 1989; and Independent, August 7, 1989.
” See: William V. Cowan, "Intelligence, Rescue, Retaliation, and Decision Making", in 
Barry Rubin (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.1-22.
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for security reasons.” Although information about the possible location of 
the Western captives emerged with the release of each hostage or through es­
capes, problems of rapidly confirming and acting on the information under­
mined any opportunity or desire by Western governments to launch any rescue 
operations in which failure would almost certainly guarantee the death of 
hostages.” As a number of Western hostages were held in the Biq'a area, any 
rescue operation was constrained by a logistical difficulty of gaining access
to an area both firmly controlled by Hizb'allah militiamen and an Iranian 
Pasdaran contingent as well as surrounded by the Syrian military. This prob­
lem led to the direct or indirect employment of local militias by Western 
governments in efforts to search for the hostages in Beirut and in southern 
Lebanon, as evident by the successful rescue of two hostages in 1984 by Amal 
and the same movement's search for the abducted American military officer in 
February 1988.” However, Amal's ability to locate hostages and mount any 
rescue operations diminished early in conjunction with the expansion of the 
Hizb'allah at the the expense of the Amal movement and with the endemic Amal- 
Hizb'allah warfare between 1987 until 1990.” Equally, the employment of the 
Druze militia in the search for Terry Waite in 1987 demonstrated the limited
” For reports of the hostages held in the Iranian embassy, see: Washington Post. May 
17, 1988; For reports of moving the foreign hostages by Hizb'allali, see: New York Times, May 
28, 1988; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Near East and South Asia, June 
8, 1988; Voice of Lebanon, May 11, 1986; and Ha'aretz, April 1, 1988. For reports of the 
hostages held in Beirut, see; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Near East 
and South Asia, June 22, 1988; Independent, Decoiiber 1, 1991; and Ma'ariv, February 2, 1987.
” See: Independent, August 3, 1989; Newsweek, February 9, 1987; and Independent on 
Sunday, March 11, 1990.
” See: Ha'aretz, February, 18. 1988; Jerusalem Post, February 18, 1988; Jerusalem 
Post, February 21, 1988; Ha'aretz, February 23, 1988; International Herald Tribune, February 
20, 1988; Ha'aretz, February 19, 1988; Ha'aretz, April 10, 1988; Foreign Report, March 17, 
1988; and FBIS, April 18, 1988.
” See: Middle East International, March 2, 1990; Jerusalem Post, March 9, 1987; and 
Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: Hie Internal Oanflict and the Iranian Connection", in John 
L. Esposito (ed.) , (1990), op.cit.: pp.130-32.
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ability of local militias on the ground in Lebanon to gain access to reliable 
intelligence on the location of the Western hostages.”
Apart from the lack of available information on any plans or attempts 
by the French or British government” to rescue its citizens from captivity 
in Lebanon, all efforts by the American administration were channeled through 
the Hostage Location Task Force, firmly established in December 1985.” While 
a number of unsuccessful and unconventional attempts were made to identify 
the location of American captives, most notably through the purchase of in­
formation from local informants and in the establishment of a counter­
terrorism programme for the Lebanese intelligence,” the failure of these 
methods underlined not only the immense security precautions adopted by
Hizb'allah's Special Security Apparatus (SSA) but also that the military 
approach was inadequate in dealing with and in resolving these types of 
hostage-taking situations.”” As revealed by the concealment of Lt.Col.
Higgins despite a massive search operation by Amal and the arrest warrents
” See: Ma'aretz, February 16, 1987. Also see: Gavin Hewitt, (1991), op.cit.
” According to Captain Paul Barril, former head of GIGN (French counterterrorism 
force), the French military considered a military intervention to rescue its hostages in 1986. 
After survey of the Lebanese terrain, it concluded any rescue attempt was not only too risky 
but also impossible, see': Newsweek, February 9, 1987.
” See: David C. Martin and John Walcott, (1988), op.cit.: pp.213-4.
” See: Washington Post, March 18, 1988; For a ÜS-Israeli hostage rescue plan in the
HfA-incident in 1985, see: Time, Decmber 16, 1991; and Samuel Segev, The Iranian Triangle 
(New York, NY.: Free Press, 1988) : p.143. For a US planned rescue operation in the autumn of 
1985 after only the release of one hostage within the framework of the US-Iranian arms-for- 
hostages deal, see: Yediot Aliaranot, December 24, 1986; Washington Post, August 9, 1987; and 
US Congress. Joint Committee. Hie Iran-Contra Affair. Report of the Congressional Committees 
Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair. 100th Cong., 1st sess. 1987: p.175. For a US military 
rescue plan in the autumn of 1986, see; Newsdav, August 11, 1989; Independent, August 16,
1989; Times, August 16, 1989; and Tower Commission Report (New York, NY.: Times/Bantam Books, 
1987): pp.351-2. For President Reagan's admission of a planned rescue attempt in January 1987,
see: Ronald Reagan, An American life (New York, NY. : Simon and Schuster, 1990).
For Hizb'ollah-Iranian secrecy of communication, see: Independent, March 7, 1990.
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against Imad Mughniya, it is alleged that even Syrian military intelligence 
was unable to locate the whereabouts of hostages and wanted terrorists 
While the application of military pressure through proxy, most notably by 
Syrian military, has been a successful means to prevent additional abductions 
of foreigners and to prevent the execution of hostages, it has been limited 
to the political environment in the Lebanon and in relation to the status 
of Syria's relationship with Iran as well as with Western governments.As
demonstrated by Syrian consolidation of its hegemony in Lebanon, which pre­
vented the abduction of foreigners by the Hizb'allah after 1987 through the 
deployment of the Syrian military in Beirut,”* any Syrian willingness to 
apply military pressure on the Shi'ite movement has been always governed by 
a desire not to jeopardize bts wider relationship with Iran”  ^ and in con­
junction with opportunities to ^safeguard its interests in Lebanon as well 
as with an improvement of its relations with Western governments.”’ Despite 
the fact that Syrian military intelligence know the identity of main offi­
cials within Hizb’allah's SSA, this has meant that Syrian moves towards 
Hizb'allah must be considered mainly gestures towards the West, ihlalignment
For arrest warrents against Imad Mughniya in 1987, see: al-Ittihad, January 31, 
1988; Da'var, November 13, 1987; Ha'aretz, January 29, 1988; and Da'var, February 1, 1988.
”* For threats by Syria against Hizb'allah to release hostages, see: New York Times, 
March 27, 1987; For Syrian storm attenpts of Hizb'allah buildings in search for West German 
hostages, see: FBIS, January 28, 1988. Also see: Independent, May 15, 1989.
”* See: Middle East Economic Digest, February 28, 1987; Middle East International, 
March 2, 1990; and Jolin L. Esposito, (1991), op.cit. : p.256.
For Syrian assurances to Iran of resistance to crackdown on Hizb'allah, see: New 
York Times, March 11, 1987; New York Times, May 23, 1988; and Independent, May 15, 1989. Also 
see: Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988) : 
p.184.
”’ The Syrian Brigadier General, Gliazi Kanaan, ruled out any rescue operations to 
release hostages because it carried too much risk to the foreigner's lives, see: Washington 
Post, February 27, 1987. Also see: Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and Syria: Fran Hostility to 
Limited Alliance", in Hooshang Amiralimadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit. : p.210.
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with its wider interests in Lebanon of preventing Hizb'allah to become too
strong at the expense of other militias, rather than any real willingness to
offend its partner Iran.”' Apart from the continued presence of the IRGC
contingent in Lebanon, a clear indication of this is the lack of Syrian
efforts to control the activities of the Hizb'allah and Iranian Pasdaran in
the Bi'qa area, as it could effectively isolate their movement beyond this 
area as well as their resistance activity against Israel since the overall
military command center of the Islamic Resistance is situated near
Ba'albek.”*
The restrictions in the application of military force to the hostage- 
crisis in Lebanon must also be viewed in a broader context.”' While it can 
be argued that a military approach should only be adopted as a last resort 
when non-military means are exhausted, it is important to recognize that the 
application of military force against the Hizb'allah has not only fuelled the 
militancy of the movement and provided it with many new members and recruits 
among the Shi'ite community but also strengthened the allegiance of 
Hizb'allah's command leadership to the more radical clergy within Iran's 
clerical establishment.”' While retaliatory strikes may seem morally justi-
”' An exception to tliis rule related to the abduction of four Soviet embassy employees 
by Hizb'allah in September 1985. Due to the strategic importance of the Syrian-Soviet 
relationship, Syrian intelligence provided the Soviet Union with information about responsible 
Hizb'allali SSA operatives in the abduction. After the Hizb'allah execution of one diplomat, a 
number of KGB operatives mth the assistance of Syrian military^  intelligence abducted three 
assistants of Imad Mughniya. These three SSA officials were murdered by the KGB and their 
bodies were sent back to the Hizb'allah with accompanied threats that it would continue to 
hunt dom and exeaite SSA members if the remaining three diplomats were not released. For 
information, see: Da'var, November 1, 1985; and Ma'ariv, February^  27, 1986. This information 
was confirmed in discussions with senior KGB officials at West European / Soviet Dialogue on 
International Cooperation Against Terrorism, Paris, June 10-11, 1991.
See: Independent, August 3, 1988; Foreign Report, May 20, 1993; and Foreign Report, 
May 13, 1993.
”' For a general overview, see: Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit.: pp.203-7.
For Hizb'allah statements that martyrs strengthen the movement's cause, see: Voice 
of the Oppressed, 0530 gmt 25 May 92 - BBC/SWB ME/1390, May 26, 1992. Also see: Independent, 
October 8, 1991.
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fiable in response to terrorist atrocities, the questionable legality of any 
type of unilateral military response not only cause strain for regional or 
international co-operation against terrorism but also will result in a high 
probability of collateral damage against civilian targets given the limited 
qualitity of intelligence on the Hizb'allah.”” This was clearly demonstrated 
in the failed assassination attempt of Hizb'allah's spiritual leader, Sheikh 
Muhammad Fadlallah, at his residence in the Bir al-'Abed quarter in the 
southern suburbs of Beirut, in which at least 80 civilians were killed and 
injured 200 others.The reluctance by the US government to execute any type 
of rescue operation must also be viewed within the context of previously 
failed attempts, most notably the failure of the 1980 Iranian hostage-rescue 
attempt.”*
Apart from its limited effectiveness in the reduction of terrorism, 
another main limitation of using the military approach to the hostage-crisis 
in Lebanon relates to the constraints in the political environment within 
which it is applied. In order to avoid a military confrontation with other 
state actors, applying military force to the hostage-crisis by Western 
governments has been constrained by the political and military risks of 
Syrian involvement and response to any action.”* As a consequence, the mili-
”” See: International Herald Tribune, Septmber 22-23, 1984. For example, the United 
States was strongly cautioned by Britain, France and West Germany from staging a military 
strike in Lebanon, see: Washington Post, February 5, 1987. Discord was also revealed by the 
refusal by France, supported by Britain and West Germany, to attend a seven-nation anti­
terrorism meeting in Rome because of apprehension of the possibility of a US military strike, 
see: Wall Street Joiuiial, February 5, 1987. Also see: Newsweek, February 9, 1987.
See: Hie Guardian, March 8, 1985; International Herald Tribune, May 17, 1985; Wall 
Street Journal, May 13, 1985; and Wall Street Journal, May 20, 1985.
112 See: Warren Cliristopher, (1985), op.cit.
”* In response to the 1987 US naval deployment, Syria accused the American administra­
tion of using the liostage-situation as an excuse for a possible attack against Lebanon, see: 
Wall Street Joiumal, February 5, 1987. For Syrian-Soviet agreement to protect Syrians in the 
Biq'a area, see: Ha'aretz, June 28, 1985.
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tary option by Western governments for the resolution of the hostage-crisis 
have not been a viable and realistic option given the intelligence con­
straints in identifying responsible Hizb'allah individuals and bases in the 
civil war environment as well as the political constraints in avoiding an 
escalation or a wider confrontation with either Syria or Iran.”’
In the absence of an effective military option, Western governments have 
utilized other instruments of statecraft in the political, economic and legal 
realm in pursuit of political objectives to secure the release of its citi­
zens from captivity in Lebanon.”® The political options used by Western 
governments have been geared towards forcing Iran and Syria to intercede with 
the Hizb'allah for the release of hostages through a combination of either 
sanctions or conciliatory diplomatic and political measures. While the under­
lying political objective has been to make it clear to Iran and Syria that 
support for terrorism in any form constitutes unacceptable international 
behaviour,”' the employment of political sanctions as punishment, through the 
withdrawal of diplomatic relations and increased political pressure in the 
regional and international context, has rested on the assumption that it 
would generate a change in the behaviour of Iran and Syria to abstain from 
its close support of the Hizb’allah and to force these states to influence 
the movement to intercede on their behalf for the release of Western cap­
tives.”* However, the disruption or absence of relations between Western
114 See: International Herald Tribune, September 22-23, 1984.
”’ The range of instruments used vary from economic sanctions, diplomatic protest, 
quiet diplomacy to nipture of relations, see: Henry Bienen and Robert Gilpin, "Economic 
Sanction as a Response to Terrorism", Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.3, No.l (May 1980) 
pp.89-98.
For a seminal work on these aspects, see: Paul Willdnson, (1985), op.cit. 
See: Independent, December 3, 1987; and Independent, August 30, 1989.
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governments and Iran as well as Syria have neither been the result of any 
Iranian or Syrian involvement with Hizb'allah nor yielded the release of any 
foreign captives, rather it has been in response to specific diplomatic in­
cidents and in the wider context of the conduct of foreign policy.”' This 
was evidently displayed by the French decision to maintain relations with 
both Iran and Syria despite their complicity in the 1983 suicide attack 
against the French MNF contingent in Lebanon.”' The reluctance of the French
government to sever ties with Syria in 1986, despite EC efforts to impose
comprehensive sanctions, out of political expediency in the conduct of
foreign policy demonstrated also the weakness of using punitive measures 
without the mechanism to enforce a uniform approach.”” Apart from the per­
manence of US policy of dipTomatic isolation towards Iran, the absence of 
relations with Iran and Syria by other Western governments has more often
hindered the pursuit of foreign policy interests towards the region and
prevented a direct dialogue with these states over the hostage-issue rather 
than assisted in the reduction of terrorism or procured the release of the 
foreign captives.”’
The effectiveness of the diplomatic option of punishing Iran and Syria
”” For Syrian threats against the Imposition of sanctions and its obstnictive effect 
in negotiations, see: New York Times, December 1, 1986, For an ovei'view, see: George Joffe, 
"Iran, the Southern Mediterranean and Europe: Terrorism and Hostages", in Anoushiravan 
Ehteshami and Mansour Varasteh (eds.), (1993), op.cit.
”' For details of Iranian-Syrian involvment in the Hizb'allali operations, see: al- 
Watan al-Arabi, December 14-20, 1984; Voice of Lebanon, October 26, 1983; Le Nouvel 
Observateiur, October 30, 1983; Le Monde, November 6-7, 1983; Ha'aretz, October 23, 1983; 
Ha'aretz, October 26, 1983; M?, October 23, 1983; and IRNA, November 15, 1983.
”” See: Middle East International, November 21, 1986; and Times, October 29, 1986. For 
a useful overview of the difficulty among EC states to adopt a coraion policy, see: Juliet 
Lodge, "Hie European Ccmcnunity and Terrorism: Fran Principles to Concerted Action", in Juliet 
Lodge (ed.) Hie Hireat of Terrorism (London: Wieatsheaf, 1988): pp.229-64.
Unattributoble interview ivith French counterterrorism official, Paris, June 1991.
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through the withdrawal of diplomatic relations is closely dependent on using 
conciliatory political measures as a complement, through offers for their 
restoration in the event Syria and Iran uses their influence with the 
Hizb'allah to secure the release of foreigners from captivity. In the case 
of US-Syrian diplomatic relations, the US government has consistently applied 
a pragmatic approach towards Syria in the absence of any relations with Iran 
and as it has been the main channel used for intercession with the Hizb'allah 
over the hostage-issue.”* Despite the fact that Syria has remained on the US 
State Department list of state-sponsors of terrorism, the reluctance by the 
US government to punish Syrian involvement with the Hizb'allah or pressure 
it to exert its influence over the movement was evidently displayed by the 
brief application of sanctions between mid-1986 until the autumn the follo­
wing year.”* Although Syria has occupied the role as the main channel for US 
efforts to release its hostages, despite Syria's limited ability to intervene 
with the Hizb'allah, the desire to disrupt US-Syrian relations has decreased 
with the elevated role of Syria in the region and within Lebanon as well as 
with its key participatory role within the Middle East peace process.”’ In 
contrast to Syria, the US government has persistently refused to remove 
sanctions towards Iran as it has pursued a subversive and aggressive foreign
12Z See: Patrick Seale, (1988), op.cit.
”* See: New York Times, June 27, 1987; Washington Post, September 3, 1987; and New 
York Times, September 11, 1987. Syria has remained on the US State Department's list of state- 
sponsors between 1986-1994, see: Patterns of Global Terrorism, US State Department, (1987-94).
”’ See: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.; Middle East International, October 11, 1991; 
Time, August 19, 1991; and Economist, September 28, 1991.
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policy in the region.”’ Although the dichotomy of full US diplomatic rela­
tions with Syria and their absence vis-à-vis Iran has been guided by other 
foreign policy considerations in the region, the unwillingness by the US 
government to punish Syria for its involvement and, at the same time, be 
conciliatory towards Iran have undermined not only the utility of placing 
pressure on these states, through sanctions and conciliatory moves, to inter­
vene more forcefully with Hizb'allah in Lebanon for the release of hostages, 
but also blocked any overall progress in negotiations over the hostage- 
crisis.”'
The French approach to political sanctions and conciliatory gestures has 
been uniformly one-sided as France has maintained diplomatic relations with 
both Iran and.Syria despite efforts by the EC to impose sanctions on Syria 
in late-1986.”* Unlike its European allies, the French government has 
accommodated Syria in the region despite its clear involvement in terrorism 
against French interests,”' and has maintained relations with Iran, with the 
exception of a brief period over diplomatic incidents from July until
”’ See: Rolf Tophoven, "State-Supported Terrorism After the Gulf War: The Role of 
Iran, Iraq and Libya", in 9th Int. Conf. on "Democracy Challenged and Put To The Test - The 
problem of Combatting Terrorism, Drugs and Organized Crime", (London: Hans Seidel Foundation, 
August 1992): pp.219-231; and Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in a 
Revolutionary Decade (Bloomington, IN.: Indiana University Press, 1990).
Ikiattributable interview with senior official in Israel's Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Jerusalem, August 1991.
”* On November 10, 1986, the EC member states, except Greece and France, adopted 
sanctions against Syria which included an anus anbargo, suspension of high-level visits, 
investigation of Syrian diplomats and tightened security around the operations of Syrian 
airlines, see: Washington Post, November 11, 1986; and Qiristian Science Monitor, December 2, 
1986. On July 14, 1987, the EC lifted its ban on high-level contacts, see: Washington Post, 
July 14, 1987.
In connection mth the EC-sanctions, President Asad threatened to retaliate against 
each country which adopted sanctions, see: Arab News, November 9, 1986. Also see: Xavier 
Raufer, (1991), op.cit.
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November 1987.”' While the French refusal to disrupt relations has been based 
on its wider foreign policy interests in the Middle East, it has also closely 
mirrored the French approach to negotiations with Iran and Syria over the 
hostage-crisis.”” In the French case, the use of sanctions against Iran and 
Syria could be seen as unnecessary as its negotiation position was assumed 
to have warranted the exploitation of Syrian and Iranian influence over the 
movement, and this was coupled with an overall willingness to make con­
cessions to Iranian and Hizb'allah demands.”’
While French unwillingness to sever relations with Syria in alignment 
with other EC states has undermined the effectiveness of sanctions,”* the 
British approach to the employment of sanctions and conciliatory measures has 
been contrary to the approach" adopted by the US government, as it has applied 
uncompromising sanctions agains^ Syria between mid-1986 until November 1990 
while its relations with Iran have been limited and relations temporarily 
severed over specific issues and incidents. As British-Syrian relations were 
permanently disrupted by the Nizar Hindawi affair,”* the British government 
adamantly refused to restore relations with Syria until it fulfilled certain
’*” See: Washington Post, July 18, 1987; Wall Street Journal, July 23, 1987; New York 
Times, July 24, 1987; and Washington Post, July 18, 1987.
’*” Prime Minister Cliirac argued that Syria played a key role in any solution to the 
chaos in Lebcuion and would retain relations with Syria, see: Washington Post, November 6, 
1986. Also see: Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.
See: Alex von Dornoch, "Iran's Violent Diplomacy", Survival (May/June 1988): 
pp.252-66; Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, Foreign Hostages in Lebanon, (1988), 
op.cit.: pp.26-7; Ma'aretz, May 8, 1988; International Herald Tribune, May 19, 1988; New York 
Times, May 5, 1988; and Liberation, May 7-8, 1988.
’** For the purpose of employing sanctions, see: Kim Richard NossaJ., "International 
Sanctions as International Punishment", International Organization, Vol.43, No.2 (Spring
1989): pp.301-22.
’** See: Patrick Seale, Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire (London: Hutchinson, 1992): pp.247-
52.
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preconditions and distanced itself from sponsoring terrorism.”’ The refusal 
by the British government to restore relations until November 1990, despite 
assurances by Syria that it had fulfilled these necessary preconditions, 
demonstrated the concentration on Iran as a limited channel for influencing 
the Hizb'allah to release its citizens from captivity. The policy also 
ignored the fact that the absence of relations obstructed any Syrian efforts 
or willingness to facilitate their release,”’ while the policies of PM 
Thatcher, which overruled requests by the Foreign Office to renew ties with 
Syria, derailed any opportunity to secure the freedom of its hostages.”' This 
was clearly evident by the volte-face in the restoration of British relations 
with Syria immediately after the resignation of PM Thatcher in the autumn of 
1990.”* Although the UK government has concentrated on Iran as the key to 
the release of its hostages, t^e Anglo-Iranian relationship suffered by a 
series of diplomatic incidents in mid-1987.”' The improvement in Anglo- 
Iranian relations, culminating in the formal reopening of Britain's embassy 
in Teheran in December 1988, was shortlived as Iran severed diplomatic rela­
tions in March 1989 after Ayatollah Khomayyni's fatwa against Salman
”’ The major conditions by Britain were: the closure of Abu Nidal's offices in the 
country, the punishment of General Mohammed al-Klioli and Col. Haitham Said, the responsible 
intelligence officers in the Hindam-affair and the Syrian Ambassador, Lutfallah Haydar, see: 
Times, November 19, 1991.
For Syria's omi admission that unfriendly relations blocked any efforts to secure 
British hostages, see: Ha'aretz, January 13, 1989.
”' For Thatcher's obstniction of relations, see: Independent, August 9, 1991; Time, 
August 9, 1991; and Independent on Sunday, August 25, 1991. Also see: John Dickie, (1992), 
op.cit.
”* See: Daily Telegraph, July 14, 1991; and Times, November 19, 1991.
See: Washington Post, June 11, 1987; and New York Times, June 5, 1987.
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Rushdie.”' Following the ascendancy of Douglas Hurd as foreign secretary 
there were negotiations with Iran over the restoration of relations. Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait contributed to the British urgency of resolving out­
standing differences with Iran through diplomatic representation,””
The varied individual approach by these three Western governments to the 
use of sanctions and conciliatory political measures as instruments to 
pressure both Iran and Syria to intercede with the Hizb'allah has been 
governed not only by their wider foreign policy interests in the region but 
also by differences in the approach to negotiations adopted by these states 
in terms of the selection of certain channels to influence the movement in 
Lebanon to release foreign hostages. Apart from the French approach to main­
tain diplomatic relations*with both Iran and France, the absence of Anglo- 
Syrian and US-Iranian diplomatic relations without a willingness to use 
conciliatory measures served not only to undermine any possibility for pro­
gress in securing the release of their citizens in captivity, but also 
demonstrated disregard for the opportunities and constraints in the fluc­
tuating relationship between Syria and Iran as well as the politicial envi­
ronment within Lebanon in which the Hizb'allah operates and exists. This 
has been evident by the failure to rely on either Iran or Syria as the only 
channel in negotiations over hostages without reference to their individual 
ability bo. exert its influence- over the movement in accordance with shifts 
in their ties to Hizb'allah's command leadership between 1987-1991 and, more 
importantly, to the status of the Iranian-Syrian relationship over time, as 
evidently displayed by the increased friction between 1986 and 1988.”’
For the Rushdie affair, see: Graham E. Fuller, (1991), The "Center of the 
Universe": The Geopolitics of Iran (Boulder, CO.: Westview, 1991): pp.254-5.
See: Independent, August 9, 1991.
For example, see: Independent, August 30, 1989.
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A major weakness in the Anglo-American approach has been the uncoordi­
nated employment of opposite channels through either Iran or Syria in efforts 
to secure the release of hostages in Lebanon and the varied approach as well 
as consistency in applying santions or making conciliatory gestures. This 
problem was evidently displayed by the indisciminate approach to comprehen­
sive sanctions on Syria by the European allies and the United States. The 
lack of comprehensiveness of these sanctions, as displayed by French refusal 
to join a concerted EC-effort and by the decision of the US government to 
abandon them the following year, rendered any pressure on Syria useless to 
forcefully intervene and limit the activities of the Hizb'allah, notwith­
standing its already limited ability to avoid offending Iran.”*
The use of the economic"option by Western governments has also assumed
the form of the combined use of ^ sanctions and conciliatory gestures towards
Iran and Syria.”* While the status of economic relations between the US and 
Iran has been governed and regulated by any progress in negotiations at the 
US-Iranian Claims Tribunal in the Hague under the 1980 Algiers agreement, any 
impairment of economic relations with Iran by either the French'or British 
governments has been avoided due to their alledged neutrality in the Iran- 
Iraq war and, more importantly, for the advancement of wider commercial 
interests in the Middle East.”’ This was evident by the continued position 
of Iran as the second most important Middle East market in 1988 for the
United Kingdom, and by France to a limited degree despite its close role as
”* See: As'ad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.
”* See: "Economic Sanctions to Combat International Terrorism", Department of State 
Special Report (July 1986 & October 1986).
See: George Joffe, "Iran, the Southern Mediterranean and Europe: Terrorism and 
Hostages", in Anoushiravan Hiteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), (1993), op.cit.; and New 
York Times, April 11, 1987.
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arms supplier to Iraq.”’- Despite official observance by Britain of the arms 
embargo on Iran, it allowed the continuation of Iranian arms purchasing 
activity in London until September 1987.”' France also placed an embargo 
against the purchase of Iranian oil after its relations with Iran was severed 
over the Gordji-affair in mid-1987.”* A resolution of the US-Iranian finan­
cial disputes has been a central issue to Iran as emphasized by the condi­
tional linkage between any efforts to intercede with the Hizb'allah proceeded 
by the release of Iranian assets frozen in American banks,”' While in some 
cases the release of US hostages has occured in conjunction with the payment 
of assets, the slow mechanism of adjudication in the US-Iranian financial 
disputes, coupled with a delay in the release of frozen Iranian assets by the 
US government, served to obstruct the release of any American hostages. How­
ever, any US unwillingness for a^speedy resolution to the financial disputes 
with Iran must be viewed within the context of the Iran-Iraq war and its 
economic consequences for internal Iranian politics as well as regional 
developments affecting other US national interests.”'
H5 Ibid; p.76.
”' The main offices of Iranian aims purchases in Europe was in London under the 
auspices of the Iranian National Oil Company, see: Hermann Moll, Broker of Death (London:
Macmillan, 1988): p.55. See: George Joffe, "Iran, the southern Mediterranian and Europe:
terrorism and hostages", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mansour Varasteh (eds.), (1993), 
op.cit.: p.80. An offer by Iran for rene^ ml of British arms supplies to Iran, transferred \da
France, was rejected by the British government, see: Ma'aretz, December 6, 1987. Iran was also
displeased with Saudi Arabia's conclusion of a $30 billion arms purchase agreement with 
Britain in mid-1988, see: Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuitv in a Revolutionary 
Decade (Bloomington, IL.: Indiana University Press, 1990): pp.63-78.
”* See: Jerusalem Post, December 2, 1987; Ha'aretz, April 5, 1988; Ma'aretz, May 8, 
1988; International Herald Tribune, December 12, 1987; and New York Times, May 19, 1988.
See: Maskit Burgin, "Shi'ite International Terrorism", in Anat Kurz (ed.), (1989), 
op.cit.: pp.51-2.
See: Counter-Terrorism in the 1990's, US State Department, January 1990. Also see: 
Kate Gillespie, "US Corporations and Iran at the Hague", Middle East. Journal, Vol.44, No.l 
(Winter 1990): pp.18-36.; Stuart S. Malawer, "Rewarding Terrorism: The U.S.-Iranian Hostage 
Accords", International Security Review (Winter 1981-82); and Middle East Economic Digest, 
August 18, 1989.
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The case of economic sanctions and conciliatory gestures towards Syria
has been used by Western governments in alignment with the imposed political
sanctions after Syrian involvement in the Hindawi-affair in mid-November
1986. While French reservations about EC-sanctions against Syria coincided
with the release of two French hostages in November 1986,”” the effectiveness
of using economic sanctions was undermined not only by the re-establishment 
of EC and US relations with Syria in mid-1987, due to Syria's role in any
negotiations in the Middle East peace process and the closure of Abu Nidal's 
offices in Damascus,”’ but also by the continued close support provided to 
Syria by the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf states as well as by Iran.”* 
Although any EC financial aid to Syria was blocked by a British veto until 
September 1990,”* any Syrian financial difficulties in the interim were cir­
cumvented by the Assad regime thpough adept exploitation of its relationship 
with Iran as well as within the Arab world and with its patron the Soviet 
Union.”’ This was particularly evident by Syrian moves towards a rapproach­
ment with Iraq within the context of Syrian-Iranian rivalry over debt re-
See: Middle East International, November 21, 1986; and Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.
”’ See: New York Times, June 27, 1987.
”* See: Yosef Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik", in 
David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.171-88.
”* See: Guardian, September 8, 1990.
”’ Between 1977 and 1988, Syria received a total of $42 billion in external aid of 
which: $23 billion was supplied from the Soviet Union; $3 billion from Iran; $12 billion from 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf states; and $4 billion from the West, see: Wall Street 
Journal, August 10, 1989. Also see: Shahram Qiubin and Cliarles Tripp, (1988), op.cit.: pp.179- 
87.
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payments from supplied oil to Syria.”’ While Western governments failed to 
utilize Syria's dependency on Soviet or Arab financing as a leverage over 
Syria, through pressure on these states, the vulnerability of Syria was re­
inforced by the gradual reduction in aid from the Soviet Union and the 
Persian Gulf states in conjunction with their own economic difficulties in 
and after 1989. Yet, Syrian moves towards strengthening its position within 
Lebanon, through the Ta'if accord, its key role in leading the Arab forces 
within the UN-coalition during the Gulf war, and its participation in the 
American-sponsored Middle East peace process led to an economic rapproachment 
with Western governments.”' The elevated political role of Syria within the 
Arab world in the aftermath of the Gulf war facilitated Syrian willingness 
to intercede with Hizb'allah to persuade the movement to release the foreign 
hostages in close cooperation with Iran.”*
The legal approach by the Western governments has been related to the 
active apprehension and prosecution of Hizb'allah members and the extradition 
of arrested suspects. While the US government has actively encouraged the 
apprehension of leading Hizb'allah members after the TWA-inciden't in 1985, 
through rewards leading to the location and apprehension of terrorist sus­
pects as well as through increased proactive legislation,”' the absence of 
any Hizb'allah actions on US soil and and any case of apprehension or pro­
secution of Hizb'allah members by US law enforcement agencies has led to a
”’ See: International Herald Tribune, July 18-19; and Observer, Novonber 1, 1987.
”' See: Farhang Jahanpour, (1990), op.cit.: pp.33-35.
”* See: Reuven Avi-Ran, "Syria Tightens Its Grip on Lebanon", in Shlomo Gazit (ed.), 
(1992), op.cit.: pp.162-71.
”' The US government issued arrest warrants for Ali Atwa, Hassan Izz al-Din, and 
Mulrarrmad Hamadi and a reward of $250,000 for information leading to their arrest, see: Middle 
East Reporter, October 18, 1985; New York Times, January 16, 1986; New York Times, April 16, 
1988; and International Herald Tribune, July 4, 1985. Also see: G. Davidson Smith, Combating 
Terrorism (London: Routledge, 1990): p.76.
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concentration of efforts to pressure its allies in Europe to apprehend 
Hizb'allah suspects and to request the extradition of those members respon­
sible for terrorist activity involving US citizens and property.”' This was 
clearly evident in US efforts for the extradition of Muhammad Hamadi, who 
was responsible for the hijacking of TWA-847 following his arrest in West 
Germany in January 1987.”” Despite unsuccessful efforts by US officials to 
persuade the Bonn government to extradite Hamadi, it actively assisted in 
preparation of the prosecution case, leading to the conviction which sen­
tenced Muhammad Hamadi to life-imprisonmentWhile unsuccessful efforts 
were made by Hizb'allah SSA officials to influence the legal process in the 
Hamadi-case through threats and abductions of West German citizens in 
Lebanon, the US government has received less co-operation from other states 
in efforts to apprehend, prosecute or extradite Hizb'allah members, mostly 
for the fear of retribution by the movement and for political expediency. 
This was demonstrated by Algeria's refusal to apprehend and extradite Izz al- 
Din for his involvement in the TWA-847 hijacking in their handling of the 
resolution of the KU422-hijacking in 1988.”* It was also clearly revealed by 
the French failure to apprehend Imad Mughniya during his known visit to Paris
159 See: Stanley S. Bedlington, (1987), op.cit.
”” See: Independent, January 28, 1987; International Herald Tribune, January 24-5, 
1987; Newsweek, February 9, 1987; Times, June 25, 1987; and Washington Post, January 19, 1987.
”’ The extradition treaty between the United States and West Germany was signed in 
June 1978, see: January 16, 1987.
”* US officials believed Izz al-Din was involved in the MJ-422 hijacking and wanted 
him to stand trial in Germany, see: New York Times, April 16, 1988; and Sunday Times, April 
24, 1988. Also see: William Zartman, "Negotiating Effectively with Terrorists", in Barry Rubin 
(ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.188. For information about Izz al-Din, see: Independent, May 15, 
1989.
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on November 10-16, 1985, despite US requests for his arrest.^”
Although French law enforcement has been successful in the apprehension 
of a number of other Hizb'allah members, most notably a whole network in 
March 1987, it has been simultaneously undermined by a French willingness to 
circumvent the legal process in certain cases for political expediency in 
relation to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon.Apart from the Gordji affair, 
a main case was the arrest of Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin's nephew, Mohammed 
Mouhajer, who occupied a senior position as co-ordinator of the French pro- 
Iranian network and Hizb'allah in Lebanon, and his subsequent release in 
March 1988 prior to the complete resolution of the French hostage-crisis.^* 
While French political interference in the judicial process was also evident 
in the release of Anis Naccaclie and his three accomplices in July 1990,*** it 
has underlined the French application of the sanctuary doctrine in order to 
avert violence on its own soil through the expulsion of terrorist suspects 
rather than allowing the legal process to take its full course.**’ Although
*** See: Le Quotidien de Paris, February 27, 1986; Le Figaro, February 26, 1986 Le 
Figaro, March 7, 1986; Independent, April 26, 1988; and Ma'aretz, February 4, 1987.
**^ See: Midiel Wieviorka, "French Politics and Strategy on Terrorism", in Barry Rubin 
(ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.61-90,
*** See; Liberation, March 26-27, 1988; Le Monde, March 28, 1987; Le Monde, April 11, 
1987; Le Point, June 15, 1987; Le Nouvel Observateur, April 3-10, 1987; le Nouvel Observateur, 
June 12-18, 1987; Le Monde, May 28, 1988; Le Figaro, October 28-29, 1989; Washington Post, 
April 6, 1988; Newsweek, April 6, 1987; International Herald Tribune, March 28-29, 1987; and 
Ha'aretz, April 6, 1988.
*** For President Mitterrand's promise for the release of Naccache, see: International 
Herald Tribune, January 31, 1990. For their release, see: Jerusalem Post, July 29, 1990; 
Ma'aretz, July 29, 1990; and Ma'aretz, July 31, 1990.
**’ For a discussion of the sanctuary principle, the granting of concessions to 
terrorist groups of presence in, and free passage through, France on the understanding that no 
terrorist incidents would be conducted on French soil, see; Edwy Plenel, "La France et le 
Terrorisme: la Tentation du Sanctuaire", Politique Étrangère, Vol.4 (1986); and Michel 
Wieviorka and Datiinique Wolton, Terrorisme a la Une: Media, Terrorisme et Démocratie (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1987). Also see: Washington Post, April 4, 1986.
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the French has pursued a tough policy of capturing and punishing terrorists 
at home, as evident by the arrests of a pro-Iranian network in 1987 and by 
its co-operation with Spanish authorities in 1989,*** it has avoided the 
arrest and prosecution of any leading Lebanese Hizb'allah member in alignment 
with the sanctuary principle and to agreements entered with Iran.*** This has 
been evident, for example, by the presence and activity of the Ahl al-Beit 
center in Paris headed by Muhammad Bakir Fadlallah, the brother of 
Hizb'allah's spiritual leader, Sheikh Muhammad Fadlallah.*’* Although a French 
magistrate issued arrest warrants against seven Hizb'allah members in Lebanon 
in April 1989 for involvement in the 1986 Paris bombings, there is limited 
ability as well as probability for French authorities to apprehend these 
suspects.*’*
The absence of overt Hizb'allah members or activity on British soil has 
prevented the apprehension and prosecution of any Hizb'allah-affiliated 
individuals which has led to a concentration by British authorities on the 
expulsion of any Iranian and Syrian diplomats using their embassies as a
*** In November 1989, Spanish authorities arrested eight Hizb'allah members in 
possession of more than l,000kgs of explosives concealed in over 30,000 cans of preserves 
which were to be shipped and used in France, see: al-SIiarq al-Awsat, Novanber 27, 1989; al- 
Watan al-Arabi, December 8, 1989; International Herald Tribune, December 15, 1989; al-Sharg
al-Awsat, December 30, 1989; Washington Post, December 16, 1989; and Le Figaro, December 8, 
1989.
*** Hie French government has admitted it reached an understanding with Iran over the 
cessation of terrorist acts on French soil, see: International Herald Tribune, Deconber 15,
1989.
*’* The Ahl al-Beit Islamic Cultural Center in Paris served as a citadel for pro- 
Iranian and Hizb'allali mæibers for meetings and recruitment, as evident by the involvement of 
Muhajir and Salali in its activities, see: Pierre Pean, (1987), on.cit.: pp.289-90. Slieikh 
Fadlallah's brother also operated a book store used as a communication center for Hizb'allah, 
see: Le Quotidien de Paris, June 5, 1987. Also see: Xavier Raufer, (1991), op.cit.: pp.100-1.
*’* The arrest warrent, issued on 89.04.27, named Abd al-Hadi Hamadi, Ibraliim Aqil, 
Hassan Gliosn, Hussein Mazbou, Hassan Ali, Mizar Lelzein, and Muliammad Mehdi Diab, see: 
Jenisalem Post, April 28, 1989. Evidence of French unwillingness to pursue suspects was 
demonstrated by its expulsion of Shapour BaJditiar's presumed assassins to Iran despite Swiss 
protests, see: International Herald Tribune, January 8-9, 1994.
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cover for activities connected with terrorism and on pressure against states 
for the extradition of any Hizb'allah members.*” While British authorities 
have continued to expel a significant number of Iranian diplomats and in­
dividuals, it has strongly condemned other states, most notably France and 
Algeria, for their decisions to release several key Hizb'allah suspects. This 
was evident in British official protests to the Quai d’Orsay after every 
French concession*” and by the attempts of the British government to organize 
a boycott against Algeria for its decision to allow the hijackers free 
passage out of the country after the KU422-hijacking incident in 1988.*”
5.4 Accurate and Timely Intelligence on Adversary and Crisis
The lack of available intelligence on Hizb'allah and its activities can 
be attributed not only to the'‘chaotic environment of Lebanon's civil war, but 
also to the extreme operational security of the Hizb'allah governing its own 
operations and its relationship with Iran and Syria.*” While the US intelli­
gence capability had been almost completely stymied by the Hizb'allah car- 
bomb attack against the US embassy in Beirut on April 18, 1983,*” and by the
*” See: Grant V. McClanahan, Diplomatic Immunitv (London: Hurst, 1989).
*” See: Times, November 19, 1991; Financial Times, January 16, 1988; and New York 
Tdræs, December 2, 1987. Britain also voiced its opposition to French concessions in bilateral 
discussions mth French representatives prior to, and at, the December 1987 Copenhagen summit, 
see: Europe, December 2, 1987; and Europe, November 7, 1987. Also see: Economist, December 5, 
1987.
*” See: Times, April 21, 1988; and Washington Post, May 3, 1988. Also see: Jolm 
Dickie, (1992), op.cit.: pp.197-99.
*” See: Ali al-Kurani, Tariqat Hizballah fil-amal al-islami (Beirut, 1986); Davar, 
January 30, 1987. As stated by US President Bush: "[w]e are dealing with less than a full deck 
of information. Its very hard...to get all the information that you need to make a decision", 
see: Newsweek, August 14, 1989. Also see: New York Times, December 29, 1983; and New York 
Times, September 27, 1984.
*” Tlie car-bomb explosion killed Robert Ames, renouned as the best CIA-analyst in the 
Middle East who was in close liason with Palestinian intelligence, and Kenneth Haas, CIA 
station chief as well as most other intelligence employees at the embassy, see: L. Pintak, 
Beirut Outtakes (Lexington, Ml. : Lexington Books, 1988). For information concerning the 
September 1984 Hizb'allah bombing of the US embassy annexe, see: US Congress, U.S.
Intelligence Perfoimcuice and the September 20. 1984, Beirut Banbing, Permanent Select
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kidnapping of William Buckley on March 16, 1984,*” any subsequent collection 
of intelligence on the Hizb'allah was almost solely confined to signal and 
photo intelligence efforts by US embassies in Tel Aviv and Cairo in the 
absence of human intelligence resources on the ground in Lebanon.*” Although 
these methods were successful in monitoring the activities of the Iranian 
Pasdaran contingent in Ba'albek and the interaction between the Iranian em­
bassies in Beirut and Damascus, they failed to yield accurate intelligence 
on the Hizb'allah or to predict any terrorist attacks against US citizens and 
property in Lebanon.*” Apart from protection through increased physical 
security for any remaining US facilities in Lebanon and provision of counter­
terrorism training for the Lebanese intelligence,*** US intelligence efforts
•kfocused on finding the location of hostages and available Hizb'allah targets 
in the event of a rescue operation or retaliatory strikes.*** These intelli­
Gommittee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ocotber 3, 1984. Also see: John B. Wolf, 
Antiterrorist Initatives (London: Plenum Press, 1989).
*” William Buckley had been tortured by the Hizb'allah to reveal CIA activity and 
Middle East policy which was contained in a document of over 4(X) pages, see: U.S. Congress. 
Joint Committee. The Iran-Contra Affair. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating
the Iran-Contra Affair. 100th Cong., 1st sess. 1987: pp.252 and 265.
*” Unattributable interview with US counter-terrorism official, Washington DC, 
September 29, 1993. For a very useful analysis of CIA-activity in Lebanon, see: David Kennedy 
and Leslie Brunet ta, Lebanon and the Intelligence Contnunity, (Cambridge, MA. : JFK School of 
Government, Harvard University, 1988).
*” For security reasons, the Iranian embassy in Syria liasie with Hizb'allah due to 
Iranian fears of intelligence surveillance of satellite and other communications by US against 
the Iranian mbassy in Beirut, see: Independent, March 7, 1990.
*** US Congress authorized the expenditiu'e of $365 million to secure USA's 262
embassies abroad secure against terrorist attacks, see: G. Davidson Smith, (1990), op.cit.: 
p.232. Also see: Joel M. Woldman, "The Security of US Bnbassies and Other Overseas Civilian 
Installations", Congressional Research Service Review (April 1985): pp.2-3; and Washington 
Post, May 12, 1985.
*** See: Andrew and Leslie Cockbuni, Dangerous Liason: The Inside Storv of the US- 
Israeli Cbvert Relationship (New York, NIL: Harper Collins, 1991): p.337.
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gence efforts were assisted by limited co-operation from Israel's military 
intelligence in pinpointing specific Hizb'allah command centers.*” However, 
the inability of even the IDF to penetrate the Hizb'allah through human in­
telligence underlined the inherent constraints of efforts to track down not 
only Western hostages but also missing IDF soldiers held by the Hizb'allah 
or to predict its modus operandi, as evident by Hizb'allah's suicide-bombing 
of IDF headquarters in Tyre in 1984.*** Despite successful IDF abductions of 
leading Hizb'allah members in southern Lebanon, most notably Sheikh Obeid, 
it failed to yield any new or useful information about the organisation due 
to its compartmentalized structure and obsession with security.As American 
and Israeli intelligence efforts to collect high-quality information on 
Hizb'allah remained unsuccessful, the efforts by the French Direction 
Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DSGE) within Lebanon were limited to 
close liason with the Lebanese intelligence community*** while the British 
GCHQ in Cyprus assumed responsibility for signal intelligence collection.*** 
These intelligence collecting activities were not only a reflection of indi­
vidual capability through actual physical presence within Lebanon but also 
to the way in which the individual states approached negotiations with the
*** For limitations in US-Israeli intelligence sharing, see: Bob Woodward, (1987), 
op.cit.: pp.380,
*** See: Samuel M. Katz, Soldier Spies: Israeli MLlitary Intelligence (Novato, CA. : 
Presidio Press, 1992): p.319; Newsweek, February 27, 1989; and Ariel Merari and Yosefa 
(Daiksel) Braunstein, (1984), op.cit.: pp.7-10. Also see: Samuel M. Katz, (1992), op.cit.: 
pp.270-81.
*** Unattributable interview with senior IDF official, Tel Aviv, August 1991.
*** A French hostage, Marcel Coudry, belonged to the anti-terrorist department of the 
Direction Générale de la Sécmrité Extérieure (DSGE-General Directorate for External Security) 
in east Beirut, see: September 25, 1985. Also see: Annie Laurent and Antoine Basbous,
(1987), OP.cit.; Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.; Pierre Marion, (1991), op.cit.; and Sunday 
Times, August 5, 1990.
*** Unattributable interview with British intelligence specialist, April 1994.
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Hizb'allah in accordance with their strategies.
In the absence of accurate information on the exact location of foreign 
hostages, it was possible to discern certain weaknesses in a number of areas 
of Hizb'allah activity, vulnerabilities which made the movement susceptible 
to pressures and offers of accomodation as an instrument of leverage by 
Western governments to maximise the utility of the application of crisis 
management techniques and the possibility for a resolution to the hostage- 
crisis. It is also possible to identify weaknesses in the Iranian-Syrian 
relationship as superimposed over the movement's activity in Lebanon in order 
to evaluate the utility of crisis management to the hostage-crisis in accor­
dance with opportunities and constraints within the context of the Lebanese 
political environment and, more importantly, within the multi-dimensional and 
triangular relations between Hizb'allah, Iran and Syria.
While the collective and centralized nature of Hizb'allah's command 
leadership made the movement's decision-making process towards the hostage- 
issue strictly the affair of the highest authority within the movement, most 
notably by the most senior and powerful cleric who occupy the position of 
Secretary-General at the time, it was also closely influenced by the personal 
allegiance of the Hizb'allah leader and other influential members with indi­
vidual factions within the clerical establishment in Iran.**’ This meant that 
increased intensity in Iranian clerical factionalism manifested itself 
through Hizb'allah activity, most notably visible with the diminished power 
of the Iranian radical cleric Mohtashemi as the movement has pursued a more 
independent line from official Iran since 1987.*** While the projection of
**’ See: John Calabrese, (1990), op.cit.: p.189; and Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: 
The Internal Conflict and the Iranian Connection", in Jolm L. Esposito (ed.), op.cit.
*** See: Washington Post, August 18, 1989; Independent, March 7, 1990; FBIS, November 
30, 1989; Washington Post, August 20, 1989; Washington Post, August 28, 1989; al-Anba, 
Nov0f[iber 27, 1989; Washington Post, May 15, 1990; al-Hayat, November 27, 1989; and 
Independent, October 23, 1991. Also see: Bruce Hoffman, (1990), op.cit.
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Iranian clerical factionalism onto the Hizb'allah was clearly evident in 
efforts by Iranian radicals to obstruct efforts to release Western hostages 
in alignment with pressures from its rival clerical colleagues after the 
ascendancy of President Rafsanjani in 1989, it was also displayed by the 
downgrading of official Iran's financial support to the movement.**’ Pre­
viously Iran had also maintained close supervision of most Hizb'allah acti­
vity through the presence of two Iranian members within Hizb'allah's main 
Majlis al-Shura, whose presence was gradually reduced with Iranian pressu­
res.*” As a consequence, the status of Iranian clerical factionalism and its 
manifestations through the Hizb'allah, as well as the nature of personal 
allegiances of its leaders manifested through its own clerical factionalism, 
have been vital to gauge in order to determine the exact ability of Iran to 
pressure the movement to release foreign captives.*’* This must be balanced 
against the constraint of Iran's inherent reluctance to pressure the 
Hizb'allah beyond a certain point, given Iran's enormous financial invest­
ments to the movement and the fact that it constitutes the most successful 
example of Iran's ability to export the revolution.*” The intensity of cle­
rical factionalism either within Iran or the Hizb'allah translated effec­
tively into a limited ability of official Iran to exert its influence over 
the Hizb'allah than at any other times.*” Although Iranian pressure on the
**’ See: Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and 
Constraints", in Hooshang Amiralimadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: p.188.
130 pj;-j^vate comrainication ^ fith Dr Yossi Olmert, Director, Government Press Office, 
Israel, December 30, 1991.
*’* See: John Calabrese, (1990), op.cit.: p.189. Also see: Sean K. Anderson, (1991), 
op.cit.: pp.19-34.
*” See: Sliireen T, Hunter, (1988), op.cit. : pp.730-49.
*” See: Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and 
Constraints", in Hooshang Amiralmdi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit. : p. 190.
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Hizb'allah led to a closer allegiance by the movement’s command leadership 
to Iran's radical clergy, it was dependent on the vulnerability of the posi­
tion of the movement within the context of militia warfare and in a post- 
civil war environment of Lebanon.*”
As the Hizb'allah strengthened and consolidated its position within 
Lebanon in conjunction with the witdrawal of Western MNF contingents in 1984 
and Israel in 1985,*” a main source of vulnerability for the movement was its 
frictional relationship with Syria, which has been most manifest through its 
protracted warfare with Amal between 1987-1990.*” While Syria was forced to 
crackdown on the Hizb'allah to maintain its control over Lebanon, it exer­
cised considerable restraint in its relationship with the movement in order 
to safeguard its relationship with Iran.*” However, strains in the Iranian- 
Syrian relationship have also been clearly manifest by the degree of Syrian 
crackdown on Hizb'allah activity, most notably displayed in 1987.*” The 
occurence of this friction provided a window of opportunity for Western 
governments to exert maximum amount of pressure on Syria to intervene with 
the Hizb'allah to procure the release of the foreign hostages and'^undermine 
the Syrian-Iranian alliance through economic and political offers to substi-
194 See: As'ad AbuKlialil, (1990), op.cit.
*” See: Robin Wright, "Lebanon", in Shireen T. Hunter (ed.), (1988), op.cit.: pp.69- 
70; and Augustus Richard Norton, (1987), op.cit.
196 See: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.
*” See: Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar, "Iranian-Arab Relations in 
Transition", in idem (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: p.13.
*” See: Jerusalem Post, November 29, 1987; Washington Post, June 30, 1987; 
International Herald Tribune, March 4, 1988; Ma'aretz, March 2, 1987; and le Matin, November 
28, 1987.
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tute Syria's dependence, most notably of oil supply, from Iran.*”
A major source of potential pressure on the Hizb’allah relates to the 
presence of the Iranian Pasdaran contingent in Lebanon as it has been crucial 
to the movement in supplying training and weaponry as well as in the exten­
sion of ideological indoctrination and moral support.*” While the Hizb'allah 
has been dependent on the interaction with the Pasdaran for the rapid trans­
formation of the movement into a well-organized milita and for its ability 
to recruit new members, any early efforts to isolate or remove the Pasdaran 
presence would have disabled the extent to which the Hizb'allah has been able 
to expand and carry out its operational activity.”* This has been underlined 
by the role of the Big'a as the transit point for not only the infusion of 
Iranian financial assistance and massive weaponry to the movement but also 
as it serves as the major comrnand and control center for the movement's 
resistance activity against Israel in southern Lebanon.*” The closeness of 
the relationship between Hizb'allah and the Iranian Pasdaran was also evident 
by the unsuccessful efforts of President Rafsanjani to reassign Pasdaran 
members more loyal to his clerical faction in order to influence progress in 
securing the release of Western hostages.*” Any limitation to the 2,000-man
*” See: Middle East International, June 27, 1986; Econcmist, March 14, 1987; and 
Financial Times, May 5, 1987.
200 See: al-Amal, May 19, 1984; International Herald Tribune, October 1, 1984;
*” As aptly summarized by a leading Hizb'allah member, the achievements made by the 
movement until now would have taken at least fifty years without any Iranian support, see: 
Martin Kramer, "Redeeming Jerusalem: Hie Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah", in David Menasliri 
(ed.), (1990), op.cit.: p.106.
*” See: Independent, August 3, 1988; Jeune Afrique, January 25, 1984; US News & World 
Report, March 5, 1989; and Washington Post, January 8, 1990.
*” See: Washington Post, January 8, 1990; New York Times, March 5, 1990; Independent, 
jidy 1, 1987; Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989; al-Majallali, April 19-25, 1989; and 
Washington Post, May 15, 1990. For a valuable overview, see: Kenneth Katzman, (1993), op.cit.; 
pp.135-6.
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strong IRGC presence in the Biq'ahas always been dependent on Syrian ability 
and willingness to intercede at the expense of its wider relationship with 
Iran.*” While a major opportunity was presented to Syria with the implemen­
tation of the Ta'if agreement in early 1991, Syrian reluctance to offend its 
ally Iran was clearly revealed by its agreement to allow the continued pre­
sence of the Pasdaran contingent within Lebanon.*”
Another pre-emptive measure to limit the early expansion and the mili­
tancy of the Hizb'allah relates to finding means and ways to both block the 
financial channels from Iran to the movement in Lebanon as well as providing 
economic substitution to the Shi'ite community through any third party or 
militia to undermine the purely economic attractiveness of Hizb'allah's re­
cruitment for potential members.”* As seen by the massive defections from 
other confessional movements to Hizb'allah, most notably by Amal members, the 
ability to provide economic assistance in the absence of a functioning state 
has been a key component for popularity of the movement and of Hizb'allah's 
electoral victory, when it gained the largest single block of seats in 
Lebanon's post-war parliamentary elections.*”
Despite the absence of precise intelligence on the Hizb'allah, analysis 
of the environment in which the movement is confined as well as assessment
*” See: New York Times, January 23, 1990; Ha'aretz, May 4, 1986; Jeune Afrique,
January 25, 1984. For a wider discussion, see: As'ad AbuKlialil, (1990), op.cit.
*” See: Independent, May 8, 1994. Also see: Augustus Richard Norton, (1991), op.cit.: 
pp.457-73.
*” Tliis was discussed by the author with Col. Menarchik, Office of Secretary for 
Defense, US Department of Defense, in 1993. For Hizb'allali financial links with BCCI, see: Los 
Angeles Times, August 12, 1991. Also see: Stephen Sacloir's film "Allah's Amy" shown on BBC2 
series Assignment, May 10, 1994.
*” For example, Hizb'allah trainee fighters in the Biq'a receive £200 per month while 
the SLA and Amal pay their fighters below £50 a month, see: Times, Novmber 14, 1987. Also 
see: Independent, May 8, 1994; Foreign Report, September 17, 1992; Foreign Report, April 30, 
1992; Hie Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (March 1993): p.6; and Hie Middle East, February 1992.
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of the reactions by the movement to pressure on the movement and to changes 
in its position within Lebanon is possible. It is also essential in the 
determination of the vulnerability of the adversaries in the employment of 
crisis management techniques with an objective of securing the release of its 
citizens in captivity. While the weaknesses of the movement usually corre­
spond to the shifts in the relationship between Iran and Syria and their own 
vulnerability to pressures and offers of accommodation, it is.vital to accu­
rately assess the weak links in the triangular relationship between 
Hizb'allah and its patrons through exploitation of crisis management within 
not only the framework of the regional environment but also the boundaries 
of the ability and willingness of these states to intercede on behalf of the 
Western governments. A measurement of Western governments' understanding of 
the dynamics of this triangular relationship can be viewed in terms of their 
selection of negotiation channels and the direction of pressure on either 
Iran and Syria to force the movement to relinquish its foreign captives. 
5.5 Maintanence of Communication Channels with Adversary
The effectiveness of crisis management in negotiations with the adver­
sary is not only directly dependent on the selection of communication 
channels with the adversary through either direct dialogue or the employment 
of intermediaries as well as on decisions to conduct negotiations in public 
or secret, but also on their employment in relation to the opportunities and 
constraints in the political environment which governs the possibility for 
either success or failure in the resolution of the hostage-crisis. While the 
actual types of communication channels have been bound by the constraints of 
the political environment and selected on the basis of being successful in 
influencing the dynamics of the hostage-crisis for its resolution, their 
effectiveness have also been closely influenced by the willingness to enter 
into negotiations backed by the ability to grant at least minimum con­
cessions. The employment of vastly different channels by the French, Ameri 
can, and British governments in their approach to negotiations has changed
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in accordance with the status of their relationships with Iran and Syria as 
well as with the actual willingness and ability of these states to intercede 
with the Hizb'allah for the release of foreign hostages. This has been clo­
sely influenced by the level of willingness and ability of Western govern­
ments to grant specific concessions to these states measured against the 
political acceptability and expediency of caving in or holding out to any 
demands.”*
Unlike Britiain's adamant refusals to negotiate with the Hizb'allah or 
with those states closely identified with the movement in Lebanon, both the 
French and the American experience with negotiations in the hostage-crisis 
have revealed a shared willingness to explore almost all channels available 
to them while they have significantly differed in approach to the negotia­
tions, the selection of intermediaries and the willingness to concede to any 
demands for the release of their citizens.”* The effectiveness of these 
different approaches to negotiations must be evaluated in terms of the suita­
bility of intermediaries in relation to the opportunities and constraints of 
the political environment in which they have been applied to as well as the 
actual mechanics of the process of individual negotiations by Western govern­
ments .
The approach to negotiations by the French government in response to the 
multiple abductions in 1985 assumed several simultaneous strategies directed 
towards direct discussions with Iran and Syria as well as towards the esta­
blishment of indirect contacts with individual members of the Hizb'allah.”* 
After the discovery of Amal's limited influence to act as an intermediary
”* See: Richard Clutterbuck, "Negotiating with Terrorists", Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (Winter 1992): pp.263-87.
*** See: Times, November 19, 1991.
”* See: Ha'aretz, Novarber 20, 1985; Le Monde, May 6, 1988; Jerusalem Post, March 27, 
1986; and Jerusalan Post, March 10, 1986.
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despite its close involvement in negotiations over the TWA 847-incident,*** 
Mitterrand's government dispatched Dr. Raza Raad, a Shi'ite French medical 
doctor with close contacts within the Lebanese Shi'a community, to establish 
channels with the Hizb'allah in November 1985 in response to the earlier kid­
nappings of four French citizens.*** Although these negotiations lasted until 
early 1986 and failed to yield any positive results,*** as evident by 
Hizb'allah's terrorist campaign in Paris,*** the subsequent efforts by French
intermediaries towards indirect negotiations with the kidnappers reflected 
political rivalry between President Francois Mitterrand and the newly elected 
Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, as evident by their dual independent efforts 
through personal envoys.*** While Mitterrand employed Syrian businessman Omran
*** See: Bassma Kbdmani-Darwish, "L'Iran, Nouvel Acteur Fort au Liban?" in Liban: 
Espoirs et Realities (Paris: Institut Fraudais des Relations Internationales, 1986).
*** See: Ha'aretz, November 20, 1985; Time, March 24, 1986; and Jerusalem Post, March 
10, 1986. It has been alledged that Imad Mughniya's visit to Paris between November 10-16, 
1985, was related to negotiations with French officials, see: Le Quotidien de Paris, February 
27, 1986; and Le Figaro, March 7, 1986. A senior Pasdaran official, k^)hammad Sadek (head of 
security), was reportedly in France in January 1986 and closely involved in the negotiations 
with French officials for the release of Anis Naccache, see: Le Nouvel Observateur, March 28 - 
April 3, 1986. Also see: Pierre Pean, (1987), op.cit.; pp.169-252. For information about Raad, 
see declassified US diplomatic cable from the American embassy in Beirut to Secretary of State 
(March 1986), No. 0 11 1353Z Mar 86.
*** While France offered Syria long-term international credits on easy terms for its 
intervention with Hizb'allali for the release of its hostages, Iranian intervention undermined 
any progress, see: Foreign Report, September 5, 1985. The French negotiations ivith Iran and 
Syria were led by: Lt.Col. Jean-Louis Esquivier (head of antiterrorism unit at the Cliamps de 
l'Êlysée); d'Hubert Védrine, an aide to Mitterrand; and Jean-Claude Cousseran (later head of 
DGSE), see: Roger Faligot and Remi Kauffer, (1994), op.cit.: p.410.
*** These attacks were initiated to pressure the French government during national 
elections in order to gain the release of Anis Naccache and halt French arms shipments to 
Iraq, see: Le Matin, January 29, 1987; New York Times, January 30, 1990; Ha'aretz, January 30, 
1987; International Herald Tribune, February 3, 1989; Jerusalem Post, March 12, 1986;
Nouvel Observateur, March 28 - April 3, 1986; al-Nahar, March 26, 1986; al-Mustaqbal, March 
23, 1986; Le Monde, July 15, 1986; Le Monde, September 7-8, 1986; and Wall Street Journal, May 
21, 1987.
*** See: Maskit Burgin, Aiiat Kurz, and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit. : pp.28-9, This 
rivalry was exploited through rumours that Mitterand's emissaries had offered to pay the 
Hizb'allali $10 million not to release the hostages until after the French presidential 
elections in May 1988, see: Liberation, May 7, 1988. For negotiation efforts, see: Mary 
Seurat, Les Corbeaux d'Alep (Paris: L'Age d'Homme, 1988); Independent, November 8, 1989; and
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Adham as its new intermediary after the abduction of four more French citi­
zens in Lebanon,”* the Chirac government intensified its own efforts through 
Dr. Raza Raad and, more importantly, through the employment of Jean-Charles 
Marchiani, alias Alexandre Stefani,”’ a personal envoy of the Interior 
Minister Charles Pasqua.”* The central role of Marchiani as the main French 
emissary in the negotiations with representatives of the Hizb'allah reflected 
not only the lead effort by the Chirac government in securing the release of 
its citizens through mainly Iran as a channel, in contrast to Mitterrand's 
efforts via Syria through Omran Adham, but also that French institutional 
responsibility for the hostage-issue was increasingly delegated through the 
Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Interior rather than through the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.^’ The lead role of the Ministry of Interior in 
the process of negotiations for,_the release of its citizens from Hizb'allah 
captivity was also revealed by certain actions which undermined efforts to 
normalize relations with Iran by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*” This was
Times, March 20, 1986,
*** Apart from Qnran Adham, two other individuals close to Mitterand involved in 
negotiations were: Francois de Grossouvre and Eric Rouleau, see: al-Qabas, April 28, 1988. 
Also see: Jerusalem Post, August 20, 1987; Le Figaro, May 7, 1988; and Ma'aretz, May 5, 1988.
**’ See: Ma'aretz, November 29, 1987; Times, November 19, 1991; Jerusalem Post, 
December 7, 1987; Yediot Aharanot, May 5, 1988; and Jerusalem Post, May 5, 1988. For a 
profile, see: Times, May 6, 1988.
*** See; Le I^ bnde, May 6, 1988; Le Nouvel Observateinr, May 6-12, 1988; and Le Nouvel 
Observateur, May 13-19, 1988,
**’ See: Michel Wieviorka, "French Politics and Strategy on Terrorism", in Barry Rubin 
(ed.), (1990), OP.cit.: p.82-4. Also see: Washington Post, July 11, 1987; Independent, 
November 8, 1989; and Middle East International, November 21, 1986. The rivalry between using 
Iran and Syria as channels through various Œiissaries was revealed by the arrests of the pro- 
Iranian network in France in April 1987. Despite the fact that the French DST indicated 
Iranian involvement, the diirac government advocated Syrian involvement, see: Le Monde, April 
27, 1987; Le Monde, May 6, 1988; and Ma'aretz, April 26, 1987.
**“ See: Independent, November 8, 1989.
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evident by the expulsion of Iraqi al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya members to Iraq, the 
arrest of a number of leading pro-Iranian Hizb'allah members in France and, 
more significantly, by the Gordji affair which led to the rupture of diplo­
matic relations between France and Iran.*** While Wahid Gordji had occupied 
a central role in negotiations between the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Iran towards normalized relations, efforts by the Ministry of Interior 
to arrest him also revealed the intense rivalry between the various mini­
stries controlled by either Chirac and Mitterrand linked in some ways to the 
hostage-affair,*** The elevated role of the Ministry of the Interior was also 
displayed in exploiting these actions in negotiations with Iran and the 
Hizb'allah over the hostage-issue, as evidently displayed by the expulsion 
of political opponents of the Khomayÿni regime, most notably the leader of 
Mujahidin al-Khalq organisation,*-and its interference in and control over the 
French judicial process which lead to the release of several key Iranian and 
Hizb'allah terrorist suspects.*** While the expulsion of Mahmoud Rajavi led 
to the release of two French hostages in June 1986, the release by France of 
$330 million of the $1 billion loan to Iran in November 1986 contributed to 
the release of three other French hostages.***
The negotiating efforts by Marchiani, aided by the enlistment of
*** See: Le Monde, May 6, 1988; Jeune Afrique, November 30, 1988; Le Point, June 15, 
1987; Ije Nouvel Observateur, June 12-18, 1987; Wall Street Journal, July 23, 1987; New York 
Times, July 24, 1987; Hadashot, July 19, 1987; Washington Post, July 18, 1987; International 
Herald Tribune, March 27, 1987; and Le Soir, March 1987.
*** The rivalry between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior was 
revealed by the claims by Gordji that French foreign ministry officials had warned him to go 
into hiding prior to attempts by the police to arrest him, see: Guardian, October 21, 1987; 
and Financial Times, December 2, 1987.
223 See: Siindav Times, June 8, 1986; and Time, June 30, 1986.
*** See: Le Monde, May 6, 1988; and Ha'aretz, April 6, 1988. Iran and France agreed on 
the payment of the $1 billion loan granted by the Shah to the French Atomic Energy Commission 
on October 29, 1986, see: FBIS, October 30, 1986. For French payment, see: International 
Herald Tribune, December 26, 1986; and Ma'ariv, November 12, 1986.
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Iskandar Safa in July 1987,*” progressed with the release of several French 
hostages in conjunction with a number of concessions to Iran.*** While 
Marchiani received a carte blanche by Chirac to pursue the complete resolu­
tion of the hostage-crisis prior to the May 1988 national elections, as evi­
dent by the release of Mohammad Mohajer in March 1988,**’ rivalry between 
the two French political factions was manifest through the expulsion of 
Mitterrand's envoy, Omar Adham, by Interior Minister Charles Pasqua from both 
any participatory role in French negotiations with Hizb'allah on the hostages 
and from France itself on May 3, 1988.*** Although Marchiani managed to secure 
the release of the last French hostage on May 5, 1988, three days before the 
final round of the French presidential elections, Jacques Chirac lost the
*** Iskandar Safa was a Lebanese Christian businessman well-connected within Lebanon 
and the Iranian clerical establishment, see: Steve Berry, (1989), op.cit.: p.21. Also see: Iæ 
Nouvel Observateur, May 6-12, 1988; Time, December 14, 1987; and Le Nouvel Observateur, May 
13-19, 1988. The approach used by Marchiani, backed by the security of twelve GIGN members, in 
meetings with Hizb'allah officials was to reveal the names of the relatives of the -Hizb'allah 
negotiators living in France, who would be harmed in the event that anything happened to 
Marchiani. This was revealed in an unattributable interview witli French counterterrorism 
official in Paris in June 1990. Apart from Marchiani, negotiations were led by Bernard Gérard, 
Director of the DST, and Philippe Rondot, from the disbanded paramilitary force Service 
d'Action Civique, see: Roger Faligot and Remi Kauffer, (1994), op.cit.: p.410.
*** See: Wasliington Post, December 1, 1987; Le Monde, November 28, 1987; Independent, 
December 1, 1987; and New York Times, December 2, 1987. At the same time as these concessions 
were made to Iran, 1'affair Inchiare emerged in late October and early November of 1987 which 
alledged that the Mitterrand government had allowed illegal arms sales to Iran from 1983 
through 1986. Hie relative limited attacks by the conservative Chirac government led to 
speculations that it feared publicity about their oim concessions to Iran, see: Le Figaro, 
November 4, 1988. Also see: Dilip Hiro, (1989), op.cit.: pp.165; and Walter de Bock and Jean- 
Charles Deniau, (1988), op.cit.
**’ See: New York Times, May 19, 1988; and Times, March 7, 1988.
*** See: Times, May 5, 1988; Ma'aretz, May 5, 1988; New York Times, May 5, 1988; 
Washington Post, May 5, 1988; New York Times, May 6, 1988; Sunday Times, May 8, 1988; and 
Ukeration, May 7-8, 1988. Adliam was believed to have been behind the leaked information 
published by the Lebanese newspaper al-Haqiqa that Chirac's emissaries had attempted to delay 
the release of the French hostages until after the 1986 parliamentary elections and that a 
ransom of $8.8 million were paid to secure the release of two Frendi liostages in November 
1987.
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election to the incumbent, Francois Mitterrand.”’ While the Interior Minister 
Pasqua insisted that no deals had been entered into with Iran, though acknow­
ledging that France had agreed to repay a second installment of $330 related 
to its outstanding Eurodif loan,*” Mitterrand's electoral victory created 
problems in the implementation of any prior deals made by Marchiani, most 
notably the release of Anis Naccache as evident from denials by Prime 
Minister Michel Rochard that he had any record of such deals, despite Iranian
insistance.*” The Iranian dispute with the French government continued over 
the case of Anis Naccache was resolved in July 1990 when he was pardoned by 
President Mitterand,*** while the last tranche of $330 million to Iran was 
settled by France in December 1991.***
The unique French approach to negotiations over the hostage-issue con­
centrated on the employment of unofficial intermediaries in direct contact 
with leading Hizb'allah members rather than through formal and high-level
**’ See: Newsweek, May 16, 1988; Pierre Marion, (1991), op.cit.: p.244; and Steve M. 
Berry, (1988), op.cit.: pp.19-22.
*** The French government repaid a second installment of $330 million to Iran wliile it 
recalled French warships in the Persian Gulf, refused to supply Iraq with Mirage aircraft, and 
lifted a sixteen-month embargo against the purchase of Iranian oil, see: Ha'aretz, April 5, 
1988; Ma'aretz, May 8, 1988; Yediot Aliaranot, May 5, 1988; Jerusalem Post, May 5, 1988; 
International Herald Tribune, May 19, 1988; International Herald Tribune, December 12, 1987; 
Middle East International, September 22, 1989; New York Times, May 19, 1988; Jerusalem Post, 
December 2, 1987; New York Times, May 19, 1988; and FBIS, June 23, 1988. It also included a 
deal for financial compensation to captors and to families of the IRGC killed in the French 
retaliatory raid on Ba'albek in 1983, see: Observer, December 6, 1987; and Yediot Aharanot,
May 5, 1988.
*** See: Economist, August 4, 1990; International Herald Tribune, February 3, 1989; New 
York Thi^ s, January 31, 1990; New York Times, January 31, 1990; and International Herald 
Tribune, February 8, 1989,
*** See: International Herald Tribune, July 28-29, 1990; Independent, August 11, 1991; 
and al-Hayat, July 30, 1990.
*** On October 25, 1991, France agreed to pay the outstanding debt to Iran, see: 
Financial Times, December 30, 1991.
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representatives of the French government in talks with Iran and Syria.This 
posture towards negotiations was greatly assisted by the rivalry between 
Chirac and Mitterand through their individual emissaries, who were able to 
exploit initiatives with either Iran and Syria to the advantage for a reso­
lution of the French hostage-crisis.*” While it is clear that Hizb'allah 
and Iran preferred to deal with unofficial French emissaries to ensure deni- 
ability in their responsibility in the hostage-affair, the French government 
also used the offices of a third state, Algeria, to guarantee the terms of 
any agreement with Iran. The acceptable role of Algeria for the kidnappers 
had been highlighted by their previous involvement as interlocutor in the 
resolution of 1980 US embassy siege in Iran as well as Hizb'allah's hijacking 
of KU422 in April 1988 in which it guaranteed the security of the hijackers 
and their free passage out of the country.*”
The effectiveness of French negotiation efforts have not only been 
related to an expressed willingness to grant major concessions in order to 
secure the release of its citizens from captivity but also to the approach 
of direct negotiations with Hizb'allah officials assisted by the maintanence 
of diplomatic relations with Syria and Iran, which was exploited by the 
rivalry between the various French emissaries.**’ Although these emissaries 
were able use their close influence with either Iran or Syria to place simul­
taneous pressure on the Hizb'allah for the release of French citizens, it
*** See: lue Qiavin, "French Diplomacy and the Hostage Crises", in Barry Rubin (ed.), 
(1990), op.cit.: pp.91-106.
*** See: Independent, Novanber 8, 1989; Observer, July 27, 1987; and Steve M. Berry, 
(1988), op.cit.; pp.19-22.
*” See: New York Times, April 14, 1988; Times, April 21, 1988; Financial Times, April 
21, 1988; Washington Post, May 3, 1988; and New York Times, April 21, 1988.
**’ See: Independent., November 8, 1989; and Maskit Burgin, Anat Kiurz and Ariel Merari,
(1988), op.cit.: pp.28-9.
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also fuelled the competition between Iran and Syria in efforts to receive 
benefits from any release of hostages.*” This was revealed by Syrian warnings 
against the execution of French hostages by the Hizb'allah/” while Iran 
attempted to circumvent Syria in the release process in order to receive the 
credit for the release of French hostages for political advantage in nego­
tiations with other states whose nationals were held hostage in Lebanon.*” 
The employment of individual emissaries with close contacts with either Iran 
and Syria benefitted from the tension and rivalry in the wider Iranian-Syrian 
relationship and on the ground in Lebanon between 1986 and 1988.*” However, 
the political rivalry between the emissaries was also exploited by the 
Hizb'allah and Iran as they were able to raise the level of concessions in 
conjunction with the political expediency in having French citizens released 
before or after the presidential ^ elections .*” Although Charles Pasqua claimed 
that France had refrained from paying any price for the release of French 
hostages, the admission by Sheikh Fadlallah that France had made concessions 
to secure the release of its citizens from captivity also predicted that the 
movement would be equally successful in its negotiations with the US govern­
ment.*”
*” For example, see: al-Watan al-Arabi, December 11, 1987.
**’ Unlike its EC partners, France not only maintained diplomatic relations mth S^ 'ria 
but also praised Syrian involvement for any resolution to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon, see: 
Ed^vy' Plenel, (1986, op.cit. For Syrian warnings, see: al-Nahar, March 19, 1987; New York 
Times, March 23, 1987; Ha'aretz, July 23, 1987; and Ha'aretz, April 15, 1988.
240 See: Con Coughlin, (1992), op.cit.
*” See: Yosef Olmert, "The Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik", 
in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.184-5; and As'ad AbuKhalil, (1990), op.cit.: 
pp.14-6.
242 See: Steve M. Berry, (1988), op.cit: pp.19-22.
*” Charles Pasqua declared that: "[w]e have not granted ransom to anyone. We have not 
yielded to any claims. Not a franc, not a dollar, not a deutsclimark. If you like, not. even an 
Iranian rial." See: Le Monde, May 6, 1988; and Time, May 7, 1988. For Sheildi Fadlallah's
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In contrast to the French approach to the negotiations with the 
Hizb'allah, the strategy employed by the United States to the hostage-crisis 
was based on a refusal to deal directly with the Hizb'allah on the ground in 
Lebanon/” While the the US refusal to negotiate directly with the kidnappers 
was a direct reflection of a major weakness to cultivate and employ useful 
local contacts within the Shi'a community, it can also be attributed to limi­
tations of direct negotiations given the extremely hostile attitude of the 
Hizb'allah, to the manner in which American officials viewed the relationship 
between the Hizb'allah and its patrons Iran and Syria, as well as to the 
limited ability to grant concessions to any demands given the constraints of 
political accountability both at home and abroad/” Although the American 
administration had successfully resolved the earlier abduction of US citizens 
through mainly negotiations with Syria, and rescue operations by its proxy 
Amal,*” the handling of the TWA 847-hijacking became a landmark event in 
which the personal intervention by Iran's Hashemi Rafsanjani with Hizb'allah 
fostered the initiative by US officials to exploit Iranian clerical factiona­
lism through an exchange of arms-for-hostages as a key component in an wider 
effort to re-establish relations with "moderate" officials in Iran for a more 
pro-Western policy after the death of Khumayyni/” Apart from Iranian inter­
vention for the resolution of the TWA-847 incident and the close involvement
statement, see: Ma'ailv, November 12, 1986; and al-Nahar, July 21, 1986.
*” See: Maskit Biugin, Anat Kiurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit. : p.24.
*” See: Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit.
*” American Frank Regier and Frenchman Cliristian Joubert were freed by Amal on April
15, 1984, see: International Herald Tribune, April 16, 1984; and Washington Post, May 9, 1984.
*” For a detailed analysis of this initiative, see: Peter Kombluli and Malcolm Byrne 
(eds.), (1993), op.cit.
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of Syria and Amal in the negotiations/” the release of 766 Shi'ite prisoners 
in exchange for American passengers also revealed a willingness by the US 
government to employ Israel as a conduit and shield for any direct con­
cessions to the Hizb'allah/”
While the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal between August 1985 until its 
disclosure in the pro-Syrian Lebanese weekly, al-Shira, in November 1986 
yielded the release of three American hostages/” the failure of this ini­
tiative demonstrated not only a severely flawed analysis by US officials of 
Hizb'allah's closer allegiance to the more radical clergy within Iran's cle­
rical establishment, but also exposed the dangers associated with reliance 
on Iran as the only channel at the expense of any Syrian involvement/” The 
failure of the arms-for-hostages affair highlighted also the major problems 
of efforts to use the comprehensive solution of the hostage-issue as a key 
component in US attempts to normalize relations with Iran without a willing­
ness to make any concessions/” While the previous option of using Syria as 
a vechicle for negotiations by the Reagan administration had been curtailed 
by the imposition of sanctions due to Syria's close involvement in the
*” See: New York Times, June 22, 1987; Times, June 26, 1985; and Sundav Times, June 
30, 1985.
*” See: Margaret Barry', Bargaining mthout Concessions: the 1985 HVA Hostage 
Negotiations (Washington, DC. : Conflict Managaiient Program, SAIS, 1987).
*” In a series of arms-for-hostages exchanges, a pattern developed with the release of 
an American hostage in exchange for the delivery of military equipment to Iran. A total of
2,004 TOW and eighteen HAW missiles, 240 HAWK spare parts and intelligence on Iraq was 
delivered by the US government via Israel to Iran in exchange for the release of three 
American hostages in July and September 1986 as well as in November 1986, see: Bruce Hoffman, 
(1990), op.cit. : p.22; and Tlieodore Draper, op.cit.
*” See: al-Shira, Ocotber 28, 1986; al-Dustur, December 22, 1986; and al-Alid, November 
21, 1986.
*” See: Farhad Kazemi and Jo-Anne Hart, "The Shi'i Praxis: Domestic Politics and 
Foreign Policy in Iran", in David Menashri (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.65-8. Also see: 
Washington Post, May 1, 1990.
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Hindawi-af f air in mid-1986/” the US government was forced to renew its dia­
logue with Syria over the hostage-issue in the absence of ties with Iran and 
in the absence of other negotiation channels with the Hizb'allah after the 
exposure of the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deals/” The decision by the 
Reagan administration to devalue the issue of the hostages in January 1987/” 
accompanied by an official decree barring travel to Lebanon by American citi­
zens/” came not only as a direct response to efforts to limit the hostage 
issue on the political agenda, following the revelation of the Iran-Contra 
affair and the abduction of four American citizens during that month, but 
also reflected the lack of available negotiation channels for the US govern­
ment, especially as the British independent envoy Terry Waite was abducted 
by the Hizb'allah, and an unwillingness to offer any kind of concessions to 
either the Hizb'allah or Iran. ^ Although the PLO had offered to act as an 
intermediary with the Hizb'allah over the hostages in 1986, especially as 
Imad Mughniyya of the Hizb'allah SSA had been a member of Fatah Force 17, all 
efforts failed as PLO's contacts within the movement were in no position to 
act independently as Hizb'allah's main leadership rejected any PLO over­
tures/” In addition, the option of using Israel as a third party, through
*” For visit by William Casey, director of CIA, to Syria, see: Times, July 30, 1986. 
Also see: United States Department of State, Svrian Support for International Terrorism: 1983- 
^  Special Report No.157 (Washington, DC.: Bureau of Public Affairs, December 1986}.
*” See: New York Times, June 23, 1987.
*” See: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit. : p.23. For 
statement by Reagan that recent US hostages had stayed in Lebanon "at their om risk and at 
their own responsibility", see: New York Times, January 27, 1987. For the new poli^q see: 
Newsweek, May 18, 1987.
256 See: Newsweek, February 9, 1987; and Washington Post, January 29, 1987.
*” The independent efforts to mediate by the PID leadership \ms discussed mth a 
senior PLO official in Egypt, April 8, 1994. Also see: Neil C. Livingstone and David Halevy, 
(1990), op.cit.: p.272-4.
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the release of imprisoned Lebanese Shi'ites in a similar exchange surrounding 
the TWA-847 incident, was also curtailed as Israel linked any release of 
prisoners with the return of its missing IDF servicemen held by Hizb'allah 
and as any reciprocal moves towards a hostage-release process would exa­
cerbate the political damage created by the Iran-Contra affair/”
Apart from an array of unofficial and independent mediation attempts by 
private individuals and businesses/” the only available channel towards
Iran used by the US government in relation to the hostage-issue was through 
the financial negotiations at the US-Iranian Claims Tribunal in the Hague, 
which was initiated in December 1986 and lasted until mid-1987/” However, 
the official American rejection to link the issue of the release of US citi­
zens in Lebanon with the return of frozen Iranian assets, while it also pub­
licly disawoved any efforts by^private mediators, left limited scope for 
maneuver in any negotiations for the resolution of the hostage-crisis/” 
Although the concentration on Syria for negotiations by the Reagan admini­
stration yielded progress in the cessation of abduction of American citizens, 
as revealed by the Syrian intervention in response to the kidnapping of 
Charles Glass in June 1987,*” it is important to recognize that these results 
can mainly be attributed to Syrian efforts to consolidate its hegemony over 
Lebanon rather than to any American success in persuading Syria to act for
259 See: Samuel Segev, (1988), op.cit.
*” For US official encouragement of private initiatives in 1985, see: Middle Fast 
Reporter, March 28, 1985. For examples of unauthorized mediation efforts during 1988, see: Los 
Angeles Times, October 19, 1988; and Newsweek, November 7, 1988.
*” After the Iran-Contra debacle, the US government and Iran resumed negotiations over 
the release of Iranian deposits in American ban]<s, see: New York Times, December 26, 1986; and 
Ha'aretz, October 16, 1987.
*” See: New York Times, October 7, 1988; and Newsweek, November 7, 1988. 
*” See: FBIS, June 22, 1987; and Washington Post, June 30, 1987.
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the resolution of the hostage-crisis/” The reliance on Syria as a main 
channel for negotiations resulted in limited progress for the release of any 
hostages given the increased tension between Iran and Syria as well as by the 
Hizb'allah-Amal warfare in Lebanon.
The succession of Bush to the US presidency in 1989 represented an 
opportunity and a major shift in the way in which the American administration 
approached channels of negotiations and the issue of concessions to the 
hostage-crisis.*” This shift was first revealed in October 1988 by overt US 
signals towards Iran of a willingness to open a dialogue on the hostage- 
issue through a third party.*” While the US government used Algerian, Swiss, 
and Pakistani officials as channels to pass messages to the Iranian regime,*” 
the Bush administration overtly signaled the Iranian regime that the use its 
influence with the Hizb'allah for the release of American hostages would be 
rewarded in some way, especially with the ascendancy of Rafsanjani in the 
aftermath of the death of Ayatollah Khumayynl.*” In an effort to facilitate 
this process through good-will gestures, the US government agreed to return 
$567 million to Iran, in an agreement under the auspices of the US-Iranian 
Claims Tribunal in November 1989, coupled with a willingness to compensate
*” See: Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit.
*” See: Independent, November 14, 1989.
*” See: Jerusalem Post, December 5, 1988; and International Herald Tribune, October 
23, 1988. This led to the visit by four leading Hizb'allah members to Iran for discussions for 
the release of US hostages, see: International Herald Tribune, October 25, 1988.
*” Algeria formed a special political-military group to deal with any hostage- 
exchange, see: Ma'aretz, August 8, 1989. For the involvement of Algeria and Switzerland as 
intenædiaries, see: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Dailv Report, Near East and South 
Asia, August 10, 1989; Independent, August 5, 1989; and Washington Post, August 11, 1989. For 
the involvement of Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see: Jerusalem Post, August 17, 
1989; New York Times, August 12, 1989; Washington Post, August 12, 1989; and Teheran Times, 
August 10, 1989.
267 See: FBIS, August 8, 1989; and New York Times, August 9, 1989,
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the families of the victims of the Iranian airbus mistakenly shot down by USS 
Vincennes in July 1988/” While Hizb'allah clerical rivalry and efforts by 
Iran's Rafsanjani to consolidate the Iranian revolution at home prevented the 
release of any US hostages/” Iranian signals that 1990 would be the last 
year for foreigners in captivity led to the release of two American hostages 
in April 1990, through Swiss mediation,*” prior to scheduled talks at the US- 
Iranian Claims Tribunal in the Hague/” Yet, US'officials adopted the posi­
tion that it would withhold tangible incentives or rewards until the remai­
ning American hostages were released/’* However, the changes in the strategic 
environment in the Middle East following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, which led 
to the freedom of the al-Da'wa prisoners in Kuwait, blocked any significant 
progress in the hostage-crisis as it increasingly became dependent on Middle 
Eastern politics rather than on^  individual initiatives by Western govern-
*” For US goodwill gestures, see: Washington Post, Septanber 5, 1989; New York Times, 
November 7, 1989; Washington Post, November 13, 1989; Independent, Novanber 8, 1989; New York 
Times, July 18, 1989; and Wall Street Journal, September 8, 1989. The US administration had 
also assisted in obtaining the release of 17 Iranians held hostage for a year by the Lebanese 
Forces, For Iranian demands for their release, see: Washington Post, October 24, 1989.
*” For opposition to any hostage-release by Iran's radical clergy, see: FBIS, March 
12, 1990; and Washington Post, January 8, 1990. Also see: Nassif Hitti, "Lebanon in Iran's 
Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Constraints", in Hooshang Amiralimadi and Nader Entessar 
(eds.) (1993), op.cit.: p.190.
*” For Iranian signals, see: Independent, March 7, 1990; Washington Post, February 23, 
1990; and Financial Times, March 8, 1990. For US admission of indirect talks with Iran, see: 
Washington Post, March 6, 1990. Hie release of PoHiill and Reed was accomplished through 
assistance by the S^vlss government with aid fran the International Red Cross and involved the 
release of Sliia Muslim prisoners held by the SLA, see: Terry Anderson, (1993), op.cit.: p.313. 
Hie success of Swiss mediation have been related to the release of two Swiss Red Cross 
officials on August 8, 1990, see: Ha'aretz, August 14, 1990.
*’* See: Washington Post, January 19, 1992; and New York Times, May 8, 1990.
*’* See: Guardian, April 24, 1990.
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merits
The personal involvement of UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar 
and his personal envoy, Giandomenico Picco, in efforts to find a comprehen­
sive resolution to the hostage-crisis through a triangular hostage-release 
process in which the Hizb'allah would release Western hostages and missing 
IDF servicemen in return for Israel’s release of imprisoned Shi’ites,^^ came 
at the invitation of Iran and provided the necessary face-saving solution for 
all involved parties as well as a shield for any indirect involvement by the 
Bush administration.”’ Apart from the removal of a major impediment to 
hostage-negotiations in the form of the release of the al-Da'wa prisoners in 
Kuwait, the success of the negotiation efforts by the UN envoy was rooted in 
not only the personal efforts by Giandomenico Picco to find a satisfactory 
overall solution to demands of all parties through secretive dialogue,”’ but 
also, more importantly, that his negotiation efforts were backed by assuran­
ces to Iran that the UN Secretary-General would release the findings with 
regard to UN Resolution 598 prior to the expiry of his term of office on 
December 31, 1991.”’ While the Bush administration rejected demands by the 
Hizb’allah, via the UN envoy, that the US government would refrain from 
retributions with the release of the last American hostage, it was privately
See: Farhang Jahanpour, (1992), op.cit. : pp.33-6; and Independent, December 5,
1991.
See: Time, Decamber 16, 1991. Also see: Maskit Burgin, "Ifestem Hostages and 
Israeli POWs in Lebanon", in Shlono Gazit (ed.), (1992), op.cit.: pp.195-7.
See: Guardian, August 10, 1991; and Times, August 15, 1991.
The contacts between Picco and Iran as well as Hizb'allali was initiated in 1990, 
see: Times, August 10, 1991. See: Independent, October 22, 1991; A main Hizb'allali negotiator 
with Picco was allegedly Husayn al-Nnsawi, see: Foreign Report, November 7, 1991. Also see: 
Giandomenico Picco, "A Personal Journey through the Middle East", Middle East Journal, Vol.48, 
No.l (Winter 1994): pp.108-12.
See: Independent, December 1, 1991.
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agreed to in communications with Iran and Syria.”’ A major contribution to 
the release of the American hostages was the settlement of outstanding finan­
cial disputes between the US government and Iran under the ten-year old 
Algiers agreement most notably in December 1991 and February 1992.”’
The American approach to negotiations over the hostage-issue has been 
characterized by the employment of an array of official and unofficial inter­
mediaries without a clear consideration for opportunities and constraints
created by the political environment within Lebanon and in the region. This 
has been evident in the confinons and erratic shifts in the direction of any 
US dialogue with Iran and Syria as well as through the nature and employment 
of intermediaries. While the limited achievements by US negotiation efforts 
can be attributed to the absence of diplomatic relations with Iran and to 
its refusal to deal directly with the Hizb'allah in Lebanon, it can also be 
explained by the reliance on Syria as the only vehicle for intercession with 
the movement in light of the limited ability and willingness by the Syrian 
regime to intervene at the expense of its wider relationship with Iran.”’ Any
Prior to the release of the last American hostage, Terry Anderson, reports surfaced 
that the US government was seeking legal indictments against the hostage-takers, see: 
Independent, December 1, 1991; and Observer, December 8, 1991. For Hizb'allah warning of 
retribution for any US attempts to captiure or kill hostage-takers, see: Independent, November 
21,.1991.
See: Ha'aretz, August 29, 1988; Ha'aretz, August 5, 1988; Independent, March 11, 
1990; Independent, October 24, 1989; Washington Post, October 24, 1989; and Washington Post, 
November 13, 1989. The U.S.-Iranian Tribunal in the Hague ruled the U.S. government to return 
$500 million to Iran in September 1986, see: Middle East Economic Digest, September 22, 1986. 
For U.S. refusal to link American hostages and frozen Iranian assets, see: Washington Post. 
January 31, 1987; and Independent, August 9, 1989. In May 1987, the U.S. government returned 
$451 million to Iran, see: Wall Street Journal, May 13, 1987. In early November 1989, it was 
agreed that the U.S. government would repay $567 million to Iran of the $12 billion held, see: 
Independent, November 8, 1989; Middle East International, Novanber 17, 1989; and Washington 
Post, May 15, 1990. Hie following amount has been payed by the U.S. government to Iran over 
the years: Jan. & June 1984 ($8.15 million); May & Nov. 1987 ($517 million); April-May 1988 
($38.2 million); May-Dee 1989 ($15.6 million); Jan.-Feb. 1990 ($925,000); Dec. 1991 ($278 
million); and Feb. 1992 ($134.1 million), see: David Jacobsen, My Life As a Hostage (New York, 
NY.: S.P.l Books, 1993): pp.311-14.
290 See: Independent, August 3, 1989; and Independent, April 25, 1990.
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Syrian intercession with the Hizb’allah from 1984 to the TWA-847 incident in 
1985 had been possible with the active support and knowledge of both 
Hizb'allah and Iran to position itself as a useful intermediary in an effort 
to exploit the hostage-crisis for political purposes and to distance itself 
from the activity of the movement despite complicity in these Hizb'allah 
operations.The use of Syrian influence over the Hizb'allah had been 
limited by its revelation of the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal and by 
intensified Iranian-Syrian rivalry over Syria's unwillingness to settle its 
outstanding payments for oil to Iran.”’ As a consequence, Syrian inability 
to effect the release of Western hostages was increasingly weakened in con­
junction with the Amal-Hizb’allah warfare in Lebanon and by the increased
*
standing of the Hizb'allah as a movement at the'expense of Amal as well as 
by the overriding interests to maintain its useful relationship with Iran as 
a leverage in the wider inter-Arab politics.’” This tendency for over­
estimation of the ability by certain intermediaries to persuade or intervene 
with Hizb'allah's command leadership for the release of American hostages was 
also evident in the approach adopted by US officials in the efforts to use 
rivalry within Iran's clerical establishment to its advantage in the US- 
Iranian arms-for-hostages initiative.’” The exclusion of Hizballah officials 
from any negotiations also ignored the effects of clerical rivalry within the
See: Masldt Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.: pp.37-8.
See: International Herald Tribune, July 18-19, 1987; Observer, November 1, 1987; 
Economist, March 14, 1987; and Financial Times, May 5, 1987. Also see: John Calabrese, (1990), 
op.cit.: p.188-9.
For a useful overview, see: Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and Syria: From Hostility to 
Limited Alliance", in Hooshang Ainirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), (1993), op.cit.: pp.198- 
216. Also see: John L. Esposito, (1992), op.cit.: pp.150-51.
For an example of the failure to exploit clerical factionalism, see: Theodore 
Draper, (1991), op.cit.: pp.453-6.
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movement itself as well as its allegiance with more radical Iranian clergy.”’ 
This was clearly demonstrated by the obstruction of any progress in the re­
lease of US hostages by the Hizb'allah command leadership with the active 
support of the radical Iranian clerical faction between 1988 and 1990.”’
Another major drawback of US negotiation efforts have been related to 
the non-secretive nature of dialogue conducted through intermediaries with 
Iran and Syria which has undermined the willingness by American administra­
tions to grant any concessions for progress in negotiations which resemble 
any deal-making.”’ In many cases, the negotiation efforts by the US govern­
ment have been not only severely weakened by the employment of non- 
conciliatory rhetoric and posturing towards Iran and the Hizb'allah,’” exa­
cerbated by the announcement ôf new and hardline counterterrorist policies,’” 
but also undermined by negotiation efforts through intermediaries without the 
actual ability or mandate to make any concessions. As a consequence, US ne­
gotiation efforts have sent mixed signals to the Hizb'allah and Iran through 
the contradiction between privately conciliatory positions and publicly
See: Washington Post, August 18, 1989; al-Anba, November 27, 1989; al-Hayat, 
November 27, 1989; Independent, October 23, 1991; and Washington Post, May 15, 1990.
See: Ha'aretz, December 17, 1989; al-Havat, November 27, 1989; Middle East 
International, August 4, 1989; and Independent, August 10, 1991.
’” See Grant Wardlaw's chapter entitled "Terrorist Hostage-TakLngs", in Grant Wardlaw,
(1989), op.cit.: pp.154-7.
As stated by leading Hizb'allah members: "US morilizing statements will not resolve 
the hostage-crisis", see: August 9, 1986. Also see: Xavier Raufer, "Middle East Terrorism:
Rules of the Game", Political Warfare (Fall 1991): p.11.
For an overview of US policies in the 1980s, see: Marc A. Chalmer, (1987), op.cit,
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stated hardline positions.”’
The British approach to negotiations has been characterized by a firm 
and uncompromising refusal to negotiate not only with the Hizb'allah but also 
with either Iran or Syria over the hostage-crisis.’” Although never offi­
cially sanctioned by the British government,”’ the independent mediatory 
role of Terry Waite, a special envoy to the Archbishop of Canterbury, has 
been the only available option for the release of the two British citizens 
abducted by the Hizb'allah in April 1986.’” While the negotiation efforts by 
Terry Waite in Lebanon had been formally initiated on November 14, 1985, 
ostensibly by American requests and on behalf of a humanitarian effort to 
secure US hostages,’” the issue of the British hostages was linked by default 
in his efforts to find a comprehensive solution to the Western hostage- 
problem.’” As the case of the al-pa'wa prisoners in Kuwait remained a central
As noted by Amir Taheri: "[t]o them any concession given is a sign of weakness and 
automatically invites further aggression on their part. The wielding of the stick by the West, 
on the other hand, is considered to be perfectly normal and a temporary hardship which has to 
be endured", see: Amir Taheri, (1987), op.cit.: p.197.
’” See: Financial Times, January 16, 1988; Times, November 19, 1991; Financial Times, 
August 9, 1991; and Independent, May 7, 1990. On October 21, 1986, the British Foreign Office 
advised its nationals in Lebanon to take maximum security precautions or leave the country.
The British government has repeatedly distanced itself from Waite and made it clear 
that his missions to Beirut were unofficial and that it could provide no assistance in the 
event of trouble for Waite, see: Newsweek, February 9, 1987; and Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and 
Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.: p.33.
See: New York Times, April 19, 1986; Jerusalem Post, August 26, 1990; and al-Nahar, 
November 22, 1986.
For a useful overview of Waite's negotiation efforts, see: Gavin Hewitt, (1991),
op.cit.
See: George Joffe, "Iran, the Southern Mediterranean and Europe: Terrorism and 
Hostages", in Anoushiravan Eliteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), (1993), op.cit. : p.89.
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demand for the kidnappers in Lebanon,”’ Waite concentrated on this issue in 
secret face-to-face meetings with Hizb'allah officials in Beirut and through 
repeated requests to the Kuwaiti government to allow him entry and permission 
to visit the al-Da'wa prisoners.”’ While his two missions to Lebanon, in 
November and December 1985, failed, as the Kuwaiti government firmly refused 
to grant him an entry visa, it underlined the failure of the conduct of clan­
destine negotiations with any Hizb'allah officials privately and, at the same 
time, maintaining a highly visible outward profile and spearheading a humani­
tarian mission without the ability to make any concessions in efforts to 
influence the Kuwaiti government over the fate of the al-Da'wa prisoners.”* 
Due to his discredited position, being closely associated with US officials 
involved in t'he Iran-Contra affair in the aftermath of its revelation in 
November 1986 coupled with an inability to affect any progress in the case 
of the al-Da'wa prisoners despite promises, Waite's return for a direct dia­
logue with the Hizb'allah in Lebanon resulted in his own captivity in January 
1987.”*
Apart from an unsuccessful attempt by the Irish Republican Army to 
persuade the Hizb'allah to release Brian Keenan through the visit of a two-
”’ See; Le Point, August 3, 1987; Da'var, May 6, 1988; and Los Angeles Times, November 
26, 1988.
29? See: Ga\ln Hemtt, (1991), op.cit.
”* For Waite's failure to secure permission to enter Kimit, see: Time, November 10, 
1986; and Observer, November 24, 1991.
”* See: Washington Post, November 18, 1986; limes, November 19, 1991; New York Times, 
January^  29, 1987; and Independent, March 26, 1990i Hizb'allah's own newspaper, al-Ahd, advised 
Waite to leave Lebanon prior to his abduction, see: Independent, November 19, 1991. Terry 
Waite had left a message before his abduction which urged the British government not to pay 
any ransom for his release or use any military options, see: Ma'aretz, February 1, 1987. As 
revealed by a declassified document, the principal architect of the Iran-Contra affair, Oliver 
North, jeopardized Waite's mission as an independent negotiator by informing Iranians that he 
was in close contact with Waite and could be used as a shield for the US and Iranians, see: 
Times, May 12, 1994.
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man IRA delegation to Beirut in December 1987,”’ any mediation attempts on 
behalf of the British hostages were confined to independent humanitarian 
efforts towards Iran by representatives of the Archbishop of Canterbury in 
the absence of British diplomatic relations with Syria and with the limi­
tation of dialogue with Iran after diplomatic incidents in late 1987 The 
involvement of John Lyttle in efforts to conduct a dialogue with Iran and 
Hizb'allah over the hostage-issue was useful as he served as a conduit bet­
ween the British Foreign Office and Iran,”’ Although the British government 
pursued a dialogue with Iran over improvement of relations and over the 
hostage-issue, these efforts were interrupted by Iran’s fatwa against Salman 
Rushdie in 1989.”’ In the absence of British relations with either Iran or 
Syria, the Republic of Ireland used the issue of the dual nationality of 
hostage Brian Keenan for its own political advantage in direct negotiations
”’ The pro-Syrian al-Shira reported that the IRA-delegation consisted of Joe Austin 
and Denis Donaldson, who arrived in west Beirut and attempted to establish contacts with 
Hizb'allah's SSA. Apart from a holding a meeting with Sheikh Fadlallah, the IRA representa­
tives offered false Irish passports in return for the release of Brian Keenan, which would 
grant the movement a major propaganda coup. However, Hizb'allah were more interested in 
establishing a working relationship with the IRA through the supply of weapons, safe-houses, 
and other assistance for its terrorist networks in Britain. IRA refused. For information on 
the IRA visit, see: al-Shira, December 30, 1987; Ian Gelldard and Keith Craig, IRA, INIA: 
Foreign Support and International Qannections (London: Institute for the Study of Terrorism, 
1988): p.77; Martin Dillon, Hie Dirty War (London: Arrow Books, 1990): pp.430-1; Ma'aretz, 
December 31, 1987; Independent, May 5, 1990; and Times, December 31, 1987.
See: Independent, March 26, 1990.
For allegations that Britain negotiated with Iran since September 1987 until 
Novanber 1987, suspended due to the release of French hostages, see: Ma'aretz, December 6, 
1987. Also see: Observer, November 24, 1991; Times, November 19, 1991; and Guardian, November 
19, 1991. In June 1988, Lyttle organized a British ijarliamentary visit to Iran which served to 
improve British-Iranian relations, see: Hadashot, June 23, 1988; and New York Times, August 
15, 1988.
For reports of direct talks, see: Defense and Foreign Affairs Weeklv, September 18, 
1988; al-Shira, October 10, 1988; Independent, May 7, 1990; Independent on Sunday, May 13, 
1990; and Ma'aretz, December 6, 1987. Also see: FBIS, August 7, 1989; Time, January 30, 1989; 
Ha'aretz, February 10, 1989; Jerusalem Post, August 26, 1990; and Independent, November 2, 
1989.
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with the Hizb'allah, Syria and Iran.’” While the release of Keenan in August 
1990 represented a diplomatic triumph for Irish diplomacy in contrast to the 
British failure to negotiate with anyone over their hostages, it was achieved 
by Iranian willingness to use the Irish hosting of the EC presidency as a 
vechicle to improve its relations with the EC member states and as a means 
to induce improved relations with the UK government, which had indicated a 
shift in approach to relations with Iran with the ascendancy of Douglas Hurd
as the Foreign Minister in late 1989.”’ In a similar fashion to the reso­
lution of the American hostage-crisis, the shifts in the Middle East by the 
impact of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait facilitated the normalisation of rela­
tions between the UK government and Iran as well as Syria while any limited 
British efforts for the release of its citizens was overtaken by the UN 
mediation of the comprehensive denounement of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon 
in 1991.”’
The British approach to the hostage-crisis, characterized by a strict 
observance of a no-negotiations and no-concessions policy as it has refused 
to deal with the Hizb'allah or even those states who have influence over the 
movement, has been closely influenced by the absence of any friendly diplo­
matic relations with Iran and Syria.”’ Apart from the unsuccessful efforts
For Irish negotiation efforts, see: Independent on Sunday, July 8, 1990; 
Independent, May 17, 1990; Guardian, July 10, 1990; Middle East International, May 25, 1990; 
Jerusalem Post, January 30, 1989; Financial Times, January 27, 1989; Ha'aretz, February 10, 
1989; Independent, August 29, 1990; and Indemndent, July 9, 1990. Ireland made a generous 
contribution to Iran in the form of £100,000 in earthquake relief, see: Independent on Sunday, 
July 8, 1990.
”’ For the shift in British policy, see: Independent, August 9, 1990; Times, November 
19, 1991; Independent, August 9, 1991; and Independent on Sunday, August 25, 1991. For Irish- 
British tensions, see: Time, January 30, 1989.
See: Times, November 19, 1991; Inependent, December 5, 1991; and Farhang Jalianpour,
(1992), op.cit.: pp.33-6.
See: Brian Michael Jenkins and Robin Wright, (1986), op.cit.: pp.2-11.
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by independent negotiators, any British official contacts over the hostage- 
issue have been veiled behind larger issues of improvement of UK-Iranian 
diplomatic relations while it has also concentrated solely on Iran as the 
channel for their release at the expense of Syrian involvement or any con­
tacts with the kidnappers themselves. Unlike the French or American hostage- 
cases, the British government has been exempt from any outstanding financial 
disputes in demands for the release of its citizens. Any progress for their 
release has been completely dependent on the willingness by British officials 
to grant Iran and Syria limited political concessions.”* Although Britain has 
chosen to maintain an uncompromising lead role in adhering to its publicly 
stated counterterrorism principles, it also faced unseperable and unavoidable 
barriers, most notably the Rushdie affair, which prevented any volte face in 
its position and to any negotiated solution to the British hostage-crisis.
Apart from the selection of various negotiation channels to communicate 
with the adversaries, the success of these efforts are dependent on the 
functions of the existing crisis management machinery in limiting the effects 
of the crisis on the policymakers in Western governments.
5.6 Functioning Machinery to Limit Effects of Crisis
All three Western governments have instituted and developed sophistica­
ted crisis management machinery specificially designated to deal and counter 
incidents of terrorism within and beyond their own borders.”* While the type 
and function of these crisis management machinery reflect the individual 
governmental structures and varying threats of terrorism, they all share a 
common purpose of providing essential support mechanisms for both reducing 
the effect of terrorism on the agenda for poliymakers as an advisory and
See: Independent, May 7, 1990; and Independent on Sunday, May 6, 1990.
”* The specific t^ pe of bureaucracy or operational functions of these individual 
crisis managanent nmchineiy will not be dealt with in this study as they have been covered 
adequately elsewhere, see: G._Davidson Smith, (1990), op.cit.: pp.92-129; and Richard 
Clutterbuck, (1992), op.cit.: pp.263-87.
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policy directing body as well as coordinating any response as an operational 
body.’” Despite the diversity of.exisiting machinery, measurement of success 
lies in their ability to shield the effects of pressure from terrorism on the 
higher echelons of decisionmakers and to provide a coordinated response to 
the specific terrorist situations. Unlike other types of terrorism, the pro­
longed duration of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon has placed special burdens 
on the machinery to operate effectively over a sustained period.’” In most
cases, the crucial role of crisis management machinery has been evident in 
the acute and periodic short-term pressures created by Hizb'allah’s threats 
of execution of hostages unless Western governments meet certain ultima­
tums.’”
The role of the media and its impact on the effective functioning of 
Western government decision-making in such short-term pressure situations has 
undoubtedly played an instrumental role in exacerbating the acceleration and 
type of any responses to the hostage-crisis.’” This has been clearly dis­
played by the American media's coverage of hijackings and abduction of US 
citizens by the Hizb'allah, most notably the TWA-847 hijacking jji 1985 and 
in response to the unprecedented number of abductions in January 1987 during 
the furor surrounding the revelation of the Iran-Contra debacle at home and
See: Louis Jean Duclos, "Le Traitement Français du Terrorisme", Études 
Polémologiques, No.49 (January 1989): pp.75-110; Uriel Rosenthal, P.T. Hart, and M. Charles,
(1989), op.cit.; and Peter A. Hall, Jack Hay^ vard and Howard Meckin, Developments in French 
Politics (London: Macmillan, 1990): pp.225-36.
See: Alex von Dornoch, (1988), op.cit.: p.262.
See: Maskit Burgin, Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, (1988), op.cit.: pp. 14-19.
See: Edward M. Joyce, "Reporting Hostage Crises: #o's in Qiarge of Television", 
SAIS Review (Winter-Spring 1986): pp.169-76. Also see: Alex von Dornoch, (1989), op.cit.; 
Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit.: pp.151-7; and Newsweek, Febniary 16, 1987.
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abroad.’” While US media coverage of the Lebanese hostage-crisis has failed 
by itself to precipitate any government response, as shown by the restraints 
in using military force, it has significantly served to elevate the hostage- 
issue on the US foreign and domestic agendas.’” The inability of US admini­
strations to deal with and limit the effects of media coverage on the fate 
of American hostages have acted as a major constraint for any effective re­
sponse as any action or inaction towards the crisis has either been scruti­
nized for any resemblance of concessions or underlined the impotence of 
government response to terrorism, reaffirming the failure to deal effectively 
with the 1980 US embassy siege in Iran.’” Although the subsequent US admini­
strations have been constrained by Carter's legacy and the critical role of 
the media in shaping US foreign policy, the ineffective role of crisis 
management machinery as an operational body was also underlined by the poli­
tical crisis caused by the covert US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deals.’” The 
revelation of the so-called Iran-Contra affair became a pivotal event as it 
not only completely discredited the US-led campaign against international
See: Newsweek, July 1, 1985; and Sunday Times, June 30, 1985. Also see: D. Elliott, 
"Family Ties: A Case Study of Coverage of Families and Friends During the Hijacking of TWA 
Flight 847", Political Communication and Persuasion, No.5 (1988): pp.67-75; and W.C. Adams, 
"The Beirut Hostages: ABC and NBC Seize an Opportunity", Public Opinion, Vol.8 
(August/September 1985): pp.45-8.
See: Laurence Zuckerman, "Tlie Dilemna of the 'Forgotten Hostages", Columbia 
Journalism Review (July-August 1986): pp.30-4. Also see: Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, (1988), 
op.cit.; Peter Stoler, Hie War Against the Press: Politics, Pressure and Intimidation in the 
80s (New York, NY.: Dodd, Mead, 1986): pp. 110-11; US News and World Report, July 1, 1985; and 
Time, August 14, 1989.
See: US House of Representatives, The Media, Diplomacy, and Terrorism in the Middle 
Fa-qt (Hearings before the Subcorrmittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs) (Washington DC. : Government Printing Office, 1985) ; and Roland D. Crelinsten,
"Victims' Perspectives", in David L. Paletz and Alex P. Schmid (eds.), Terrorism and the Media 
(London: Sage, 1992): pp.208-38,
See: E. Gilboa, "Effects of Televised Presidential Addresses on Public Opinion: 
President Reagan and Terrorism in the Middle East", Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol.20
(1990): pp.43-54.
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terrorism, undermining previous and current efforts by its allies, but ahn,
caused a severe political crisis for the Reagan presidency which his admini
stration never completely recovered from, as the truth about the Iran-Conli,,
scandal remains to be resolved.’” The political fall-out of the US-Irani
arms-for-hostages deals severely curtailed any official US efforts to proem-
the release of its citizens from captivity as it also had severe politic,, i 
consequences in Iran.’” As a result, any subsequent ability of the US govern
ment to act vis-à-vis the American hostages was severely limited by the poli
tical environment in the Middle East, tarnished by the Iran-Contra affai*,
despite the existance of a well-deliniated machinery for dealing with terro
rism.’”
In the French case, the role of the media has not only elevated th< 
importance of the hostage-crisis on the French domestic and foreign polif , 
agendas but has also been exploited by the various political parties for e/ 
pediency in the two elections in 1986 and 1988.’” While the circumventi'.; 
of any coordination between existing and responsible crisis management bodic,. 
was a reflection of the nature of the French "cohabitation" government, ti.: 
absence of any overall response, facilitated by the political rivalry betwecr
See: William S. Cohen and George J. Mitchell, Men of Zeal: A Candide Inside Story 
of the Iran-Contra Hearings (New York, NY. : Penguin, 1989) ; and Peter Kombluh and Malcolm 
Byrne, (1993), op.cit.
For the internal consequences of the Iran-Contra affair in Iran, see: David 
Menashri, (1990b), op.cit.: pp.374-85.
See: Marc Celmer, (1987), op.cit. Also see: Michel Wieviorka, "Defining and 
Implementing Foreign Policy: The US Experience in Anti-Terrorism", in Yonah Alexander and 
Abraliam H. Foxman (eds.) Hie Annuals of Terrorism: 1988-1989 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1990): pp.171-201. Also see: Stephen Sloan, "US Anti-Terrorism Policies: lessons 
to be Learned to Meet an Enduring and Qianging Hireat", Terrorism and Political Violence, 
Vol.5, No.l (Spring 1993): pp.106-121.
See: Luc Qiauvin, "French Diplomacy and the Hostage-Crises", in Barry Rubin (ed.), 
op.cit.: pp.91-106; and Ting, March 24, 1986. Also see: Steve M. Berry, (1989), op.cit.: 
pp.19-22.
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Chirac and Mitterrand, contributed to severe friction and cross-purpos. 
vity between responsible French ministries and agencies, most notably ,, 
lations with Iran.’” Although this rivalry worked to the advantage. , 
speedy resolution of the French hostage-crisis in conjunction with elo< 
the role of the media exacerbated the search for accomodation with Hi/j. 
and Iranian demands in which French foreign policy became bound 
urgency for solutions to the hostage-crisis for political expedient , 
also served to give the impression that the French judiciary was sub: 
to the political masters, most notably in relation to the Gordji-afJ 
The British experience with countering domestic terrorism has let 
development and existence of a well-defined crisis management st, 
minimizing interagency rivalry, as well as a reduction in media prt. 
the decision-making process.’” Apart from the moral leadership of the , 
government in its crusade against terrorism, these functions contri:,, 
a complete devaluation of the hostage-crisis as an issue for poliyi;..., 
facilitated by broad cross-party support, until the 1988 emer^ 
hostage-pressure groups and political observers questioning governme;
See: Newsweek, December 14, 1987; Time, July 27, 1987; Observer, July 26, li 
Economist, December 5, 1987.
See: Independent, November 8, 1989; Ihe Spectator, November 9, 1991; and \ . 
November 13, 1988. Also see: George Joffee, "Iran, the Southern Mediterranean and Fa 
Terrorism and Hostages", in Anoushiravan Ehtesharrd and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), op. 
pp.77-9,
See: Alex von Dornoch, (1988), op.cit.: pp.260-1.
’” See; David Bonner, "United Kingdom: The United Kingdom Response to Terroi 
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.4 (1992): pp.171-205.
Tlie British Ministry of Defense and Foreign Office require its employees 
disclaimers that neither any official extraordinary measures mil be taken beyond t:. 
conduct of foreign policy: nor mil the British government alter its policy for cone- 
individual welfare. This was discussed in an unattributable interview by the autho; 
foiTiîer FCD diplomat in November 1992.
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in the aftermath of apparent French concessions assisting in the complete 
resolution of its own hostage-crisis in Lebanon.’” While the inflexibility 
of PM Thatcher deflected criticism from within and the public for its refusal 
to conduct any dialogue at all despite Britain's longstanding position and 
contacts in the Middle East, any real pressures from critics were kept at bay 
by the inner sanctum of British policymaking and over-shadowed by the imposi­
tion of the Iranian fatwa on Rushdie and developments in the region eminating 
from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait which limited the government's manuverability 
and urgency to resolve the crisis.’”
Despite the existence of fully functional crisis management machinery 
in all these three Western governments, the inability to shield policymakers 
from the effect of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon demonstrates not only the 
vulnerability of Western democratic states with a free press to this form of 
crisis, aptly exploited by these terrorist groups and their patrons, but 
also the inadequate functioning of the crisis management devices in educating 
the public and pressure groups on the constraints and opportunities of the 
complex environment under which they operate under in efforts to extract its 
fellow citizens from captivity.”* The revelation of the Iran-Contra affair 
had an enourmous impact not only on the ability by the US presidency to
See: John McCarthy and Jill Morell, (1993), op.cit.; and George Joffe, "Iran, the 
Southern Mediterranean and Eiuope", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.),
(1993), op.cit.: pp.89-90.
’” See: John Dickie, (1992), op.cit.: pp.199-200. Also see: Independent, June 23,
1988; Independent on Sunday, August 25, 1991; and Times, November 19, 1991.
”* As stated by Ambassador Robert Oakley: "[t]he highest officials are tom between 
maintaining a national and governmental posture of strength, based on antiterrorist 
principles, and a policy more in keeping with their humanitarian and domestic political 
concerns. Public opinion and media pressures are sùnilarily schizophrenic, one day calling for 
toughness and no concessions to terrorists, but the next day moved by the phlight of the 
hostages and the appeals of their families", see: Robert Oakley, "International Terrorism", 
Foreign Affairs, Vol.65, No.3 (1986). Also see: Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, 
"Hostage taking, the presidency, and stress", in Walter Reich (ed.), (1990), op.cit.: pp.211- 
29.
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function but also made any British and even French responses to their own 
hostage-crisis in Lebanon look relatively less damaging or at least more 
politically defensible in comparison. Efforts to limit media impact must 
form the first line of defense in the search for better adaptability of 
exisiting crisis management machinery to the hostage-crisis as these in­
cidents exhibit unique features, distinguishing them from other forms of 
terrorism in longevity and in the complexity of the environment.
5.7 Broad Platform of Support for Measures
The options of response selected by Western governments are not only a 
reflection of their capability to adapt its crisis management techniques and 
machinery to the dynamics of the hostage-crisis environment, but also mirror 
the urgency created by domestic pressures as well as the political accepta­
bility of any response both at home and abroad. While the number and fre­
quency of hostage-takings differ among various governments, the degree to 
which Western governments are willing to bend an uncompromising no­
concessions policy depends on elevated public expectations of the perceived 
ability by their governments to deliver the freedom of citizens held in cap­
tivity in accordance with made promises without a visible sacrifice of any 
principled positions against terrorism.’”
The support by the public for any military reply to terrorism has been 
strongest in the United States as evident by the domestic popular support for 
the retaliatory raid on Libya in 1986 and the military interception of the 
aircraft carrying the Achille Lauro perpetrators in 1985.’” Notwithstanding 
the questionable legality of these actions and the strains caused in allian­
ces with friendly states, the creation of false expectations for the American
See: Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit. As phrased by Peggy Say, sister of Terry 
Anderson: "I have to wonder if quiet diplomacy is a code word for no diplomacy", see: Time, 
May 23, 1988.
See: Rex A. Hudson, (1989), op.cit.: pp.364-5; and Time, April 28, 1986.
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public in the utility of using military force in the response to the hostage- 
crisis in Lebanon undermined the credibility of the US government in its re­
solve to exact swift and effective retribution and exacerbated the pressures 
on the policymakers to find alternative ways to extracticate the US from 
previously made guarantees to return its citizens home safely.’”
The issue of negotiations with the Hizb'allah and its patrons over the 
hostages has also to be seen in the context of a switch from support of hard­
line policies to more conciliatory tones in conjunction with the duration of 
the crises.’” While the revelation of the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deals 
totally discredited US hardline rhetoric against state sponsored terrorism, 
the US public increasingly recognized the value of negotiation with the 
ascendancy of the Bush administration and, at the same time, the limits of 
military response in retaliation or rescue attempts in the event of deaths 
of hostages.”4 The Iran-Contra affair certainly had a very adverse effect on 
Reagan's standing with the US public, as evident in opinion polls which 
found Reagan's approval rating plummeting drastically as the largest single 
drop for any US president in history.’” Although Western governments moved 
to limit their responsibility towards citizens by either issuing, in the case 
of Britain, warnings to nationals to adopt extreme security precautions or
Wliile US public opinion polls indicated a 77% approval for the retaliatory actions 
against Libya, opposition to the action was evident in France, who refused permission for US 
aircrafts to use French airspace, and in Britain, by its condannation accounting for 59% of 
the population, see: New York Times, April 21, 1986; and Time, April 28, 1986.
See: Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, (1992), op.cit.: pp.307-40.
In a poll conducted by TIME/CNN in August 1989, over 58% of respondents favoured 
negotiations with the terrorist groups for the hostages' release, see: lime, August 14, 1989.
A New York Times/CBS News poll recorded a drop in Reagan's approval rating from 67% 
to 46% in November 1986, see: Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, (1988), op.cit.: p.292 & 437. 
Another New York Times/CBS News poll found that 53% of the public believed that the president 
was lying about the Iran-Contra affair, while only 34% believed he was telling the truth, see: 
New York Times, July 18, 1987.
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leave Lebanon, or barring travel to and stay in Lebanon, in the case of the 
US government,’” an overwhelming majority of Western public consider it still 
a duty for their governments to do whatever they can to free its citizens 
taken hostage,’” This trend was echoed by the British public who over­
whelmingly supported negotiations for the hostages' release, after the 1990 
release of two American hostages without any apparent sacrifice of prin­
ciple.’” The French case underlined the acceptability of conducting nego­
tiations and entering into concessions, shielded by tough visible hardline 
policies, for the public as long as these in the end yielded the freedom of 
the all the hostages.’”
While entering into deals with the Hizb'allah and Iran received limited 
degree of acceptability in tjie domestic arena for Western governments with 
the return of released hostages, it created serious friction in friendly 
alliances as decisions to deviate from commonly agreed principles seriously 
undermined the position of those Western governments, most notably Britain, 
who chose to adhere to a rigid refusal to either negotiate or conduct behind- 
the-scenes deals for the release of its citizens.’” This was evidently dis­
played by the British outcry against the US covert policy with Iran, trading 
arms for hostages.’” It was also a serious source of tension in Anglo-French
See: New York Times, January 27, 1987; and Newsweek, May 18, 1987,
’” See: Time, August 14, 1989.
Hie poll, conducted on May 8, 1990, yielded over 75% in favour of negotiations, 
see: Middle East International, May 11, 1990.
See: Independent, May 7, 1990. Also see: Êlie Vannier, "Les Otages au Liban", 
Études Polémologiques, Vol.49, No.l (1989): pp.157-64.
See: Financial Times, August 9, 1991.
Hvo high-level British officials, Sir Anthony AcJdand and Sir Percy Cradock, 
visited Wasliington to inquire about allegations of US-Iranian deal-making and lodged a foimal 
complaint in June 1986. For a useful account, see: Cbn Coughlin, (1992), op.cit.: pp.312-3; 
and Geoffrey Smith, Reagan and Hiatcher (London: Hie Bodley Head, 1990).
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relations with public and private condemnations after every release of French 
hostages.’” This became clear by the decision of Chirac to request the French 
parliament for a surprise vote of confidence, on the eve of the December 1987 
Copenhagen EC summit, in order to provide extra protection against criticism 
from British PM Thatcher.’” These unilateral actions by Western governments
may have served their immediate national interests -and alleviated public 
pressures, yet it seriously impaired the collective political will and credi­
bility of any closer international co-operation between states in the field 
of counter-terrorism.’” It also rendered the effectiveness of coercive in­
struments of crisis management in pressuring state-sponsors of terrorism 
useless as Western states often circumvented collective action for short­
term political expediency in pursuit of their own individual national 
interests in the Middle East and elsewhere.
5.8 Crisis Management: Consideration of Precedent Effect of Crisis Behaviour 
A major underlying assumption of adhering to the principles of no­
negotiation and no-concession for Western governments to the hostage-crisis 
is that terrorism must not be rewarded and that appeasement through con­
cessions will only encourage further acts of terrorism.’” While the under-
See: Independent, May 7, 1990; Times, December 1, 1987; Times, May 5, 1988; and 
Independent on Sunday, May 6, 1990.
See: Economist, December 5, 1987; and Tine, December 14, 1987.
See: Independent, December 3, 1987; Independent, August 11, 1989; and Time, August 
14, 1989. Also see: Alex von Dornoch, (1989), op.cit.; and Stanley S. Bedlington, (1986), 
op.cit.
According to President Reagan: "concessions to terrorists only serve to encoiurage 
them to resort to more terror to obtain their political objectives, thereby endangering still 
more innocent lives. If terrorists understand that a government steadfastly refuses to give in 
to their demands... this will serve as a strong deterrent", as quoted in: Robert M. Sayer, 
"Combatting Terrorism: American Policy' and Organization", Department of State Bulletin,
(1982): pp.1-17. Also see: airistian Science Monitor, October 26, 1988. According to France's 
Prime Minister Cliirac: "[w]hen you negotiate mth people who take hostages you are obliged, in 
the negotiation, to give something. It may be just a little, it may be a lot, but you have to 
give something. Once you have given something, the kidnappers gains from his action. So what
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pinnings of these principled assumptions are based on absolute standards in 
alignment with common moral values in the West, their transformation from 
theory into practise vis-à-vis the Western hostage-crisis in Lebanon revealed 
inconsistency and hypocrisy as these standards were gradually discarded for 
other overriding concerns in the foreign and domestic arenas.’” The diffi­
culty of applying these principles consistently into practise underlines the 
inseperable nature of responses to terrorism and the conduct of Western 
foreign policy in the Middle East, In short, there are other factors at work 
here. As such. Western government dealings with hostage-taking incidents 
became dependent on each government's own foreign policy behaviour towards 
those states, most notably Iran and Syria, with influence over the Hizb'allah 
as well as constrained by events in the overall political environment in the 
Middle East. The commonly accepted assertion, providing the foundation for 
the principles of no-negotiations and no-concessions, that softening the 
tough line through dealing with, and providing concessions to, the Hizb'allah 
only rewards and encourages more hostage-taking must be examined within the 
framework of the dynamics of Middle East politics rather than n.n isola­
tion.’” While US experience with hostage-takings in Lebanon supports the 
assertion that conceeding to Hizb'allah demands leads to further kidnappings, 
the experience of the French and the British governments in their approach 
to the hostage-crisis provide ample contradictory evidence.’” Despite major
is his normal and spontaneous reaction? He does it again, thinking that is a way of obtaining 
what he cannot obtain by other means. So you get caught in a process. Naturally you can get 
maybe two, three or four hostages freed. But you luinediately give the kidnapper an inducaænt 
to seize another three, four, five or six. So it is an extraordinary dangerous and 
irresponsible process. That is why I don't negotiate", see: Economist, June 11, 1988.
’” See: Paul Wilkinson, (1986), op.cit.; Independent, August 11, 1989; and Times, 
February, 30, 1988.
’” For a useful example, see: Independent, August 30, 1989.
See: Independent, May 7, 1990; and Economist, June 11, 1988.
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French concessions to the Hizb'allah and its patrons, no new French hostages 
were abducted after January 1987.’” Although most of these French concessions 
related to the settlement of legitimate outstanding foreign policy disputes 
with Iran, a number of French concessions, most notably the expulsion of 
anti-Iranian opposition leaders and the release of imprisoned terrorists were 
serious breaches of the highly principled moral position of Western govern­
ments.’” Equally, British policy towards negotiation and concessions failed 
to provoke either new hostage-takings or any resolution to existing hostage- 
incidents.’”
The virtous principles of no-negotiation and no-concession can neither 
be applied in a vacuum nor in absolute terms.’” As the announcement of 
setting these rigid principles on one's own conduct frequently fail to con­
form to the realities of pursuing foreign policy in highly dynamic hostage- 
situations, as other interests in the Middle East takes precedence over the 
hostage-crisis, it is bound to invite charges of hypocrisy and double­
standards at home and by allies.’”
See: Independent. August 11, 1989. Also see: Appendix I.
See: Grant Wardlaw, (1989), op.cit.: pp.157-9.
See: Independent, May 7, 1990; and Economist, November 8, 1986.
’” See: Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, (1992), op.cit.: pp.307-40.
’” As aptly observed by Ronald Crelinsten: "[l]ike a child clamoring for forbidden 
toys, the public expects the government simultaneously to give in and to hold fast", see: 
Ronald D. Crelinsten, "Terrorism and the Media: Problems, Solutions, and Counterproblems", 
Political Cccmumication and Persuasion, Vol.6, No.3 (1989): p.312. According to Robert Fisk:
" Whatever the Western nations, including Britain, may say about never bowing to terrorism, 
money will have to be paid for the release of all the hostages...in one way or another the 
hostages mil have to be l)ought back because money has to be paid for everything in Lebanon.", 
see: Independent, August 5, 1989.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
"To release a hostage, it is necessary to identify the group and 
the country that supports that group. There is no single country in 
the region that alone can wield pressure on all the groups: indeed, 
different political groups of the same country have been known to 
patronise differing Beirut groups. These groups, interact with each 
other and exchange information: but each has its own hierarchy, its 
own allegiance and each guards its hostages dearly...[I]n their war 
against the outside enemy, these groups will do with their hœtages 
what best serves their interests: whether it be demands for political 
moderation in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the release of fighters from 
Israeli prisons, the purchase of arms and spare parts, or the freeing 
of assets in Western banks. It is a war without arms."’
6.1. Introduction
The interaction between the dynamics of the foreign hostage-crisis in 
Lebanon and the responses by the American, French, and British governments, 
in efforts to secure the release of their citizens from Hizb'allah captivity, 
has demonstrated the difficulty for Western states in reconciling their 
firmly-held principles of no-negotiations and no-concessions in dealing with 
either the Hizb'allah or its patrons with the actual and practical realities 
governing any resolution to the foreign hostage-situations in Lebanon. This 
difficulty has been not only based on the uniqueness and complexity of the 
triangular and multi-dimensional interactions between Hizb'allah, Iran, and 
Syria that governed motivations for any release of foreign captives but also 
on the manner in which these Western governments actually responded to the 
hostage-crisis itself, given the framework of opportunities and constraints 
in the crisis environment. This study has provided a methodological approach 
which not only evaluates the inner dynamics of Hizb'allah and its confinons 
interaction with the Lebanese environment as well as with Iran and Syria but
’ Statement by former Lebanese hostage Jamil Nasser, "The IMcostly War", New 
Stateanan, February 20, 1987; p.10.
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also provides a framework, integrating the principles of crisis-management, 
which makes it possible to assess the effectiveness of Western government re­
sponses to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon. This combined analysis has yielded 
new and valuable insights on the individual level through the case-study into 
the mechanisms that govern the behaviour of one of the most dangerous and 
militant Middle Eastern terrorist organisations (the Hizb'allah) within its 
environment in Lebanon, as well as its relationship with those states provi­
ding direct or indirect support (Iran and Syria). The thesis also provided 
a new analytical framework in the study of terrorism for the evaluation of 
the performance and effectiveness of Western government responses to the 
foreign hostage-crisis, using traditional crisis management techniques, which 
were evaluated against the actual crisis environment. This chapter will 
discuss the most important findings of the case-study of Hizb'allah and its 
patrons, Iran and Syria, and whether the American, British, and French 
governments were effective in their approach to the hostage-crisis using 
crisis management techniques in terms of their adherence to previously 
delineated requirements as well as to the dynamics of the crisis environment 
itself. It will also briefly discuss the applicability and lessons of crisis 
management techniques based on these findings for Western governments and the 
international system as a whole, most notably in order to more closely 
resolve the dilemma of fulfillment of the duty by these states to protect 
their citizens taken hostage abroad, without any major sacrifice in the 
conduct of foreign policy.
6.2 Findings of the Case-Study on Hizb'allah
This case-study demonstrated, contrary to the longstanding conventional 
wisdom of most academic scholars, analysts, and policymakers, that an in- 
depth analysis of one of the most complex and secretive terrorist organisa­
tions in the Middle East cannot only be accomplished despite the subject's
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complexity but also yield predictable patterns and conclusions for a fuller 
comprehension of the inner dynamics of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon. More­
over, the case-study achieved these results through the linkage of the 
findings throughout the analysis into an aggregate whole, which provided a
new mechanism for understanding the behaviour of the Hizb'allah and its 
interaction with Iran and Syria with special reference to the process of
hostage-taking of Westerners.
A main task of this case-study was to answer the underlying questions 
of why the Hizb'allah resorted to hostage-taking and what mechanisms governed 
the initiation and resolution of the hostage-incidents. An essential starting 
point to find answers to these questions was to discard the prevalent assump­
tions in the West that the Hizb'allah movement emerged on the Lebanese scene 
in 1982 as a mere creation of Iran and acted to a large extent as an Iranian 
autonom, principally as it ignored the importance of the historical antece­
dents to the formation of the Hizb'allah, which fundamentally shaped its 
ideological outlook as well as its current behaviour. In particular, it was 
argued that the shared theological experience between future Hizb'allah and 
Iranian clergy in Najaf, Iraq, provided the basis for close personal friend­
ships which have been instrumental in governing the Lebanese movement's ideo­
logical deference to the Islamic Republic of Iran and provided the basis for 
the evolution of a series of complex clerical networks which governed pre­
vious and present activity. While this Najaf-experience has been traditio­
nally overlooked, despite its major importance in explaining the origins 
and depth of the continued close personal relationships which extended bet­
ween a number of Iranian and Hizb'allah clerics, it also explained the move­
ment's ready assimilation of, and close adherence to, Islamic Iran's ideo­
logical doctrines, especially as most of Hizb'allah's clerical elite were 
influenced by Ayatollah Khumayyni during his exile in Najaf between 1964
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and 1978.
This contextual approach, stressing the importance of the shared theo­
logical experience in Najaf between leading Hizb'allah clergy and members of 
Iran's clerical establishment, was a necessary prelude for a fuller under­
standing of the Hizb'allah as an militant Shi'ite organisation and for the 
underlying mechanisms that governed its hostage-taking activity. Firstly, it 
explained the nature and scope of the underlying personal relationships bet­
ween Hizb'allah and Iranian clerics, which fundementally served to regulate 
and govern the movement's previous and present activity. Secondly, it was 
used also to explain the Hizb'allah's ideological and spiritual deference to 
Islamic Iran's pan-Islamic vision and authority within the context of the way 
in which it has influenced and translated into the movement’s own revolu­
tionary struggle and activity in Lebanon.
In what way did the shared theological experience in Najaf between 
leading Hizb'allah clergy and members of Iran's clerical establishment in­
fluence and govern the previous and present activity of the movement? It was 
demonstrated that the collective Najaf-experience played a pivotal role in 
the actual formation of the Hizb'allah in 1982 and the subsequent guidance 
provided by its former Iranian Najaf-educated clerical colleagues, most 
notably from All Akhbar Mohtashemi. The strengths of these ties were evident 
in the pre-Hizb'allah period not only through the close assistance provided 
by Lebanese Shi'ites to its Iranian clerical colleagues in their anti-Shah 
revolutionary activity but also within the parallel activities of the 
Lebanese al-Da'wa party and Shi'ite educational institutions, led by Najaf- 
educated Lebanese clerics. These clerics became a natural and conducive 
source for Iranian clergy to spread the revolutionary Islamic ideology in 
Lebanon as defined and led by Imam Khumayyni through increased political 
activism of the Lebanese al-Da'wa party and challenges by its more radical
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and loyal followers within Amal to the movement’s moderate and secular orien­
tation. It was demonstrated that these ties between Lebanese Shi’ites and 
Iranian clergy consolidated with Israel's 1982 invasion, influenced by an 
array of other key preceding events which accelerated the political radica- 
lization of the Shi'ite community in Lebanon, and translated into the forma­
tion of the Hizb'allah under the active supervision and guidance of leading 
Iranian clergy, closely assisted by the presence of an Iranian Pasdaran 
contingent in the Biq'a area. Apart from the strong influence of Najaf- 
educated Iranian clergy over its Lebanese counterparts in the actual creation 
of Hizb'allah, it was demonstrated that these ties increasingly assumed 
importance as Najaf-schooled Iranian clergy, most notably members of the so- 
called revolutionist faction within Iran's clerical establishment, were 
appointed to head the major official Iranian institutions at work within 
Hizb'allah and to act as main official liaison with the Lebanese movement. 
This meant that the Hizb'allah was not only closely dependent on its Iranian 
allies for material support for the survival and rapid expansion of the 
movement but also most closely attuned to the uncompromising radical ideology 
of the Iranian revolutionist faction and, consequently, very susceptible to 
clerical factionalism in Iran. It was shown that the dismissal and appoint­
ment of Iran's radical clergy within these Iranian institutions at work 
within the Hizb'allah determined the degree of obedience displayed by the 
movement to Islamic Iran's official leadership and orders, most notably 
revealed by Hizb'allah's willingness to release its Western hostages. The 
close influence of the Iranian revolutionist faction over members of 
Hizb'allah's command leadership was used, at times, as an instrument by these 
Iranian clergy to both sabotage moderate and pragmatic overtures by the 
Iranian official leadership in the foreign policy arena as well as to bolster 
the faction's own positions within Iranian clerical power-struggles. This
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faction vas assisted by the Iranian Pasdaran's active and close involvement 
with the Hizb’allah, as it often acted in opposition to the policy directions 
and goals of its civilian superiors, in order to further its own hardline 
revolutionary principles. It was demonstrated that the dismissal of 
Hizb’allah's closest Iranian allies from Iranian institutional positions at 
work within the movement strongly affected the behaviour of the movement 
towards official Iran, beginning in late 1986 and intensifying after the 
death of Ayatollah Khumayyni in 1989.*
While the collective Najaf-experience was useful in explaining the 
strong personal relationships between the Hizb'allah leadership and Iranian 
clerics, which fundementally governed and regulated the hostage-taking acti­
vity of the Lebanese Shi'ite movement, it was also used to explain the way 
in which Hizb'allah's ideological and spiritual deference to Islamic Iran's 
pan-Islamic vision and authority influenced and translated into the move­
ment's own revolutionary struggle and activity in Lebanon. It was clearly 
shown that Hizb'allah's rapid growth and popularity within Lebanon was 
achieved not only by a successful combination of ideological indoctrination 
and material inducement by the movement through Iranian assistance, but also 
by the ability of Hizb'allah leaders to mobilize and unite the Lebanese 
Shi'ite community within the framework of an organisation with clearly 
defined and articulated political objectives. While Hizb'allah's ideological 
deference to Ayatollah Khumayyni's pan-Islamic vision and authority was 
instrumental in shaping the nature of the movement's organisational structure
* Hiis was demonstrated most notably by the dismissal of Ali-Akbar ^ bhtashani from his 
post of Interior Minister in the 1989 post-Khumayyni Cabinet; the arrest and execution of 
Medhi Hashemi, head of the Office of Islamic liberation Movements, in late 1986; the demotion 
of Hosein Sheikh-ol-Islam's and Javad Mansuri's positions within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; the replacement of Ayatollah Mehdi Karnibi in 1989 from his post as head of the 
Martyr's Foundation. See Chapter Three (pp.135-47) for specific details.
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and the manner in which the movement sought to implement its pan-Islamic 
strategy of overthrowing the confessional system and establishing an Islamic 
state in Lebanon governed by Islamic law, Hizb'allah's mastery of political 
violence became an essential component in the pursuit of its pan-Islamic 
goals as it projected itself as the spearhead of the struggle against the 
enemies of Islam, namely the United States and Israel. In turn, this pan- 
Islamic premise provided the ideological raison d'etré for most of the move­
ment's political and military activity in Lebanon and acts as a defining 
characteristic of the movement's symbiotic relationship with Iran, which 
underlines their close co-operation and converging interests.*
While it was demonstrated that these pan-Islamic goals have provided the 
Hizb'allah with a sense of purpose and mission as a revolutionary movement 
and that it's activity closely converges with Iranian foreign policy inte­
rests, the Iranian-Hizb'allah relationship experienced tension and friction 
when Islamic Iran's ruling clergy was forced to subordinate the radical 
philosophy of the revolution for the pragmatic interests of the state. This 
reinforced the close allegiance between Hizb'allah leaders and members of 
Iran's revolutionist faction. Despite the fact that Hizb'allah veils its 
revolutionary struggle in uncompromising pan-Islamic motifs, the movement has 
demonstrated greater flexibility in readjusting to the realities of con­
straints imposed by Lebanon's multiconfessional civil war environment and by 
Syria's wider ambition to establish hegemony over Lebanon.
While Hizb'allah's leading clergy adhere to Iran's pan-Islamic vision 
and profess absolute allegiance to the authority and guidance of Ayatollah
* Hizb'allah's grand Pan-Islamic strategy for Lebanon is set to proceed in four 
stages: armed confrontation with Israel; overthrow of the Lebanese regime; the liberation of 
any form of intervention by the Great Powers in Lebanon; and the establishment of Islamic rule 
in Lebanon (later joined by other Muslims in the creation of a single Islamic coumuiity).
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Khumayyni, it was established that the rank and file of the movement are far 
from monolithic but rather bound by their own complex allegiances and subject 
to frequent disagreements within the movement. Intra-Hizb'allah disagreements 
have been most evidently focused on the degree to which the movement should 
conform to Iranian and Syrian foreign policy interests in Lebanon, especially 
any quest for the resolution of the Western hostage-issue at the expense of 
compromising the movement's own agenda. In particular, Hizb'allah's "democra­
tization process", whereby elections were held every two years for senior po­
sitions in the Consultative and Executive Shura, was not merely a rotation 
of responsibility among a core group of senior Hizb'allah clergy but also re­
flected the internal dynamics of the power struggle for the leadership 
between the more moderate and radical factions within the organisations. As 
such, any election that either maintains the status quo or yields significant 
changes within the Hizb'allah hierarchy reveals not only the degree of 
radicalism of a Hizb'allah leader, which subsequently will influence the 
direction of the organisation, but also where the allegiance of that leader 
lies within Iran's clerical establishment. At another level, the Hizb'allah 
elections were not merely a useful guide to monitor Hizb'allah's relationship 
with Iran but also indications of challenges confronting the organisation 
inside Lebanon. This was clear from the ascendancy of both Sheikh Abbas al- 
Musawi in May 1991, which allowed a resolution to the Western hostage-crisis 
in return for Hizb'allah's permission to remain the only armed movement in 
Lebanon's post-civil war environment, and Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah in 
February 1992, which led to Hizb'allah's decision to participate in the 
Lebanese parliamentary elections in the autumn of that year. This illustrates 
that an understanding of the behaviour of the Hizb'allah movement depends on 
the depth and allegiance of closely forged relationships between individual 
Hizb'allah leaders and Iranian clergy as well as the adaptability of a parti­
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cular Hizb'allah leader to suit the movement's activity to the political 
requirements of the environment within which it operates. As a result, it was 
demonstrated that any analysis of Hizb'allah requires not only an under­
standing of the movement itself but also its interaction with elements within 
Iran's clerical establishment as well as with Iranian institutions. Further­
more, Hizb'allah is far from a unified body, as displayed by confinons cleri­
cal factionalism between its leading members over the direction of the move­
ment and its constant readjustments within Lebanon.
Any analysis of Hizb'allah's involvement in the process of hostage- 
taking of Westerners must not only take into account these mechanism of 
relationships that control and govern the movement's activities but also the 
influences of the multilayered Lebanese, regional, and international poli­
tics. These influences affect the process of the hostage-crisis as Westerners 
are abducted and released for individual Hizb'allah motives or in convergence 
with Iranian, and to a lesser extent, Syrian interests. This involves exa­
mination of the nature and dynamics of Hizb'allah's command leadership and 
its decision-making process, which must be balanced against the dynamics of 
Hizb'allah's institutional relationships with Iran and Syria in Lebanon in 
accordance with internal Lebanese factors and external developments, creating 
opportunities and constraints in the practise of hostage-taking.
It was demonstrated that the use of different cover names by the 
Hizb'allah, when engaged in hostage-takings and other covert operations, is 
a remnant of the Shi'a tradition of concealment as practised when religious­
ly persecuted in ancient times in order to confuse the enemy. Apart from pro­
viding a shield against persecution or reprisals, Hizb'allah's. use of cover 
names has also signified the different currents and concerns within the move­
ment at specific periods, reflecting the movement's political and military 
orientation. While the involvement of a specific and small number of
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Hizb'allah clans in the actual hostage-takings underlined that clan-loyalty 
and individual clerical relationships provided the basis for the movement, 
it also showed that it functioned under a centralized and well-organized 
leadership structure, governed by a supreme politico-religious board of 
authority, composed of a small and select group of Najaf-educated uluma. The 
absolute nature of the supreme religious authority of Hizb'allah's command 
leadership debunked the idea that any of Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity 
was pursued independently by individual Hizb'allah clans. This was re­
inforced by Hizb'allah's institutionalized cooperation and coordination with 
Iran and Syria in some of these operations. This has meant that Hizb'allah 
initiated its hostage-taking activity within the context of the collective 
interests of the organisation as a whole. As a consequence, it was necessary 
to analyze the nature of Hizb'allah's command leadership, its decision-making 
structure as well as policy with specific reference to the movement's 
hostage-taking activity. This made it also necessary to examine the role and 
influence of Iranian clergy and institutions at work within the movement as 
well as Syria's influence within and over Hizb'allah activity.
While the highest authority within Hizb'allah's command leadership re­
flected the individual Shi'ite clergy that assisted in the foundation of 
the movement in July 1982, it was also detailed that the main clergymen who 
exercise control over the movement are the ones responsible for a specific 
committee or portfolio, especially since the 1989 restructuring of the 
movement with the addition of two new organs, the Executive Shura, and a 
Politbureau, leading to greater decentralization of decision-making as well 
as increased factionalism over specific portfolios. It was established that 
Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity was executed by a separate Hizb'allah 
body, the so-called Special Security Apparatus (SSA), whose members main­
tained close liaison with Iranian diplomatic representatives in Beirut and
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Damascus as well as with Iranian Pasdaran officials and Syrian military 
intelligence. The relations between Hizb'allah's SSA and Syrian military 
intelligence have been characterized by periods of conflict and co-operation, 
dictated by the shifting internal situation in Lebanon. Syria has pursued a 
calibrated policy of tacit co-operation with Hizb'allah and support for its 
abductions of foreigners, as long as they were in accordance with Syrian 
strategic interest in Lebanon.
Apart from the Hizb'allah decision-making apparatus and the institu­
tionalized relationship with Iran and Syria through military and civilian 
channels at work in Lebanon, it was shown that Hizb'allah's mechanism for 
hostage-taking was also subject to influence from clerical factionalism with­
in the organisation itself and to a web of clerical relationships extending 
from members of the national Majlis al-Shura to various clergy within Iran's 
civilian and military establishment. It demonstrated that the degree of 
divergence between Hizb'allah's subordination, in principle, to the supreme 
religious and political authority of Ayatollah Khumayyni, and the dis­
obedience and disagreements displayed within Hizb'allah ranks towards Iran's 
official leadership, was dependent on Hizb'allah's and individual clergymen’s 
interaction with official Iranian institutions as well as on clerical fac­
tionalism in Iran. In turn, any friction in Hizb'allah's relationship with 
Iran was influenced by the impact of Iranian clerical factionalism on the 
institutions at work in Hizb'allah.
It has been shown that the Hizb'allah, as a revolutionary movement, was 
most closely attuned to the revolutionist faction within Iran's clerical 
establishment, stemming from the involvement of these Iranian clergy prior 
to and in the actual formation and development of Hizb'allah, which tran­
slated into the appointment of these Iranian clergy to the official Iranian 
institutions at work in Hizb'allah, ranging from the Pasdaran contingent and
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personal Iranian representatives in Damascus and Beirut to Iran's Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the Martyrs' Foundation. As a result, the Hizb'allah 
became gradually susceptible to clerical factionalism in Iran, as evident 
by the dismissal and appointment of Iran's redical clergy within these in­
stitutions after 1986. It was demonstrated that the Hizb'allah has been 
affected by the availability of Iranian financial and material resources to 
sustain its massive services and project for the Shi'a community, while the 
Iranian Pasdaran has remained the most reliable and loyal ally of the 
Hizb'allah.
Hizb'allah's abduction of Western citizens was initiated in specific and 
limited time periods, or phases, which indicated they were directly influen­
ced by a number of factors and events affecting the organisation within 
Lebanon, either for the purposes of survival or for the advancement of its 
pan-Islamic goals. It was also recognized that Hizb'allah activity was di­
rectly related to the collective as well as individual interests of high- 
ranking Hizb'allah clergy. This was examined also through the influence and 
involvement of Iranian clergy and institutions at work on Hizb'allah's 
hostage-taking activity, which was governed by the array of official and 
unofficial interaction between the Hizb'allah and Iran as manifest through 
hostage-taking, either in alignment with the motivations of official Iran or 
as a manifestation of clerical factionalism. This assessment was balanced 
against Hizb'allah's own requirements for its position within the internal 
Lebanese environment, especially in terms of Syrian influence over its acti­
vity.
The initiation of abductions of Westerners demonstrated a strong causal 
linkage between events (internal Lebanese, regional or international) and 
motivation for hostage-taking acts by the Hizb'allah, often on behalf of 
Iran. This was clearly highlighted by Hizb'allah's first four abduction cam­
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paigns of American, French, and British citizens, lasting until the autumn 
of 1986, in which the movement's activity was closely co-ordinated with Iran 
and Syria. Apart from Hizb'allah's co-operation with Iran and Syria in a 
wider attempt to rid Lebanon of all foreign presence through suicide-attacks, 
the kidnappings of Westerners were motivated by the movement's support for 
Iran in the Iran-Iraq war and in an attempt to free imprisoned members held 
in Europe and the Middle East, most notably in Kuwait and Israel. This phase 
also underlined the heavy influence of certain Iranian revolutionary clergy 
within and over Hizb'allah's decision-making process.
The close convergence of interests between Hizb'allah and Iran governed 
hostage-taking activity in Lebanon until the end of 1986 without major signs 
or impact of any clerical factionalism either within the organisation or from 
Iran in the process of abductions or releases of hostages. The following 
phases revealed discord between Hizb'allah and Iran which was largely the 
result of rivalry within Iran's clerical establishment which affected the 
organisation directly as its closest Iranian allies were demoted from posi­
tions in institutions at work within the organisation in Lebanon. It was 
demonstrated that the imposition of Iranian clerical factionalism on the 
movement's activity was most notable in the process of the release of Western 
hostages rather than in the actual abductions. This Iranian factional rivalry 
was also translated into clerical in-fighting within the Hizb'allah. Although 
efforts to obstruct the release of Western hostages by the Iranian revolu­
tionist factions were designed to undermine more moderate Iranian foreign 
policy towards the West, this phase revealed that efforts to delay any re­
leases by Hizb'allah were also motivated by its preoccupation towards re­
adjustment of its position within the Lebanese civil war and internal rivalry 
within the movement over its present and future direction. As such, the 
Western hostages were not only abducted for causal motivations but also kept
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as insurance of its position within Lebanon and against retribution by 
Western governments.
While the January 1987 spate of kidnappings of Westerners was motivated 
by the arrest of leading Hizb'allah members in Europe as well as reflected 
clerical factionalism in Iran in the aftermath of the revelation of the US- 
Iranian arms-for-hostages deals, it also underlined Hizb'allah's escalatory 
efforts to confront IDF and SLA militarily in southern Lebanon and its compe- 
tion with Amal, supported by Syria, over the control of the Shi'a community 
and territory. The protracted Amal-Hizb'allah warfare between 1987 until 1989 
produced friction with Syria, as it threatened military intervention against 
the movement with the extension of its hegemony in Lebanon, which prevented 
the abduction of any further Westerners. While the Hizb'allah used the 
Western captives as leverage against Syria and the West, it increasingly 
concentrated on the expansion of its political and military influence and 
presence in southern Lebanon, especially after the death of Ayatollah 
Khumayyni and the conclusion of the Ta'if accord in 1989.
It was demonstrated that the devolution of Ayatollah Khumayyni's spi­
ritual and political authority, coupled with the ouster of the movement's 
staunchest allies within Iran's clerical hierarchy, led to a crisis within 
Hizb'allah's command leadership and increased clerical factionalism over the 
direction of the movement, especially as Iran downgraded its support while 
the movement felt increased pressure from Syria to release its hostages. 
Although the Hizb'allah, in co-operation with the Pasdaran, managed to ob­
struct the release of hostages, the movement's position was increasingly 
dependent on Iran's relationship with Syria and the hostage-issue became 
closely connected to its own survival in a post-militia phase of Lebanese 
politics under Syrian hegemony. Ultimately, the hostage-issue was used by the 
Hizb'allah to reach an agreement between Iran and Syria over its future in
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Lebanon, under which the movement was allowed to remain armed as an resis­
tance movement in return for the release of its foreign hostages within the 
framework of fulfillment of its own requirements as well as in alignment with 
Iranian and Syrian interests. It was demonstrated that the ascendancy of a 
new Secretary-General of the movement, which led to both the comprehensive 
conclusion of the Western hostage-crisis under UN-auspices in 1991 as well 
as its participation in the 1992 Lebanese parliamentary elections, underlined 
that ultimately the political necessity of close affiliation with Iran's 
official leadership for its survival in Lebanon took precedence over any 
individual or collective agendas within the Hizb'allah as well as motivations 
by Iran's revolutionist faction. It was underlined that a reduction of the 
influence of the more Iranian clergy in Iranian politics paralleled a de­
motion in positions of its closest allies within the Hizb'allah.
The understanding of the influences exerted for the process of release 
of hostages depended not only on the impact of the relationship between 
Hizb'allah and Iran at various levels as well as the internal Lebanese en­
vironment but also on the movement's relationship with Syria, closely deter­
mined by the status of the Iranian-Syrian relations in the Lebanese, regional 
and international arena.
6.3 Findings of the Influence of Iranian-Syrian Relations Over Hizb'allah
The nature and dynamics of the triangular Hizb'allah-Iran-Syria rela­
tionship has been vital in order to discern the influences and mechanisms 
exerted by Iran and Syria, both individually and collectively, over the pro­
cess of abduction and, more importantly, releases of foreign hostages by the 
Hizb'allah. It was shown that this process was subordinate to continuous 
changing relationship and alliance between Iran and Syria over a decade, 
itself subjected to either confluence or conflict in their own individual 
political and economic agendas in the Middle East affected by a wide variety
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of internal Lebanese, regional, and international events. In particular, the 
Iranian-Syrian relationship was shown to experience serious tension in con­
junction with shifting political and economic conditions in the region, espe­
cially marked by irreconcilable differences with respect to their interests 
and aspirations over the future of Lebanon. Apart from underlining their 
contradictory political ideologies, the larger problems between the two 
states were also superimposed on the ground in Lebanon over Hizb'allah acti­
vity. It was argued that the way in which the Iranian-Syrian relationship 
affected the position and activity of the movement in Lebanon fundamentally 
shaped the application of Western crisis management techniques with the 
opportunities and constraints in their application in accordance with tension 
and co-ordination in the alliance between Iran and Syria over Hizb'allah 
activity, especially as these two states acted as facilitators in all nego­
tiations for the release of hostages.
It was clearly demonstrated that any friction or co-operation in the 
political and economic relationship between Iran and Syria affected all 
aspects of Hizb'allah activity in Lebanon. While both Iran and Syria were 
adept at exploiting the relationship for their own benefit in Lebanon or 
elsewhere in the region, their close collusion remained uniform in Lebanon 
in the confrontation against common foreign enemies, coupled with complete 
obedience by the Hizb'allah to Iranian wishes and orders. However, after the 
success of Hizb'allah's activity in ridding Lebanon of foreign influence, the 
incompatible aims by Iran, seeking the establishment of an Islamic republic 
on Iranian lines, and by Syria, seeking consolidation of its hegemony over 
Lebanese affairs, became visible through intense competion by their clients, 
Amal and Hizb'allah, over the hearts and minds of the Shi'ite community. The 
underlying friction between Iranian and Syrian attempts to seek political and 
military dominance in Lebanon, as manifest through Amal-Hizb'allah warfare,
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was exacerbated by other difficulties in their alliance both internal and 
external to Lebanon. Specifically, the underlying economic bond between 
Syria and Iran, especially Syrian dependence on Iranian oil supplies, demon­
strated several rifts over Syrian refusals to settle out-standing debts over 
oil payments to Iran between 1986 and 1988 and over subsequent Syrian efforts 
to lessen its economic dependency on Iran through internal Syrian oil produc­
tion. While Syria exploited the economic disputes with Iran to its own advan­
tage, it was demonstrated that other differences over Lebanon stemmed from 
the incompatibility between Syrian attempts to consolidate its control over 
Lebanon while seeking a political and economic rapprochement with Western 
governments after accusations of Syrian involvement in terrorism, and Iranian 
exploitation of Hizb'allah's abductions in the pursuit of specific foreign 
policy objectives and in the expansion of the movement at the expense of 
Amal,
Both Syria and Iran have shown an interest to defuse any serious con­
flict in Lebanon in order to preserve their relationship. However, 
Hizb'allah’s pursuit of a greater independent line from Iran, in the after- 
math of clerical factionalism in late 1986, compounded the problems in any 
attempts to make the movement answerable to either Iran or Syria for both 
the control over and the limitation of its activities. Although Syria avoided 
a complete crackdown on the Iranian proxy, whenever the Hizb'allah seriously 
challenged Syrian authority, the Syrian regime moved to exercise control over 
the activity of the Hizb'allah through a blockade of the transfer of Iranian 
Pasdaran in the Biq'a area and control of movement of the Hizb'allah in the 
Biq'a and Beirut areas. However, the underlying factor for any Syrian re­
straint in the elimination of the military and political presence of the 
Hizb'allah was based on its nonexpendable relationship with Iran. It was 
clearly shown that neither Syria nor Iran have been willing to sacrifice
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their alliance on account of any Hizb'allah activity, rather both regimes
have been forced to exercise restraint in their relations with Hizb’allah at
various times as to not offend each other. When Hizb'allah activity was
harmful to the Iranian-Syrian alliance, as evident by Amal-Hizb'allah armed
clashes and certain hostage-taking incidents, both Iran and Syria acted in 
concert to enforce agreements between their two proxies as well as to place
limitations on the abduction of foreigners. However, the Iranian-Syrian
alliance experienced particular problems in conjunction with the projection
of Iranian clerical factionalism onto the Hizb'allah command leadership in
attempts by Iran and Syria to use extraction from the hostage-crisis as an
instrument in the foreign policy arena in their dealings with Western
governments.
It was demonstrated that the support for the Hizb'allah from Iran and, 
to a lesser extent acceptance by Syria, changed concurrently with the changes 
in the Iranian leadership, following the death of Ayatollah Khumayyni, and 
with Syrian efforts to consolidate its control over a post civil-war Lebanon 
with the Ta'if agreement in 1989. While the defeat of the revolutionist fac­
tion in control over the political authority in Iran translated into dimini­
shed possibility for a radical leadership of the Hizb'allah to be able to 
confront Syrian efforts to establish political and military hegemony in 
Lebanon, it also became clear that Syrian designs within Lebanese territory 
took precedence over any official Iranian interests. Syrian concessions to 
Hizb’allah and Iran, in the form of allowing the movement to remain armed and 
for the continued presence of the Pasdaran contingent on Lebanese territory, 
meant that the movement was forced to submit to a reorientation in activity 
in alignment with Syrian interests in order to survive within Lebanon's post- 
civil war environment.
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6.4 Conclusion
In a larger context, the unravelling of these complex mechanisms of the 
Hizb’allah-Iranian-Syrian relationship that governed the movement's hostage- 
taking activity have been essential in providing answers to why the Western 
hostage-crisis occured and what mechanisms governed the initiation and reso­
lution of these hostage-incidents. However, it is also essential to address 
the reasons why the hostage-crisis ultimately became resolvable; what the 
hostage-crisis achieved for the Hizb'allah, for the Iranian regime, as well 
as for the Lebanese Shi'a community; and, ultimately, what the future course 
is for the Hizb'allah, especially whether its transformation over a decade 
from a revolutionary movement to a political party has meant the abandonement 
of political violence as a principal means to achieve its pan-Islamic goals.
While the abduction of foreigners by the Hizb'allah almost always con­
verged with the interests of Iran and, to a lesser extent, Syria, the process 
of releasing Western hostages became a source of frequent disagreement within 
the Hizb'allah movement itself and in its relationship with Iran and Syria 
as well as a source of constant friction in the Iranian-Syrian alliance. The 
complete closure of the Western hostage-file in 1991, under the auspices of 
the United Nations, was explained by many analysts as a result of the fact 
that Western hostages had outlived their usefulness to Hizb'allah, Iran, and 
Syria. However, the breakthrough in the comprehensive release of Western 
hostages was not merely a way to resolve an issue which had become a liabi­
lity question for those involved but rather the combined result of the dyna­
mics at work of the Hizb'allah-Iranian-Syrian relationship, which had been 
profoundly influenced by a confluence of regional and international events. 
Apart from the profound changes and influences in the Middle East, following 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait which facilitated the release of the 15 al-Da'wa 
prisoners, Hizb'allah's responsiveness to close the hostage-file was based
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on its own threatened position in a post-civil war Lebanon and a convergence 
of interests with Iran, who needed to resolve the hostage-issue in order to 
rehabilitate itself economically and politically with the West, and Syria, 
who had lost its traditional support from the Soviet Union when it had an 
opportunity to expand its influence over Lebanon and participate in regional 
political processes. As the Western hostages constituted an asset for the
Hizb'allah in its relations with Iran and Syria, the movement agreed to re­
lease the hostages as a quid pro quo for Syrian guarantees that the movement 
was permitted to remain armed, when all other militias were disarmed, in 
order to confront Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. Syrian aquiescence 
to Hizb'allah's armed struggle also served its interests in both pressuring 
Israel in the Arab-Israeli peace talks as well as waging a proxy war against 
Israel which ensured Syrian deniability. Hizb'allah's own initiative of in­
viting the UN Secretary-General as the mediator in the hostage-release pro­
cess highlighted the movement's continued close consideration for Iranian 
interests, most notably as a means to pursue Iran's outstanding disputes with 
Iraq under UN Resolution 598. The denounement of the Western hostage-crisis 
in 1991 demonstrated not only the importance of understanding the mechanics 
of the Hizb'allah-Iranian-Syrian relationship but also that they were all 
extremely adept at using the hostage-crisis to their own advantage.
While the Hizb'allah and Iran have demonstrated skillful adaptation to 
changes in their environment, they have equally been skilled at exploiting 
the hostage-issue to extract political and economic concessions. However, 
what did the hostage-crisis actually achieve for the Hizb'allah, and Iran, 
as well as the Lebanese Shi'a community? Hizb'allah's practise of hostage- 
taking has meant different levels of achievement for the organisation itself, 
for varying factions within Iran's clerical establishment and for the 
Lebanese Shi'a community as a whole. For the Hizb'allah movement itself, the
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hostage-taking activity has served many important functions which reinforced 
the movement’s ideological and political raison d'etré, assisted in the ex­
pansion of its influence within the Lebanese Shi'ite community as well as 
defined and forged the movement's ties to Iran's clerical establishment. In 
many ways, Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity has been a total success for 
the movement in the advancement of its pan-Islamic cause on the strategic 
level and as an instrument to achieve practical and tactical goals for the 
organisation itself. As a practical instrument, the hostage-issue was used 
to accomplish specific organisational requirements for the movement, most 
notably to force the release of imprisoned Shi'ites in Europe and Israel 
while it shielded the movement from retaliation when waging its relentless 
armed warfare against foreign presence in Lebanon. In many ways, the hostage- 
issue also insured the movement against any serious confrontation with Syria 
and, in the end, translated into ensuring and consolidating the very survival 
of the movement in a post-civil war Lebanon. As the movement used the 
hostage-issue in close convergence with Iranian foreign policy interests vis- 
â-vis the West, its hostage-taking activity served to ensure continued close 
Iranian support and material assistance for the movement, which was essential 
for its expansion within the Shi'a community. In a wider sense, Hizb'allah's 
hostage-taking activity also served to enhance its revolutionary credence and 
image as the true defender of the Lebanese Shi'a community against the 
enemies of Islam, especially as it played an instrumental role in expelling 
foreign forces out of Lebanon and through its tireless armed campaign against 
Israel. In this revolutionary struggle, the Hizb'allah was very successful 
in achieving not only its practical goals but also in accomplishing a psycho­
logical athmosphere of fear in the West of the actual threat and capability 
of the movement which served to enhance the status of the movement within 
Lebanon and beyond as a major nemisis of Western governments.
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As the most successful example of Iran's export of the revolution, the 
Hizb'allah and its hostage-taking have also greatly benefitted Iran as an 
instrument of proxy in the foreign policy arena towards the West. While the 
Hizb'allah served a vital role for Iran providing it with a translator and 
conduit to spread Iran's Islamic revolutionary message to the Islamic masses 
of the Arab world and the possibility to actively participate in the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, the movement's hostage-taking activity provided Iran with 
a means to force the gradual improvement of economic and, to a lesser extent, 
political relations with Western governments. During the Iran-Iraq war, 
Hizb'allah's hostage-taking activity was used to pressure Western governments 
to concede military and economic assistance to Iran vital to its continued 
war efforts, as evidenced by the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal and by 
French financial concessions. While Hizb'allah's hostage-taking failed to 
influence the West's Middle East policies to any great extent, as any arms 
sales to Iran were equally matched by military and financial support to Iraq, 
the hostage-issue was increasingly used by various factions within Iran's 
clerical establishment for any array of political purposes. For the revolu­
tionist faction, which enjoyed close ties to Hizb'allah's leadership, the 
movement's hostage-taking activity was used as an instrument to sabotage 
pragmatic moves by the official Iranian leadership towards the West by 
blocking the release of hostages. The increasing difficulty for Iran's offi­
cial leadership to control the movement to release Western hostages has had 
serious consequences for Iran in accordance with its need to rehabilitate its 
war-ravaged economy through improved relations with the West. This often 
served to enhance the position of the radical clergy in Iran and to undermine 
any more moderate signs of rapproachement between Iran and the West.
For Lebanon's Shi'a community, the Hizb'allah and its hostage-taking 
activity have served to propel a traditionally impoverished and passive
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community into political action and militancy within Lebanon’s civil war and 
at the forefront of Lebanese politics. While Hizb'allah activity served to 
consolidate Iran's material assistance to the movement, its rapid transfor­
mation from a rag-tag militia into a tightly organised movement with an 
impressive military and extensive social services programme for the Shi'a 
community meant that the Hizb'allah positioned itself as a true political, 
ideological, and economic defender of the Shi'a community, filling the vacuum 
in place of the scant protection and assistance provided by the Lebanese 
government and other militias. In this process, Hizb'allah's hostage-taking 
activity ensured financial backing from Iran, as it suited the patron’s inte­
rests, which it used for the expansion of the movement's popularity and in­
fluence over the Shi'a community through a skillful combination of material 
inducement and ideological indoctrination. While Hizb'allah's terrorism 
stereotyped the image of Lebanon's Shi'ites as religious fanatics bent on 
martyrdom in the Western world, the profound role and service of the 
Hizb'allah movement, fighting and buying its way into the hearts and minds 
of the Shi'ite community, far outweighed the consequences of any non-Islamic 
moral constraints imposed by Western public opinion. Apart from the fact that 
Hizb'allah veiled its justifications of violent activity solely to Muslim 
believers and according to Islamic law, the movement also provided the dis­
possessed Shi'ite community within a lawless civil war environment with a 
divine Islamic purpose and mission, which transformed from revolutionary 
struggle to a political vechicle aimed at addressing Shi'ite grievances and 
enhance its wider agenda in Lebanon.
The transformation of the Hizb'allah from a revolutionary movement to 
a political party in Lebanon's post-civil war environment raises the question 
whether the movement has abandoned the use of political violence, especially 
hostage-taking, to achieve its pan-Islamic goals. While the Hizb'allah has
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demonstrated a mastery of political violence in its quest for enhancement of 
its position and agenda within Lebanon and beyond, the movement also demon­
strated it was very susceptible of, and adaptable to, changes within its own 
environment. However, every sign indicates that it has retained the same 
degree of its pan-Islamic zeal and militancy. While Hizb'allah's reorienta­
tion in activity, substituting hostage-taking for participation within the 
political process, occured to suit the realities of a post-civil war Lebanon, 
the movement has also escalated its committment and struggle to confront 
Israel and achieve its pan-Islamic goal of liberating Jerusalem both within 
Lebanon and beyond. The intensification of the movement's attacks against 
Israel in southern Lebanon can be attributed to efforts to sabotage any pro­
spect for any Arab-Israeli peace, which would de facto jeopardize its very 
existence and its accomplishments hitherto within Lebanon. While the 
Hizb'allah has increased its Islamic extremism by continuing its guerilla 
attacks against Israel in southern Lebanon, the movement also launched a new 
form of terrorism, car-bomb attacks, specifically aimed against Israeli high- 
profile targets outside the region since March 1992, most notably in South 
America and in Europe, both in revenge for Israeli actions against the 
Hizb'allah as well as to sabotage any emerging signs of Arab-Israeli peace. 
Although the Hizb'allah discovered that it can subvert the system from within 
through its participation within Lebanese electoral politics, its vanguard 
position of Islamic extremism with its messianic aspirations for the esta­
blishment of an Islamic republic in Lebanon and the eradication of Israel, 
means that the movement for the moment will intensify its concentration of 
attacks against Israel through bombs to avert any emerging Arab-Israeli 
rapproachement rather than on hostage-taking against the West. Ultimately, 
the degree to which the movement's position is threatened, coupled with the 
ability of Iran to sustain its revolutionary pan-Islamic zeal at home and
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abroad, will determine the means and levels of political violence employed
by the Hizb'allah in the future. This case-study laid the foundation for
understanding and predicting these mechanisms which governed Hizb'allah's
employment of terrorism in the past and for the future.
6.5 Western Responses to the Hostage Crisis in Lebanon: Effectiveness of Crisis Management Techniques
In view of the complexity of the preceding case-study of the Hizb'allah 
and its interaction with Iran and Syria, the balance-sheet for Western res­
ponses to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon has not surprisingly reinforced the 
fact that these states have experienced difficulty in not only adapting to 
the crisis environment itself but also in balancing their individual respon­
sibility towards their citizens taken hostage abroad with their requirements 
to safeguard the maintanence of other collective national interests. This 
recognition that the hostage-crisis in Lebanon constituted a unique form of 
foreign policy crisis for Western governments, in which the Western policy 
of no-negotiations and no-concessions severely restricted the maneuverability 
in the selection of response to the hostage-crisis, led to the employment of 
traditional principles and techniques of crisis management as a useful 
instrument for the evaluation of the crisis itself as well as a guideline in 
order to cope and manage this complex form of crisis more effectively and 
successfully.
The highly context-dependent nature of crisis management necessitated 
the deliniation of seven political and operational requirements for its 
effective application to terrorist crisis situations, especially within the 
framework of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon. An underlying common feature of 
these crisis-management requirements was close considerations of the crisis- 
environment, most notably as it determined the effectiveness in the selec­
tion, direction, and timing of crisis management techniques. The underlying
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criteria for the successful application of crisis management was determined 
to be not only close adherence to the seven essential requirements of effec­
tive crisis management balanced against the inherent constraints for Western 
governments in the conduct of domestic and foreign policy but also the per­
formance of their approach in the hostage-crisis based on the previous case- 
study on the dynamics of the relationship at work between Hizb'allah, Iran, 
and Syria.
The evaluation of Western government performance in accordance to the 
employment of specific crisis mangement techniques in alignment with opportu­
nities and constraints in the crisis environment cannot be adequately judged 
solely on the ability by these states to achieve the rapid release of its 
citizens from captivity. As all three Western governments eventually achieved 
the release of their hostages in Lebanon, a complete balance-sheet of Western 
response must also account for the gains and losses incurred individually and 
collectively by the behaviour of these governments in their efforts to ex­
tract their citizens from captivity. As a consequence, what are the lessons 
and insights from Western responses, using crisis management techniques, to 
the hostage-crisis in Lebanon? What is the balance-sheet of Western responses 
in terms of gains and losses in the selection of their individual and collec­
tive approach to the hostage-crisis? And finally, what are the general 
lessons of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon for Western governments and for the 
international system as a whole?
A main problem for the inconsistency between the West's declaratory po­
licy of not negotiating or conceeding to any demands and the actual conduct 
by these governments in dealing with the hostage-crisis in Lebanon can be ex­
plained by the often incompatible nature of firmly held counterterrorism 
principles as an integral component of foreign policy in the Middle East to­
wards Iran and Syria, who exercise any degree of control over the Hizb'allah
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movement. The fact that Iran and Syria acted as intermediaries for Western 
governments in dealing with the Hizb'allah posed problems in upholding a non- 
flexible no-concessions policy as these states benefitted indirectly from 
concessions made to influence the movement despite their own complicity in 
some of these terrorist acts. While most Iranian and Syrian demands of con­
cessions for any intercession with the Lebanese movement focused on specific
outstanding disputes in the foreign policy behaviour by Western governments 
towards these states, it was shown that any deviation from the principles of 
a no-concessions policy was dependent on the conduct of conciliatory foreign 
policy by Western states towards Iran or Syria in alignment with shifts in 
the regional environment creating opportunities and constraints in the 
pursuit of wider foreign policy interests. In turn, this had to be balanced 
against the desire by Western governments to extract its citizens from cap­
tivity, closely influenced by domestic political pressures and its unwilling­
ness to maintain a non-conciliatory position at the expense of the pursuit 
of wider foreign policy opportunities in the region. The balance-sheet for 
the American, British, and French efforts to limit their political objectives 
towards the hostage-crisis and their means employed in pursuit of those ob­
jectives demonstrated not only the urgency of the crisis on the political 
agenda and the expected ability by these states to secure the release of its 
citizens from captivity but also the way in which these governments adapted 
to the crisis environment through the selection and employment of crisis 
management techniques.
The lessons from the US experience in responding to the hostage-crisis 
are multifold. Firstly, the American approach to the hostage-crisis has been 
a complete failure in terms of deviating from the principle of limited objec­
tives in the crisis and limited means in pursuit of these objectives. While 
the hostage-issue was elevated on the US political agenda, mainly as the
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result of its previous traumatic experience with the 1979 Iranian hostage- 
crisis, the problems for the US policymakers were exacerbated by its own 
creation of unrealistic expectations of what could be achieved given the 
restrictions imposed by the crisis environment. Despite the fact that the 
Lebanese hostage-crisis differed fundementally from the previous Iranian 
hostage-situation, the US government approached the Lebanese hostage-crisis 
from the same vantage point, as any US manoeuverability was curtailed by its 
non-flexible public policy of no-negotiations and no-consessions while it 
assumed a lead-role in the West's containment of Iran, which US policymakers 
viewed as the main culprit behind these acts of terrorism. Contrary to 
limited political objectives in the hostage-crisis, the US government assured 
its domestic constituency of the rapid release of its citizens from captivity 
without any negotiation with, or concessions to, either Iran or Hizb'allah, 
a policy pursued only through the means of coercion and force. A major 
problem with this approach was that the release of American hostages could 
not be achieved through the reliance of force and coercion, especially as 
this only strengthened the militancy and popularity of the movement itself 
and the strength of Iranian radical clergy within Iran's official leadership.
Secondly, the US response to the hostage-crisis demonstrated a failure 
to adequately understand the dynamics and mechanisms of the hostage-crisis 
and the configuration between the Hizb'allah, Iran, and Syria, which ultima­
tely governed the release of American citizens from captivity. This was re­
vealed by its reliance of force and coercion as the main crisis management 
technique employed against the Hizb'allah as well as Iran and, more impor­
tantly, in the flawed selection of communication channels with the adversa­
ries. This was most clearly demonstrated by the behaviour of certain policy­
makers behind the clandestine US-Iranian arms-for-hostages initiative, which 
attempted to use the hostage-issue to open a new strategic relationship with
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Iran. This flawed uni-dimensional approach, which demonstrated both a lacking 
knowledge of the configuration of the Hizb’allah-Iranian relationship and the 
psychology behind Iranian moves, led not only to the most serious crisis for 
the political survival of the Reagan administration and the credibility of 
its counter-terrorism posture among its allies but also set back any pros­
pects for a US-Iranian rapproachement for many years. It also totally under­
mined any propects for progress on the US hostage-front, as the issue was 
devalued immediately after the revelation of the Iran-Contra affair in 
President Reagan's battle for political survival at home. Although his pre­
sidential successor treated the hostage-issue with extreme caution, the fai­
lure of US reliance on military force to coerce the Hizb'allah and Iran, 
coupled with the disarray of channels pursued in the crisis, revealed the 
continued inability of US leaders to recogize ways to limit the hostage- 
issue on the political agenda and of their own limited maneuverability in 
responding as well as resolving the hostage-crisis. However, any criticism 
of the way in which the US administration tackled the hostage-issue in the 
period following the revelation of the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deals 
must also recognize that any maneuverability or avenues for negotiation or 
resolution of the American hostage-crisis in Lebanon were completely closed, 
especially given the public scrutiny of any US moves which even slightly 
resembled concessions and given the fervent anti-US hostility displayed by 
both Iran and the Hizb'allah. It was demonstrated throughout the case-study 
that limited intelligence on the behaviour of the Hizb'allah and its allies 
does not translate into limited knowledge of how the movement operates and 
interacts with Iran and Syria, rather it can be determined by examining the 
boundaries of the dynamics governing this complex triangular relationship, 
yielding opportunities and constraints in the crisis environment which should 
serve as the basis for the selection of crisis management techniques and the
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evaluation of their likely effect in eliciting a favourable response from 
either Iran or Hizb'allah. A main problem with the US response was this dis­
regard for the opportunities and constraints in the fluctuating relationship 
between Syria and Iran as well as the political environment within Lebanon 
in which the Hizb'allah operates and exists. This became clear by the failure 
to rely on either Iran or Syria as the only channel in negotiations over 
hostages without reference to their individual ability to exert its influence 
over the movement in accordance with shifts in their ties to Hizb'allah's 
command leadership between 1987-1991 and, more importantly, to the status of 
the Iranian-Syrian relationship over time, as evidently displayed by the 
increased friction between 1986 and 1988,
Thirdly, the US response to the hostage-crisis also demonstrated that 
the release of Americans from captivity could only be achieved in exchange 
for US direct or indirect concessions to Iran and, to a lesser extent, Syria. 
While it was demonstrated that a causal relationship existed between 
Hizb'allah's abduction of American citizens and internal as well as external 
Lebanese events, it was also clear that their release were contingent on the 
removal of underlying points of friction in the US-Iranian relationship, most 
notably the US return of Iranian frozen assets and a change in US foreign 
policy towards the region, and in the wider US-Syrian relationship, espe­
cially US willingness to recognize Syrian hegemony over Lebanon, Despite 
the fact that the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal in real terms only achie­
ved a temporary cessation in the abduction of Americans, as more hostages 
were taken to replace those released, Hizb'allah's willingness to release its 
hostages seemed to occur in conjunction with US conciliatory measures, espe­
cially with the release of Iranian assets, and, more importantly, with the 
changes in the regional environment which made the refusal to release US 
hostages more of a liability than an asset for Iran and Hizb'allah in the
364
advancement of their own agendas. This has meant that the fate of the US 
hostages was more bound by US flexibility in resolving its foreign policy 
disputes with Iran rather than through non-conciliatory positions and re­
liance on coercion. It was also underlined that Syria's ability to pressure 
the release of the US hostages remained limited and governed by its wider 
relationship with Iran. However, any Syrian pressure on Hizb'allah to release 
US hostages increased with the American approval of the Ta'if agreement which 
confered recognition of Syria's role over Lebanese affairs.
Fourthly, the US response to the hostage-crisis showed also that the 
existing crisis management machinery remains unable to shield US policymakers 
from the effects exerted by the mass media as they continue to exacerbate the 
pressures of any type of response. It was argued that a major effort must be 
made by US policymakers to educate the mass media and the public of the 
complex dynamics which governs the Lebanese hostage-crisis and any subsequent 
response by the US government. Furthermore, it is important to discuss pub­
licly the consequences of any US government response not only to highlight 
the limitations imposed by the crisis environment in securing the release of 
US hostages but also to safeguard broad support for any measures at home and 
abroad among allies. The inability of US policymakers to conduct its dealings 
over the hostage-crisis in the open contributed to the need for initiating 
clandestine operations to meet the demands of public expectations and to 
resort to short-term coercive measures rather than a more calculated long­
term foreign policy approach in the region.
The lessons of the French experience in dealing with the hostage-crisis 
have been unique to the nature of political rivalries within France's cohabi­
tation period between 1986 and 1988 as well as to its individualistic style 
and manner in dealing with Middle East terrorism in the past. Firstly, the 
French political objectives in the hostage-crisis were contingent on the
365
political rivalry between Mitterrand and Chirac for political expediency in 
the battle for the French presidency, whether the delay or immediate release 
of French hostages benefitted the political agenda of respective candidate, 
in the 1986/1988 national elections. This political rivalry between the two 
candidates was also manifest through institutional rivalry between specific 
French ministries in some way in charge of issues connected with the hostage- 
crisis. It was determined that the achievement of the individual political 
objectives in the hostage-crisis and the means employed in pursuit of these 
were directly dependent on the strategy of the two political candidates in 
negotiations with Hizb'allah, Iran, and Syria. This strategy was directly 
manifest through the dispatch of individual emissaries to conduct negotia­
tions directly with the Hizb'allah and with either Iran or Syria. Although 
the French political and institutional rivalry over the hostage-issue consti­
tuted an asset in its efforts to limit Iranian retribution over French 
support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, through the process of individual 
offers to grant concessions in outstanding disputes with Iran, it also became 
a liability as Iran and the Hizb'allah were able to use this political rival­
ry to achieve maximum concessions to their own advantage and as the diffi­
culties in meeting already agreed concessions to Iran continued long after 
the release of the last French hostage.
Secondly, the French response to the hostage-crisis demonstrated not 
only a very sharp understanding of the mechanisms that governed the behaviour 
of the Hizb'allah, Iran, and Syria but also adept ability to utilize the 
dynamics of the crisis environment for its own advantage in securing the 
rapid release of French hostages prior to the May 1988 elections. It is 
beyond doubt that the degree to which the French government was able to ex­
ploit this configuration for the advancement of foreign policy in the region 
and to secure the release of French hostages was directly related to the
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nature of the analomy of "cohabitation" in the French political system. While 
the success of the French approach vas related to the unique exploitation of 
the crisis environment, which translated into the employment of unofficial 
intermediaries in direct contact with the Hizb'allah rather than through 
formal and highlevel contacts with Iran or Syria, it can also be attributed 
to the fact that the French pursued its own policy in the Middle East without 
any close consideration of its allies or any substantial pressure from the 
domestic media. The former was clear by the use of individual emissaries with 
close ties to either Iran or Syria, who benefitted from the tension and 
rivalry in the wider Iranian-Syrian relationship and on the ground in Lebanon 
between 1986 and 1988. The latter was demonstrated by the French ability and 
willingness to grant major concessions while withstanding criticism from its 
allies and the mass media, a task assisted by the subordination of the judi­
ciary to political expediency.
Thirdly, the French handling of the hostage-issue also showed the value 
of using crisis management techniques through a mixture of accomodation and 
coercion. Although French reluctance to impose sanctions on Iran and Syria 
reflected the underlying political strategy to the hostage-crisis and the 
uniqueness of its foreign policy in the region, any tension in the French- 
Iranian relationship was equally manifest of, and exploited by, the French 
political rivalry. However, the French approach underlined the advantages of 
a mixture of coercion and accomodation in relations with Iran and Syria 
rather than strict reliance on punishment through the rupture of diplomatic 
ties or through sanctions, as exemplified by the US and British approach. The 
latter approach only served to contribute to limiting the options available 
for Western governments.
The lessons of the British response to the hostage-crisis are related 
to its uncompromising policy of refusal to conduct any negotiations with the
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Hizb'allah and Iran as well as Syria or concede to any demands, coupled with 
its successful ability to limit the hostage-issue on the political agenda. 
Firstly, the British government managed to successfully subordinate and limit 
its political objectives by relegating the issue of the British hostages on 
the foreign policy agenda. This devaluation of the British hostage-issue re­
flected not only its previous experience in countering terrorism at home and 
abroad, which was reinforced by a public acceptability of a hardline policy, 
but also a wider recognition that the hostage-issue was bound by wider con­
straints of the Middle East environment, most notably restricted initially 
by the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages debacle and later by the Rushdie-affair. 
The adamant policy by the British government that there would be no deals 
with terrorists and no ransom paid under any guise from the outset of the 
hostage-crisis, reinforced by public support, contributed to consistency 
and effectiveness in subordinating the hostage-issue on the political agenda. 
A contributing factor to this success was the relatively limited number of 
British citizens in captivity compared to the American and French hostage- 
problem, It was also recognized that the British hostage-takings occured in 
conjunction with major events in the Middle East, many which affected the 
hostage-issue, which directly led to a limited degree of manoeuverability for 
the British government in employing crisis management techniques.
Secondly, the British response to the hostage-crisis showed also limited 
comprehension of the mechanisms that governed any release of British hos­
tages. Apart from the fact that the British government faced insuperable ob­
stacles in the Middle East which hampered any response to the hostage-crisis, 
the limited efforts of using indirect negotiation channels and its almost 
permanent imposition of diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran and 
Syria demonstrated clearly that its behaviour was not attuned to the reali­
ties of the crisis environment. This was clearly evident by its individual
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insistence of maintaining sanctions against Syria long after its allies re­
moved them while it also concentrated on using Iran as the only limited 
vechicle towards the resolution of the British hostage-crisis. While it may 
be argued that Britain and its policy towards the hostage-crisis could afford 
to neglect a close understanding of the crisis dynamics, most notably as it 
refused to alter its counterterrorism policy and was faced with huge obstac­
les in the conduct of foreign policy towards the Middle East, it also created 
problems for the British government when faced with increasing criticism at 
home after the release of other hostages of different nationality and for 
unnecessarily prolonging the agony of its citizens in captivity due to its 
inflexible and principled stand against terrorism. Despite the fact that the 
mass media increasingly raised the profile of the hostages on the political 
agenda, the British government never faced a serious problem in limiting the 
effects of publicity critical of its approach and the way it meet its respon­
sibility towards securing the release of its citizens.
These individual lessons of the American, French, and British responses 
to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon have shown that crisis management can be 
used as an instrument to better understand why Western governments have expe­
rienced difficulty or success in efforts to secure the release of their citi­
zens from captivity. More importantly, the context-dependent nature of crisis 
management and its application to the dynamics of the crisis environment made 
it possible to bridge the diversity of circumstances surrounding the hostage- 
crisis for each individual Western government with a means to evaluate the 
effectiveness of their individual response. However, adaptability to the 
crisis-environment constitutes only a facet of judging the effectiveness of 
Western government response to the hostage-crisis as it cannot only be mea­
sured by the speed of which the freedom of Western hostages was secured. It 
also requires the provision of a balance-sheet of Western responses in terms
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of gains ' and losses in the selection of their individual and collective 
approach to the hostage-crisis.
The previous lessons of the Western hostage-crisis demonstrated the 
difficulty for Western states in adapting crisis management techniques to the 
crisis environment while also balancing their individual responsibility to­
wards their citizens taken hostage abroad with their requirements to safe­
guard the maintenance of other collective national interests. How serious 
were the setbacks and reverberations of Western responses to the hostage- 
crisis both individually and collectively, and what was ultimately lost and 
gained in this process?
The overall American response to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon clearly 
demonstrated its continued vulnerability to this form of terrorism and that 
it was slow in learning from previous lessons and in adapting to the crisis 
environment. The US policymakers' preoccupation with the safety and well­
being of American hostages in Lebanon, elevated to the status of a major 
national security concern in response to the grave damages caused by the 
Hizb'allah's suicide- and abduction campaigns as well as to its own public’s 
fear and alarm of Iranian-inspired Shi'ite terrorism, contributed to the 
disastrous US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal which had serious consequences 
not only for its domestic credibility but also in its inability to conduct 
foreign policy in the Middle East and justify its actions to its allies. The 
misperception of the dynamics of the crisis situation and its own ability to 
resolve the crisis quickly and with coercion which led to the Iran-Contra 
affair contributed to one of the most serious crises in constitutional US 
government in recent history. It also totally undermined the credibility of 
the US-lead effort in counterterrorism and cooperation among its allies, 
whose steadfastness in refusing to concede to terrorist demands seriously 
damaged its own and its allies prospects of securing the release of its
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citizens from captivity. US willingness to engage in concessions with Iran 
and the Hizb'allah not only signalled to its adversaries that hostage-taking 
was an extremely useful instrument in extracting political and financial 
concessions from the West but also undermined any credibility of US criticism 
of other states' deviation from the principles of no-negotiation and no­
concession to terrorists and their demands. It also exacerbated the problems
for the US in the conduct of its foreign policy in the Middle East, most 
notably in the Iran-Iraq war and its involvement in Lebanon, as the hostage- 
issue became a pressure-point used by Iran for its own regional interests 
and designs. As the political fall-out reverberated within the US and among 
its allies for a very long time, the restricted manoeuverability of any US 
response led to the overreliance on the use of force to respond to the 
hostage-crisis. Apart from the limited utility of the US military option 
given the intelligence constraints in identifying responsible Hizb'allah in­
dividuals and bases within a civil war environment and the political con­
straints in avoiding a wider confrontation with either Iran and Syria, it 
also undermined the process of negotiation by other Western states as 
coercion strengthened the militancy of the movement and the position of the 
more radicial Iranian leaders within Iran's clerical establishment. The 
legacy of the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal restricted the options avai­
lable for US policymakers, which devalued the hostage-issue from a prominent 
position on the political agenda and placed its resolution in the fate of 
the underlying shifting currents of Middle East politics.
The overall French response to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon showed that 
it firmly understood the dynamics of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon and the 
requirements for successfully conducting business in the Middle East, most 
notably with Iran and Syria. While the inner dynamics of the French response 
were bound by internal political rivalry between Chirac and Mitterand, the
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salience of the hostage-issue was clearly felt as an electoral issue in 1986 
and 1988 as well as with an increase in retaliatory Iranian measure against 
French policy in the Middle East. While the French political rivalry skill­
fully dictated the fate of its hostages in Lebanon and exploited the crisis 
dynamics through complex negotiations, the reverberations of the French con­
duct of granting political and financial concessions to Iran and the release 
of imprisoned Hizb'allah members to the movement in Lebanon were largely felt 
abroad rather than at home. The French subordination of the judiciary to the 
political authorities through the release of suspected Hizb'allah members not 
only seriously impaired the success and collective will of the West's wider 
efforts to apprehend and prosecute terrorists but also gravely dented the 
reputation of French counterterrorism and cooperation with its allied agen­
cies. It also totally undermined any progress by the efforts of those Western 
states which continued to adhere to a no-negotiations and no-concessions 
policy out of principle. Unlike other Western states that refused or were 
slow to adapt to changing conditions, the French government managed to master 
the art of maneuvering between Iran, the Hizb'allah, and Syria. However, 
French willingness to readily concede to demands for political expediency for 
its domestic constituency and in the foreign arena had also a price. This was 
manifest with the bombing campaign in Paris which aimed to force the French 
government to give into the demands of Iran and the Hizb'allah. It must also 
be recognized that the consequences of French behaviour did not cease with 
the release of its last citizen from captivity, most notably as the diffi­
culty in fulfilling outstanding concessions to Iran created tension and fric­
tion in France's wider conduct of foreign policy in the Middle East over an 
extended period. This was clearly revealed by the anger displayed by Iran 
over the difficulty for, and unwillingness of, Mitterrand to fulfill promises 
made by his predecessor.
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The overall British response to the hostage-crisis managed successfully 
to minimize any damage to its reputation as the unsurpassed champion of hard­
line counterterrorist policy. While the British approach was unable to use 
the crisis dynamics to its own advantage in attempts to resolve the hostage-
crisis, it was clearly recognized that the British government faced insupe­
rable problems in the foreign policy arena beyond its power to control, most
notably as its options towards the hostage-issue were restricted by its 
adversarial relationship with both Iran and Syria as well as by the disclo­
sure of deals by its allies with the hostage-takers themselves. However, 
increased domestic political criticism focused on the applicability of this 
type of hardline counterterrorist policy in conjunction with the clandestine 
deals made by Britain's allies with the release of hostages with different 
nationalities. In particular, a major source of criticism focused on the per­
ceived limited efforts made by British officials in utilizing its contacts 
in the Middle East to explore possible avenues for securing the release of 
its citizens from captivity. Nothwithstanding the validity of this criticism, 
it raises the question whether negotiating or conceding to terrorist demands 
actually encourages or leads to further kidnappings. While the French and the 
British behaviour towards the hostage-crisis provide evidence that this is 
not necessarily the case, it underlines the problem of applying firmly esta­
blished counterterrorism principles in a vacuum without consideration for the 
dynamics of the crisis environment. This is at the heart of the dilemma for 
Western governments in attempting to balance its individual responsibility 
towards its citizens while maintaining its overall national interests.
What are the general lessons of the hostage-crisis for Western govern­
ments and for the international system as a whole? Unlike any other previous 
studies of the hostage-crisis in Lebanon or the way in which Western states 
have response to it, this study has merged the dynamics of the crisis envi­
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ronment surrounding the hostage-incidents with the instruments and techniques 
of crisis mangement in order to more closely reconcile the underlying policy 
dilemma for Western governments and to improve the successfullness and effec­
tiveness of any response. While this case-study provided an indepth under­
standing of the mechanisms that governed the hostage-crisis in Lebanon, the 
employment of crisis management offered a uniform manner in which to judge 
the different individual Western responses. Although the Hizb'allah and its 
hostage-taking activity represented an isolated phenomenon of unparalleled 
sophistication in the use of terrorism for political purposes in the Middle 
East in the 1980's, which served to paralyze the capability of many Western 
governments to function in the domestic and foreign policy arena, the nature 
of the post-Cold war environment in the Middle East with the rise of militant 
Shi'ite movements and with the possibility of these groups abducting Western 
hostages within civil war environments necessitates this type of approach to 
both understand Islamic movements and their use of terrorism within a poli­
tical context but also to begin a move away from applying generalized 
counter-terrorism guidelines to context-specific problems.
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APFBNDIX I: OKGMjlSATKML OTÜCIÜRE OP HIZB’ALIM
Head of Politibureau
EXBOniYE SHORA
FinaDcial AffairsSocial AffairsMilitary
JudicialPoliticalIdeology
SPOKESMAN
MASS MEDIA
Electoral Body
HAMZATS & msguES
POKER
RESOURCESOMflTIïE
ISLAMIC RESISTANCE
fead of Executive Shaira
RECCNSTRUCTICN
CCMMTITEE
TECHNICAL ADMINISTRATIVE OCMMHTEE
CCNSULTATIVE COUNCIL
RBCRUriMENr and PRCFAfflNDA 
APPARATUS
JIHAD Ali-BIM'
(ffftjY REGRCNSMmCN ORGAN)
SECRBmRY-(3NERAL
andlEPUIY SEntETARY-GENERALSpecial Security %paratus(1) Central Security
(2) Preventative Security
(3) Overseas Security
RBŒKWAL ŒMMANDS
(1) Beirut & southern suburbs
(2) Biq'a area
(3) Southern Lebanon
* This organisational structure drew from various sources in the Arabic press and from interviews 
with Western government officials. In particular, this structure was adapted from: (1) A Nizar 
Hamzeh, "Lebanon's Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accomodation", Tliird World 
Quarterly, Vol.14, No.2 (1993): pp.327-28; and (2) The Lebanon Report, Vol.4, No.3 (1993): p.7.
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APPENDIX II
American, British, and French Hostages Held in Lebanon, 1982-92;
Date
Kidnapped:
Name/Nationality : Kidnapped Claimed By: Status:^
82/07/19 David Dodge [US]
84/02/10 Frank Regier [US]
84/02/15 Christian Joubert [Fr]
84/03/07 Jeremy Levin [US]
84/03/16 William Buckley [US]
84/05/08 Benjamin Weir [US]
84/08/29 Jonathan Wright [UK]
84/12/03 Peter Kilbum [US]
85/01/08 Lawrence Jenco [US]
85/03/14 Geoffrey Nash [UK]
85/03/15 Brian Levick [UK]
85/03/16 Terry Anderson [US]
85/03/22 Marcel Carton [Fr]
Marcel Fontaine [Fr] 
Danielle Perez [Fr] 
85/03/25 Alec Collett [UK]
85/05/22 Jean-Paul Kaufmann [Fr] 
Michel Seurat [Fr] 
85/05/27 Dennis Hill [UK]
85/05/28 David Jacobsen [US]
85/06/09 Thomas Sutherland [US]
86/02/? Marcel Coudari [Fr]
86/03/08 Jean-Louis Normandin [Fr] 
Phillipe Rochot [Fr]
Aurel Cornea [Fr]
Georges Hansen [Fr] 
86/03/28 Leigh Douglas [UK]
Phillip Padfield [UK] 
86/04/08 Michel Brian [Fr]
86/04/11 Brian Keenan [UK]
86/04/17 John McCarthy [UK]
86/05/07 Camille Sontag [Fr]
86/09/09 Frank Reed [US]
86/09/12 Joseph Cicippio [US]
86/09/28 Jean-Marc Sroussi [Fr]
86/10/21 Edward Austin Tracy [US]
Islamic Jihad
Islamic Jihad 
Islamic Jihad 
Islamic Jihad
Revolutionary Organisation of 
Socialist Muslims 
Revolutionary Commando Cells 
Islamic Jihad
Islamic Jihad - Khaibar Brigade 
Islamic Jihad - Khaibar Brigade 
Islamic Jihad
Islamic Jihad & Revolutionary Justice 
Organisation 
Islamic Jihad & LARF 
Islamic Jihad
Revolutionary Organisation of
Socialist Muslims
Islamic Jihad
Islamic Jihad
Islamic Jihad
Islamic Jihad
Islamic Jihad
Revolutionary Justice Organisation 
Revolutionary Justice Organisation 
Revolutionary Justice Organisation 
Revolutionary Justice Organisation 
Revolutionary Justice Organisation 
Arab Revolutionary Cells 
Arab Revolutionary Cells 
Siffine Islamic Organisation 
Organisation of Islamic Dawn 
Arab Commando Cells 
Revolutionary Justice Organisation 
Arab Revolutionary Cells - 
Omar Mukhtar Brigade 
Revolutionary Justice Organisation
Revolutionary Justice Organisation
Re:83/07/21 
Re:84/04/15 
Re:84/04/15 
Es:85/02/14 
D: 85/10/05 
Re:85/09/14
Es;84/09/16 
D: 86/04/17 
Re;86/07/26 
Re:85/03/27 
Re:85/03/30 
Re:91/12/05
Re.88/05/04 
Re:88/05/03 
Re:85/03/31
D: 86/04/23 
Re:88/05/04 
D: 86/03/05 
D: 85/05/29 
Re:86/11/02 
Re:91/11/18 
Re:86/11/11 
Re:87/ll/27 
Re:86/06/20 
Re:86/06/20 
Re:86/06/20 
D: 86/04/17 
D: 86/04/17 
Re:86/04/ll 
Re:90/09/25 
Re:91/08/08 
Re:86/11/10
Re:90/04/31 
Re:91/12/02 
Es:85/10/01 
Re:91/08/08
 ^The abbreviations indicate the following status: [re]: released; [d]: died in 
captivity either by execution or natural causes; [es]: escaped.
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87/01/13
87/01/20
87/01/24
87/06/17
88/02/17
89/05/12
Roger Auque [Fr]
Terry Waite [UK]
Jesse Turner [US]
Robert Polhill [US]
Alan Steen [US]
Charles Glass [US]
William R. Higgins [US] 
Jack Mann [UK]
Revolutionary Justice Organisation Re:87/11/27
Revolutionary Justice Organisation Re:91/11/18
Islamic Jihad for the Liberation
of Palestine Re:91/10/21
Islamic Jihad for the Liberation
of Palestine Re:90/04/22
Islamic Jihad for the Liberation
of Palestine Re:91/12/03
Organisation for the Defenseof Free People Es:87/08/18
Organisation of the Oppressed on Earth D: 89/02/17 
Armed Struggle Cells Re:91/09/24
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APPENDIX III: CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN LEBANON FOR THE HIZB'ALLAH
1958
After the Iraqi revolution, a number of leading religious scholars in Najaf (Iraq) form an underground 
political organisation, Jama'at al-'Uluma'fi Najaf al-Ashraf (the Association of Najaf 'uluma') in 
order to counter the threat of conmunism over the Shi'a religious coranunity. The main leader was 
Muliairmad Baqir al-Sadr, who served as the ideological moving force behind the Shi'a resurgence at the 
theological schools in Najaf. This organisation served as the direct antecedent to the formation of the Iraqi al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya which would later contribute to the establishment of the Lebanese al- 
Da'wa movement. Sheikh Fadlallah works closely with al-Sadr in advocating Shi'ite activian.
1964
Ruhallah al-Khcmayyni arrives in Najaf from exile where he joins the emerging circles of militant 
younger uluma. While al-Khumayyni's period in Najaf (1964-78) fostered his radical ideology and vision 
of Islamic order, he taught and forged close-knit personal relationships with a small number of 
radical uluma and students to whom he offered inspiration and ideological guidance. Almost all future 
Hizb'allah leaders came into contact with al-Khumayyni at Najaf where they received their theological 
education.
1966
Sheikh Fadlallah arrived in al-Nab'a, a slum district of northeastern Beirut, from Najaf where he 
established several religious and cultural institutions. His position was elevated from his work among 
the poor Shi'a community in al-Nab'a as well as for his teaching of Shi'ite activism to students at 
the Islamic Shari'i Institute.
1968/9
Tlie establishment of al-Da'wa al-Islamiya, a clandestine organisation composed of a secret network of 
Najaf clergy, came as a response to the Ba'ath regime's campaign aimed at suppressing the activities 
of the radical uluma and institutions in Najaf and Karbala. Muhairmad Baqer al-Sadr holds a meeting 
where he discuss the idea of a Shi'a revolution in Lebanon for the first time with a number of his 
younger and radical disciples.
1970
Shi'a unrest and violent confrontations between the Shi'a and the Ba'ath regime resulted in mass 
arrests and closures of religious institutions. It also led to mass deportations of foreign uluma and 
students. Many Lebanese clerics return to Lebanon, where they established a number of religious 
institutions in Beirut, Ba'albek and southern Lebanon in an attempt to replicate their own experience 
in Najaf for a new generation of Lebanese Slii'ite activists. These hawsats received ideological 
inspiration and guidance from Najaf as well as considerable financial support. Among the more 
important founders of these hawzats in Lebanon were Sheikh Muhammad Ismail al-Khaliq and Sheildi 
Muhairmad Yazbek. Parallel to this activity, other Najaf-educated clerics founded the Lebanese Islamic 
al-Da'wa. This provided newly arrived Najaf-graduates with an organizational framework. Hie Lebanese 
al-Da’wa concentrated on recruitment and indoctrination of young Shi'ites through cooperation with the 
Lebanese Union of Muslim Students, especially graduates from the Arab University of Beirut. This 
student organisation convenes under the leadership of Sheikh Fadlallah. He was .adopted as the 
spiritual leader of the Lebanese al-Da'wa.
1974
March 17: Imam Musa al-Sadr announced the creation of the Harakat al-Mahrumin (the Movement of the 
Disinherited), a mulitsecterian political action movonent aimed at a non-violent struggle against the
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Lebanese government for its failure to address social grievances and security needs.
1975
The outbreak of civil war in Lebanon. Harakat al-Mahrumin established an adjunct aimed militia, Amal, 
ostensibly to defend the Shi'a coommity and to fight Israeli incursions in southern Lebanon, as a 
first authentically armed Shi'a organisation in Lebanon.
1976
June: Sheikh Fadlallah was evicted from the al- Nab'a by the Christian militias of the Lebanese Front. 
This led to his more activist position as evident by his major political work, Islam and the Logic of 
Force, in which he advocates political force as a means to preserve and defend Islam against secular 
and non-Islaitdc movements.
1978
March: Israel invaded southern Lebanon which led to a massive exodus of Shi'ites from the South to 
Beirut. It also led to the transformation of Shi'a grievances into armed resistance which contributed 
to the resurgence of Amal in the active defense of the Shi'a community.
August 25: Imam lîusa al-Sadr disappearence during a visit to libya became an important and symbolic 
event to the Amal movement and the Shi'a community in Lebanon. It revived a near dormant Amal from 
marginalization to the forefront of Shi'ite activism. It also exposed Amal to internal rivalry over 
the leadership.
1979
The establishment of an Islamic Republic of Iran, following the overthrow of the Shah, served as a 
demonstration for the Shi'a comnunity in Lebanon of the possible achievments that a well-organized 
and mobilized Slii'a community could accomplish in the face of oppression and injustice.
1980
The Lebanese al-Da'wa is dissolved as an independent organisation. The inability of the organisation 
to mobilize the Shi'a community into political action led to the decision to use Amal as a vechicle 
to dissimenate revolutionary ideas through infiltration of former al-Da'wa members into Amal. Some of 
these members managed to rise through the ranks of Amal and pose a serious threat to Nabih Berri's 
leadership of the organisation.
1982
June 6: Israel invades Lebanon.
June 7: Colonel Sayyed Shirazi, the Iranian commander of the Islamic Army's Ground Forces, signs a 
military agreement with Syria which allows the deployment of a small Iranian Pasdaran contingent into 
Lebanon. An 800-man strong Pasdaran con-tingent, led by Mohsen Rafiqdust, is deployed into Ba'albek. 
It is later reinfor-ced by another 700 Pasdaran, dispersed among the villages in the Biq'a.
June 11: Three IDF soldiers, Zvi Feldman, Zachary Baumel, and Yehuda Katz, are listed missing-in- 
action, captured during a battle in the Sultan Yakoub of the Biq'a valley. The return of these 
soldiers become a core demand for Israel in any negotiations for the rele^e of any Shi'ite prisoners.
June 21: In Ba'albek, Husayn al-Musawi, deputy head and official spokesman of Amal, announce the 
creation of Islamic Amal when Nabiii Berri participates in the first session of the National Salvation
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Cocrinittee. Sheikh Ibrahim al-Aitdn, Amal's representative in Iran, criticize Nabih Berri and announces 
his split from Amal,
JIÛ.Y 4: Four Iranians are kidnapped by the Christian Phalange militia. They are: Ahmad Motevaselian, 
the Ba'albek commander of the Pasdaran contingent; Mohsen Musavi, the Iranian chargé d'affaires; 
Akhaven Kazem; and Moghadam Naghi Rastgtae. In response, Islamic Amal kidnap the first American 
citizen, David Dodge, two weeks later.
August 25: US Marines arrived in Lebanon, along with Italian and French military forces to evacuate 
PLD from Beirut. These troops withdraw on September 10.
September 16-18: Over 2,000 Palestinians are massacred by the Phalange militia in the Sabra and 
Shatila refugee camps in West Beirut.
September 29: US Marines return to Beirut with Italian and French military forces. Israeli military 
leaves Beirut.
Decenter 26: Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli is appointed "president of the Islamic Republic" in Ba'albek.
December 28: Tripartite discussions begin between Lebanon, Israel and the United States on a draft 
Lebanese-Israeli peace treaty.
1983
i^ ril: The Iranian Pasdaran expands from Ba'albek into Beirut.
April 18: An Hizb'allah car-bombing of the US embassy in West Beirut results in 69 deaths.
May 17: Israel signs the Lebanese-Israeli peace treaty after the Lebanese parliament adopts it by 
sixty-four votes to two.
September 4: IDF withdraw from the Schouf mountains east of Beirut to southern Lebancxi. Fighting 
between Druze-PLO elements and the Lebanese army leads to US and French intervention in support of the 
Lebanese army.
October 23: A twin-suicide attack by the Hizb'allah against the US and French military headquarters 
of MNF contingents results in the death of 241 US Marines and 58 French soldiers.
November 4: A Hizb'allah suicide-attack against the IDF headquarters in Tyre results in 60 deaths.
November 17: French military bomb the Sheikh Abdallah barracks in Ba'albek in retaliation for the 
suicide attacks against their headquarters.
November 23: Lebanon severs diplomatic relations with Iran after attacks by the Iranian Pasdaran on 
the remaining Lebanese am^ presence in the Biq'a.
December: Three members of the Lebanese al-Da'wa are arrested for the series of bombings in Kuwait 
(December 12), most notably against American and French targets. Two of the arrested are closely 
related to leading Islamic Amal and Hizb'allali members.
1984
February 7: The United States announces the redeployment of its Marines to American warships in the 
Mediterranean from Lebanon. France, Britain and Italy also mthdraw from Lebanon.
February 16: Sheikh Raghib Harb, the Imam of the village of Jibshit in southern Lebanon, is
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assassinated by unidentified gunmen. Hizb’allah blames Israel and Sheikh Harb becomes a central figure 
in the movement's martyrology, known as the "sheikh of the martyrs".
Mardi 5: Lebanese parliament abrogates the May 17-agreement between Lebanon and Israel.
September 20: A Hizb’allah suicide car-bomb attack against the U.S. Bnbassy Annexe in East Beirut 
results in 23 deaths and 60 injuries.
1985
February 16: At a meeting in Shyah in the southern suburb of Beirut, Hizb'allah publicly announces for 
the first time its ideological prograirme and strategy in a manifesto entitled "Text of Open Letter 
Addressed by Hizb Allah to the Down-trodden in Lebanon and the World". Hizb'allah also appears for the 
first time as a unified organisation with a œinnand leadership.
March 8: A car-bomb planted by Lebanese intelligence, in cooperation with CIA, fail to kill 
Hizb'allah's spiritual leader, Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, near his residence in the Bir al- 
'Abed quarter in the southern suburbs of Beirut, but leads to 80 deaths and 200 injured.
June 6: Israel caipletes it's military withdrawal from Lebanon.
June 14: Hizb'allah operatives. Hassan Iz el-Din and Muhammad Ali Hamadi, hijack TWA 847 with 39 
American passengers. The hijacking ends on June 30 after Syrian and Iranian intervention.
1986
February 17: Two IDF soldiers, Joseph Fink and Rahamim Levi Alsheikh, are kidnapped while patrolling 
the security area between Bint Jbeil and Beit Yahiin by Hizb'allah men loyal to Sheikh Abbas al-Musam 
and Slieikh Obeid.
May 28: The Majlis al-Shura [Consultative Council], the supreme decision-making body of the Hizb'allah 
adjoumes for the first time.
Nbventer 3: Beirut-based magazine, al-Shira, reveals that the US government has secretly sold arms to 
Iran and that former US National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane, has visit Iran. The source of the 
information is Ayatollah Montazeri's representative in Lebanon, Sheikh Ismail al-Khaliq, a leading 
Hizb'allah cleric.
1987
January 15: Muhammad Ali Hammadi is arrested in Frankfurt, West Germany, and the Hizb'allah retaliate 
in Lebanon with an unprecedented wave of abduction of foreigners.
February 22: Syrian military Intervention into West Beirut to restore order.
February 24: Syrian military Idlls 23 Hizb'allah members in the Bas ta district of Beirut.
June 16: Hizb'allah-Amal clashes in Beirut.
1988
February 17: Amal-Hizb'allah clashes after the abduction of Lt.Col. William Higgins, the American 
Clrief of UNTSO, by Hizb'allali's Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi.
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April: Heavy armed clashes between Amal and Hizb’allah in southern Lebanon.
i^ ril 4: Amal attacks Hizb’allah’s positions in the Nabatiya area and captures the area in battles 
resulting in over 51 deaths and 130 injured. Amal expelled Hizb’allah menbers to Biq'a.
%ril 5-17: Hizb'allah hijack a Kuwaiti aircraft, KU 422, and demands the release of the al-Da'wa 
prisoners in Kuwait.
May 6: Hizb'allah initiates warfare against Amal in Beirut. Within three days, Hizb’allah captures 
central and southern parts of Beirut. The fighting results in over 525 casualties on both sides.
May 28: Ceasefire agreement between Anml and Hizb'allah. Ikider the agreement, Syrian troops are 
deployed throughout the southern suburbs; all militia offices are converted into political offices; 
Hizb'allah is allowed to remain armed and maintain its Hay al-Mahdi barracks and military presence 
along the Green Line with East Beirut; and most of Syrian troops to be gradually withdrawn and 
replaced by Lebanese internal security forces. Hizb'allah dispatches its armed forces to Sidon in 
order to challenge Amal's control over southern Lebanon.
December 15: Sheikh Javad Kafsi, operational officer in the Believer's Resistance îfovement, and four 
of his colleagues are kidnapped by Israeli military units in the village of Jibshit in an Israeli 
effort to trade him for the missing Israeli soldiers.
1989
January: Mustafa Dirani, the former head of Amal's security service defects to Hizb'allah.
January 30: An agreement between Amal and Hizb'allah announced after Iranian-Syrian diplomatic efforts 
which recognizes Amal's authority over the security of southern Lebanon while Hizb'allah is permitted 
to conduct only nonmilitary activity.
March 14: General Michel Aoun declares a "war of liberation" against Syria.
July 28: Sheikh Abd al-Karim Obeid, a senior Hizb'allah cleric and regional military commander of the 
Islamic Resistance, is abducted by elité Israeli military units from his home in the village of 
Jibshit.
October: A major Hizb'allah meeting takes place to confront challenges presented by the death of 
Ayatollah Khomayyni in Iran and to a post-militia phase of Lebanese politics with the Ta'if accord. 
Factionalism is revealed within the clerical leadership of the organization. Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli 
assumes control over the organisation as Secretary-General.
October 22: The National Reconciliation Charter (Ta'if agreement) approved by the Lebanese MBs in
Ta'if, Saudi Arabia.
December 7: Amal-Hizb’allah clashes resimie in Beirut.
December 23: Amal-Hizb'allah clashes in the Iqlim al-Touffah area southeast of Sidon which killed at 
least 23 fighters,
1990
October 31: Cease-fire agreement between Amal and Hizb'allali.
November 5: Amal and Hizb'allali sign a peace agreement after Iranian-Syrian diplomatic efforts. On
November 10, all Lebanese militias are withdraw from Beirut. Hizb'allali redeploy their military frcm 
Beirut to the Biq'a.
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1991
April 21: An agrément between Syria and Iran permits the Hizb'allah to remain armed as a resistance 
movement while all other militias are disarmed in accordance with implementation of the Ta'if 
agreement.
May 22: Syria and Lebanon sign a Treaty of Brotherhood, Co-operation and Co-ordination.
May 23: Sheikh Abbas al-^ kisawi is elected Secretary-General of the Hizb'allah and Sheikh Ibrahim al- 
Amin as his deputy.
August 6 - December 5: A comprehensive hostage-exchange under the auspices of the Ikiited Nations leads 
to the complete release of Western hostages.
1992
February 16: Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi is assassinated in an Israeli helibome attack after he and other 
high-ranking Hizb'allah officials attend an annual memorial service in the village of Jibshit in order 
to mark the eight anniversary of the death of Sheikh Raghib Harb.
February 18: Hizb'allah announces the unanimous election of SheiWi Hassan Nasserallah as the new 
Secretary-General of the movement.
August 23 - September 6: Hizb'allah participates in the Lebanese parliamentary elections and wins 
eight seats out of 128.
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